The evolution of Franco-Spanish relations in the late XVIII - early XIX centuries.

Morzheedov Vladislav Gennad'evich ORCID: 0000-0003-2139-4291 senior lecturer; Department of Fundamental Legal and Socio-Humanitarian Disciplines; Non-governmental educational private Institution of Higher Education 'Moscow Financial and Industrial University 'Synergy' 105318, Russia, Moscow, Izmailovsky Val str., 2 wladek@rambler.ru Other publications by this author

The relevance of the study of relations between France and Spain in the late XVIII - early XIX centuries is based on the need to understand the dynamics of interaction between the two powers during a period of important political and socio-economic changes that affected many European countries during this period. The analysis of the evolution of Franco-Spanish relations makes it possible to identify the mutual influence between various foreign policy factors and domestic political processes. Such research also helps to create a more holistic picture of the processes that took place in Europe during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

The end of the XVIII - beginning of the XIX centuries is a period saturated with various events of an economic, socio-political and cultural nature. France and Great Britain were the leading players on the European stage at that time. The rivalry between these powers began back in the 1660s, and the contradictions that arose between them lay at the heart of many conflicts, including the Napoleonic Wars. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the famous French historian Albert Vandal characterized the period when Napoleon Bonaparte was in power in France as "a twelve-year battle given to the British in the space of the whole world" ^{[4, pp. 71-72]}. The era of the revolutionary or Napoleonic wars is generally well studied. However, there are still a number of problems and issues that come to the attention of researchers less often than others or they have not been studied comprehensively.

Traditionally, historians, when studying the period of the late XVIII - early XIX centuries, focus on analyzing the relationship between revolutionary and Napoleonic France with Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia. The Pyrenean direction of French foreign policy and the role of Spain in Napoleon Bonaparte's plans to rebuild the European political space are most often viewed through the prism of the liberation movement that has unfolded on the territory of the Spanish state since 1808, directed against France's attempt to put Spain and the Iberian Peninsula as a whole under its full control. Franco-Spanish relations are somewhat on the sidelines when considering the main problems of international politics of the late XVIII - early XIX centuries. due to both geographical and political factors. It seems important to analyze the evolution of Franco-Spanish relations on the eve of the large-scale conflict that has unfolded since 1808. In Spanish historiography, the term "War of Independence" (Spanish La Guerra de la Independencia) is usually used for this conflict, in French historiography it is referred to as the "Spanish War" (French La guerre d'Espagne), and in Portugal, after the British, it is called the "Peninsular War" (English. The Peninsular War). If we count from General Junot's campaign through Spain to Lisbon in the autumn of 1807 and take into account the most difficult campaign in southwestern France, from Bayonne to Toulouse in the first four months of 1814, it turns out that the Pyrenean War took about six years. Fighting on the Iberian Peninsula took place almost daily, both small skirmishes and large battles took place, which entered the history of military art in several European countries ^{[18, pp. 59-60]}. Napoleon himself viewed the conflict in Spain as a "fatal knot" and, reflecting on his past in exile on fr. St. Helena, he recognized that the invasion of Spain was the first significant mistake in a series of his actions that predetermined the fall of the First Empire in 1814.

Due to geographical, political and socio-cultural reasons, Franco-Spanish relations have a long history. In the context of the growing global political and economic confrontation between Great Britain and France, which also affected the Iberian Peninsula, Spain most often sided with the latter during the XVIII century. At the same time, it is possible to note not only political, but also cultural ties between the two countries. For example, the Spanish monarchy had a great influence on the emergence of court etiquette during the French "Great Century". On the other hand, certain echoes of Enlightenment ideas came from France and, despite the rather strong conservative sentiments in Spanish society, thinkers, writers and politicians of liberal views also appeared in it.

To understand the causes of the war that unfolded in 1808 in Spain, it is necessary to analyze the evolution of Franco-Spanish relations, to identify their relationship with the internal political changes that occurred in Spain and France after 1789. In general, the history of Franco-Spanish relations during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars can be considered based on the following periodization: Stage 1 (1789-1795) – revolution and internal political crisis in France, cooling of Franco-Spanish relations; struggle against revolutionary influence in Spain; Franco-Spanish war as part of the war of the First anti–French coalition; conclusion of the Basel Peace Treaty (July 22, 1795); Stage 2 (1796-1798) - conclusion of the Second Treaty in San FranciscoIldefonso On August 19, 1796, the French Directory and the Spanish government create a military alliance aimed primarily against Great Britain;Stage 3 (1799-1807) – the preservation of the Franco-Spanish alliance during the Consulate in France, the conclusion of the Third Treaty of San Ildefonso on October 1, 1800 and the Treaty of Aranjuez on March 21, 1801; the growth of French influence on the foreign policy of the Spanish Kingdom; the Spanish-Portuguese "Orange War"; the establishment of the regime of the First Empire in France; the Treaty of Fontainebleau on October 27, 1807 and the Franco-Spanish invasion of Portugal;Stage 4 (1808-1814) – The Madrid Uprising and the Bayonne abdication in May 1808, military operations in Spain and Portugal, in which anti-French forces, with the support of Great Britain, oppose Napoleon and his brother Joseph Bonaparte, who took the Spanish throne; the unfolding of a large–scale guerrilla war in Spain - "guerillas"; spring 1814 – the loss of control over Spain by Napoleon's troops.

