Confederation of Sahel States — a new integration alliance of the countries of «global South» (legal aspects)

Chetverikov Artem Olegovich Doctor of Law Professor; Department of Integration and European Law; Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution 'Kutafin Moscow State Law University (MSAL)' 123001, Russia, Moscow, Sadovaya-Kudrinskaya str., 9 rossija-artem@rambler.ru Other publications by this author

"Before our eyes, the African continent is becoming a new center of power. Its political and economic role is growing exponentially. And everyone will have to reckon with this objective reality": Russia-Africa Summit, July 28, 2023 — statement by the President of the Russian Federation {Russia-Africa Summit. July 28, 2023 [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of application: 30.07.2024)}

Introduction

Africa is not only the cradle of humanity. Being the birthplace of two of the world's oldest integration alliances, the African continent, according to the Director General of the World Trade Organization (2005-2013) P. Lamy, acts as "one of the harbingers of the regional integration movement", which today has spread around the globe ^{[1, p. 1]}. We are talking about:

1. The East African Community, the successor to the Customs Union formed in 1917 between Kenya and Uganda, at that time British protectorates ^{[2, p. 25]} (as of 2024, the East African Community covers eight states: the Republic of Burundi, the Republic of Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Rwanda, the Federal Republic of Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Uganda, Republic of South Sudan) {East African Community. History of the EAC. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (accessed: 30.07.2024); East African Community. Partner States. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of application: 30.07.2024)};

2. The South African Customs Union, whose historical roots stretch even deeper — in 1889 ^{[3, p. 146]} (now includes five countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Eswatini, South Africa) {History of SACU. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024); Member States. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

After decolonization (mid-20th century), Africa became a global leader in the number of integration structures uniting its countries, ahead of other parts of the world in this regard. They exist on a continent—wide scale: the Organization of African Unity (since 1963), then the African Union (since 2002). Even more of them were created at the level of individual African regions and subregions - largely with the same goals, not always with easily distinguishable names and with overlapping composition of member States. Thus, in Eastern and Southern Africa, in addition to the East African Community and the South African Customs Union, there is an Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community; the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, etc. function between the Central African States ^[4-5].

Quantity, however, does not always translate into quality. Of course, it cannot be argued that Africa has absolutely nothing to boast about. African integration alliances can rightfully be proud of achievements in some important areas that their counterparts on other continents of the globe could envy. For example, in the context of the formation of a "common financial market" provided for by the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, the experience of the member states of the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa - SEMAK (French. CEMAK), and the West African Economic and Monetary Union — UEMOA, formed in the late XX — early XXI centuries. They have unified banking and exchange spaces under the control of supranational financial regulators ^{[6, pp. 12-64]}).

Nevertheless, the overall effect of African integration is still very modest, and the unification projects embedded in the texts of their constituent and other documents often remain on paper, turning into a project (however, this is not unique to Africa). What, for example, are the fantastic plans from the very beginning to merge the economic systems of African countries into a single national economic complex over three decades, as provided for in the 1991 Treaty establishing the African Economic Community ("The community will be gradually formed during a transition period of a maximum of thirty—four (34) years" - Article 6 "The Procedure Community Formation"). According to these plans, an "African common market" should be operating on the continent today, which is about to complement the "pan-African economic and monetary union", implying "the creation of an African central bank, as well as a single African currency" {Union africaine: Traité institution la Communauté économique africaine. Adoptée le 3 June 1991 Abuja, Nigeria. Entrée en vigueur le 12 Mai 1994. P. 24. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 05/19/2024)}.

In real life, according to such a fundamental indicator reflecting the mutual integration of national economies as the volume of trade turnover, the export supplies of African states to each other now account for only about 16% of their foreign trade. This gave reason to the President of the Republic of South Africa, S. Ramaphosa, to regretfully state: "African countries trade with the rest of the world, but their trade among themselves is limited" ^[7].

The idea of building the United States of Africa looks even more utopian, which inspired the thoughts of the architects of the Organization of African Unity in the 20th century ^[8] and, with the advent of the 21st century, was again raised to the shield in the program acts of the African Union on the initiative of the head of Libya (1969 — 2011) M. Gaddafi:

"Convinced that the ultimate goal of the African Union is to create a United States of Africa with a Union Government, as outlined by the founding fathers of the Organization of African Unity" - The Accra Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union of July 3, 2007 {Déclaration d'accra. Doc. № Assembly/AU/Decl. 2 (IX). [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

Despite the failures of the past, the problems of the present and the challenges that African States will repeatedly face in the future (coups d'etat, civil wars and territorial disputes turning into military clashes; low standard of living of the population and high corruption of the administrative apparatus; terrorist threats; epidemics; climate change, etc.), the increasing role of Africa in world affairs, which promises to become one of the main trends of the 21st century, encourages the leaders of these states to seek new forms of unification that can bring them closer to prosperity and increase their combined weight in the global economy and politics, not in words, but in deeds.

In the context of economic integration, the main hopes today are pinned on the project of the African Continental Free Trade Area (not only for goods, but also for services), which almost all countries of the continent have agreed to enter: The Agreement on the Establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area was concluded on March 21, 2018 and entered into force on February 5, 2021; by the end of 2023, the document signed by 54 of the 55 member States of the African Union, ratified by 47 {Union africaine: Accord établissant la zone de libre-échange continentale africaine. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

In the context of political integration, attempts to unite fifty socio-economically and ethno-culturally diverse and disunited States by federal and even confederate ties to the United States of Africa at once are doomed to failure in the foreseeable future. Progress in this direction is obviously possible only in narrower, more compact formats (the same applies to full-scale economic integration, which is not limited to the elimination of interstate trade barriers). There has also been progress here recently in at least two African regions.

