The problems of the theory of the reference of signs in modern linguistics

Chilingaryan Kamo Pavelovich ORCID: 0000-0002-3863-8603 Associate Professor; Department of Foreign Languages of the Higher School of Management; P.Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 10 Miklukho-Maklaya str., office 707, Moscow, 117198, Russia chilingaryan_kp@pfur.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The relevance of the research is due to the need for a systematic analysis of the development of the theory of reference, which is one of the key problems in the philosophy of language and semiotics, as well as the fact that the theory of reference and the problems of the relationship of signs plays an important role in understanding the processes of communication and the possibilities of cognition in modern society. The theory of reference allows us to analyze how we use signs to designate objects and phenomena of the real world. Referential is a key concept in linguistics that describes the ability of words or expressions to point to objects in the real world. The theory of reference studies how language connects words with their referents and how this affects the understanding of the text.

One of the research methods is historical and philosophical analysis, which allows us to trace the development of the theory of reference from its origins to modern views.

The subject of the study is the history of the development and current state of the theory of reference, which reflects a variety of approaches and concepts. Some researchers believe that reference is a purely semantic phenomenon, while others emphasize the importance of context and pragmatics for understanding referentiality. The issue of the influence of cultural and social factors on reference in various languages is also being actively investigated. The history of the development of the theory of reference began with the works of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell in the early twentieth century. Frege introduced the concept of semantic reference, arguing that every word has its own referent in the world. Russell developed this idea by proposing a theory of descriptions, according to which words indicate objects by describing their characteristics.

The works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson played an important role in the further development of the theory of reference. Wittgenstein proposed the concept of language games, arguing that reference depends on the context and use of a word in a certain situation. Davidson developed the theory of truth, according to which reference is determined through the connection between language and the world.

The research material was the work of Plato. Kratil, Umberto Eco, Gombrich E. (1960), Lyons, John (1977), Krutkin V. L. (2006), Jacques Derrida, Borges Jorge (1992), Claude Levi-Strauss (1987).

The theoretical basis of the research is the work of such scientists and philosophers as Charles Pierce, F. de Saussure, Gombrich E. (1960), R. Jackendoff (1976), J. Baudrillard, Aristotle, Augustine Aurelius, Charles Pierce, Ferdinand de Saussure, Ray Jackendoff (1976), William James (1890), Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard.

The practical significance of the research consists in the possibility of using the results obtained for further study of the theory of reference, as well as for the development of new approaches to the analysis of communication and cognition processes.

Discussion and results

From the point of view of the relationship between the sign medium and the referent, the traditional dualistic distinction between "conventional signs" (names that we give to people and things) and "natural signs" dates back to Ancient Greece (Plato "Cratylus") ^[1]. Aristotle ^[2] considers words as prototypical examples of conventional signs. Augustine Aurelius ^[3] in 397 AD distinguishes "natural signs" (signa naturalia) from ordinary signs (signa data, "given signs") on the grounds that natural signs are devoid of intentionality and are interpreted as signs due to their direct connection with what they mean (he cites smoke as an example pointing to the fire, and footprints indicating that an animal passed by). Both "natural" and "conventional" signs appear in Charles Pierce's tripartite classification ^[4].

The problems of the theory of the reference of signs in the works of Pierce

Figure 1. The model of the Semitic triangle Ch. The Pier

What Peirce considers the "most fundamental" division of signs was very influential. Although it is often misinterpreted as a classification of various "types of signs", it refers to the various interpretative relationships between a sign medium and its referent. While Saussure's "sign relations" exist between the signifier and the signified (and are internal to the language system), in Peirce's model the concept is referential.

Figure 2. The dyadic model of the sign according to F. de Saussure

Three different relations according to Ch . To the Pier:

Symbolic: based on relationships that are basically unmotivated, arbitrary, or purely conventional, so they need to be coordinated and studied. These are, for example, the language as a whole (plus specific languages, letters of the alphabet, punctuation marks, words, phrases and sentences), numbers, Morse code, traffic lights, national flags.