The main attention in the proposed work will be paid to the analysis of relations between France and Spain in 1799-1807, since it is at this stage that important political changes take place in both countries, which later lead to the war on the Iberian Peninsula that unfolded in 1808. The war in Spain as part of the Napoleonic Wars has been studied in general more deeply and comprehensively than the previous stages of Franco-Spanish relations. Due to the scale and impact of this conflict on subsequent events and the results of the Napoleonic Wars, it seems reasonable to consider this stage in a separate study. Therefore, in the article we will limit ourselves to analyzing the first three stages.

The first stage of the evolution of Franco-Spanish relations, based on the periodization proposed above, should begin with the influence of the revolutionary changes taking place in France. Spain's first reaction to the events of 1789 in Paris was not overtly hostile. The Spanish monarchy, like the French, did not immediately realize the depth of the political process that had begun. Moreover, at that time, the Spanish government was forced to solve internal problems – riots broke out in Catalonia, there was a tense food situation due to a series of crop failures.

When the Spanish government realized the seriousness of the situation in France, it decided to establish a kind of "sanitary cordon" against the revolutionary "plague". The Inquisition was authorized to confiscate printed materials and manuscripts of an anti-monarchical nature. The army was put on alert, and movement to France was difficult. About 14 thousand French families in Spain were taken under special supervision. The trial of the French king Louis XVI and his execution in January 1793 inclined Spain to the side of the enemies of France. This incident had a certain significance for the relations between the two countries over the next fifteen years. Even when the two countries became allies, the Spanish Bourbons could not forget about the revolutionary atrocities and the execution of the French royal couple.

In 1793-1795, the Franco-Spanish War was fought as part of the war of the First Anti-French Coalition. This conflict was limited to the borders of the Pyrenees. The contingents that participated in it were small compared to the armies in other theaters of war. On the French side, an ideological argument was put forward for launching hostilities against Spain – the Revolution was fighting the Bourbons. It was also believed that the operations in Europe were a prelude to further hostilities in the colonies, which indicates the expansionist motives of the French revolutionary authorities. The Franco-Spanish war could also disrupt colonial trade and affect British finances. The first battles of this war were successful for the Spaniards, who threatened Bayonne and surrounded Perpignan. Paris decided to strengthen its troops by clearing the Mediterranean Sea. This allowed the British to attack Toulon. The subsequent French counteroffensive was crowned with success, the French penetrated into Spain and occupied a number of territories.

In early 1795, the first Minister of Spain and royal favorite Manuel de Godoy found himself in a difficult situation. His policies were criticized by Spanish liberals, who considered him an adventurer, unable to engage in serious public affairs. Also, due to problems both inside the country and failures in the war, support for King Charles IV and his wife, Maria Luisa of Parma, began to decline among the population. At this time, some French politicians began to speak more and more often from the rostrum of the revolutionary Convention about the need to make peace with Spain and involve it in a war against the real enemy – Great Britain. As a result, on July 22, 1795, the Basel Peace Treaty was signed between Spain and France. According to Article 4 of this treaty, the French Republic returned "to the King of Spain all conquered territories, from which French troops will be evacuated within fifteen days after the exchange of instruments of ratification." Article 9 also stated that "in exchange for the restitution provided for in Article 4, the King of Spain, in the interests of himself and his successors, cedes and transfers to the French Republic the entire Spanish part of the island of San Domingo in the West Indies" ^[19]. Thus, although the Spanish monarchy lost part of its colonial possessions, at least all European possessions were returned to it.

The second stage in the development of Franco-Spanish relations is associated with the rapprochement of the two countries after Spain's withdrawal from the First anti-French Coalition. On August 19, 1796, the Government of Godoy concluded the Treaty of San Ildefonso with France (the Second Treaty of San Ildefonso). This agreement sealed the military alliance of the two powers against Great Britain. The latter responded by actually disrupting maritime ties between Spain and its American colonies ^{[5, p. 303]}.

The Treaty of San Ildefon outlined the conditions for mutual assistance in case one of the countries finds itself in a state of war. Many historians believe that the alliance with France contradicted the interests of the Spanish monarchy, because the conflict with Great Britain was fraught with severing ties with the colonies, and potentially even their loss. The subsequent war with the British sharply worsened the already difficult economic condition of the Spanish Empire, trade between the colonies and the metropolis was interrupted ^{[2, pp. 79-80]}.

Thus, after the conclusion of the Basel Peace Treaty, Spain enters the orbit of French influence, but at the same time plays the role of a junior partner. Under direct pressure from the French government, Spain declared war on Great Britain and Portugal on October 6, 1796. However, for the Spaniards, this war was unsuccessful. The British navy completely blocked Spanish ports, as a result of which Spain's trade with Europe and South America was paralyzed. In 1797, Madrid was forced to allow the colonies to trade with neutral countries, which violated the principle of trade monopoly that existed in the Spanish Empire ^{[7, p. 362]}. Military defeats and the economic crisis that broke out in the country became the reasons for Godoy's resignation in March 1798 ^{[13, p. 193]}.

