Unified legal framework for restricting the turnover of landmine weapons

Primov Magomedrasul Narimanovich ORCID: 0009-0003-6216-2734 Senior State Customs Inspector of Dagestan Customs 367013, Russia, Republic of Dagestan, Makhachkala, Yusupova str., 3 pmn-05@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Primova Medina Narimanovna Independent researcher 367000, Russia, Republic of Dagestan, Makhachkala, Korkmasova str., 12, sq. 28 pmn-05@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The most characteristic manifestations of the crisis of international humanitarian law (IHL) provoked by the collective West are the armed conflicts between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as in the Israeli-occupied territory of the State of Palestine, during which heavy losses are incurred not only by the armed forces of the States participating in these conflicts, but also by the civilian population. At the same time, violations of IHL are allowed, including those related to the use of restricted or prohibited types of conventional weapons ^{[1, p. 94]}.

The current situation fully confirms forecasts about the tendency to non-compliance with IHL norms justified by certain higher values; about the aggravation of the problem of compliance with existing legal regulations, the unresolved nature of which hinders the development of IHL; about long-term global legislative initiatives that impede the development of IHL, leveling the current legislation; about ignoring serious problems hiding behind violations of IHL norms; about considering problems and the potential of IHL in isolation from the process of finding solutions to the main problems of world development ^{[2, pp. 18-29]}.

At the same time, reasonable doubts about the effectiveness of IHL in resolving local conflicts do not negate the general conclusion of most researchers that there are no alternatives to the regulatory role of IHL ^{[3, pp. 74-80]}.

Pointing to the need for conscientious compliance with IHL, researchers also note the lack of a mechanism for monitoring compliance with established prohibitions as a significant drawback of the protocols to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons that May Be Considered Excessively Injurious or Having Indiscriminate Effects (the Convention on "Conventional" Weapons), therefore, the main guarantee of compliance with IHL is only the goodwill of the parties ^{[4, p. 68]}.

At the same time, it is the events of recent years that have shown the need to provide real content to the activities of international organizations, primarily the United Nations, whose main task is to ensure international peace and security. In essence, the obligation to comply with the requirements of IHL is a condition of membership in the United Nations. At the same time, the Security Council of this organization, represented by its permanent members - the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Great Britain), the United States of America, has a special responsibility for compliance by all members of the United Nations with its statutory tasks, on whose position the practical solution of all issues of ensuring peace and security depends.

One cannot but agree that even fragmentary, inconsistent compliance with IHL norms certainly has a real positive impact on military conflicts and helps to minimize their negative consequences. Considering IHL as a historically established social mechanism conditioned by humanity's need to prevent the course of destructive processes of the appropriate kind, minimizing their negative consequences, leads to the conclusion that abandoning IHL is an unnatural act, since humanity needs a social mechanism that prevents the realization of its own destructive potential. At the same time, hybrid wars largely neutralize the effectiveness of this social mechanism ^{[5, pp. 33-37]}.

In these circumstances, motivated proposals for the implementation and adaptation to modern problems of international treaties in the field of disarmament, including those regulating the turnover of landmine weapons, are of particular importance. This work cannot be successful without assessing the role of the cold war in the destruction of the USSR, taking into account the fact that it continues in relation to Russia, the US strategy to ensure its absolute military security, implemented through local wars that bleed out opponents of the hegemon, safe for the latter due to the lack of retaliatory actions involving unacceptable damage to the United States. Accordingly, the main generator of conflicts and wars of various causes and causes is the United States. Under such circumstances, the problem of anti-war struggle is actualized, the refusal to solve it is a historical irresponsibility to the present and future generations ^{[6, pp. 80-82]}.

1. IHL crisis, local conflicts, mine problem

The desire of the remaining sole superpower to strengthen world hegemony, expand spheres of influence, and weaken its rivals has caused an aggravation of the international situation associated with a series of wars initiated by the United States. In this regard, the scale and total nature of contradictions, conflicts, wars, mutual fear and distrust, which have acquired unprecedented scale and irreversible character in modern conditions, are noted ^{[7, pp. 9-19]}.

Moreover, the process of globalization affects the transformation of wars, which causes the military and political leadership at all levels to have difficulties with an adequate perception of continuous military confrontation (Gerasimov N. N. Philosophical analysis of the image of war in the era of globalization: abstract. dis. ... cand. philos. sciences'. - Volgograd, 2019. URL: https://vak.minobrnauki.gov.ru/advert/100043197 (date of application: 05/11/2024)).