Iconic: based on perceived similarity or imitation (including some recognizably similar qualities such as appearance, sound, feeling, taste or smell) - for example, portrait, scale model, metaphors, sound effects in some podcast, dubbed movie soundtrack, imitative gestures.

Indexical: based on a direct connection (physical or causal). This relationship can be observed or deduced - for example, "natural signs" (smoke, thunder, footprints, echoes, non-synthetic odors and aromas), medical symptoms, measuring devices (weather vane, thermometer, clock, alcohol level), recordings (photography, film, video or television, voice recorded on audio media), personal "trademarks" (handwriting, phrases).

These three well-established forms of the relationship between the representative and the object form part of the Piers triadic model of the sign. For Pierce, signification is a three—way relationship (requiring an interpreter), not just a two-way sign-object relationship. Nothing is inherently a symbol, icon, or pointer. The same sign means in different contexts may include different sign relations.

Restoring the connection between the sign and reality

The views of Umberto Eco are interesting ^{[5, 6]}. Eco was greatly influenced by Peirce, but he criticizes Peirce's referential realism and, like Saussure ^[7], excludes referentiality from his own communicative "theory of codes". For Eco, "the assumption that the "meaning" of a sign-thing has something to do with the corresponding object" is a "referential misconception."

The real object corresponding to the sign has absolutely no relation to any semiotic purpose. He adds that "the referent of the sign is ... an abstract entity, which is also just a cultural convention." The referent is the cultural world. As for "iconism," Eco insists that perception itself is encoded, as is the relationship of "similarity" between an image and its referent. As for indexes (or pointers), "conventional" correlations are derived from the repeated experience of associating an index with its object. Eco is a conventionalist, considering all signs as conventionally encoded, and meanings as "cultural units" that together form a semantic universe. Therefore, he prefers to "ignore the difference between motivated and arbitrary signs."

Iconic relationships are usually ranked according to the degree of conditionality or motivation: predominantly symbolic forms, such as language, are highly conditional or "unmotivated"; iconic forms always assume some degree of conditionality; index forms "direct attention to their objects by blind coercion." Indexical and iconic symbolic means can be considered as limited by their referents. Within each form, specific signs also differ in the degree of conventionality or motivation. Such characteristics influence their interpretation. For example, it is widely argued that while symbolic and (to a lesser extent) iconic signs require "decoding" (in the words of structuralists), index signs are not part of the sign system and depend mainly on inference. Overlaps between these three forms of iconic relationships emphasize the fact that conventional, coded symbolism cannot be neatly separated from other forms of iconic relationships.

Language is a (predominantly) symbolic sign system, and it is widely regarded as a predominant symbolic form. Pierce states that "all words, sentences, books, and other common signs are symbols," and we will follow his usage here. Saussure ^[8] avoids calling linguistic signs "symbols" because of the danger of confusion with popular usage, in which symbols are never completely arbitrary, demonstrating remnants of a "natural connection" with what they signify. Thus, it is important to remember that literary, religious, mythical and heraldic "symbols" are not purely symbolic in a semiotic sense.

According to K. Chilingaryan and D. Chistyakov ^[9], for Saussure there is no internal, direct or self-evident connection between the linguistic signifier and the signified (a concept, not an extra-linguistic referent). The relationship between them is an internal connection within the linguistic system. The connections between words and ideas have no natural basis. The principle of arbitrariness means that the connection between a sign and its meaning is not natural or inevitable. For example, the word "table" in Russian means an object on which you can put something, but there is no logical connection between the sounds "ct", "o" and "l" and the object itself. This word is an "unmotivated" sign, since its meaning does not follow from its sound form.

Pierce notes that the symbols (which he then called "markers") "for the most part, they are conditional or arbitrary." Arbitrariness refers here, of course, to the sign-object relationship. A symbol is a sign "whose special significance or suitability to represent exactly what it represents lies in nothing other than the very fact of the existence of a habit, predisposition, or other effective general rule according to which it will be interpreted in this way. Take, for example, the word "man". These letters do not look at all like a person; neither does the sound with which they are associated." Elsewhere, Pierce adds that "a symbol performs its function independently of any similarity or analogy with its object and equally independently of any actual connection with it." The absence of dependence on similarity or direct connection contributes to the strength and flexibility of symbols in this sense.