1. Confirming the commitment to the goal of creating a "political federation" in East Africa, which is legally fixed in the current founding treaty of the East African Community in 1999 ^[9], the heads of its member States, in order to put the federalization process into practice, decided in 2017 to first form an East African "political confederation":

"The Heads of State accepted the political confederation as a transitional model of the East African Political Federation and instructed <...> prepare a constitution for a political confederation" — paragraph 9 of the Joint Communique of the Eighteenth Ordinary Summit of Heads of State of the East African Community on May 20, 2017. {Joint Communiqué: 18th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State of the East African Community. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

2. In these endeavors, the leaders of the three states of the western flank of the African continent outstripped their East African colleagues by signing on July 6, 2024, an agreement on the unification of their countries into the Confederation of Sahel States, the legal aspects of the structure and functioning of which this article is devoted to.

Historical and geographical excursion

Burkina Faso (translated from the national languages of the indigenous population — "Land of honest people"), the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Niger are countries that have a long common border and belong together:

on the one hand, to the West Africa region (as such, they are part of the above—mentioned West African Economic and Monetary Union — UEMOA, which has 8 members, with a common banking, exchange space and, most importantly, a single supranational currency - the CFA franc, which is planned to be renamed eco in the future; until recently At that time, they also consisted of a broader composition — 15 states — the Economic Community of West African Countries, briefly ECOWAS, from the English ECOWAS, within which, along with economic integration projects that are not as advanced as in UEMOA, a peacekeeping mechanism was created that legalizes collective military operations in crisis situations ^[10]);

on the other hand, the Sahel natural and climatic zone (from the Arabic "coast", "coast", "border"; the Sahel is a drought-prone tropical savanna belt between the Sahara Desert in North Africa and the wetter and more fertile lands adjacent to the equator; in total, 10-11 belong to the Sahel African states from Senegal to the west to Sudan to the east ^{[11, p. 4; 12, p. 1404]}; the countries of the Sahara and Sahel, taken together, a total of 29, are members of the Community of Saharan-Sahel States, which is recognized as one of the regional economic communities within the African Union, but does not have any there have been significant integration achievements).

To clarify the prerequisites for the emergence of the Confederation of Sahel States and the strength of the bonds that unite its members, the common historical fate of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger plays no less a role than the geographical factor, namely, belonging:

previously, it belonged to the French Colonial Empire (hence the common state language — French, and similar legislation that absorbed the traditions of French law);

then and to this day — to the so-called "Francafrica", i.e. the zone of influence of the former metropolis over the de jure lost colonies, which de facto remain, now as nominally sovereign states, under French neocolonial patronage (including military presence and control over natural resources) ^{[13, 14]}.

The coups d'etat that took place in 2021-2023 in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — an event not uncommon in the life of African countries - brought to power military regimes (which consider themselves transitional), which proclaimed a course to weaken dependence on France, while simultaneously striving to develop relations with Russia, primarily in the military sphere and in the fight against terrorism. "It is becoming obvious," domestic Africanist experts conclude, "that privileged cooperation with France in the Western and Central regions of Africa is being curtailed and successfully refocused on strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. Thus, thanks to Russia's assistance in improving the combat capability of the Malian army, training military personnel and law enforcement officers in Mali, tangible progress has been made in countering the terrorist threat. At the same time, it should be noted that France's military presence there for almost nine years as part of Operation Barkhan has not been crowned with serious success in the fight against terrorists. Similar sentiments of a "turn" towards the Russian side are observed in Burkina Faso, where a military coup took place on September 30, 2022" ^{[15, p. 25]}.

After the coup in Niger on July 26, 2023, this country found itself facing a military intervention supported by France and carried out under the auspices of ECOWAS. In response, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger jointly announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS on January 28, 2024 {Communiqué conjoint du Burkina Faso, de la République du Mali et de la République du Niger: Les trois pays décident de leur retrait sans délai de la CEDEAO // Office National d' edition et de Presse. Le Sahel. 28 janvier 2024. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

Even earlier, on September 16, 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger laid the first stone in the building of their trilateral confederate union with the obligation to assist each other in case of aggression from abroad, creating the Alliance of Sahel States (French. Alliance des Etats du Sahel). On July 6, 2024, the confederate union acquired its final (by today) organizational and legal form and its modern name - the Confederation of Sahel States (French. Confédération des Etats du Sahel), while retaining the old designation, however, only in the form of an abbreviation (in full: Confederation of Sahel States; abbreviated: Confederation or AGS — French. AES; this article uses only the first version of the abbreviated name).

Our historical and geographical excursion would be incomplete if we did not mention another fact that preceded the creation of the Confederation of Sahel States and is important for understanding its modern legal status, even more so its future prospects:

The tripartite integration of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger is by no means a phenomenon of today and not a whim of their current military regimes. The movement in this direction began almost immediately after their independence, back in 1970, when, at the initiative of the United Nations, the Body for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gurma States was created (French. Autorité de Développement Intégré des Etats du Liptako-Gourma) ^[16].

The Body for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gurma States was originally intended for the collective development of natural resources and socio-economic development (including with the involvement of international financial sources) only of the common border region of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger - the Liptako—Gurma region (hence the name), but in the XXI century. his activities were spread over their entire territory.

After the creation of the Alliance, then the Confederation of Sahel States, the Body for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gurma States did not cease to exist. So far, it continues to function as an independent integration structure with the same composition of Member States. In the future, it will probably be legally linked to the new Confederation or incorporated into its structure (see the next section).

Legal status

Constituent documents. The Confederation of Sahel States has been established and operates (at least at the first stage) on the basis of the provisions of two international treaties.

