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Politics and Society
Reference:
Safonova A.S.
Comparative analysis of the representation of youth cells of the parliamentary political parties in the Internet
// Politics and Society.
2024. ¹ 2.
P. 37-50.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0684.2024.2.71195 EDN: UERLEQ URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=71195
Comparative analysis of the representation of youth cells of the parliamentary political parties in the Internet
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0684.2024.2.71195EDN: UERLEQReceived: 04-07-2024Published: 11-07-2024Abstract: The object of the study are the youth "wings" of Russian parliamentary political parties: the Young Guard of United Russia, the Leninist Communist Youth Union of the Russian Federation, the All–Russian Youth Organization of the LDPR, the Youth of a Just Russia, the subject is the practice of their political Internet communications. Central attention is paid to studying the level of media activity of the youth "wings" of the parliamentary political parties of the Russian Federation in the digital environment, as well as identifying the nature of political discourse and communication barriers and gaps between youth organizations as the basic subjects of communication interaction and Russian youth. In the context of growing digitalization, the issue of creating digital ecosystems and platforms aimed not only at strengthening party brands, but also at discussing problems and implementing ideas and proposals of Russian youth is becoming relevant. Using analytical services similarweb.ru , be1.ru , Jaga Jam and Medialogy an attempt has been made to compare the communication activities of Russian youth cells of parliamentary political parties in the digital environment according to three criteria: the importance of the official websites of the parties, activity in social networks on the example of the VKontakte social network, as well as publication activity in the media. The analysis revealed that the agenda of the youth departments seems to be deeply formalized and monotonous. News, information and event products of all youth cells do not reflect the current interests and needs of youth, are not aimed at their organic involvement in the social and political agenda, the content is imperative and agitational in nature, which enhances the asymmetry and subject-object nature of communications. The author concludes that the youth "wings" of political parties as important actors of the communicative space need regular and systematic media analysis in order to assess the general public profile, including public opinion, image, reputation and competitiveness, which will help effectively manage communications, be relevant to the youth audience, control the image in the media and adapt to the changing conditions on the political scene. Keywords: Internet activity, communication analysis, media analysis, youth political organizations, young people, political communications, website, social media, publication activity, communication gapsThis article is automatically translated. In the context of increasing digitalization, an important task of modern research is to study the motivational factors of choosing information sources and content units on the Internet. According to the research company Mediascope, today more than 95 million people use the Internet in Russia at least once a month, which is 78% of the country's population over the age of 12. Socially and politically active youth is an important driving force capable of shaping the architecture of social space, creating new institutions, setting trends and new formats of media consumption [1]. It is the younger generation that makes up the bulk of Internet users. Thus, according to VTSIOM, 50% of young people aged 18-24 use Internet resources as the main source of news, including the basic source of political information, which determines the attractiveness of the network as a key communication platform for youth political organizations. Topical issues of youth media consumption regularly come into the focus of attention of Russian and foreign researchers. Thus, A.V. Lipatova examines the features of youth media consumption based on the analysis of statistics and surveys of research companies GWI (GlobalWebIndex), Datareportal, WeAreSocial, Meltwater, Mediascope [2]. A comprehensive study of modern practices and dynamics of media consumption of Russian youth was conducted by I. A. Poluekhtova [3]. The focus of attention of A. Luchinkina, L. V. Zhikhareva and A. S. Andreeva turned out to be the peculiarities of media consumption of young people with different gender identities [4]. Some scientific works focus on the study of political, including protest activity of modern youth in the digital environment [5;6;7]. Considerable attention in scientific research is paid to the introduction of digital technologies into the communication activities of political actors. O. I. Lyakhovenko's research is aimed at studying political telegram channels as an instrument of expert communication and reflection on the current political situation and processes [8]. E.V. Brodovskaya examines the analysis of trends in the transformation of political parties and proto-party network actors into digital ones under the influence of information and communication technologies [9]. The authors, who study the peculiarities of the consumption of political content in the digital environment, point out that information about political parties, leaders and actions causes the activity of a relatively small number of young users of digital communications. The attention of young people is attracted by information about personal hobbies, to a lesser extent – about professional activities. The proportion of those who are interested in solving environmental and social problems, protecting human rights and volunteering is comparable [10, p. 102]. This fact indicates the need to identify communication gaps between the real demands of young people and the agenda that political actors form and broadcast. At the same time, the network space remains an environment for a wide range of risks and threats associated with the development of various forms of deviant, protest behavior, as well as cyber aggression. To date, the phenomena of trolling, astroturfing, sockpapeting and others have already been widely studied [11]. At the same time, the issues of the formation of digital competence of young people, their needs and interests