"A symbol is connected to its object by virtue of the idea of the mind using the symbol, without which such a connection would not exist." It "becomes familiar only or mainly due to the fact that it is used and understood as such." Symbolic signs are usually understood as intended to convey something. Their intended meanings are not intuitively obvious: understanding symbolic signs depends entirely on our familiarity with the relevant conventions (without which they may not signify or be misinterpreted). We perceive symbols according to a "habitual connection," a "rule," or "a law, usually an association of general ideas, which acts in such a way that the symbol is interpreted as referring to a given object." Therefore, the symbol must exist in "permanent connections through which it is connected to something other than itself."

While arbitrariness is considered a key "constructive feature" of language, displacement is another key property that allows linguistic signs to be used to represent objects in their physical absence, including entities that exist only in our imagination. Thus, the meaning of really common symbols can go beyond specific contexts ("here and now", to which other animals are chained). This is in stark contrast to index signs (which corresponds to the difference between semantic and pragmatic meaning). Such qualities allow symbols to be good means of thinking. The symbolic method is most effective in conveying abstract concepts and genera. Pierce notes that "an authentic symbol is a symbol with a general meaning," denoting a kind of thing rather than a specific thing. Linguistic categories perform this key function. Although what we call reality is too rich and varied to be reproduced at will, symbols can be studied and recalled to an amazing degree."

Symbols are widely considered by semiotics as the best example of words, but they are not limited to this form. They include any conventional signs denoting concepts, and any form of signifier has the potential for symbolic use. Images can acquire some symbolic status of words, although their volume and flexibility are limited. Images cannot "resemble" the referents of abstract ideas. Concepts are not amenable to direct representation. However, images can be used symbolically to represent objects related to abstract concepts. So, the familiar ideographic symbol of the heart is used to denote abstractions such as love, romance, emotions or health. On the Internet, simple images similar to a house, indicating a link to the home page of the site, are primarily symbolic: they do not look like a specific house, but conditionally denote the concept of "home". In some contexts, the image of a lion can function as a metaphorical symbol of abstract concepts such as strength or bravery (which, of course, are traditional associations, not zoological features of lions).

Figure 3. Symbolic and iconic image of the object

When images have a well-established conventional meaning, they function as iconic symbols. Public signage often depends on visual symbols, which are designed to achieve a common reference (within a limited range of discourse) and to ensure credibility. For example, in the sign "Entry with dogs is prohibited", a simple, schematic representation of a prototype dog is likely to be a more effective general symbol than an image of a specific type of dog - although, unlike the word "dog", any image of a dog inevitably resembles some types of dogs more than others. Even a photograph can have a symbolic function (in the appropriate context), such as when images of coins are used to denote the "economy" when it is the subject of television news.

Symbolic forms are often more indirect. Only context and conditions can determine whether a sign with a general image of a male figure is intended to refer to people in general (as on the "no entry" sign) or only men (as on the toilet door). In the case of a road sign, where a simple schematic image of a deer on the sign indicates the danger of wild animals, the sign can be called indexically symbolic, since the deer is part of the animal world as a whole and designates it.

The traditional basis of iconic sign-object relations lies in similarity. In semiotics, icons are not necessarily visual, they can include any sensory method. Nevertheless, the photographs are widely cited as vivid examples of iconicity. A necessary property of a representative painting (for example, a portrait) is that it is perceived as sufficiently similar to what is depicted on it for this object to be recognized. However, since Plato, philosophers have noted that everything is similar to everything else in various ways, having many common properties. Paintings can be viewed as visually similar to their objects in countless ways (and at the same time noticeably unlike them in other ways - for example, they are usually flat and framed, properties that most resemble those of other paintings). Although the most significant visual property is often considered to be the shape of the contour, this is not always the case, for example, when depicting the sky, sea, clouds, smoke, and so on. Similarity is not a distinctive feature of pictorial representation, as is often assumed; it is not a sufficient condition, as in traditional theories of similarity. Like other judgments, similarity depends on context and frame of reference.

