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Passichnik S., Melnik G.S., Blochin I.N., Baichik A.V.
Disinformation and "hate speech" in the online media of Kazakhstan (results of monitoring 2022)
// Litera.
2024. ¹ 6.
P. 178-187.
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8698.2024.6.71046 EDN: MOIMKZ URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=71046
Disinformation and "hate speech" in the online media of Kazakhstan (results of monitoring 2022)
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8698.2024.6.71046EDN: MOIMKZReceived: 12-06-2024Published: 19-06-2024Abstract: The article examines the problem of using the "language of hostility" and disinformation in the media texts of the Kazakh media, as well as the problem of stuffing fake news during the political events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan. The goals of disinformation are determined and the effects on the mass audience are evaluated. During the tragic events at the beginning of the year, the Internet was turned off in the country, which led to an information vacuum. After the restoration of communication, a stream of fake materials of various formats (audio, video, images and messages on social networks) began, the purpose of which was to incite fears among the population. The platforms WhatsApp, YouTube, Telegram and VKontakte were investigated. Case analysis of texts was also used as part of the analysis. The materials were selected by random sampling. Various criteria were taken into account for the selection of publications, including attendance, the toxicity of comments, the number of articles and posts in online publications and social networks, as well as genres of materials and the presence of elements of hate speech. The purpose of this study is to comprehensively analyze the destructive consequences of disinformation recorded in the Kazakh and Russian media during the attempt to forcibly seize power in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The following methods were used: critical analysis of scientific literature, media monitoring, discourse analysis, and the method of comparative analysis. Case analysis of texts was also used. In 2022, Kazakhstan faced new geopolitical and information challenges: armed border conflicts, disinformation and "hate speech". All these risks have led to an even greater polarization of Kazakh society, socio-political tension and a decrease in the level of trust in the official media. The key factor in changing the situation may be increasing the information literacy of the population and its promotion through cooperation with civil society institutions, the implementation of universal media education programs. Given the volume of data and the amount of information processed, it is difficult to fit the whole situation and analyze how the discourse of "hate speech" and disinformation was built. The repeatedly disseminated unreliable and contradictory information significantly increased the tension of the network media field, contributing to a greater polarization of opinions about the extraordinary event and the aggression of participants in the information exchange. Keywords: hate speech, disinformation, fake news, unrest, terrorists, Kazakhstan, media, information space, journalism, international journalismThis article is automatically translated. Introduction The indicated problem is considered in the aspect of the concepts of "post-truth" and the clarification of the concepts of "disinformation" and "fake" [7; 8; 10; 11; 14]. In the works revealing the features of disinformation, the spread of fake (false) news, it is emphasized that their dissemination reduces the level of political relations, conducting political debates, worsens the activities of opposition forces, threatens electoral processes and increases the polarization of society [1]. Fake is considered as a complex mental formation that differs in national specifics. The methodological basis was the latest domestic and foreign works devoted to: 1) disinformation [4; 6; 7] and 2) fact-checking [1; 2; 9; 13; 16]. Pointing out the importance of fact-checking and the process of its institutionalization, media experts identify two areas of it: social epistemology and critical realism. And if within the framework of the first one they traditionally study "issues of institutionalization of norms, practices, and the authority of journalism" (verification of information has always been one of the main tasks of journalism), then "the second direction is associated with various theories of truth, with ways of verifying knowledge and norms dependent on it, methods of activity of journalists is associated with ways of verifying knowledge and dependent on this norms, methods of activity of journalists" [1, p.54]. In a number of works, the genesis, conditions of existence and consequences of the existence of pseudo-information in the information field are studied [3]; an analysis of media practice to prevent fake flows in various spheres of life, for example, healthcare [15; 17], the military is given conflicts [16], political communication practices [3]; methods for journalists on fact-checking are offered [5]. Despite the institutionalization of fact-checking, the flow of disinformation continues, especially in conflict confrontations, information (hybrid, proxy) wars. Studying the experience of the January events in 1922 in Kazakhstan, to some extent, can contribute to the awareness of representatives of government and media structures of the consequences of destructive fake information and the ability to anticipate them. The purpose of the article is to show trends in the representation of the concept of "fake" in Kazakhstani and foreign social networks during an attempt to forcibly seize power. Methods and methodology The objects of study were WhatsApp, YouTube, Telegram and VKontakte. The following methods were used: critical analysis of scientific literature, media monitoring, discourse analysis, and the method of comparative analysis. Case analysis of texts was also used. The materials were selected by random sampling. Various criteria for the selection of publications were taken into account, including attendance, toxicity of comments, the number of articles and posts in online publications and social networks, as well as genres of materials and the presence of elements of "hate speech". The novelty of the research lies primarily in: a) the introduction of new data into scientific circulation, reproducing events in the media to prevent the seizure of