in the socio-political aspect, which should and can be taken into account when developing and testing digital solutions, remain not fully explored. Russian youth as a whole underestimates the seriousness of the problem of distributing illegal content and is not ready to realize the priority of social stability and public safety over the value of absolute freedom in the online environment [12, p. 93]. At the same time, in the modern political landscape, digital data is becoming an important tool for effective communication and mobilization in the hands of political actors. The ability to use media analytics allows not only to theoretically comprehend the features of the formation of a political agenda, but also to predict probabilistic conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation, to study the values, interests and moods of narrow and broad groups of the public, and therefore allows you to develop more effective strategies for political, including election campaigns. The object of the study is the youth "wings" of parliamentary political parties, and the subject is the practice of their political Internet communication. The choice of the research object is due to a significant decrease in the number of youth political organizations compared to the early 2000s, the current state agenda in terms of spiritual, moral and patriotic education of the younger generation and extensive academic discussions on the subject of the modern youth agenda [13]. The purpose of this study is to study the level of media activity of youth "wings" of parliamentary political parties of the Russian Federation in the digital environment, as well as to identify the nature of political discourse and communication barriers and gaps between youth organizations as the basic subjects of communication interaction and Russian youth. The total number of registered political parties at the beginning of 2024, according to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, was 24. Today, 4 out of 5 parliamentary parties have youth branches, namely: 1. "Young Guard of United Russia" / MHER ("United Russia"). 2. "Leninist Communist Youth Union of the Russian Federation" / LKSM RF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation). 3. "All-Russian Youth Organization of the LDPR" / WMO LDPR (LDPR). 4. "Youth of Fair Russia" / MSR ("Fair Russia – For the truth"). The New People Parliamentary Party does not have a separate youth "wing", which may indicate that the party has not yet fully appreciated the potential of the younger generation not only in terms of representing its interests, but also in terms of ensuring continuity and strategic development. When developing digital media products and projects, youth political organizations should take into account the need to create universal, understandable and simple meanings for rational and emotional perception, which will be able to form the necessary patterns of social behavior among young people. In this regard, at present and in the near future, the communication policy of youth cells of political parties is determined not only by the degree of digital transformation and the ability to integrate modern communication technologies into the Internet environment, but also by the ability to create the necessary context and conditions for the organic self-organization of the youth community. In order to identify distinctive features in the communication promotion of youth cells on the Internet and determine the best strategies, a method of competitive media analysis is proposed. In this study, we will analyze the official websites of the youth wings, their official communities on social networks, as well as publication activity. In the structure of the PESO model of communications [14], the organization's website belongs to the so-called "own channels" ("owned media") and is a central element of the communication policy of the youth cell as a political actor, allowing full control over the formation of its own media content. The presence of a website is a significant indicator of the subjectivity of the youth "wing", and its main page is the calling card of the ideological platform and the main point of contact with target audiences. It is thanks to the site that any organization, including a political one, can be found in the online environment through search engines. The elaborate structure, loading speed, visual design, intuitive navigation and meaningful content of the site largely determine the effectiveness of the communication policy and reflect the desire to take into account the values and needs of the target audience. To date, not all youth "wings" of parliamentary political parties have separate websites. Thus, the Youth of a Just Russia has only a tab in the "party projects" section on the official website of the "parent" party, which makes it difficult to conduct a comparative analysis with competitors. The absence of a separate website may indicate a weak subjectivity of the youth "wing" of the MSR. Web services were used to conduct a comparative analysis of the sites similarweb.ru and be1.ru . Key factors for assessing the significance of sites in the structure of digital communications made metrics such as download speed, the traffic to the site per month, the quality index of the site (X), the number of impressions of the website in search engines Yandex and Google (KPS), number of queries for keywords (short circuit), check the responsive layout of the site and availability of site links on the page to social networks (Social Media Optimization). In addition, the analysis was carried out for the general visual and semantic component of the content. The data of the conducted web analytics presented in Table 1 indicate relatively high statistical indicators of the importance of the site of the Young Guard of United Russia, which is the leader in all the considered metrics. Table 1 Comparative analysis of the official websites of youth cells of political parties (March 2024)