Nevertheless, at least since the time of the ancient Greeks, similarity is usually considered as the "natural" basis of an image, as opposed to the conventionality of words. Iconic forms do not attract our attention to their mediation, they seem more direct and transparent than symbolic forms. Ernst Gombrich ^[10] speaks of "the viewer's ability to read the "iconicity" in a sign, "seeing" the referent in a symbolic medium - even in such a very conventional iconic symbol as a heart on a playing card, which has very little anatomical relation to the human heart. We usually underestimate the importance of our active contribution to the formation of meaning, but images, in particular, usually do not need to be "read" at all.

Although iconic signs are often defined as natural and contrasted with conventional ones, Pierce views iconic signs as motivated and conventional. Although "any material image" (such as a painting) can be perceived as similar to what it depicts, it is "largely conventional in its way of representation."

Tsch. Pierce says the portrait of a man we haven't seen is convincing. As long as, based only on what we see on it, we can form an idea of the person it depicts, it is an icon. But, in fact, it is not a pure icon, because we are strongly influenced by the knowledge that this is an effect caused by the appearance of the original through the artist.

Nevertheless, Pierce argues that "every painting (no matter how traditional its method)" is an icon. For most semiotics, images are not as conventional as linguistic signs. However, many structuralists agree that reference is mediated not only by similarity, but also by representative conventions. Indeed, it has been suggested that iconic signs resemble not their referents, but the conventional representations of these referents within the framework of culture. Although Eco argues that what an iconic image looks like is its mental representation, he later offers an influential critique of "iconicity" from a conventionalist perspective.

Iconicity is a "matter of degree". No matter how "natural" the resemblance may seem, the images are similar to what they represent, only in some respects. What we tend to recognize in an image is the analogous relationship of parts to the whole: as in a diagram. Even the most "realistic" image is not a copy or even a copy of what is depicted on it. It's not often that we mistake an image for what it represents. Of course, pictures are often used (as in similar books) to illustrate what is being discussed. However, unlike a pointer, "an icon has no dynamic relationship with the object it represents" and, therefore, "does not provide any guarantee that such an object that it represents actually exists." Iconicity is not an objective relationship between a sign and an object: the similarity is in the eyes (or rather, in the mind) of the beholder.

According to art critics, paintings do not necessarily denote what they depict (or refer to what they look like): they can be both "symbolic" and iconic. However, since abstractions are not amenable to direct representation, the "iconic language" has very limited representational capabilities (such as highly conventionalized pictographic signs). Linguist John Lyons ^[11] notes that iconicity depends on the capabilities of the native speaker. While phonic means can represent characteristic sounds (albeit relatively conditionally), graphic means can represent characteristic forms (as in the case of Egyptian hieroglyphs). Iconic gestures, which are "remarkably similar between languages," are very effective at conveying shapes, location, and movement. In sign languages for the deaf, iconic signs have the same advantage over spoken languages.

The category of index signs at the Pier includes what have been considered "natural signs" since ancient times. Augustine Aurelius ^[3], who considers both words and images to be conventional signs, distinguishes from them as natural signs "those that, in addition to the intention or desire to use them as signs, nevertheless lead to the knowledge of something else, such as smoke when it points to fire."

Unlike iconic and symbolic signs, index signs do not represent or symbolize things. Although dark clouds are often interpreted as a sign of imminent rain, they do not mean rain (in the sense of reflecting some intention). There is nothing arbitrary or arbitrary in the fact that cumulonimbus clouds are a sign of a thunderstorm. They also do not symbolize rain iconically, being likened to it or the similarity of attributes. However, they mean something different than themselves when we conclude that they indicate an approaching thunderstorm.

Unlike symbolic and iconic signs, natural signs themselves are not part of an interpretive system (although, nevertheless, they may need to be interpreted in accordance with conventions, such as weather forecasts). Of course, natural signs that are directly referential have no place in the Saussure model.