The solution of issues in the field of international law in general and, in particular, IHL, is impossible without filling in the real content of the provision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, according to which the Russian Federation is the legal debtor of the USSR. The events that followed the liquidation of the USSR showed that, in another capacity, the Russian Federation is not a participant in international relations, equivalent to the collective West. The latter openly initiates local armed conflicts directed directly or indirectly against the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, minimizing local wars is a prerequisite for an effective solution to the mine problem. It is obvious that while maintaining the dominant role of the collective West, the latter no longer needs to take into account the interests, including in the field of IHL, of dependent states embedded in the global agenda ^{[8, pp. 69-91]}.

The presence of causes and conditions contributing to the emergence of local armed conflicts indicates the increasing urgency of solving problems related to the use of conventional weapons, including the problem of trafficking in landmine weapons. The current international legal regulation of the turnover of landmine weapons is two documents with different subjects of regulation and differing concepts for solving the problem of trafficking in landmines. And the Protocol on the Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, as amended on May 3, 1996 (URL: www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/pdf/mines_prot2.pdf (accessed: 04/15/2024)) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (URL: www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/mines_convention.shtml (date of application: 04/15/2024)), as local conflicts with the use of landmine weapons show, the problems of limiting the turnover of the latter are not solved.

When considering the problems related to the international legal regulation of the turnover of landmine weapons, a special place is occupied by the question of its effectiveness, the availability of a mechanism for the implementation of existing mine action treaties. At the same time, an analysis of the completeness of participation in these treaties by States that have combined their consent to be bound with reservations and statements that do not agree with the content of these documents requires separate consideration.

First of all, this conclusion is relevant to the Protocol on the Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II), the provisions of which caused the greatest diversity of opinions among its participants.

To a lesser extent, this situation is typical for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), among the parties to which, however, there is also a State that has declared its rights that are not fully consistent with participation in the treaty.

The noted circumstances, the presence of relevant reservations, create prerequisites for changing the scope of obligations, the fulfillment of which is imposed on the parties to the relevant international treaties, respectively, entails failure to comply with their provisions properly.

Since the legislative regulation of the turnover of mine weapons is, along with humanitarian demining, one of the main directions for solving the mine problem, the specific content of legal regulations should not be disputed due to their lack of certainty, lack of necessary specifics. Interpretations of individual provisions of mine action treaties, and even more so of these treaties as a whole, must comply with the requirements of the Convention on the Law of Treaties.

In such circumstances, there are grounds to conclude that such a concept of a treaty on the regulation of the turnover of landmine weapons is necessary, which is not only based on uniform, unified definitions of all types of landmine weapons related to conventional weapons, but also establishes specific and unambiguous conditions for their use. At the same time, the territory in which the use of landmine weapons is supposed to be used acts as a criterion.

The need to consider this issue is evidenced not only by the different subject matter of regulation of the two mine action treaties, but also by the fact that their main provisions have become the subject of declarations, interpretations, often significantly changing the content of the relevant regulations.

2. Declarations and reservations concerning Protocol II

The following declarations and reservations have been made by the parties to many provisions of Protocol II (URL: www.treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-2&chapter=26&clang=_en (date of application: 04/15/2024)), which, in some cases, affect its execution. Note that the articles of the Ottawa Convention, by virtue of article 19 of the latter, are not subject to reservations. We believe that in some cases, the existence of relevant reservations and declarations with respect to Protocol II is not fully consistent with the measures established by article 14 to comply with it.

Thus, 106 States are parties to Protocol II, 26 of which have accompanied their consent to be bound by declarations, reservations, interpretations of certain provisions of this document or the latter as a whole. That is, 80 (75%) of 106 States did not stipulate their agreement with any reservations, while 26 (25%) States formulated their own, often overlapping position, in some cases affecting the main content of the document. There are also special, specific interpretations of it. The most extensive reservations, statements that largely coincide, were made by the United States and Israel.

Most of the States that made statements supported Ireland's interpretation of article 1 and article 2, paragraph 3, of Protocol II.

2.1. Statements with a common position

Ireland's declaration under article 1, according to which the provisions of Protocol II applicable in peacetime must always be respected, was supported by Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Liechtenstein, Canada, Finland, South Africa, France, Austria, Italy, Greece, Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, making similar statements.

In addition, according to the statement of Ireland, the words "first of all", which are supplemented by paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the "Definitions" of Protocol II, are intended to clarify that anti-vehicle mines equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel.

The same statements as Ireland have been made on both of the above provisions: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, South Africa, Sweden.

Pakistan stated with regard to article 1 that it took precedence over other provisions of Protocol II. It is Pakistan that has paid special attention to this norm: it has declared its priority over the rest of the content of the treaty, the inadmissibility in this context of restricting the rights of peoples fighting for self-determination against colonial, foreign domination and occupation. In addition, with regard to this issue, on the scope of application of Protocol II, it was noted that its provisions should always be respected, taking into account the circumstances.