In addition to the criteria discussed in the table, an analysis of the design and usability of the sites was carried out. The most modern and relevant web design trends is the website of the Young Guard of United Russia, which has a clear interface and is made in the outline of the corporate identity of the party. The main page is not overloaded with unnecessary information and advertising blocks, unlike competitor sites, the site structure allows you to quickly search for the necessary information. It is possible to note the web page (tab on the main website of the party) of the Youth of Fair Russia, namely the structuring and use of various types of media content: photos, videos, text, images. The sites of the All-Russian Youth Organization of the LDPR and the Leninist Communist Youth Union of the Russian Federation look the least visually developed and optimized. They have a less intuitive interface, weak structure and logic, scarcity of media materials, are overloaded with visual elements, advertising and information blocks made in a disjointed style without taking into account modern web design requirements. All youth organizations lack adaptive layout, which can make it difficult to interact with the site on mobile devices. Despite MHER's leading position in site analysis, it is important to note the significant shortcomings of all the cells under consideration in terms of interaction with the target audience – young people. News and information products do not reflect the current interests and needs of young people and are not aimed at their organic involvement in the social and political agenda. To a greater extent, they are imperative and agitational in nature, which reinforces the asymmetric and subject-object nature of communication. A website that builds trust should be created taking into account the analysis of the audience, identifying its values, needs, preferences and user habits. As our analysis has shown, the websites of the youth divisions of political parties are mainly focused on informing users about their activities and current events, and the agenda looks too formalized and monotonous. Having no chance and opportunity to get relevant and relevant information from official sources, the youth audience willingly "consumes" it in third-party channels, often of questionable quality and content. So, over the past few years, the so-called insider telegram channels have become the main platform for distributing political content. As O. I. Lyakhovenko rightly notes, departmental rumors, "conversations in smoking rooms", expectations (including those with a formative function), "raw", unprocessed solutions, "mosaic" information (taken out of context), etc. are often presented under the guise of exclusive materials. In some cases, there is no "inside" at all, but the reader gets a false sense of belonging to real political and managerial processes. Sometimes "inside" turns out to be a purposeful leak of information (reliable or false) based on media and political consequences [15, p. 122]. Thus, we can state that the sites of all the youth "wings" under consideration, being more tools for reporting and working out the current agenda, do not perform the functions of engagement, interactivity and feedback. At the same time, it is important to understand that it is the site as a key web resource that can become an asset capable of accumulating the main requests of the audience, covering equally issues of education and health, youth and family policy, cultural and spiritual and moral education. As recent studies show, social media (social networks, messengers, blogs, forums, etc.) act as the main source of information for modern youth, which become communication platforms of their kind, capable not only of reproducing images and processes of physical reality, but also of implementing them, satisfying the need for self-presentation [16]. As a space of socio-political communications, social media allows you to form an identity, emphasize status and reputation exclusively through media experience and media studies, excluding the real social environment [17]. Using the analytical service Jaga Jam, quantitative indicators of the "weight" of youth parties in the Vkontakte social network were analyzed (Table 2). The period 01.11.23 – 31.01.2024 was selected for all objects of analysis Table 2 Comparative analysis of official communities of youth cells of political parties on Vkontakte
The key indicators were selected: the total number of subscribers on the page; the total number of posts for the selected period, the sum of all likes, comments and reposts (user reactions); the number of post views on the page for the selected period; the engagement coefficient – the percentage of subscribers who make reactions on the page. The gender and age profile of the audience was also measured. The youth "wing" of United Russia has the largest number of subscribers, and, accordingly, the number of post views, however, in terms of engagement, the organization is only in third place with a high frequency of posting, which indicates ineffective communication interaction with the audience, which may be associated with attracting a "cold" audience, insufficiently relevant content or lack of feedback. The top 3 topics of the MHER community are volunteer and volunteer projects, as well as a special military operation. According to the indicator of user engagement, the youth "wings" of the Communist Party and Fair Russia are in the first positions, which indicates a fairly high level of audience loyalty when the content corresponds to the values of subscribers, arouses interest and reactions. This factor indicates the desire of the organization to build long-term relationships with its audience, which in the future can contribute to increasing awareness and strengthening reputation. The key topics of the LKSM are volunteering and volunteerism, memorable dates and regional news. The low level of involvement of subscribers of the WMO LDPR can be explained by the irregularity of publications (on average, 1 publication every 2-3 days), but the account is characterized by an informal and friendly style of communication. It is important to note that the largest number of subscribers aged 18-35 years was recorded at MHER (64%), the least at MSR (23%), which may indicate either a low level of interest in the organization's activities from the youth audience, or the lack of a strategy for systematic work with youth. Also, all youth wings, with the exception of MHER, have a gender imbalance: on average, there are 2 men per 1 woman. The social networks of all youth organizations perform an informational and image function, and are more focused on the older age group of young people (over 25 years old). The content strategy of official accounts is aimed at using visual content - unique graphic images/pictures with symbols and text inscriptions while minimizing the amount of text in the "body" of the post. We cannot disagree with the research of M. V. Ilyicheva, A.V. Lapin and M. S. Ruleva, in which the authors came