Demographic situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the 2000s

Buyarov Dmitrii Vladimirovich ORCID: 0000-0002-8337-6817 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor; Department of General History, Philosophy and Cultural Studies; Blagoveshchensk State Pedagogical University 675000, Russia, Amur region, Blagoveshchensk, Lenin str., 104, room 456 buyarov_d@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Skatov Daniil Romanovich ORCID: 0009-0005-2266-2069 Lecturer; Department of General History, Philosophy and Cultural Studies; Blagoveshchensk State Pedagogical University 675000, Russia, Amur region, Blagoveshchensk, Lenin str., 104, office 456 daniilskatov@bk.ru

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is one of the five autonomous regions of the People's Republic of China, and is the largest territorial entity in China. According to the 2000 census, it had about 20 million people, represented by 47 nationalities. By 2020, the population of Xinjiang has increased to 25 million 852 thousand people. The largest peoples are shown in Table 1. After the formation of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in 1955, the percentage of national minorities began to decrease and in parallel there was an increase in the number of Han Chinese.

Table 1. Large ethnic groups of the XUAR^[26].

The various ethnic groups in the XUAR live relatively compactly. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz live mainly on the border with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. Uighurs live mainly in southern Xinjiang, while Han Chinese dominate in northern Xinjiang and cities (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Map of the ethnic composition of the SUAR districts (2020) ^[11].

If we compare demographic indicators in 2000, the changes in the composition of the population of the XUAR are not too significant, but the number of Han Chinese in the region has undoubtedly increased, which is very painfully perceived by Uighurs and creates the basis for ethno-social contradictions.

The increased attention of the central government of the People's Republic of China to Xinjiang and demographic policy in the region is due to a number of factors. Firstly, the religious factor. More than half of the population (58% according to the 2010 census) are Muslims. Religion has a significant impact on the demographic situation. Early marriages, large families – such a conservative way of life inevitably comes into conflict with the policy of the official authorities. In many ways, the policy of birth control caused great discontent, especially among the rural population, which is more traditional and religious. The spread of Islam in the XUAR predetermined the threat of religious extremism, but not all Uighurs adhere to radical manifestations of their religion, and often themselves become victims of extremists from neighboring countries ^{[2, p. 9]}.

Secondly, the ethnic factor. In the 1990s, as noted by J. Smith, the Uighurs deliberately exaggerated cultural and religious differences with the Han Chinese. They used such a tool to demonstrate ethnic differences ^[19]. These are symbolic differences (language, local time), and more substantive differences, for example, culinary preferences. Xinjiang has never fully become a melting pot of nations. Contradictions between two major ethnic groups remain in the region: the Uighurs and the Han Chinese.

Thirdly, the socio-economic factor. The dissatisfaction of national minorities was caused by the factor of remoteness from the center, and as a result, a lower standard of living. The lack of high-quality infrastructure, healthcare, and education inevitably led to the formation of a new round of contradictions. Many Uighur nationalists do not consider Xinjiang to be the western part of China or the eastern outskirts of the Turkic world, but promote the idea of Xinjiang as an independent center ^{[7, p. 30]}. In the first quarter of the XXI century, the autonomous region began to demonstrate good indicators of macroeconomic development, but nevertheless continued to lag behind the average indicators for the PRC.

Fourth, the political factor. Despite the autonomous status, it is difficult to talk about independence in the management of the region. The 2001 Law on National Territorial Autonomy was intended to resolve a number of issues, but the right to self-government in Xinjiang is rather narrowed ^{[5, p. 114]}. The Center strictly monitors what is happening on the periphery, controlling events using various tools: the prevalence of Han Chinese in government positions (72% in 2013), strict control of entry and exit from the region and movements of citizens within it ^[21].

The traditionalism and conservatism of Xinjiang society is the reaction of the population to the changes that are taking place in the region. The active development of the region by the Han Chinese, as well as the above-mentioned factors, led to interethnic contradictions and conflicts in 2009 and 2014 ^[10]. The actual increase in the number of Han Chinese in Xinjiang was traditionally perceived by the Uighurs very painfully ^[8].

Speaking about demographic dynamics, we will focus on the indicators of the 5th, 6th and 7th population censuses, as well as intermediate data obtained between censuses. At the time of the 5th census in 2000, the Uighurs represented the majority of the population, while being a national minority. Han Chinese represented a little less – 40% of the total population of the autonomous region. In order to stabilize the situation, the central government in the 2000s began to implement measures aimed at developing education and healthcare, which generally influenced demographics.