According to Pierce, the index "indicates" something: for example, "a sundial or a clock indicates the time of day." The index exercises real physiological power over attention and directs it to a specific object." Index signs "direct attention to their objects by blind coercion." The index usually points away from itself, but in some cases it points to itself (as in the case of this self-referential sentence).

Pierce's choice of the "pointing finger" (index finger in English) as a prototypical example of an index class may be slightly erroneous, since, unlike natural signs, the human act of pointing is also a symbolic sign. Of course, pointing gestures have an index dimension, although travelers with linguistic problems can attest to their limited usefulness as a form of communication.

Like other sign relationships, indexality requires interpretation. An ungraded thermometer will be of little use, and even a graduated one requires familiarity with the relevant conventions - if you are used to Celsius, then 98 Fahrenheit is a lot or a little?

However, index relations offer the most direct connection to the referent, which is in strong contrast to symbolic relations. The index sign is a symptom of the state of affairs. Indexality manifests itself in many forms. Road signs demonstrate indexality when they indicate an appropriate location (for example, an intersection sign at an intersection), when they point directly to what they refer to (direction signs), or when they depict something closely related to what they signify (an image of cutlery pointing to nearby canteens).

Although photographs are perceived as iconic (visually resembling their objects), Pierce notes that they are also indexical (which leads some to call them iconic indexes). Photographs, especially instant ones, are very instructive, because we know that in some respects they are exactly like the objects they depict.

According to V. Krutkin ^[12], for sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, "photography is usually considered as the most accurate reproduction of the real." Photographic media seem to imply a transparent relationship between the iconic medium and its referent. Photography is based on a direct causal relationship with an external object. Of the three types of relationships on which signs are based, only indexality can serve as proof of the existence of an object. Pierce notes that "photography, due to its optical connection with the object, is proof that this view corresponds to reality." In many contexts, photographs are seen as proof that events occurred at the time they were shot, not least in legal contexts: CCTV cameras and speed cameras are, of course, widely used in this capacity. The index nature of photography is a causal relationship between a pre-photographic referent and a sign... nothing can guarantee at the value level." Even before the advent of digital photography, both "correction" and editing were practiced, but some photography researchers claim that each photo contains "significant distortions." Just as images are similar to what they represent, only in some respects, in photography everything that is shown inevitably turns into a flat, decontextualized fragment, which is usually much smaller in scale and (with the exception of films) motionless and silent.

As a medium of information, photography is primarily indexical; as a "message" (which depends on how the photograph is used or interpreted), this iconic connection may not be dominant. Like all "photographs that changed the world", Joe Rosenthal's famous 1945 photograph "Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima" ("iconic" in the popular sense) is primarily symbolic in a semiotic sense. Pierce argues that all indexes refer to single instances (for example, "this man"), whereas a symbolic representation can refer to general classes of instances (for example, "men"). Despite their literal specificity (which makes them unsuitable for road signs), photographs can be used to indicate common classes. Within the advertising genre, the power of the famous photographic "cowboy" advertising of Marlboro cigarettes stems not so much from their indexality as images of specific people, but from their symbolization of the stereotypical concept of masculinity (even to the extent that we may have to remind ourselves that this is not "masculinity", because the form functions to assume the opposite).

As already noted, Saussure considers both the signifier and the signified as immaterial, psychological forms; language itself is a form, not a substance. He uses several examples to confirm his point of view. For example, in one of several chess analogies, he notes that using ivory chess pieces instead of wooden ones does not affect the system in any way. Similarly, he asks why a street that has been completely rebuilt can remain "the same street." Saussure suggests that this is because the street is not a purely material thing, although he insists that this does not mean that such entities are "abstract", since we cannot imagine a street or a train outside of their material realization.

Since Saussure considers language in terms of a formal function rather than a material substance, anything that performs the same function in a system can be considered just another lexeme of the same type. Saussure notes that sound is not a part of language, but simply a substance that language uses. He proceeds from the fact that the means by which the sign is produced do not matter, since they do not affect the system.