1. The first and main (according to the chronology of the second) — interstate (subject to ratification by the Member States) The Treaty establishing the Confederation of Sahel States (AGC), signed on July 6, 2024 in the capital of Niger, Niamey; further briefly: the Treaty of Niamey 2024 {Traité portant création de la Confédération des Etats du Sahel (AES). [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

In the originally signed form (before the adoption of additional protocols, which are scheduled to be concluded later) The Niamey Treaty of 2004 consists of a preamble defining the reasons and objectives for the creation of the Confederation, and the main part (thirty-one articles, nine sections), which states:

the general legal framework of the Confederation is the conceptual framework, principles, competence, prohibition of unilateral reservations by member States, etc. (section I "Definitions", section II "On creation, principles and areas of competence", section VII "On dispute resolution", section VIII "On international treaties and agreements", section IX "Other and final provisions");

the organizational mechanism of the Confederation, the presence of which differs from its prototype — the Alliance of Sahel States, which did not have its own bodies (section III "On the organization of the Confederation", section IV "On the College of Heads of State of the Confederation", section V "On the Confederal sessions of the Council of Ministers", section VI "On the Confederal sessions of Parliaments").

2. The status of the constituent document of the Confederation, although inferior in force to the Treaty of Niamey in 2024 (since it was concluded earlier and as an intergovernmental agreement applied without ratification), retains the treaty that initiated the process of its formation as an Alliance of Sahel States: the Liptako-Gurma Charter on the Establishment of an Alliance of Sahel States between Burkina Faso andBurkina Faso, the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Niger, signed on September 16, 2023 in the capital of Mali, Bamako; then briefly: The Charter of Liptako-Gourma 2023 {Charte du Liptako-Gourma institutionant l'Alliance des Etats du Sahel entre le Burkina Faso, la République du Mali, la République du Niger. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

The Liptako-Gurma Charter of 2023 (preamble and 17 articles):

It acts as a preliminary agreement that laid down the program of action, the implementation of which was the Niamey Treaty of 2024 (we are talking, first of all, about Article 3 of the Charter, according to which the member states "will further create the bodies necessary for the functioning and future mechanisms of the Alliance, and determine the order of its functioning," which Niameysky did the 2024 agreement);

It enshrines the obligations of the member States, which are of fundamental importance for the Alliance, now the Confederation, to combat crime and protect against external aggression, which will be discussed below; these obligations were not included in the text of the Niamey Treaty of 2024 (possibly later they will be transferred to one of the additional protocols to it) and continue to have their source in the Charter Liptako-Gurma 2023, to which Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger declared their commitment during the transformation of the Alliance into a Confederation ("Confirming their commitment to the Charter of Liptako-Gurma on the Establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AGS)" - the preamble of the Treaty of Niamey 2024).

Member States and conditions of membership. At the time of its creation, the Confederation of Sahel States included three countries with a total population of about 70 million people (Burkina Faso - 21,751,000 million, Niger — 26,803,275, Mali — 20,250,833 ^{[17, p. 4]}), called in the Treaty of Niamey 2024 "member States" or "the Confederated States" (French. Etats confédérés); the 2023 Liptako-Gourmet Charter uses the designations "member countries", "Parties", "Contracting Parties", which are also still in force.

The 2024 Treaty of Niamey does not contain provisions on the right of member States to withdraw from the Confederation, as well as on the entry of new States into it. If we proceed from the Liptako-Gurma Charter of 2023 (Articles 11, 14), where such provisions are available, then any member State may leave the Confederation by denouncing the constituent documents, which will enter into force six months after notification of it. In turn, "any other state located in similar geographical, political, socio-cultural realities, which accepts the goals of the Alliance," now a Confederation, can join.

A potential invitation to join the Confederation of new member states is the recognition of not only French but also English as its languages, which may indicate a willingness to see former colonies and dependent territories of other European powers, primarily Great Britain, in its composition (it is significant that in Article 22 of the Treaty of Niamey 2024, English and French They are called only the "working languages" of the Confederation; the "official languages" of the Confederation should be only the "national languages of the member States", the list of which is entrusted to its supreme governing body to determine).

Membership in the Confederation does not require the member States to renounce sovereignty, but entails restrictions on sovereign rights in matters of both foreign and domestic policy. Namely, each Member State:

Retains independence and sovereignty only to the extent that its competence is not delegated to the Confederation (see below);

Undertakes not to conclude international treaties that run counter to the principles and objectives on the basis of which the Confederation was created ("Each confederated State may conclude international agreements in accordance with its constitutional norms, without prejudice to the principles and objectives of this Treaty" — Article 21 of the Treaty of Niamey 2021).

Joining and staying in the Confederation implies the fulfillment by the member States of a set of conditions that are set out in its constituent documents in the form of several groups of obligations.

1. The first, most general and fundamental group of conditions (obligations) are the fundamental principles that apply equally to the member States and to the Confederation as a whole in the person of its bodies, which will be discussed below (Article 3 of the Treaty of Niamey 2024):

respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States (any, not only those belonging to the Confederation);

inadmissibility of aggression between the confederated States;

prohibition of any coercive measure;

solidarity between the confederated States;

protection and protection of the interests of the population.

2. The second group of conditions is the general obligations of the Member States for the development of cooperation and integration (Article 5 of the Niamey Treaty of 2024), namely, obligations:

to cooperate on defense and security issues through agreements in order to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity;

Coordinate diplomatic activities through a shared vision and common policy on major geopolitical issues;

cooperate on issues of economic and financial progress, seeking to implement structured investments;

to promote the integration of peoples, contributing to the achievement of free movement of persons, goods and services, as well as the realization of the right of residence and establishment (enterprises, etc.) in the confederal space;

Create common institutions;

to prohibit any coercive measure that is capable of having a negative impact on the population, the stability of State power and solidarity between the confederated States.

3. The third group of conditions includes the individual obligations of each Member State to protect law and order, sovereignty and territorial integrity. As already noted, these obligations are still enshrined in the Liptako-Gurma Charter of 2023, which established the predecessor of the Confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States:

the obligation to "fight terrorism in all its forms and organized crime in the common space of the Alliance", now the Confederation (Article 4 of the Charter of Liptako-Gurma 2023);

the obligation to counteract "any armed uprising or any threat encroaching on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each of the member countries of the Alliance, giving preference to peaceful and diplomatic means, and, if necessary, use force to cope with situations of violation of peace and stability" (Article 5 of the Charter of Liptako-Gurma 2023).