Israel's interpretation of article 1, which differs from others, has, in our opinion, an obvious implication. Limiting the application of Protocol II to armed conflicts only with the participation of the armed forces of the specified State leaves open the question of compliance with the requirements of Protocol II by other paramilitary groups that are not formally part of the structure of the armed forces - police, border troops, private military companies, special services of this State, including their agent network, not deprived of the possibility of using landmine weapons on the territory of the occupied territories. It appears that the obligations of the State party to comply with Protocol II are not limited to the status of the armed groups belonging to that State, despite the fact that the trafficking of landmines, specifically in relation to Israel, is not exclusively accessible to its armed forces.

A number of States considered it necessary to draw a fundamental distinction between anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. On paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol II, the position of Ireland was shared by Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Liechtenstein, Canada, Finland, Switzerland, South Africa, France, Austria, China, Italy, Greece, Pakistan, Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Israel. We are talking about the statement according to which the words "predominantly" ("mainly") in relation to the definition of an anti-personnel mine mean that anti-vehicle mines with a device for protection against manipulation are not considered anti-personnel. Here, it should be noted a slightly different interpretation of the norm under consideration by Pakistan, which stated that the use of the words "first of all" in describing anti-personnel mines implies the exclusion of anti-tank mines equipped with anti-personnel mines as detonators that do not explode upon contact with a person from the list of these mines.

In general, this position seems untenable, since the definition of an anti-personnel mine used in Protocol II differs from that given in the Ottawa Convention, to which 15 of the above-mentioned 18 States are parties, with the exception of China, Pakistan, and Israel. In addition, the anti-handling (displacement) device, which prevents the neutralization of an anti-vehicle mine, makes it even more dangerous than an anti-personnel mine.

In essence, the interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 3, declared by 18 parties to Protocol II corresponds to the definition of an anti-personnel mine given in the Ottawa Convention. Despite the completely identical definitions of the munition "mine", the anti-personnel mine in the Ottawa Convention is characterized differently than in Protocol II. In the latter, due to the reservation used in it, "mainly", mainly, the definition of an anti-personnel mine has a broader content. The Ottawa Convention excludes from the list of anti-personnel mines mines intended for use against vehicles equipped with a device that prevents their movement - a device for protection against manipulation. The unconditional danger to humans of this category of mines, which, by virtue of their purpose, have much more destructive properties than an anti-personnel mine, is not taken into account by the ban established by the Ottawa Convention. Thus, Protocol II, in view of the subject matter of its regulation, solves the tasks stated in the preamble of the Ottawa Convention in a more comprehensive manner ^{[9, pp. 10-26]}.

In addition, it is necessary to take into account the process of improving mine weapons, new varieties of which do not fully fit into the framework of its definitions enshrined in the Protocol, and are not taken into account at all in the Ottawa Convention.

In this regard, the question arises of changing the concept of the mine action treaty, as well as of amending the definitions of landmine weapons used both in paragraphs 1-5 of Protocol II and in Article 2 of the Ottawa Convention. We believe that the definition of a mine designed to destroy enemy manpower should include any other types (IEDs, "other devices") of ground-based explosive ammunition intended for the same purpose, regardless of the method of their installation. At the same time, we consider the concept of limiting the use of all types of landmine weapons exclusively to the territory of our own state to protect our state border and territory to be effective. At the same time, a complete ban should be established on the transfer (sale) of all types of landmine weapons to other States in the absence of an agreement on military cooperation and military assistance with them.

The third position in terms of the number of States parties that have joined concerns subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 5 of Protocol II, as it does not contain obstacles to agreement between the States concerned within the framework of peace treaties or other similar arrangements on the distribution of responsibilities in a manner other than that specified in this norm, while respecting its spirit and purpose. Identical statements on this issue were made by Germany, Sweden, South Africa, Italy, Greece, and the United States.

Israel formulated its position in a different way, more categorically, pointing out the inapplicability of this norm in the presence of a peace treaty on the transfer of territory, another agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

According to paragraph 9 of Article 3, the positions of Pakistan, Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom coincide. This is a statement according to which land can be a legitimate military target for the use of landmines if there is a specific military advantage. We believe that this fact confirms the complete impossibility of considering these States as a bona fide party to Protocol II. The above statement (interpretation) has a meaning that goes far beyond the scope of a separate mine action treaty, since it confirms the obvious fact that, regardless of participation in international treaties, military advantage is the main priority.