Further, as part of the analysis of the evolution of Franco-Spanish relations in the late XVIII – early XIX centuries, we will consider in more detail the stage of 1799-1807. The coup in France, as a result of which the general of the Republican army, Napoleon Bonaparte, acquired enormous power in the country, began on 18 Brumaire (November 9), 1799, and the decisive action took place the next day – on 19 Brumaire (November 10). At impromptu meetings of the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Elders, a decree was adopted according to which all power in the French Republic was transferred to three persons – Consuls Bonaparte, Sieyes and Roger Ducos ^{[6, pp. 125, 129]}.

It is important to note that the coup of 18 Brumaire in France was at first positively received in official Spanish circles. The news of the end of the Directory was a relief for many Spaniards, as they did not feel sympathy for it due to French interference in their internal affairs and constant, sometimes contradictory, demands for the application of the Treaty of San Ildefon in 1796. Diplomatic relations with the Directory have deteriorated significantly since 1798, and, in addition, there was widespread It is widely believed that the French government encouraged plans to spread the revolution to Spain and most likely wanted to overthrow the Bourbon monarchy here in the future.

The coup and the establishment of a new political regime in France coincided with the difficult domestic political situation in Spain. At that time, the Spanish government was headed by Mariano Luis de Urquijo, who was a significant political figure in 1798-1800. He sought to carry out a number of rather radical reforms, largely influenced by the policy of the French Directory. It was also important that these reforms directly affected the influence and interests of the Inquisition and the Catholic Church in Spain. Thus, in the period 1798-1800, the foundations began to be laid for the creation of a national Spanish church, headed by bishops and relatively independent from Rome from an economic and legal point of view.

Despite the difficult international situation of Spain, the internal political struggle was most of all occupied by the political elite, at the court and in the highest circles of Spanish society there were all sorts of intrigues and maneuvers between the two factions, led respectively by Urquijo and Godoy. The political coup of 1799 in France had a direct impact on this situation, since in Spain it was interpreted in such a way that it created favorable conditions for the subsequent triumph of Urquijo's opponents. Unlike the period when the Directory was in power, for some time there was no direct interference of the new French regime in the internal politics of Spain. However, it became clear that it was no longer possible to continue Urquiho's policy. Nevertheless, under the direct influence of Napoleon Bonaparte, significant changes in French foreign policy soon began to take place, which concealed some uncertainty for the future and in turn influenced the international position of Spain.

On October 1, 1800, the Spanish government, represented by Urquijo, concluded the Treaty of San Ildefonso with France (the "Third Treaty of San Ildefonso"), in which France undertook to expand the territory of the Duchy of Parma of the Bourbons at the expense of the territories of Tuscany (Article I), and Spain would cede Louisiana to France and put six warships at its disposal, ready to transport French equipment and supplies for the army in Egypt (Articles III, IV and V). Interestingly, Article VII specifically stipulated that "the obligations contained in this treaty in no way deviate from those expressed in the Treaty of Alliance signed in San Ildefonso ... on the contrary, they re-unite the interests of the two Powers and provide guarantees provided for in the Treaty of Alliance, in all cases, in which they should be applied to" ^[20].

Urquijo, satisfied with the agreement because it met the historical aspirations of Spain, tried to prove that Louisiana had cost Spain much more than it was worth, and that therefore it was advantageous to exchange it for Tuscany. The agreement surprised the Spanish court, which interpreted it as an act of "generosity on the part of the master of Europe," as Bonaparte was sometimes called somewhat prematurely. The Spanish Bourbons and their government believed that the establishment of a Consulate in France would be the beginning of a time favorable for Spanish foreign policy and the realization of its interests. However, subsequent events showed that this was largely an illusion.

Despite attempts to strengthen his position, including by maintaining allied relations with France, Urquijo was well aware that his political opponents inside the country were becoming stronger. In August 1800, the French Ambassador Alquier informed Talleyrand of the possibility of an impending change of government in Spain, prompted by Queen Marie Louise and Godoy's growing ambition. At the same time, in order to dismiss Urquijo, French intervention was optional, given the sufficient number of his opponents inside the country. Allied relations with France provoked opposition from the aristocrats of the conditional "English" party. In 1799-1800 . Urquijo was accused of embezzlement and illegal personal enrichment, and King Charles IV began to listen to these accusations. At the same time, Urquiho managed to stay in power longer than expected. His resignation took place only at the end of 1800, coinciding with the strengthening of the new regime in France and the arrival of Lucien Bonaparte, the younger brother of the first consul, to Spain as ambassador. The consequences of the coup d'etat in France turned out to be disastrous for Urhiko for two main reasons: 1) the gradual rapprochement of Napoleonic France with the Holy See began, and the papal authorities were dissatisfied with the church reforms carried out by the head of the Spanish government; and 2) the first consul had a personal negative opinion about Urquijo in connection with his anti-papal policy, possible sympathies with the ideas of the Jacobins, as well as due to Urquijo's refusal to transfer at one time to Spanish language two works dedicated to the Italian and Egyptian campaigns of Bonaparte.