Pierce recognized the materiality of the sign: "Since the sign is not identical to the signified, but differs from it in some respects, it must have some properties that belong to it in itself. These are the material qualities of the sign." However, materiality has "nothing to do with the representative function" and does not appear in his classification schemes.

Although Saussure did not consider the materiality of a linguistic sign relevant to his system, most subsequent theorists who adopted or adapted his model decided to return materiality to the sign. Modern theorists of "social semiotics" usually argue that the material form of a sign can generate its own meanings. For example, structuralist theorists transformed Saussure's model of the sign, establishing a clear distinction between form and meaning, signifier and signified, which Saussure strongly rejected. Structuralism has established the "primacy of the signifier."

Psychoanalytic theory also contributed to the reassessment of the signifier - in the Freudian theory of dreams, the sound of the signifier could be considered as a better guide to its possible signified than could be assumed with traditional "decoding". For example, Freud reports that in the dream of a young woman about to get married, there were flowers - including lilies of the valley and violets. According to popular symbolism, lilies were a symbol of chastity, and the woman agreed that she associated them with purity. However, Freud was surprised to find that the word "violet" was phonetically associated with the English word "violate", which indicates her fear of violence.

Poststructuralist theorists, although widely criticized as idealists and relativists, also sought to overestimate the sign. From Plato to Levi-Strauss, the spoken word occupied a privileged position in the Western worldview, creating the illusion of absolute presence and transparency of meaning. Speech has become so natural that "not only the signifier and the signified seem to unite, but in this confusion the signifier seems to erase itself or become transparent." Writing has traditionally been given a secondary place.

Jacques Derrida's deconstruction ^[13] marked the "return of the repressed." In an effort to create a "grammatology" or study of textuality, Derrida defends the primacy of the material word. He notes that the specificity of words is itself a material aspect. The materiality of a word cannot be translated or translated into another language. Materiality is exactly what translation lacks." Despite the irony characteristic of postmodernism in this position of the theorist, whom many consider to be an extreme idealist, Derrida's ideas formed the basis of the views of other theorists who sought to "rematerialize" the linguistic sign, emphasizing that words and texts are things. However, it should be noted that Derrida's accusation of phonocentrism against Saussure does not take into account the motivation of Saussure, who reacted against the existing priority of written language, and that in this historical context his radical goal was to establish spoken language not just as a deformed form of written language, but as worthy of study in itself.

Material objects can themselves function directly as signs, not only in the form of "status symbols" (such as expensive cars), but also as part of a repertoire of signs that people rely on to develop and maintain a sense of personal and social identity. People attach "symbolic meanings" to televisions, furniture, and smartphones that are not defined by the utilitarian functions of such mundane objects. The basis for such thinking has already been laid within the framework of structuralism.

Conclusion

A sign as such may not be a material entity, but it has a material dimension - a sign medium. "Fundamental to all semiotic analysis is the fact that any system of signs (semiotic code) is carried by a material carrier that has its own principles of structure." Moreover, some media rely on several interacting sign systems: television and cinema, for example, use verbal, visual, auditory and locomotor signs. The medium is not "neutral"; each medium has its own capabilities and limitations, and, as Umberto Eco notes, each of them is already "charged with cultural significance." The material expression of a text is always significant; it is a separately modifiable semiotic characteristic.

The formal model of Saussure's linguistic sign system does not imply direct references to reality beyond the sign. This is not a denial of non-linguistic reality, but a reflection of his understanding of his own task as a linguist. Saussure acknowledges that in most scientific disciplines, "the objects of research are given in advance" and exist independently of the observer's "point of view". However, he emphasizes that in linguistics, on the contrary, "it is the point of view that creates the object." It is easy to see how this can be criticized as an idealistic position. For the realist, the known exists in advance, it is completely independent of the knower and in no way depends on reason. However, according to the Saussure model, although linguistic sign systems are mental constructs, they are also socially constructed - intersubjectively, not purely subjectively. According to the position of social construction, linguistic categories and signs do not reflect the objective world, but the "way of seeing" our culture. Unlike nomenclaturists, for whom things in the world are predetermined and simply indicated by language, the Saussure principles assert the inessential nature of objects.