power in Kazakhstan; b) the creation of an empirical database that can be used as methodological material for the formation of information policy of the Republic. The results of the study The events related to the attempt to forcibly seize power in Kazakhstan in January 2022 were widely covered in scientific discourse. During this period, media strategies based on manipulating public consciousness showed how political goals are achieved with the help of "hate speech". The relevance of the topic is explained by the growing risk of clogging the global information space with unreliable news, disorganization of the audience, undermining trust in both the media and political institutions, deterioration of the activities of opposition forces, increased polarization of society and destructive impact on the intellectual and moral values of society. The risk of spreading disinformation and deliberately false information is especially high in the context of a coup in the Republic of Kazakhstan and in the context of large-scale information and psychological warfare. According to the President of Kazakhstan, the initiators of the January 2022 events in Kazakhstan had significant connections in law enforcement agencies and criminal circles. As a result, the official name of the events was the violent seizure of power, in accordance with part 3 of Article 179 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The investigation showed that the preparations for the coup began in mid-2021. The reason for this was the rash decision of the local authorities to raise prices for liquefied natural gas, which led to people coming out to peaceful demonstrations in the Mangystau region. Protests and subsequent riots in Kazakhstan became the main topic discussed on social networks in early 2022. Activists from the "Safe Internet League" claim that 2,877 reports about what has been happening in the Central Asian country since January are not reliable (TASS. 10.01.2022 https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13386881). The head of the organization, Ekaterina Mizulina, notes that about a quarter of the falsifications were found in sources that previously disseminated false information about coronavirus and vaccines. According to her, communities actually change the topic of discussion, distracting from the original one: "it doesn't matter what information fake news distributors use to cause alarm among citizens of Russia and CIS countries." As an example, Ekaterina Mizulina cited information about the mass surrender of weapons and the transfer of security forces to the side of the protesters (TASS. 10.01.2022 https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13386881). During the political crisis, two vectors of information flows were identified. One is connected with external forces aimed at provoking ethnic conflict via the Internet. The second is information coming from official authorities. Special attention was paid to the imposition of an incorrect narrative about terrorism on the media, which after the January events led to the massive spread of fakes in the media. On January 7, 2022, a statement about 20 thousand terrorists also appeared on the Twitter account of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, stating that "a terrorist war was unleashed against our country"; "it was an armed aggression by international terrorism against our country"; "we could have completely lost control of Almaty, which was simply given to the terrorists." On the evening of January 8, 2022, the entry was deleted. On January 5, 2023, Attorney General Berik Asylov in an interview with Tengrinews.kz answered the question about 20 thousand terrorists during the January events in Kazakhstan: "different information was received, including such ... Different information was received, including from citizens, that there are foreign criminals, including those who spoke foreign languages – Kyrgyz, Uzbek, different" (Tengrinews.kz 05.01.2023 https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/na-vopros-o-20-tyisyachah-terroristov-otvetil-genprokuror-487810/). He noted that the society also had a feeling that all the attackers were terrorists. Later, Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, a former adviser to the first president Nursultan Nazarbayev, said that the information transmitted to Tokayev was unreliable, and the figure of 20,000 terrorists had previously been used by the leadership of the National Security Committee, obviously, to intimidate (Tengrinews.kz 05.01.2023 https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/na-vopros-o-20-tyisyachah-terroristov-otvetil-genprokuror-487810/). During the research, two main lines of disinformation were discovered. The first line is connected with statements about the arrival of terrorists from other countries. There were also reports that citizens of other countries participated in mass riots for money. On the sidelines of the Mazhilis, the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan Berik Asylov said for the first time that there were no 20 thousand foreign terrorists. "Today, 19 foreigners have been detained, these are citizens of the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In fact, they are all participants in mass riots. There were no 20,000 foreign terrorists, I do not know where you got it." (Sputnik.kz 14.03.2022. https://ru.sputnik.kz/20220314/genprokuror-oproverg-slova-tokaeva-o-20-tysyachakh-terroristov-vo-vremya-yanvarskikh-sobytiy-23501300.html The second line of propaganda is associated with the creation of an image of an internal enemy and indicates the participation of religious extremists, including the organization Yakyn Inkar, which is banned in Kazakhstan. Earlier it was reported that among those detained after the January events in Kazakhstan there are a number of supporters of the radical Yakyn Inc cell. The name of this extremist organization was announced in a documentary by the Khabar TV channel. However, on February 25, 2022, this information was not confirmed. At the request of the publication Tengrinews.kz(https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/skolko-privlekli-otvetstvennosti-yanvarskih-sobyitiy-462885/ ) the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan replied that there were no adherents of the religious extremist organization "Yakyn Inkar" among those administratively convicted and criminally charged from among the persons detained by the internal affairs bodies. The events in the Republic of Kazakhstan in January showed that