Thus, the personal dislike on the part of the First Consul of France and some of Urquijo's sympathies for the radical ideas of the Jacobins influenced Bonaparte's attitude towards the Spanish first minister. A particularly difficult topic for Franco-Spanish relations was Spain's refusal to provide substantial naval assistance to its ally. However, this position of Spain was explained, among other things, by the fact that for many years its fleet lacked the people and good supplies to man the ships that Bonaparte demanded. In the end, Bonaparte, through his brother Lucien and through other channels, began to express sympathy for Godoy, who, after a short break at the end of 1800, again came to the fore and began to determine the internal and foreign policy of the Spanish kingdom.

The Spanish court expected from the Consulate, in addition to the help it needed to implement its plans in Italy, the end of the revolution in France itself and the cessation of attempts to transfer it to Spain. King Charles IV welcomed the emergence of a new French government. Moreover, based on popular opinion, especially among French emigrants, he hoped that Bonaparte would restore the constitutional monarchy in France. It is important to note that the attitude of the King of Spain towards Bonaparte was also influenced by Jose Nicolas de Asara, an important figure at court. Asara had a deep knowledge of France, and for a while he was ambassador to that country. At the same time, Asara met personally with Bonaparte on several occasions. Being an opponent of the policies of Secretary of State Urquijo and the French Directory, Asara expressed a favorable opinion of the new leader of France.

The assessment of Bonaparte's personality in the Spanish high society was, nevertheless, sometimes very contradictory. Many admired his military abilities and believed that by consolidating his political power in France, he would gain control over Europe. That is why the Spanish groups opposed to the alliance with France were very disappointed, because they lost confidence in the victory of the British and, as a result, their political positions weakened inside the country. At the court of the Spanish king, they hoped for the possibility of achieving peace in Europe, which was very important, given the difficult economic situation of the monarchy. In 1800, Bonaparte defeated Austria, the main opponent of the Spanish plans for Parma, on the battlefield. The military successes of the first consul and his subsequent rapprochement with the Catholic Church gave new hopes to the "French" group in Spain, formed around the Queen and Godoy, and seriously weakened the positions of Urquijo and the "English" party.

The position of the First consul regarding Spain was also not unambiguous. On the one hand, Bonaparte was confident of the material benefits of an alliance with Spain, although he was not well aware of the real state of affairs in the kingdom. Like most Frenchmen of the time, he overestimated the capabilities of her army, as well as the ability of the Spanish royal family to influence Italian affairs. On the other hand, the first consul spoke negatively about Spain, criticizing its backwardness, which he attributed to the influence of the Inquisition and religious fanaticism. Bonaparte was convinced of the incapacity of the Spanish rulers, noted the destabilizing role of constant intrigues at the Spanish royal court and the high level of corruption.

Despite the above-mentioned factors that influenced the relations between the two countries, France, after the establishment of the Consulate regime, sought rapprochement with Spain. The style of diplomatic work that prevailed during the Directory's time has been changed. Thus, the previous practice of exchanging gifts, interrupted at the beginning of the revolutionary period, was resumed. Godoy was seriously attacked by the Directory and as a result was forced to resign from the government in 1798. Therefore, a change in attitude towards him from the new French government favored him politically. The establishment of good relations between Lucien Bonaparte and Godoy proved that the first consul favourably views the "prince of peace" to return to power in Spain. In December 1800 Urquijo was removed from the post of Secretary of State, and Pedro Cevallos, who was under the full influence of Godoy, was appointed in his place. The royal favorite himself was appointed generalissimo and had the right to obey only the monarch, which gave him great power ^{[2, p. 81]}.

The Spanish court hoped to use France and its growing influence to carry out its plans in Italy for the expansion of the Duchy of Parma. It was believed that the Consulate would be the beginning of a favorable period for Spanish foreign policy interests. However, the reality turned out to be completely different, and it immediately became clear that maintaining friendly relations with Bonaparte was pushing the Spanish monarchy towards a foreign policy that required it to carry out serious obligations and required the expenditure of its material resources and military potential. In addition, the first consul did not always act in favor of his ally and, moreover, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Spain did not provide full naval assistance to protect Malta and rescue the French army in Egypt.

Immediately after coming to power, Napoleon analyzed and came to what needed to be done to bring Spanish politics under control. Bonaparte knew that Godoy had enough enemies inside Spain, and the latter needed to succeed in order to strengthen his influence. About to sign an agreement on the fate of the Duchy of Parma, Bonaparte expressed a desire for Spain to start a war with Portugal in order, among other things, to weaken the influence of the British in the Pyrenees. It could also help France itself in its confrontation with Great Britain, and against his political opponents in Spain.

To implement these plans, Bonaparte sent his brother Lucien as ambassador to Madrid. At the same time, Lucien needed to negotiate with Godoy, the only person who, by all accounts, could overcome Charles IV's reluctance to go to war with the country where his eldest daughter was the wife of Prince Regent Juan. Therefore, when, at the end of 1800, Bonaparte set himself the task of removing Portugal from British influence, he did not hesitate to turn to the person whom he considered the most suitable for this task.