As noted above, individual States parties have stated their own, original, interpretations of the provisions of the Protocol.

2.2. The special position of the USA and Israel

Very voluminous reservations and interpretations, largely canceling the declared agreement with Protocol II, belong to the authorship of the world hegemons – the United States and Israel.

Thus, in section I of its statement, the United States made a reservation, pointing out its right, taking precautions for the safety of the civilian population, to use other devices to destroy food and beverages stocks that can be used by the enemy's armed forces.

Israel has claimed a similar right in relation to subparagraph (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 7 of Protocol II. Meanwhile, the latter contains a complete ban on the use of booby traps and other devices that are connected or associated with food or beverages.

Given the well-known reputation of the United States, which they fully confirmed by the organization of armed conflicts (the Chinese Foreign Ministry called the United States the largest instigator of conflicts. URL: tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17126497 (date of appeal: 04/15/2024)), including in recent years, as well as Israel's actions in Gaza, it is difficult even to assume that they comply with any agreements. The United States systematically organizes military operations on the territory of other states, respectively, the above reservation actually refers to the destruction of food stocks in the territories of other states occupied by the United States.

In our opinion, the above reservations, in essence, enshrine the right of the United States and Israel to carry out genocide of the population in the occupied territories of other States.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution No. 260 (III) of December 9, 1948, and entered into force on January 12, 1951. The United States signed this Convention on December 11, 1948, ratified it on November 25, 1988, and Israel on August 17, 1949. According to paragraph (c) of article II of the Convention, genocide is defined as actions committed with the intention to completely or partially destroy any national, ethnic, racial, religious group, including, inter alia, the deliberate creation of such living conditions for any group that are designed for its complete or partial physical destruction (URL: www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/genocide.shtml (date of application: 04/16/2024)).

The deprivation of food and beverages to the civilian population, under the pretext of the assumption of the possibility of its use by the enemy's armed forces, as it seems to us, is an outright manifestation of genocide.

Regardless of the specific norm, the United States excluded any interpretation of Protocol II that restricts their complete freedom, for any reason, to refuse assistance, restrict or prohibit the export of scientific and technical equipment, materials, and information, and also stated that Protocol II cannot be used as a pretext for any assistance to a State party to strengthen its the military potential associated with mine weapons. Israel has made a similar statement in relation to article 11, paragraph 7, of Protocol II.

The US statement, according to which any decision taken by the person responsible for conducting a military operation is evaluated only on the basis of his own assessment of the information available during the operation, was formulated by Israel earlier, when it joined the Convention on "Conventional" Weapons on March 22, 1995 and agreed to be bound by Protocols 1 and 2 thereto, adopted on October 10 in 1980.

The positions of the United States and Israel also coincide with respect to article 14 of Protocol II, which they interpreted in such a way as to remove any responsibility from war criminals and exclude the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in respect of such persons.

Such an approach seems incompatible with participation in the UN, all members of which, according to paragraph 1 of Article 93 of the UN Charter, are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The obligation of each UN member to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in the case in which it is a party is enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 94 of the Charter, and the right of a party to the case to appeal to the UN Security Council, in case of non-fulfillment by the other party of the obligation imposed on it by the Court decision - paragraph 2 of the same norm (URL: www.un.org/ru/about-us/un-charter/full-text (date of application: 04/16/2024)).

At the same time, it is necessary to recognize the fact that article 14 of Protocol II does not specifically indicate that its participants recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for Disputes over Violations of this treaty. An alternative to this could also be another arbitration court with the agreement of the parties. In fact, the refusal of a member of an international organization to recognize its jurisdiction in resolving disputes between members of this organization is not consistent with participation in it.

We will focus separately on the US statement on subparagraph (i) of paragraph 1 of Article 7 of Protocol II, which, according to the applicant, belongs only to a limited category of objects classified as the cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples due to their clearly recognizable characteristics and generally recognized significance. We believe that the above interpretation allows the United States to determine the list of objects of the appropriate category at its discretion.

From a legal point of view, the position of the Russian Federation is justified, which declared the interpretation of the same norm in the context of the corresponding special norm - article 1 of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (URL: treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-2-b&chapter=26&clang=_en (date of application: 04/16/2024)).

Thus, the United States and Israel, allegedly agreeing to Protocol II, simultaneously established exclusive preferences for themselves, which are incompatible with participation in this treaty.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains provisions establishing that a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty is not allowed (subparagraph "c" of article 19). According to subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 of article 2, a reservation means a unilateral statement, in any formulation and under any name, made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting or approving a treaty or acceding to it, by which it wishes to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State (URL: www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/law_treaties.shtml (date addresses: 04/16/2024)).