4. The logical complement to the previous group of conditions is the principle of collective self—defense ("one for all - all for one"), which from the very beginning was the basis of the Alliance, now the Confederation of Sahel States and acts as a typical element of the legal structure of confederate unions of the past, as well as military blocs of the present (NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization In the constituent documents of the Confederation of Sahel States, the principle of collective self-defense is set out as follows:

"Any encroachment on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more Contracting Parties will be considered as aggression against other Parties and will entail the obligation of assistance and assistance from all Parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain security in the space of the Alliance [now the Confederation — Author]" (art. 6 The Liptako-Gurma Charter of 2023), bearing in mind that "Aggression referred to in Article 6 also implies any attack on the defense and security forces of one or more Contracting Parties, including when such forces are deployed on national territory or in a theater of military operations outside the Alliance space [now the Confederation — Auth.], any attack anywhere on ships or aircraft of one or more Parties" (Article 7 of the Charter of Liptako-Gurma 2023).

5. Having pledged to jointly counteract external aggression, the member States of the Confederation simultaneously forbade themselves to use force against each other. The prohibition on the use of force in relations between member States is included in the list of fundamental principles of the Confederation, enshrined in Article 3 of the Treaty of Niamey 2024 ("inadmissibility of aggression between confederated States" — see above). In the Charter of Liptako-Gurma 2023 (Article 8), it is specified in the form of the following list of prohibited actions (including with respect to third states, i.e. countries that are not members of the Confederation):

"The parties undertake to:

not to resort among themselves to the threat, use of force or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of any Party;

not to blockade ports, roads, coast or strategic infrastructure of any Party with the help of the armed forces;

not to commit an attack or aggression against another Party or third States from the territory placed at the disposal of one Party;

do not allow paramilitary groups, irregular military formations or mercenaries from the territory of one Side to carry out an attack against any country covered by the Charter."

6. Finally, the member States of the Confederation are subject to a financial obligation to pay the contributions necessary for its functioning (Article 10 of the Charter of Liptako-Gurma 2023), the amount and payment procedure of which have yet to be determined.

The organizational mechanism. The organizational mechanism of the Confederation (also in its original form) includes three instances, which, on the one hand, are typical for pre-existing confederate unions and for modern international (intergovernmental) organizations of sovereign states, on the other hand, from the point of view of the distribution of roles and decision-making powers, reflect the peculiarities of the forms of government and political regimes of most African countries. countries (strong presidential power):

1. The Board of Heads of State consisting of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Member States; the heads (presidents) of the Member States who are members of the Board, alternately, for a period of one year, hold the post of President of the Confederation (French. Président de la Confédération).

In the Treaty of Niamey 2024 (Articles 7-9, 11), the College of Heads of State is qualified as the "highest authority of the Confederation", which "gives impetus to the vision and determines the content of the confederal policy on defense, security, diplomacy and development." The Collegium of Heads of State makes all its decisions on the basis of unanimity, and if the decisions are of a "normative nature", then their application in the Member States as a precondition presupposes "their adoption into the internal legal order according to the procedures existing in each State" (lack of direct action);

2. The confederal sessions of the Council of Ministers are meetings of "ministers responsible for foreign affairs, ministers responsible for defense, and ministers responsible for coordinating development issues" (Article 12 of the Niamey Treaty of 2024); The Confederal sessions of the Council of Ministers are chaired by the President of the Confederation, who has the right to delegate the presidency to the Prime Minister of his as with other bodies of the Confederation, the procedure for convening and holding Confederal sessions of the Council of Ministers should be determined by the "internal regulations" adopted at the first session;

3. The confederal sessions of parliaments include representatives elected in equal numbers by the national parliaments of the Member States; these representatives bear the title of "confederal deputy"; the exact quantitative parameters and the order of election should be determined by the additional protocol to the Treaty of Niamey 2024.

The confederal sessions of parliaments are an advisory body. The Niamey Treaty of 2024 (Articles 14, 19) provides that "issues of common interest of the Confederation" are discussed at them. The subject of discussion may also be "any issues that are important to the Confederation in the fields of defense, security, diplomacy and development," as well as "any other relevant issue of interest to the life of the Confederation." The acts adopted as a result of the discussion — resolutions and recommendations — are sent to the President of the Confederation and have "consultative force", i.e. they are not legally binding.

As noted above when describing the conditions of states' membership in the Confederation, one of their common obligations is the obligation to "create common institutions" (Article 5 of the Treaty of Niamey 2024). It follows that the design of the organizational mechanism of the Confederation is not limited to the Collegium of Heads of State, Confederal sessions of the Council of Ministers, Confederal sessions of Parliaments and is further subject to expansion beyond by creating other instances, including specialized ones (bodies operating in certain areas of competence of the Confederation).

The decision to create two such instances was taken by the heads of the member states of the Confederation simultaneously with the signing of the Treaty of Niamey 2024. {Communiqué final du Premier sommet des Chefs d'etat de l'Alliance des Etats du Sahel, Niamey le 6 juillet 2024. [Electronic resource] - Access mode: (date of appeal: 30.07.2024).}. This is a common Investment bank and a common Stabilization fund, the status of which is entrusted to be jointly determined by the national Ministers of Foreign Affairs and ministers responsible for coordinating development issues (paragraph 18 of the Communique of the Summit on July 6, 2024).

At the summit meeting on July 6, 2024, the Presidents of the Member States also confirmed the joint decision of their military chiefs of Staff on March 6-7, 2024 to create a Joint Force of the Sahel States (French. Force unifiée des Etats du Sahel), which "have as their task the implementation on an ongoing basis of a tripartite plan to combat armed terrorist groups, transnational organized crime and other threats faced by these countries" (paragraph 13 of the Communique of the Summit on July 6, 2024).