After Godoy's return to power, France and Spain signed the Treaty of Aranjuez on March 21, 1801, which fixed the terms of the Treaty of San Ildefon in 1800. According to the treaty, Spain returned Louisiana to the French, which had been received by the Peace of Paris in 1763. As compensation for Louisiana, France undertook to create the Kingdom of Etruria on the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Tuscany. This kingdom was intended as compensation to the relatives of Charles IV and Marie Louise, the Dukes of Parma, who lost their duchy during Napoleon's Italian campaign. Both treaties once again demonstrated Spain's dependence on France and the subordination of Madrid's foreign policy to dynastic interests at the expense of national interests ^{[2, p. 82]}.

In fact, after the conclusion of the above-mentioned treaties, Spain became a hostage to Bonaparte's policy in Italy. From that moment on, the real influence of the Spanish Bourbons in the Italian states practically disappears. To top it all off, the first consul tried to delay the entry into possession of the newly formed Kingdom of Etruria of its ruler, Luigi of Bourbon–Parma (Louis I), heir to the Duke of Parma and husband of Charles IV's daughter, by forcing him to pass through Paris before settling in his kingdom. The "Parma affair" has always depended on Bonaparte's policy towards Austria, and Napoleon often pushed the interests of his Spanish ally into the background. Therefore, the wishes of the Spanish King Charles IV and his wife meant little in solving this issue. Bonaparte actually used his ally – he returned to France a territory that would be very useful in possible negotiations with England, left Spain strategic control over the port of Livorno, which was disputed by the British and Neapolitans, received arguments for increasing Spain's demands for naval assistance and demonstrated his ability to redraw the political map of Italy by creating a new one the kingdom. On the other hand, the generally positive reaction of the Spaniards regarding the resolution of the issue with the Duchy of Parma allowed the first consul to further increase the requirements for Spain to provide assistance within the framework of the existing union.

When signing the Treaty of San Ildefon in 1800, the Spanish side particularly insisted that France give firm guarantees not to sell or alienate in any way the property and ownership rights of Louisiana ^{[15, p. 82]}. Such a promise was made by the French government, but this did not prevent it from being broken later. Bonaparte decided in 1803 to sell Louisiana to the United States. At that time, Europe was on the verge of a new war, and the goodwill of the United States seemed to the French leader more important than the precarious possession of this distant territory. In addition, the French Navy was not yet ready, capable of securing communication with Louisiana ^{[9, p. 202]}. The example of resolving the issue with Louisiana proves once again that France did not consider Spain as an equal partner in their alliance.

Bonaparte did not forget about his main opponent in Europe, and indeed in the world – Great Britain. The traditional partner of the British on the Iberian Peninsula was Portugal, with which allied relations began in the XIV century, when in 1373, when an agreement was concluded between King Edward III of England and King Fernando I. Portugal by the beginning of the XIX century. It still remained in the orbit of Great Britain's influence.

Based on the tasks of the political and economic struggle with the British, Bonaparte decided to push Spain to solve the Portuguese problem. He correctly calculated that Godoy would not resist his demands, because in the midst of a power struggle within the Spanish monarchy, Godoy would need the support of the "master of Europe". Thus, Spain's participation in Portuguese affairs was guaranteed, as was its cooperation in the implementation of the First Consul's broad foreign policy program. Already on January 29, 1801, Lucien Bonaparte and Godoy signed an agreement in Madrid, according to which they decided to send ultimatum demands to Portugal that it completely sever diplomatic and economic ties with Great Britain. Having received the refusal of the Portuguese government, Godoy beat Napoleon and attacked Portugal first, avoiding the advance of French troops through Spanish territory.

The Spanish-Portuguese War began on May 20, 1801, and ended in early June. However, instead of completely occupying Portugal and taking Lisbon, which Napoleon hoped for, Godoy began peace negotiations with the Portuguese. It is interesting to note that as a war trophy, the Spanish generalissimo presented Queen Maria Luisa with several branches plucked from Portuguese orange trees. Hence, another name for this conflict is the "Orange War" ^{[2, p. 82]}.

The Spanish-Portuguese War ended with the signing of the peace Treaty of Badajoz on June 6, 1801. According to this agreement, Portugal was obliged to pay a contribution of 25 million francs, transfer to France part of its American territories north of Brazil, and transfer to Spain the city of Olivenza with adjacent territories. The Portuguese also had to close their ports to the British military and merchant fleet ^{[16, p. 247]}.

The following year, after the negotiations, France and its allies (Spain and the Batavian Republic) conclude the Treaty of Amiens with Great Britain on March 27, and peace comes to Europe. The French and their allies received back the colonies captured from them (except Ceylon and Trinidad). However, already in May 1803, the conflict between the French and the British resumed ^{[3, p. 18]}, and in 1804, hostilities began for Spain.