The above statements by the United States and Israel, we believe, fall within the scope of the above norms of the Vienna Convention, that is, they are incompatible with the participation of these applicants in Protocol II. In general, their position suggests that the purpose of participation in the treaty is the desire, if necessary, to exert pressure on other States parties to this treaty, to manipulate them, at the same time, to rid themselves of obligations to comply with the treaty. At the same time, it should be noted that the geographical location of the United States, unlike the Russian Federation, does not have a land border with unfriendly states.

The inconsistency of the United States, which declared in 2014 its readiness to participate almost fully in the global mine ban, at the same time, the presence of exclusively verbal changes in their position on this issue, is evidenced by the content of A. Bauer's study. It also touches on the topic of searching for new technologies that allow the United States itself to abandon the use of certain types of weapons (anti-tank mines) in favor of other, alternative weapons ^{[10, 128-130]}.

Characterizing Protocol II as a whole, we consider its assessment by the People's Republic of China, given on April 7, 1982, when ratifying the Convention on "Conventional" Weapons and agreeing to be bound by Protocols I, II, III thereto, to be justified.

The position of the PRC, without exaggeration, is unique in stating that the use of landmine weapons by the aggressor and the attacked State cannot and should not be interpreted to the same extent: aggression and self–defense are not the same thing. In this sense, the PRC's statement on the conceptual shortcomings of Protocol II (URL: treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-2&chapter=26&clang=_en (date of application: 04/18/2024)) seems reasonable, requires appropriate implementation.

3. Declarations regarding the application of the Ottawa Convention

This document reflects unfulfilled desires related to a complete ban on anti-personnel mines.

Of the 164 States that are parties to the Ottawa Convention, 133 States have signed it, the rest have joined, but so far have not signed this document. 95 States are parties to both mine action treaties. Of the total number of 16 States that have made declarations, 12 (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Montenegro, Serbia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain) are also parties to Protocol II, and 4 (Canada, Greece, Mauritius, Poland) participate only in the Ottawa Convention. At the same time, South Africa, Sweden, and the United Kingdom made their statements on both documents (URL: treaties.un.org/Pages/Home.aspx?clang=_en (date of application: 04/10/2024)).

As for the substance of the statements, it is necessary to note the special position of Australia, which stated that military activities authorized by the United Nations or conducted in accordance with international law jointly with the armed forces of States not only not parties to the Ottawa Convention, but also violating its prohibitions, will not be considered as a violation of the Ottawa Convention. It is obvious that this statement was made in the interests of States that are not parties to the Ottawa Convention and are engaged in activities prohibited by it. Australia is a military and political ally of the United States and participates in the latest military exercises conducted under the auspices of the United States. One of the three largest US military centers is located on the territory of Australia ^{[11, 82-83]}.

We believe that these activities, as well as Australia's interpretation of joint military activities with States violating the prohibitions established by the Ottawa Convention, do not comply with the above-mentioned provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, constitute a de facto refusal to comply with the Ottawa Convention.

Summarizing the above, it is difficult to agree with the conclusion that Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention play a key role in limiting the suffering and destruction associated with local conflicts ^{[12, 25-26]}.

Conclusion

By itself, the fact that there are various declarations, interpretations, reservations, in relation to the basic provisions of both mine action treaties, indicates the possibility of one's own subjective interpretation of these documents, respectively, the problematic nature of their proper uniform execution.

At a minimum, the above-mentioned declarations and reservations indicate, in our opinion, the need to exclude interpretations of mine action treaties that do not comply with the requirements of the Convention on the Law of Treaties. In addition, the classification of landmine weapons used in mine action treaties, respectively, the various restrictions and prohibitions imposed on their use, in themselves, entail problems of their control and practical application, respectively, different interpretations of the main provisions of the mentioned treaties, turning their execution into a subject of legal casuistry.

In such circumstances, there is an objective need to consider the concept of a single mine action treaty based on the complete prohibition or restriction of the turnover of landmine weapons by a State party to this treaty on the territory of another State party to the same treaty, with the exception of situations related to the existence of military assistance treaties between them.

As for the turnover of landmine weapons on their own territory, the unconditional legal basis for their use is the protection of the state border, other territory, in particular, military facilities, from armed aggression from outside, from other States.

We believe that setting appropriate priorities will make it possible to unify mine action bans and restrictions within the framework of a single international treaty on landmine weapons.

At the same time, it is obvious that, in modern conditions, the practical implementation of this or another important peace initiative is the exclusive prerogative of international organizations uniting states that do not belong to the collective West, which, as always before, recognizes only the right based on force for the opposing side.