Competence. Similar to the confederate associations that existed in the past (see conclusion) and the supranational integration associations of our time (the Eurasian Economic Union, the European Union, etc.), the constituent documents of the Confederation of Sahel States provide that its member States:

on the one hand, they maintain "their independence and their sovereignty";

on the other hand, they refuse to single—handedly resolve some issues of domestic and foreign policy, transferring them to the level of the Confederation, which for this purpose is endowed with competence - "competence delegated to the Confederation" (Article 4 of the Niamey Treaty of 2024; see the full text in the conclusion of this article).

At the same time, the Confederation is bound by a ban on taking measures legalizing military or other forceful influence on any of its member States: "No legal instrument and no act of the Confederation can authorize the use of force against a confederated state" (Article 23 of the Treaty of Niamey 2024).

With regard to the spheres of competence (subjects of reference) of the Confederation, the Niamey Treaty of 2024 departs from the purely defensive (including anti-terrorist) vision of integration processes, which the member States were initially guided by when creating its predecessor, the Alliance of Sahel States ("This Charter aims to establish an architecture of collective defense and mutual assistance for the Contracting Parties Parties" — Article 2 of the Charter of Liptako-Gurma 2023).

From now on, according to Article 4 of the Niamey Treaty of 2024:

"The competence delegated to the Confederation is in the following areas:

defense and security;

diplomacy;

development.

The Additional Protocol defines competence at the confederal level in each of the spheres, if necessary."

As follows from the quoted provision, the Confederation of Sahel States remains, first of all, a military and diplomatic union, and in this, in fact, does not differ from the previously existing confederate entities. At the same time, the addition of "development" issues to the competence of the Confederation, the concept of which is not defined, and therefore allows for a wide interpretation, allows its bodies to be empowered to address an almost unlimited range of issues in all areas of public life (socio-economic and scientific and technological development, development of culture, education, medicine, sports, etc. etc.).

What will be the exact content and scope of the Confederation's competence; in what order will it be implemented (in particular, will there be other specialized bodies besides those already planned to create an Investment Bank and a Stabilization Fund); will the Confederation's bodies on certain issues receive the authority to act over the heads of the member states (issue acts directly to citizens and legal entities) or, as it is envisaged today for its highest body, the Conference of Heads of State, any confederal decisions having a "normative character" for application to citizens and legal entities will first be subject to transformation into national legal institutions?

Additional protocols to the Treaty of Niamey 2024 are designed to answer these and other questions, which then, taking into account practical experience, can be amended and supplemented, including those aimed at further expanding the competence of the Confederation (according to Articles 25-27 of the Treaty of Niamey 2024, additional protocols — as well as the Treaty itself and amendments to it — in order to enter into force, they need to be ratified by all Member States).

When preparing additional protocols, the member States of the Confederation, among other things, will have to decide on the future status of the previously established trilateral integration alliance, the Body for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gurma States (see above, historical and geographical digression).

In accordance with the founding document of this Body in the latest edition — the Revised Agreement on the Body for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gurma States (OLG) dated January 24, 2017; further briefly: The 2017 Agreement {Traité révisé de l'Autorité de développement intégré des Etats du. Liptako-Gourma (ALG). [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of appeal: 30.07.2024)} — The Confederation of Sahel States and the Liptako-Gurma Integrated Development Authority have partially overlapping subject competence, including addressing security issues of the member States (The Authority "carries out its activities in three main areas: poverty reduction, sustainable development and strengthening security" — Article 7 of the 2017 Treaty).

The organizational mechanisms also partially coincide: according to Articles 11-20 of the 2017 Treaty, the Body is headed by a Conference consisting of heads of Member States or their representatives and a Council at the level of authorized national Ministers, i.e. analogues, although not full equivalents, of the Conference of Heads of State and the Confederal Sessions of the Council of Ministers of the Confederation of Sahel States.

At the same time, the Body has a permanent administrative apparatus, which the Confederation does not yet have — the Executive Committee. Due to this, the Body, in particular, can perform the functions of an "executive agency and an authorized contractor" in the implementation of investment and other projects aimed at the joint development of the member States (Articles 8, 21-29 of the 2017 Treaty).

Will the Body for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gurma States be preserved and, if so, in what form after its member States have united into a more ambitious Confederation in terms of goals and broader competence? The discussion of this issue began almost immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Niamey in 2024. {12e Conférence Extraordinaire en ligne des ministres de l'Autorité du Développement Intégré des Etats du Liptako-Gourma (ALG). [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

Various solutions are possible: from the liquidation of the Body with the reproduction of its competence by the additional protocol to the Treaty of Niamey 2024 as an integral part of the competence of the Confederation to the preservation of the Body as an independent legal entity, whose work should be linked to the achievement of the goals of the Confederation.

By way of comparison, we note that dualism, even the multiplicity of integration structures involving the same states, is not an unprecedented phenomenon in the practice of international integration. For example, the member states of the modern European Union - the EU, in the 50s — 60s of the XX century. carried out integration activities within the framework of three European Communities: one general economic (European Economic Community — EEC) and two sectoral (European Coal and Steel Community — ECSC, European Atomic Energy Community — Euratom) which, although not immediately, received a unified system of governing bodies (the Commission of the European Communities, now the European Commission, etc.).

In the 90s of the XX century. The European Communities complemented, but did not replace, the European Union with the same composition of member States. In the 21st century, the situation has simplified, although not completely: the member states, in parallel with the EU, continue to develop integration in the field of atomic energy within Euratom, which retains the quality of a separate legal personality with its own legal personality, including in the international arena, but is subordinate to the EU authorities, as indicated in its founding treaty ^{[18, pp. 66-100]}.

In the case of the Confederation of Sahel States, one thing is still obvious: its member States do not intend to abandon the legacy of the Liptako-Gurma Integrated Development Authority, and this position is directly fixed by them in the constituent documents of the Confederation ("Faithful to the goals and ideals of the Liptako-Gurma Integrated Development Authority" - preamble of the Liptako-Gurma Charter 2023).