In the Pierce sign model, there is clearly a referent - something beyond the sign to which the sign apparatus belongs (although not necessarily a material thing). However, it also has an interpreter, which leads to an "endless series" of signs. In any case, for Pierce, reality can only be known through signs. He argues that, from the point of view of logic, signification can only be partial, otherwise the sign will destroy itself, becoming identical to its object.

As an illustration of many semiotic concepts that we have already considered, we can recall Borges' story “Tlen, Ukbar, Orbis Tertius” ^[14]. The story begins with a description of an encyclopedic article about the mysterious country, Ukbar, which is the first evidence of the existence of a conspiracy of a group of intellectuals to create a fictional world, Corruption, in which special metaphysical and physical laws operate and the action of the legends and tales of Ukbar develops. Over time, the narrator encounters more and more significant artifacts of Decay, and in the end the Earth becomes Decay. This is how signs capture space and begin to replace reality.

The spectrum in the figure is a simplified schematization of philosophical views on "reality", which can serve as a reminder that we do not always talk about the same thing when referring to the "world". The three positions depicted bring physical, social and psychological reality to the fore, respectively (from left to right), although they are not separable.

Figure 4. Realism vs idealism

The Irish philosopher George Berkeley ^[15] became a famous proponent of "subjective idealism", arguing that there are no things independent of reason ("to be is to be perceived"). His contemporary, the English writer Samuel Johnson, allegedly kicked a stone in response, stating: "I refute it this way." It resembles Zen Buddhist koans when, in response to a particularly tricky question about the nature of consciousness, the teacher slaps the student on the back of the head.

The American linguist Ray Jackendoff ^[16] argues that linguistic references do not refer to an independently existing reality, but to our own idea of this world, which is "the result of the interaction between external data and the means available for their internal representation." This emphasis on psychological reality (or the phenomenal world) is called constructivist. A more socially oriented position of constructivism emphasizes the role of language and other semiotic systems in the "social construction of reality". What we collectively acknowledge in discourse is a reality for us.

If for psychologist William James ^[17] the "primary reality" is the sensorially perceived physical world, then sociologist Alfred Schutz ^[18] insists that we live primarily in a symbolic, intersubjective reality: not a private one, but a social one - "the world of our common experience." Without such intersubjectivity, supported in particular by language, we could never "mean the same thing." The social world is embedded in the material world, but our understanding of reality is a product of common ways of describing and classifying. No one doubts that there is a physical environment independent of us, but this environment, to the extent that it is the context of discourse, is itself largely "constructed". The cultural realities in which we live are reflected in culture-specific "folk theories" - self-evident schemes that structure "areas of experience".

As the philosopher William Marshall Urban ^[19] notes, "none of the concepts of "independence of consciousness" or "dependence of consciousness" has, as a concept, any meaning without the other," adding that "communication presupposes both idealism and realism." The two poles around which the issues of realism and idealism have always revolved are matter and mind." We can avoid the dualism of subject-object and mind-matter without reductive assimilation of one pole into the other. Pierce, who called his position "objective idealism," can be seen as a combination of aspects of both realism and idealism. Indeed, one philosopher argues that "no sound philosophy has ever been exclusively one or the other." Although Peirce recognizes the reality of things and events that "do not depend on the vagaries of me and you," in his social theory of reality, it is consent that constitutes reality.

Saussure ^[8] would undoubtedly agree with this. However, the non-referential sign system, considered separately from the social context of use, raises the metaphysical question of the connection between language and the world (or the world of signs). The great founders of analytical philosophy-Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein and Russell-posed the question "How does language connect to the world?" to the very center of philosophy." But that's another story.