The official publication of the State Council of the People's Republic of China – the White Paper "Development and Progress of Xinjiang ^[12] indicates an increase in the welfare of the population. Chapter 7 shows a steady decline in the Engel coefficient, especially among urban residents. The average life expectancy was 71.12 years. At the same time, there was a new trend of a decrease in mortality and fertility, as well as a decrease in the dynamics of population growth (at the same time, the birth rate at the end of the 20th century among the Uighurs was the highest in the country. In order to increase demographic indicators and reduce social tension, benefits and allowances were introduced for national minorities:

1. Lowering the age of marriage to 18 years for women and 20 years for men;

2. Permission for a larger number of children in the family (2-3 children were recommended for urban and 3-4 for rural areas) ^{[4, p. 90]}.

At the same time, socio-economic problems persisted. Chinese researcher Jiang Xiaowei points out the difference in income between the Han and Uighurs ^[23]. It is indicated that Uighurs are less educated, receive lower wages (especially in the non-governmental sector), and hold fewer government posts. Other researchers come to similar conclusions ^[20]. Especially, Uighur youth had great difficulties, including problems with access not only to work, but also to necessary education, due to ignorance of the Chinese language ^[22]. Thus, intergroup socio-economic inequality in the 2000s is one of the factors of contradictions in the region.

One of the important conflict-causing components in the demographic policy of the People's Republic of China is the migration policy of China. Based on the population censuses, there is an increase in its number in the XUAR. According to E. Howell, migration policy is one of the factors of population growth. This policy is the result of systematic and organized efforts by the Chinese government to increase the proportion of the Han population in regions where Muslim communities predominate, in order to mitigate ethnic contradictions ^[14]. Of interest is the fact that the migration of Han Chinese in the 2000s to the region was perceived by some Uighurs as a means of strengthening the central government of the People's Republic of China, monopolizing local natural resources and accumulating wealth through the exploitation of minorities ^[18].

Nevertheless, we can observe positive trends. The best example is the development of Urumqi, the capital of the XUAR. In the first half of the 2010s, the newest airport was built there, the Beijing-Urumqi superfast railway was launched, hospitals, factories, factories, residential buildings were built ^{[6, p. 156]}. The development of infrastructure undoubtedly improves the standard of living of the local population and creates conditions for the most effective development. The fight against poverty, unemployment, and a well–established social policy are not just part of the economic development of the region, but also an opportunity to prevent interethnic conflicts and contradictions at the very beginning.

In 2014, after the tragic events in Kunming, China's demographic policy in Xinjiang was criticized again. Xi Jinping continued to push for reforms, talked about the "Chinese dream" and the preservation of ethnic unity. Not all of the Chinese public was on the side of the President of the People's Republic of China at that moment. In local social networks, one could see not only calls for limiting contacts with the local non-Han population, but also calls for the extermination of the Han people by radical groups. There were also reports criticizing the granting of too broad rights for national minorities (an increase in exam scores, the opportunity to have more children, etc. ^[15].

After the 2014 incident in China, a change in the approach to national policy could be observed. In January 2016, the policy of "One family, one child" was replaced by the permission to have two children in a family. This was due to the fact that the previous policy eventually led to a gender imbalance, demographic aging, the problem of "hidden children" and internal immigration from the countryside to the city ^{[3, p. 84]}.

With regard to Xinjiang, there are different points of view on the new demographic policy. In his research, German scientist A. Zenz emphasizes that the Chinese authorities are engaged in forcibly reducing the birth rate of Uighurs and other national minorities through sterilization, forced abortions, etc. ^[24]. Many Western news outlets describe the demographic situation in the XUAR in the same vector. Using statistics, research, as well as reports from a number of Uighurs who left China, the media take the position that the decline in the birth rate in the XUAR is the result of the coercive policy of the central government of the People's Republic of China. The Xinjiang government responds to these accusations that the sharp decline in the population is due to Beijing's finally properly functioning family planning policy. A researcher at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Li Xiaoxia, rejects A. Zenz's idea of "demographic genocide." According to her, the birth rate is decreasing due to an increase in the education and cultural level of women. Economic incentives encourage women to comply with birth control rules ^[27]. This is confirmed by statistics, as well as the fact that the decline in the birth rate somehow occurs throughout China, and not just Xinjiang ^[1].

In general, several trends can be identified that accompany a decrease in the birth rate in the XUAR:

1. Strict adherence to family planning policy. This policy applies to the whole of Xinjiang (and the country as a whole), regardless of ethnicity;

2. Changes in the mentality of the Uighurs. Despite their conservative nature, an increasing number of young people from ethnic minorities prefer to invest time and effort in personal development.

3. The weakening of the influence of religion. In recent years, raising the issue of "birth control and contraception" has not been clearly perceived negatively and as contrary to religious principles ^[28].

Based on the above, it would be more correct to say that Xinjiang is at the fourth stage, in accordance with the theory of demographic transition, when the birth rate and the death rate become equal, and the process of demographic stabilization ends. At the same time, according to S. Chen in Xinjiang, despite the decrease in 2018, the annual population growth exceeded the national average by two times. XUAR, along with Tibet, represents the youngest demographic structure ^[9]. No more than 10% of the population are people over the age of 65 ^[25].