Conclusion

It has long been noted that the confederation is a transitional form of state unification, which "everywhere tends to disappear and be replaced by a federal state or even a unitary state" ^{[19, p. 760]}.

Members of the confederate alliances in the past were the lands of the Federal Republic of Germany and the cantons of the Swiss Confederation, today the federation (the word "Confederation" in the name of the latter is only a tribute to historical memory).

The provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (a unitary state) in the XVI — XVIII centuries consisted of the Republic of the United Provinces, also known as the Dutch States-General by the name of its highest collegial body, which is also usually classified as a confederation ^{[20, p. 245; 21, p. 95]} (there is, however, another point of view considering the Republic of the United States provinces as a hybrid entity with elements of both confederation and federation ^{[22, p. 8]}).

The states, i.e. the member states, passed through the confederation to the federation The United States of America — the United States, whose founding document laid down the basic principle of the confederate structure of the United States in almost the same terms as it is done today in the Confederation of Sahel States (is it not a question of textual borrowing by the authors of the Niamey Treaty of 2024, about the reception of law?):

The Treaty on the Establishment of the Confederation of Sahel States (AGS) — the Treaty of Niamey 2024

Article 4

"Each of the confederated States retains its independence and sovereignty, with the exception of the competence delegated to the Confederation."

Articles of Confederation of the USA 1777

Article II

"Each state retains its sovereignty, its freedom and its independence and any kind of authority, jurisdiction and law that this Confederation [refers to the states in the person of their legislative assemblies — Auth.] are not directly delegated to the United States assembled at the Congress" {Articles of confederation. [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

The confederations of the past have, to put it mildly, not quite a good reputation as ineffective management structures due to the absence of permanent central bodies endowed with real authority and capable, on occasion, of using force against Member States that violate general legal regulations. For example, here is what modern American lawyers write about the confederate structure of the United States:

"Initially, the Articles of Confederation as a viable plan for governing the country were doomed to failure. Indeed, they did not provide for any really ruling national government — only one Congress of State Representatives [unlike the modern bicameral Congress as the federal parliament of the United States, its confederal prototype was composed of delegates appointed by the legislative assemblies of the states and freely recalled by the latter — Ed.]. When the Congress was not in session, the executive power had to be exercised by committees established by the Congress. Moreover, although the Articles of Confederation granted a number of powers to Congress, this authority could actually act in the most important areas only with the consent of 9 of the 13 states [then part of the United States — Ed.]. Unanimous approval was required to amend the Articles of Confederation themselves. In the Articles of Confederation, the states pledged to comply with the decisions of Congress, but Congress was not vested with the power to enforce its decisions. He could only ask the states to obey their decisions. <...> As George Washington [commander-in-chief of the American army in the War of independence from Great Britain and, later, the first president of the federal United States] once noted, the Articles of Confederation tied the states together with a “rope made of sand" ^{[23, pp. 46-47]}.

However, confederations also had (and obviously still have) attractive features: otherwise, this form would have already been consigned to oblivion. First, the creation of confederations is traditionally accompanied by the transfer of foreign policy issues (defense against a common enemy and diplomatic relations with foreign powers) to their competence by Member States.

Some theoretical definitions emphasize this characteristic of the confederate form of state associations:

"A confederation is an association of states preserving sovereignty, endowed with certain supranational qualities that allow it to be a subject of international legal relations" ^{[24, p. 71]};

"A confederation of States is a voluntary association between States, usually neighboring ones, which are and remain sovereign from the point of view of international law, but delegate to the bodies established by them the types of competence and powers they explicitly specify in order to ensure better protection of some common interests of all their members, especially in the fields of diplomacy and defense" ^{[25, p. 196]} etc.

It is also directly reflected in the constituent documents of some historical confederations. In particular, as stated in Article 2 of the Vienna Final Act, one of the basic laws of the confederate German Union, which existed in 1815-1866.:

"This association acts from the inside as a community of independent, independent states with mutual equal rights and obligations under the treaty, but in external relations as a common force bound into one political unit" {Schlussakte der Wiener Ministerkonferenzen (15. Mai 1820). [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}.

By teaching Member States to behave as elements of a single whole in relation to the outside world, historical confederations have helped to create awareness among their ruling circles and their peoples that it is also better to act together in the management of internal affairs. As we would say today, unity in the exercise of external state functions entails a similar unity in the exercise of internal functions.

Secondly, it is wrong to think that the activities of historical confederations and their legal institutions were directed only externally and did not affect the issues of internal life at all. For example, the American Articles of Confederation of 1777 consolidated a number of integration and legal norms that helped strengthen the interrelationships between the states, directly between citizens of different states and were subsequently transferred verbatim or almost verbatim to the current federal Constitution of the United States of 1787. These are, first of all, the clause (condition) that state citizens enjoy equal "privileges and immunities" in each other's territories, and a clause on "full trust and respect" for official acts, documents and court proceedings of other states, i.e. their mutual recognition.

In a number of aspects, the Articles of Confederation of 1777 actually remain in force to this day. This applies both to the very name of the country "United States of America", which was established by the first article of the document (the US Constitution of 1787 uses it as a given), and, what is very important in practical terms, the prohibition of secession, i.e. depriving the states of the right to secede from their confederate, then federal union (in the Constitution There are no direct indications in this regard, whereas the Articles of Confederation in the preamble and Article XIII fixed the "eternal" nature of the union of states, and these provisions were then cited by the President and the Supreme Court of the United States as a legal justification for the illegality of intra-state separatism) ^[26].