Although Saussure ^[8] insists on the interdependence of the signifier and the signified - and that one precedes the other or takes precedence over it - the theorists of structuralism and poststructuralism rejected or ignored his position, or accepted his terms, but not his model, asserting instead the "primacy of the signifier". Many postulate a complete separation of the signifier and the signified (which does not make sense within the framework of Saussure). In deconstructivist discourse, an "empty" or "floating signifier" is defined as a signifier with an indefinite, highly variable, indefinable, or non-existent signifier. Such signatures mean different things to different people: they can mean many or even any signified; they can mean anything their interlocutors want. In the non-Saussure state of the radical gap between the signifier and the signified, the "sign" means only what it means.

The “floating signifier" was mentioned in 1950 in Levi-Strauss's work ^[20] "Introduction to the works of Marcel Moss". For Levi-Strauss, such a signifier is like an algebraic symbol that has no inherent symbolic meaning, but can represent anything. The first explicit mention of the "empty signifier" belongs to Roland Barthes ^[21] in the essay "Myth Today". Barth defines an empty signifier as one that does not have a definite signifier. He also speaks of non-linguistic signs as being so open to interpretation that they represent a "floating chain of signifiers."

While Saussure believes that the signifier and the signified (no matter how arbitrary their relationship may be) are inseparable, like two sides of a piece of paper, poststructuralists rejected what they considered to be a completely stable relationship embedded in his model.

Jacques Derrida refers to the "play" or "free play" of the significates: they are not fixed on their signified, but point beyond themselves to other significates in the "indefinite direction of the signifier to the signified." The philosopher sought to "deconstruct" Western metaphysical systems, denying the existence of any finite definable meanings. Derrida coined the term différance to hint that meaning is indefinitely postponed. He argues that signs always "refer" to other signs, and there is no definitive "transcendent signified," independent of language, offering an illusory completion of meaning and "a hopeful end to the reference from sign to sign."

Derrida stated that "il n'y a pas de hors-texte", which translates as an idealistic statement that "there is no outside text" (there is no outside text). For Marxist materialists and realists, semiotic idealism is unacceptable: "signs cannot be allowed to absorb their referents in an endless chain of signification, in which one sign always points to another, and the circle is never broken by the intrusion of what the sign refers to." However, the emphasis on the inevitability of signedness does not necessarily mean the denial of any "external reality".

In the spirit of romantic longing for an unmediated world, Jean Baudrillard interprets many representations as a means of hiding the absence of reality; he calls such representations "simulacra" (or copies of a copy without originals). He sees a degenerative evolution of ways of representation, during which signs increasingly lose their meaning.:

These are the successive phases of the image:

● It is a reflection of the basic reality.

● It masks and distorts the basic reality.

● It masks the absence of basic reality.

● He has nothing to do with any reality: he himself is a pure simulacrum.

Baudrillard suggests that when speech and writing arose, signs were invented to indicate a material or social reality, a referential connection that has been increasingly eroded since then. With industrialization, when advertising, propaganda and commodification appeared, the sign began to hide the "basic reality". In the postmodern era of hyperreality, when what is only an illusion in the media of communication seems quite real, signs hide the "absence of reality" and only seem to mean something.

For Baudrillard ^[22], simulacra, the signs characterizing late capitalism, exist in three forms: forgery (imitation), when there is still a direct connection between signs and referents; production (illusion), when there is an indirect connection; and simulation (forgery), when signs are in relation only to other signs, and not to any fixed external reality. Baudrillard's claim that the Gulf War never happened is certainly provocative, and it is hardly surprising that the disparaging label of a semiological "idealist" that he applies to Saussure has been applied to him as well. The danger of radical epistemological relativism became all too obvious when, faced with an inconvenient truth, a senior aide to the 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump, declared that there were "alternative facts."

Such perspectives, of course, raise a fundamental question: "What is 'reality'? The fact that the world we live in is a social construct does not make it any less real to us. Subjective (or intersubjective) realities can be just as powerful as physical ones. The products of social construction matter. As the American sociologist William Thomas noted, "if [we] define situations as real, then they are real in their consequences" (the so-called “Thomas theorem"). Thus, reality and truth can be considered as the construction of perspective. It is not a denial of "external reality" if we claim that most of our knowledge of the world is indirect; we perceive many things mostly (or even exclusively) the way they are presented to us in our media and communication technologies.