In September 2021, a White Paper on the development of the Xinjiang population was published ^[17]. Qualitative analysis reveals several features of demographic evolution. In 2000-2020, population growth in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region was 1.15 points higher than the average for the whole of China. According to the 6th National Census in 2010, the population of Xinjiang was 21.82 million, an increase of 3.36 million compared to 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, the average population growth rate in Xinjiang was 1.68%.

According to the 7th national Population Census conducted in 2020, the population of Xinjiang reached 25.85 million, an increase of 4.04 million compared to 2010.. Between 2010 and 2020, the average population growth rate in Xinjiang was 1.71%.

Between 2000 and 2020, the number of Uighurs in Xinjiang increased from 8.34 million to 11.62 million. Its average annual growth is 1.67%, which is much higher than that of national minorities in other regions.

In the 2000s, with the improvement of the socio-economic situation in the XUAR, key health indicators improved. Over the period from 2000 to 2023, the average life expectancy increased by 8.6 years and reached 76 years (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Average life expectancy in the XUAR ^[13].

The infant mortality rate in the XUAR decreased from 26.58 ppm in 2010 to 6.75 ppm in 2020, the mortality rate of children under the age of 5 fell from 31.95 ppm in 2010 to 10.91 ppm in 2020, and the mortality rate of women during childbirth – from 43.41 per 100 thousand births to 17.89 per 100 thousand births.

The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is characterized by a relatively young demographic profile. In 2020, the proportion of the population under the age of 14 exceeded the national average by 4.51%, while the proportion of the population aged 60 years and older lagged behind the national figure by 7.42%. In addition, there are more young people among the Uighurs than in the general regional demographic group (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Age groups in 2020 ^[13].

To date, scientists disagree about the demographic situation in the XUAR. There are several points of view, including rather extreme views on population policy on the part of the central Government of the People's Republic of China.

The official position of the Chinese authorities has been repeatedly voiced in the media space, but it is best reflected in the White Paper "Development of the Xinjiang Population" published in September 2021. It indicates that the population of ethnic minorities (among which the Uighurs predominate) continues to develop and the quality of life in the XUAR is improving. The government's position is supported by a researcher from Xinjiang, Li Xiaoxia. In her writings and speeches, she notes that improving the quality of life and education among ethnic minorities inevitably leads to a conscious decrease in the birth rate and strict compliance with the laws of the People's Republic of China.

An alternative view of the problem of the demographic development of the XUAR is presented by Western media and researchers, who focus on the lack of stability in the region as a result of the migration of ethnic Han people to the region, which increases economic and social inequality. The most extreme position on the demographic situation in Xinjiang is expressed by A. Zenz, according to whom the "demographic pit" of 2018 is a consequence of increased birth control of the Uighurs, through sterilization of the population, including by coercion. The researcher calls the demographic policy of the People's Republic of China in Xinjiang "the genocide of the Uighurs."

The ethnic diversity of Xinjiang is an important factor in the demographic transformations being carried out in it. In the early 2000s, the policy of the central government of the People's Republic of China, sometimes contradictory, did not find support from the people of Xinjiang. The high level of interethnic tension became a catalyst for the emergence of crisis phenomena, which culminated in the unrest of 2009 and 2014.

On the part of the Government of the People's Republic of China in the 2000s, there was a trend towards economic development in Xinjiang. Subsidies to the region, infrastructure development, and changes in legislation on the population were not perceived by national minorities as an opportunity to resolve conflicts. The central Government has failed to solve all the problems of economic and social inequality. This policy was accompanied by the increasing migration of Han Chinese to the region, which caused new contradictions.

After the 6th population census, it became clear that the policy to improve the quality of life of the population was effective, as evidenced by the growth of the population of national minorities, an increase in the level of education, and an increase in income. Nevertheless, many problems remained unresolved, which led to new unrest. Since 2014, the Chinese Government's policy in Xinjiang has been changing the vector from economic development to internal security policy. As part of Xi Jinping's "Chinese dream" political strategy, measures to create "ethnic unity" are beginning to be implemented.

The abolition of the "one family, one child" policy and the further transformation of this norm in 2018 and 2021 were due, in our opinion, to demographic problems throughout China. Based on statistics, the number of Uighurs in the XUAR is steadily growing and refutes the data on the "genocide of the Uighurs."

To date, the degree of relations between national minorities and the Government has been reduced. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government needs to implement measures to improve the demographic situation in the XUAR. This requires a set of socio-economic, political, and cultural reforms to create a favorable atmosphere in the region in order to avoid new unrest and conflicts.