Similarly, the Swiss Treaty of Union of 1815, which finally fixed the legal model of the confederate alliance of the cantons of Switzerland before its transformation into a federation (this would happen in 1848), established in § XI the principle of free movement of goods between the cantons. Deviations from this principle needed the approval of the confederal authorities (the cantons retained the right to levy tolls for their passage on roads and bridges, but to raise them, extend their validity or establish new such tolls was allowed only with the approval of the Sejm — the general confederal body). {Bundesvertrag (1815). [Electronic resource] — Access mode: (date of access: 30.07.2024)}).

On other issues, the Swiss cantons in the confederate period developed mutual integration, including the harmonization or unification of their legislation, through multilateral treaties — "concordats", which, according to the conclusions of modern Swiss historians, de facto complemented the Union Treaty and expanded the competence of the confederal Diet ^{[27, p. 3]}. Thus, the Concordat on Police Measures against Fraudsters, Vagabonds and Other Dangerous Persons (signed on June 17, 1812, confirmed by the Sejm on July 9, 1818), together with the Concordat on the manufacture of passport Forms (signed between June 22 and July 2, 1813 and confirmed by the Sejm on July 9, 2018), introduced a unified procedure for issuing citizens passports for staying inside Switzerland and traveling abroad; The Concordat on Posts of July 9, 1818 proclaimed the freedom of mailing, as well as the equality of citizens of the cantons in the collection of postage; The Concordat on the sample of Swiss coins of July 14, 1819 fixed a single gold or silver content of banknotes, etc. {Recueil officiel des piéces concernant le droit public de la Suisse. Tome premier. Neuchatel en Suisse: C.-H. Wolprath, Imprimeur du Gouvernement. 1852. — P. 349-361, 379-382}).

In the confederate German Union, the formation of general German law was carried out through the joint development by the member States of model (uniform) laws, voluntarily adopted by them as their normative acts with the same content. The main result of such work was one of the outstanding monuments of not only German, but also world law — the All-German Commercial Code of 1861, which was then applied in the German Empire until it was replaced by the current German Commercial Code of 1900, which incorporated many of its provisions ^[28].

Although the confederation prepares the ground for the subsequent state unity of its members, this soil may not be sufficiently loosened or initially unsuitable to achieve the desired result. There are well-known failed and obviously untenable confederations, which already at the time of their birth were artificial formations that had no chance of success.

Such, for example, was the confederate alliance called the United Arab States (OAS), which existed, more formally, in 1958 — 1961. Between geographically remote and economically weakly interconnected Yemen, Egypt and Syria, the latter two States were members of the alliance as members of the United Arab Republic (UAR), which was a federal entity. The OAR was dissolved in 1961, after which the OAS was abolished ^{[29, pp. 60-61]}.

If we imagine that the United Arab States did take place, then the OAS member States would have to pursue a unified foreign policy and create unified armed forces, and their citizens everywhere would have to enjoy the equal right to hold official positions and have freedom of movement throughout the confederal territory; the OAS member States would also have to form the Customs Union and coordinate its activities in the fields of education and culture (Part I "Union" of the Charter of the United Arab States of March 8, 1958 {Basic Documents of the Arab Unification. New York: Arab Information Center. June 1958. — P. 21-25)}).

What fate awaits the Confederation of Sahel States, which was described in this article? If we start from the provisions of the constituent documents, then it is also considered by the member states as a transitional stage to unification into a federation, although without specifying a time frame ("Full of desire to eventually come to a federation" - the preamble of the Niamey Treaty of 2024).

Will it be possible to achieve this goal? And won't the Confederation of Sahel States turn out to be a one-day thing, given that the decision to create it was taken by the military regimes of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which came to power as a result of coups d'etat and in the future should be replaced by governments formed democratically and holding, perhaps, other views (the possibility of new ones cannot be excluded coups with another change in domestic and foreign policy)?

A priori, it is hardly possible to give an unambiguous and exhaustive forecast about the integration potential of the Confederation of Sahel States at the moment. Firstly, it depends on a wide range of non-legal factors, including unpredictable and uncontrollable ones (for example, major droughts that periodically occur in the Sahel zone and tend to increase and intensify due to climate change, can lead to an aggravation of the humanitarian situation, and subsequently to the destabilization of State institutions).

Secondly, from a legal point of view, it should be borne in mind that the constituent documents of the Confederation (the Charter of Lipka-Gurma 2023 and the Treaty of Niamey 2024) have so far laid only a general outline, a sketch of its design. Many legal provisions necessary for the normal functioning of the Confederation are insufficiently spelled out there, in a nominal format or not at all (for example, the content and procedure for exercising the competence of the Confederation will be determined by additional protocols that have yet to be prepared; nothing is said about the international legal personality of the Confederation, without which it is unrealistic to pursue a unified foreign policy; indication of Article 20 of the Niamey Treaty of 2024 the fact that disputes between Member States are subject to settlement "diplomatically" does not guarantee the fulfillment of obligations, rather, it opens the way to their violation, etc.).

If the creators of the Confederation of Sahel States seriously intend to succeed, then they should pay special attention to the lessons of the immediately preceding confederate union on the African continent, which existed at the end of the XX century between Senegal and the Gambia for about ten years, but eventually collapsed: the Confederation of Senegambia (1981 — 1989).

The citizens of Senegal and the Gambia found themselves on different sides of the state border "thanks" to European colonialists, who arbitrarily cut their possessions in Africa and not only there, without taking into account local realities (the territory of the Gambia, a former colony of Great Britain, is a semi—enclave inside the territory of Senegal, a former colony of France, in the form of a narrow strip along the river of the same name; The British and French ministers agreed on such a separation, which, according to modern French historians, became "the quintessence of the absurdity of the colonialists" at the end of the XIX century at a meeting in Paris ^{[30, p. 143]}).

In 1981, after an attempt to remove the legitimate President of the Gambia from power, who retained it with the help of the armed forces of Senegal, an Agreement was concluded between the Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of Senegal on the establishment of the Confederation of Senegambia on December 17, 1981; further briefly: The 1981 Treaty, according to the preamble of which both countries "represent one people, which the vicissitudes of history have divided into two states" {Pacte entre la République de Gambie et la République du Sénégal institutionant la Confédération de la Sénégambie. Signé à Dakar le 17 décembre 1981 // Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités. Vol. 1261. Doc. № 20735. P. 331}.