In 1804, two important changes also took place in the internal political life of France. First, the Civil Code was approved, in the development of which the First Consul himself took an active part. In honor of him, this normative act is also sometimes called the Napoleon Code. The Civil Code of 1804 became a model for the adoption of codes of a number of European countries ^{[10, p. 290]}. Secondly, on May 18, 1804, a special decree of the French Senate proclaimed that "the government of the Republic trusted the emperor, who would take the title of Emperor of the French" ^{[14, pp. 444-445]}. On December 2, 1804, the magnificent coronation ceremony of Napoleon and his wife Josephine took place in Notre Dame Cathedral. Thus, the regime of the First Empire was established in France. All these changes had an impact on her further foreign policy course.

When Napoleon came to power, he acted in many ways empirically, without a clear plan. His decisions were not necessarily the fruit of carefully thought-out plans and, on the contrary, were often a simple reaction to the circumstances of a particular moment, an ill-considered step in the chain of events that, in the opinion of the emperor, were supposed to lead to universal peace on the continent, provided that France was in the position of hegemon.

As a result of the gradual satelization of Spain, its foreign policy turned out to be almost completely subordinated to the will of its northern neighbor. At the same time, supporters of rapprochement with Great Britain remained in the country, or at least those people who were against the comprehensive subordination of France in the foreign policy course. This situation forced Godoy to play a double game, thus, a future confrontation with the Napoleonic Empire was planned.

As a result of the participation of anti-French coalitions in the wars, crisis phenomena have worsened in Spain itself. The country began to experience difficulties due to the increasing British naval blockade. The food crisis of 1802-1805 led to famine and rising prices. The lack of regular trade with the colonies made it impossible to compensate for these difficulties. The United States, taking advantage of Spain's predicament, actually became the main trading partner for the Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Spain's difficult economic situation has affected the instability of public finances and devalued the national currency.

Speaking about the evolution of Franco-Spanish relations in the early 19th century, it is necessary to note Godoy's special personal role in the domestic and foreign policy of the Spanish monarchy. Often his figure in historical memory is endowed mainly with negative features. However, during the period of Godoy's rule in Spain, an attempt was made to carry out a number of transformations in the spirit of the Enlightenment: the power of the Inquisition was limited, assistance was provided to the disadvantaged, there were measures to support scientists and artists, road infrastructure and agricultural production were being developed.

To explain some of the ambiguity and inconsistency of Godoy's policy, it is necessary to remember that he had to act in a very hostile environment, he had many opponents from very different strata of society. Conservatives criticized him for seeking to reduce the role of the church in society. Supporters of progress and reform were outraged by the book censorship and control of the press and printing houses in Spain. The masses of the population often saw Godoy's figure as the reason for their difficult economic situation. Godoy's opponents in Spain gradually began to group around the figure of Prince Ferdinand of Asturias, the son of King Charles IV. In addition, as noted earlier, many of Godoy's opponents in Spain linked the country's future with Great Britain, not France. They believed that due to the short-sighted policy of the royal favorite, Spain was losing its power and turning into a secondary European country. At the same time, the pro-French foreign policy was conducted not only by Godoy, but also by the government of his political rival Urquijo. At the same time, Godoy gradually began to incline towards the need for a break with France in the future and to side with its opponents in Europe.

The Franco-Spanish military alliance was seriously tested in the autumn of 1805. On October 20, when the French emperor accepted the surrender of the Austrian army of General Mack at Ulm, a great naval battle was unfolding at Cape Trafalgar. By the night of October 21, the Franco-Spanish fleet under the command of Admiral Villeneuve was defeated by the British, led by Admiral Nelson. Despite the death of the British naval commander, it was a brilliant victory that consolidated the hegemony of Great Britain on the seas ^{[17, p. 255]}. For France, the defeat in the Trafalgar Naval Battle meant abandoning further plans to land directly on the British Isles. After that, Spain no longer had reliable means of communication and ways to maintain trade with its colonies. In fact, it was the beginning of the end of the Spanish colonial empire.

After Trafalgar, it became obvious to many representatives of the Spanish ruling circles that the benefits of cooperation with Napoleonic France were becoming negligible. Spain suffered significant material and reputational costs in connection with the war against Great Britain. Therefore, Spanish policy became increasingly inconsistent. In February 1806, Godoy proposed to Napoleon once again to solve the "Portuguese question" by conquering and dividing Portugal and its colonial possessions in the future. At that moment, this proposal remained unanswered, because Napoleon was engaged in redrawing the political map of the territories of the former Holy Roman Empire of the German nation.

Franco-Spanish relations began to deteriorate. When in the autumn of 1806 Napoleon became embroiled in a war with Prussia, on whose victory Godoy was betting, Spain began to hatch secret plans to break the unpopular alliance with France ^{[21, p. 28]}. For example, in a conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire A.Ya. Budberg, the Spanish envoy Count Noronha spoke in the spirit that "Spain has long been burdened by the tyranny of the French government and that even the ruling party, which since the conclusion of the Basel Peace has encouraged the Madrid court to follow a policy consistent with the interests of France, renounces its misconceptions and, Thus, there is every reason to believe that under favorable circumstances, his Catholic Majesty will not hesitate to throw off the yoke of Bonaparte and return to the right path" ^{[1, pp. 313-314]}.