to the conclusion that in the youth organizations of the main political parties there is completely no attitude towards the manifestation of creativity and creativity aimed at developing projects related to the promotion of new approaches in the implementation of the party's political agenda, and in the content There are no sharp topics in the posts that could provoke users to a discussion or a critical response [18, p.200]. Next, we will consider the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the publication activity of mentions of youth cells in the media, namely: the total number of messages, the number of original messages without reprints, the number of publications in the media at the federal and regional levels, the nature of mentions, coverage, social influence (the number of likes and shares of media materials in social media). Competitive media analysis was conducted using the analytical service Medialogia for the period from 01.01.2023 to 12/31/2023 for all categories of media at the federal and regional levels (Table 3). Table 3 Comparative media analysis of youth cells of political parties (for 2023)
As the analysis showed, MHER has the largest number of mentions and coverage, which is explained by large material, financial and human resources, as well as a large number of young people involved. The analysis of the event series allows us to conclude that the information occasions of the MHER with the highest media index are associated with a special military operation: humanitarian missions in new regions, volunteer activities, patriotic actions, celebration of important historical dates (Victory Day, the Day of Lifting the Siege of Leningrad, Flag Day, etc.), as well as the beginning of the presidential election campaign. The news series of the Lenin Communist Youth Union is built around the communist agenda and largely draws on the experience of the past. Historical chronicles, analysis of the Soviet experience, biographies of party leaders, marking important historical dates and events. The Fair Russia Youth event and news field has also been built around regional volunteer actions, where the emphasis is on the regional network of youth wings. The WMO LDPR news agenda appeals more to topics related to the youth themselves and their future: analysis of youth problems, discussion with youth of the country's future, participation in youth events, generational continuity, etc. Patriotic and volunteer themes are also present in the information field of the organization and look organic in the general information flow. All the "wings" are largely woven into the news agenda of the parent parties and are often mentioned in their news events. Based on the dynamics of the number of reports by region, it can be concluded about the degree of activity of youth "wings" in different subjects. Thus, most of the messages mentioning MHER were recorded in Moscow, Moscow and Tula regions, the Republic of Tatarstan and the Chechen Republic; LKSM – in Moscow, Moscow, Saratov, Novosibirsk and Samara regions; LDPR Ministry of Defense – in Moscow, Krasnodar Territory, Nizhny Novgorod, Arkhangelsk and Rostov regions, MSR – in Moscow, Altai Territory, The Republic of Dagestan, as well as in the Tula and Ivanovo regions. At the same time, it is important to note that all youth cells, except for the LDPR Youth Organization, have mentions in the Moscow region several times higher than those in other subjects of the Russian Federation (see Figure 1-4).
Fig.1. Dynamics of the number of messages mentioning MHER Fig.2. Dynamics of the number of messages mentioning LKSM Fig.3. Dynamics of the number of messages mentioning WMO LDPR Fig.4. Dynamics of the number of messages mentioning MSR Thus, the MHER, LKSM and SMR have an imbalance in the information presence of party youth cells in regional media, where there is a significant youth potential for building support, strengthening party positions and creating coalitions, while the LDPR youth party provides approximately an equal level of public capital in the regions of presence. An analysis of the presence of youth segments of parliamentary parties in the media allows us to identify a number of information contexts: participation in election and election campaigns, volunteer and volunteer missions, mostly related to a special military operation, the opening of youth party cells and election headquarters in the regions, as well as the celebration of official dates and historical events. The subject matter of the information occasions allows us to conclude once again that the youth "wings" of the parties are devoid of political subjectivity. To a greater extent, performing the functions of political mobilization, socialization and activation of electoral participation during electoral periods, they remain only a tool in the hands of the "mother" parties. At the same time, youth "wings" can play an important role in shaping the political consciousness of young people, involving them in the political process and preparing a new generation of political leaders capable of influencing decision-making [19;20]. In order to become a platform for professional and personal growth, as well as to earn the trust and support of youth cells, it is necessary to focus on what is really interesting and important for the younger generation: social engineering, entrepreneurship, combating unemployment, environmental issues and environmental protection, health prevention issues and much more. In this context, the function of political media resources is to ensure constant socio-political dialogue and two-way symmetrical communication between the government and citizens [21]. The digital environment is able to effectively mobilize the political participation of young people in public life, and youth political organizations, as one of the main actors of the communicative space, can and should timely use this ability to their advantage by creating digital ecosystems and platforms that work not only to strengthen party brands, but also aimed at discussing and implementing relevant issues. ideas and suggestions of Russian youth. An important tool for political organizations is regular and systematic media analysis in order to assess the general public profile, including public opinion, image, reputation and competitiveness, which will help effectively manage communications, be representative, control the image in the media and adapt to changing conditions in the political arena. References
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