According to the main part of the 1981 Treaty in the Confederation of Senegambia, "each of the states retains its independence and sovereignty," but there are common institutions (governing bodies) to promote mutual integration and develop a common policy. The head of the Confederation of Senegambia became the President of the Confederation, whose post the 1981 Treaty reserved for the President of Senegal as a larger, virtually dominant state. The President of the Confederation made decisions, as a rule, with the approval of the Vice-President, who became the President of the Gambia. The President, Vice-President and other officials appointed by them together constituted the collegial bodies of the Confederation of Senegambia — the Council of Defense and Security and the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Confederation of Senegambia had a General Secretariat, an administrative apparatus subordinate to the President, and a Confederal Assembly, an interparliamentary body with advisory powers.

Without slowing down, within about a year from the date of the conclusion of the founding treaty of the Confederation of Senegambia, the member States prepared and signed additional protocols that defined the architecture of its military and law enforcement structures, as well as settled institutional (organizational) and financial issues:

Protocol on the Coordination of Foreign Relations Policy of July 2, 1982 {Protocol sur la coordination des politiques dans le domaine des relations extériéures. Signé à Banjul le 2 juillet 1982 // Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités. Vol. 1295. Doc. No. 21414. P. 181};

Protocol on the Financial Rules of the Confederation of July 2, 1982 {Protocol relatif au règlement financier de la Confédération. Signé à Banjul le 2 juillet 1982 // Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités. Vol. 1295. Doc. № 21415. P. 187.};

Protocol on the Institutions of the Confederation of July 2, 1982 {Protocole relatif aux institutions de la Confédération. Signé à Banjul le 2 juillet 1982 // Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités. Vol. 1295. Doc. № 21416. P. 187};

Protocol on Confederal Defense and on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of Senegal for the Creation of the Armed Forces of the Confederation of Senegambia of January 12, 1983 {Protocol sur la défense confédérale et l'intégration des forces armées de la République de Gambie et de la République du Sénégal pour la constitution des forces armées de la Confédération de la Sénégambie. Signé à Banjul le 12 janvier 1983 // Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités. Vol. 1322. Doc. № 22033. P. 3};

Protocol on Confederal Security and on the Integration of the Security Forces of the Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of Senegal in order to create the Security Forces of the Confederation of Senegambia of January 12, 1983 {Protocol sur la défense confédérale et l'intégration des forces armées de la République de Gambie et de la République du Sénégal pour la constitution des forces armées de la Confédération de la Sénégambie. Signé à Banjul le 12 janvier 1983 // Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités. Vol. 1322. Doc. № 22033. P. 3}.

However, it did not go beyond the unification of law enforcement agencies, and unequal and incomplete (the member States pledged to transfer to the "Confederal Armed Forces" and "Confederal Security Forces" under the sole command of the President of the Confederation of Senegambia, he is the President of Senegal, only part of their military and law enforcement units).

Senegal and the Gambia have not managed to find common ground on the priorities of the development of national economies, including foreign trade policy, without which full integration is impossible (Senegal preferred to maintain high barriers to trade with third countries, except for the former metropolis of France, while the Gambia practically had no such barriers). The Gambian population was not financially interested in the unification of commercial legislation with Senegal (the Gambia had a black market through which cheaper industrial goods entered Senegal), and the Gambian political elite was dissatisfied with the unequal nature of the association (Ghana demanded, but could not achieve the introduction of a rotating system for the president, and therefore the commander-in-chief of the security forces of the Confederation which Senegal retained) ^{[31, pp. 137-139]}.

As a result, the Confederation of Senegambia has not implemented the integration projects of the member States provided for in the constituent document on issues beyond defense and security, namely, "development of the economic and monetary union" and "coordination of their policies on issues in any other areas in which the confederated States agree to jointly exercise their competence" (art. 3 The 1981 Agreement).

Eventually, by mutual agreement of the member States, the Confederation of Senegambia was officially dissolved (Agreement on the Dissolution of the Confederation of Senegambia of September 21, 1989 {Accord portant dissolution de la Confédération de la Senéambie (avec protocol d'application). Signé à Banjul le 21 septembre 1989 // Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités. Vol. 1546. Doc. № 26845. P. 176}).

In order not to repeat the fate of its predecessor, the Confederation of Sahel States needs to have a carefully thought—out positive agenda, constantly update it taking into account the changing situation and, of course, implement it (the same applies to other integration alliances - confederate and other, located in Africa or on other continents of the Globe).

The construction of a common defense, the joint fight against crime is an important, but, in itself, an insufficient condition for unity. It is equally important to ensure that States, citizens and business circles (economic elite) become richer in the process of integration, primarily in material terms, and that such an increase in wealth (or poverty reduction in the case of African countries) is linked in their eyes with their country's stay in the integration entity, with the activities of the authorities integration education, with the implementation of regulations and other decisions of integration education.

This can also be facilitated by the construction and financing under the auspices of integration education with the further transfer to its direct management of a complex of infrastructures that African countries urgently need: roads, ports, industrial and energy facilities, networks and pipelines, educational and medical institutions, research institutions, etc.

If the Confederation of Sahel States moves forward in the creative endeavors attributed by the constituent documents of the Confederation to its sphere of competence with the beautiful name "development", then it has the right to count on a stable credit of trust from the population and local elites — regardless of which regimes will be in power in its member States at a particular moment.

If, on the contrary, like the Senegambia Confederation that has sunk into oblivion, the unifying messages within the Confederation of Sahel States are reduced only to military-police activities, then the new integration alliance will probably last for some time in the mode of a besieged fortress, but its chances of remaining for a long time will be low, and the prospects of growing into a federation are illusory.