Also, for Spain, the issue of control over the colonies was acute, which, as noted above, was largely lost. In order to save his own position and his king, Godoy intensified diplomatic work on the possible transition of Spain to the side of the anti-French coalition. In part, this ambivalence in matters of the Franco-Spanish alliance was one of the reasons for Napoleon's transition to more decisive action on the Iberian Peninsula in 1807-1808.

Due to the increased rivalry between Godoy and supporters of the heir to the royal throne, Ferdinand, Napoleon could have relied on the latter to strengthen his influence in Spain and prevent its withdrawal from the alliance with France. Moreover, the Prince of Asturias expressed a desire to marry a representative of the French imperial family. However, Napoleon did not take any action to put Ferdinand and the opponents of the royal favorite at the head of Spain instead of Charles IV and Godoy. However, it became obvious to the emperor of the French that sooner or later it would be necessary to pay attention to Spain in order to somehow resolve the internal political conflict.

In 1807, Napoleon once again threatened Portugal with armed intervention if it did not close its ports to British ships. At the same time, he also said that if Portugal does not comply with his demands, Spain will declare war on it along with France. He made this statement in mid-July 1807, without even negotiating with Spain on this issue. It was only on September 8 that he sent a letter to Charles IV, in which he stressed that at the moment it was urgently necessary to wrest Portugal from British influence in order to encourage the British to ask for peace ^{[22, p. 13-31]}.

As already noted, until 1807, the mainstay of Great Britain on the Iberian Peninsula, apart from the enclave of Gibraltar, was Portugal, a commercial partner that did not close its ports to British military and commercial vessels. It served as a transshipment base between Great Britain and the Mediterranean Sea, where British garrisons, limited in their capabilities, were located in Malta and the islands of Sardinia and Sicily ^{[8, p. 63]}.

The conclusion of the Treaty of Fontainebleau in October 1807, which provided for the future division of Portuguese lands, was supposed to strengthen the alliance between Spain and France. The arrival of French troops crossing Spain on their way to Portugal strengthened Napoleon's position both in relation to Prince Ferdinand and in relation to Godoy ^{[11, p. 286]}.

By November 1807, it became obvious that a significant part of the Spanish population was increasingly inclined to Charles IV to hand over the throne to his son. In this case, Godoy's all-powerful royal favorite was facing an uncertain future and, most likely, arrest. Napoleon instructed his diplomats to report on whose favor public opinion was leaning. Being an ally of Spain, Napoleon considered himself entitled to intervene in the impending succession crisis. Napoleon began to think about replacing the Spanish Bourbons on the throne with one of his relatives.

The events that followed in 1808 marked a new stage in the history of Franco-Spanish relations. They led to the outbreak of a large-scale war on the Iberian Peninsula between, on the one hand, the defenders of Spanish independence, supported by Great Britain and, on the other hand, the French occupation army and a few "afrancesados" or "Josefinos" - supporters of King Jose I (Joseph Bonaparte). The entry of the Napoleonic troops, their gradual deployment in various cities of the kingdom and, finally, the sudden occupation in the conditions of political instability generated by the Bourbons, were quite hostile measures that did not please the Spanish population, who believed that they were dealing with an ally.

The French government is forcing the entry of a contingent of French troops into Spanish territory under the official pretext of sending an army to Cadiz to besiege Gibraltar as part of the fight against Great Britain. By the beginning of 1808, it became obvious that a significant part of the French troops would remain in Spain. Godoy tried to take a number of steps that would not allow the group behind Ferdinand to seize the initiative and take power into his own hands against the backdrop of the unfolding internal conflict and the French occupation of the kingdom's territory. Supporters of the Prince of Asturias decided to take the initiative into their own hands and mutinied in Aranjuez on the night of March 17-18, where Godoy transported the royal family. The rebels forced Charles IV to get rid of Godoy, and two days later they forced him to abdicate in favor of his son, who thus became the new king of Spain under the name Ferdinand VII.

Another significant event occurred on May 2, 1808, when the inhabitants of Madrid rose in revolt to prevent the French from taking the youngest son of Charles IV out of the capital. This was the beginning of the Spanish national liberation war against Napoleonic France. In early May 1808, at a special meeting organized in Bayonne by Napoleon, both key representatives of the Spanish Bourbons, Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII, abdicated the Spanish throne under pressure from the French emperor. Further, Napoleon, with the participation of the Council of Castile, on June 6, by a special decree proclaims his elder brother Joseph as the new king of Spain ^{[11, pp. 287, 291]}.

Napoleon assumed that the Spaniards would not be hostile to the change of a dynasty of foreign origin. When the Habsburgs lost their positions in Spain at the beginning of the XVIII century, it was the French Bourbon dynasty that gave the country a new life. Moreover, due to political changes in other parts of Europe, which occurred due to the victorious military campaigns of Napoleon, the Bonaparte dynasty began to acquire a certain legitimacy. Joseph Bonaparte was positioned as a bearer of more progressive values than the former Bourbons. Napoleon wanted to develop and introduce a constitution in Spain that would be similar to the French one. The enthronement of Joseph Bonaparte was supposed to promote the introduction of more liberal legislation in Spain that could satisfy the population.

If he talks about the prerequisites that caused the outbreak of the Iberian War or the War of Independence, then, firstly, it should be noted that there were actually several "Spaniards". A significant part of the population was quite conservative in their views, but a small part of intellectuals, the nobility and even the highest aristocracy in some way sympathized with the ideas of the French Revolution and saw in Napoleon and France the hope for progressive changes in their own country - from politics, legislation, economy and ending with the cultural sphere. Secondly, Spain was in the orbit of the Anglo-French confrontation, and an important factor in this confrontation was the desire to maintain a Spanish presence at sea in order to maintain ties with the Spanish colonies in different parts of the world. But the loss of a significant part of the Spanish fleet after the Battle of Trafalgar undermined the naval and colonial power of Spain, which aggravated the economic situation in the metropolis. Many attributed the causes of all these misfortunes that befell the kingdom to the Franco-Spanish alliance. Thirdly, Napoleon most likely did not have reliable information about what was happening inside Spain and what political sentiments prevailed there. It can be assumed that when he went to meet with Karl and Ferdinand in Bayonne, he was not aware of the Spanish political realities. There were reports from French agents in Spain that the people welcomed the French army when it went on a Portuguese campaign. It was also reported that the figure of Napoleon himself is very popular among Spaniards, that all segments of the Spanish population admire the successes of the French emperor. This, however, was completely untrue. It should also be borne in mind that very often French informants communicated with representatives of the Spanish intelligentsia and aristocracy, who supported the ideas of the French Enlightenment and saw Napoleon as the creator of a new world.

In general, the situation in Spain, which had developed by 1808, contributed to the temporary unification of social groups focused on different values and ideals, sometimes polar and otherwise incompatible. For many participants in the liberation struggle against Napoleon, France of the Enlightenment and Revolution was the personification of evil, and the war against it was a "holy Crusade", i.e. a crusade. The unfolding resistance movement to the power of Napoleonic France was one of the last manifestations of national unanimity, although even then the phenomenon of the "two Spaniards" began to manifest itself, later expressed in revolutionary events and internal crises that engulfed the Spanish monarchy in the 19th century ^{[12, pp. 124-125]}.

Summing up, it should be noted that at the end of the XVIII - early XIX centuries, Franco-Spanish relations went through different stages of their development, due to the influence of both internal and external factors. The political changes in France during the revolution and the subsequent rise to power of Napoleon Bonaparte played an important role in the evolution of relations between the two countries.

During the Directory, tensions in Franco-Spanish relations increased due to France's insistent requests for naval assistance. Some changes in Franco-Spanish relations occurred after the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire. Unlike the government of the Directory, the first consul did not at first interfere directly in the internal politics of Spain, but in foreign policy Bonaparte's influence became decisive. The first consul of the French Republic, who became emperor in 1804, also constantly demanded from his Spanish allies the widest possible participation in military operations, primarily against Great Britain. Napoleon wanted to use the Spanish fleet to fight for Malta and to support the French army in Egypt. The repeated refusal of the Spaniards to provide this assistance due to financial difficulties and the difference in the strategy of the two countries led to a constant exchange of complaints through the diplomatic line. Spain wanted to send its fleet, first of all, to liberate the colonies captured by Great Britain. In addition, helping the French in Egypt created great difficulties for the Spanish government, since the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of severing diplomatic relations with Spain. There was a risk of the conflict spreading to the North African States, which would put Spain in a difficult situation, since wheat trade with these countries was of vital importance to it.

Bonaparte often disregarded the usual formal rules in dealing with an ally. Successive heads of Spanish government have constantly complained about the lack or lack of information about France's negotiations and agreements with other countries, even when it directly concerned Spanish interests. Moreover, Bonaparte evaded the fulfillment of certain agreements with Spain, which he himself promoted. This was the case, for example, with the maritime agreement signed by the two countries on February 13, 1801, the plans of which were never implemented, since the first consul considered them useless shortly after signing. Thus, the Spanish monarchy in relations with its French ally was often in a state of uncertainty, not knowing what might happen to the signed agreements and treaties.

It can be argued that until the outbreak of the War of Independence in Spain, there was a gradual satelization. She was involved in a difficult international situation, which in many ways contradicted Spanish interests and aggravated the already difficult economic situation in the country, and control over the processes taking place in the colonies was increasingly lost. For France, Spain's essentially subordinate position was very advantageous in light of the global confrontation with Great Britain and attempts to build a system of Continental blockade. In addition, France considered Spain as a counterweight to pro-British Portugal and a springboard for its conquest. However, the lack of reliable information from the French government about the mood within Spanish society, the split within the ruling circles of Spain, the sometimes arrogant attitude of France towards its ally, diplomatic maneuvering and the ambivalence of Godoy's policy on the eve of 1808 led to a number of steps on the part of Napoleon, which caused a full-scale war in the Pyrenees. The French emperor was forced to attract significant forces to fight the Spaniards, which did not allow them to be used in other directions. An impressive part of the Spanish population has participated in a real guerrilla war since 1808 – "guerilla" ("guerilla"). All this undermined to a large extent the forces of Napoleonic France and eventually became one of the reasons for the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire in 1814.