the state still cannot effectively combat disinformation and fakes in the media and the Internet. The case in Ukraine shows that with financial injections, media resources and the support of social networks, any false information can be spread to the population in huge volumes. The spread of fakes in Kazakhstan in January was facilitated by the presence of information coordinators among active bandit formations in Almaty and other cities. According to Tokayev and law enforcement agencies, this became one of the main causes of the riots, the president gives the following opinion: "it should be noted that among them, the commanders of bandit formations, there were people who were very well informed, specially trained. That is, the disinformation campaign, the so-called fakes, flowed like a river." In 2022, the main narratives of the "hate speech" were the political situation in Kazakhstan and the crisis in Ukraine, it can be noted that disinformation trends have similar dynamics. The most relevant topics causing intolerance were the status of the Kazakh and Russian languages and the presence of Russian migrants in Kazakhstan. In general, observations of the information sphere of Kazakhstan have shown an increase in propaganda materials with immersion in the language of hostility. The vocabulary of hostility is most often used in comments on articles on controversial topics and in such popular media as nur.kz , tengrinews.kz , azattyq-ruhy.kz . In the period 2022-2023, there were more provocative statements and statements by Russian officials and public figures about the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan in Kazakhstan. These statements stimulated the growth of hate speech on the Internet. One of the most notable cases is a post on the page of Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on VKontakte (nur.kz . 08/02/2022 https://www.nur.kz/world/1981349-vzlomomobyasnil-pomoschnik-medvedeva-ego-provokatsionnyy-post-vkontakte/) where Kazakhstan was called an "artificial state" and accused of "genocide of Russians." Although the post was deleted after 10 minutes, it was quickly shared on other resources. Dmitry Medvedev's statement caused a very negative reaction in the Kazakh society and increased Russophobia among users. In the light of the geopolitical crisis in Kazakh society, the need to strengthen and develop one's own identity – culture, traditions and, above all, the Kazakh language - has increased. Therefore, any mention or discrimination of the state language causes a lively negative reaction from society. An illustrative example in this topic is the statement of businessman Ramil Mukhoryapov, founder of Chocofamily (nur.kz . 10/20/2022 https://www.nur.kz/society/1993587-osnovatel-chocofamily-okazalsya-v-tsentre-skandala-iz-za-vyskazyvaniy-o-kazahskom-yazyke/). At a meeting with Russian migrants, he commented on the situation when a person addresses in Russian and is answered in Kazakh. "In fact, if this happens, I will personally be extremely saddened. But except for the situation when a person really does not know Russian. Because I think it's a little weird anyway. A little bit of some kind of manifestation of such nationalism. It can be accepted, but it's not from a big culture," the businessman wrote. This statement caused discontent and led to increased ethnic differences and antipathy towards the Russian language. In addition, many users have announced a boycott of Chocofamily. Later, a criminal case was opened against Ramil Mukhoryapov under the article on inciting ethnic hatred (part 1 of Article 174 of the Criminal Code) for his statements about "nationalism" and the Kazakh language. This problem of "migrants and Russophobia" is also related to the conflict in Ukraine, namely, the massive evasion of Russians from mobilization in September and October 2022. Due to the large flow of Russians, rental prices increased sharply, there were cases when tenants were evicted and apartments were rented at a higher price. In addition, some citizens expressed concerns about increased competition for jobs. These sentiments were also actively expressed in the comments of users of social networks. "Air tickets have become expensive because of them." "Nonresident students are suffering because of this influx." "In fact, there are more of them, why underestimate them? We are not happy with them" (Tengrinews.kz 18.10.2022 https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/skolko-rossiyan-ejednevno-priezjaet-v-kazahstan-480735 /). In 2022, disinformation on completely different topics was spreading in the Kazakh media space. During the tragic events of the beginning of the year, the Internet was turned off in Kazakhstan, which created a certain information vacuum. After the connection, there was a stream of fakes in various formats of audio, video, images and messages on social networks with speculation on the fears of the population. The most popular fake was the claim that Arystan KNB allegedly monitors mobile phones. The messages talked about the emergence of "new communication rules", according to which phone calls, calls and messages on WhatsApp will be recorded, and all devices are connected to "departmental systems of the CDMX wiretapping service and the government." However, it turned out that this is an old fake, and some Kazakhstani sites such as Factcheck.kz and Stopfake.kz , refuted this information (Factcheck.kz 11.01.2022 https://factcheck.kz/socium/fejk-arystan-knb-vse-ustrojstva-podklyucheny-k-vedomstvennym-sistemamproslushki/). On January 7, 2022, during the riots in Almaty, the famous Kyrgyz musician Ruzakhunov, who was on tour here, was detained. The musician was mistaken for a bandit and even recorded on video his remorse, in which he gave a different name and denounced himself. On the Kazakhstan TV channel, the musician was presented as one of those who participated in the January events for money. After the intervention of the Kyrgyz Embassy, Ruzakhunov returned home. A video about Ruzakhunov's participation was broadcast on January 9, 2022 (Tengrinews.kz 05/25/2023 https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/sud-astane-vyines-reshenie-isku-kyirgyizskogo-muzyikanta-500122/). In addition, against this background, information that was not verified by users was distributed in various WhatsApp chats. The flow of fakes about the coronavirus and the negative effects of the vaccine is not decreasing. The themes "Bill Gates", "5G towers", "chipping", "reducing the number of people on earth" and the like are also popular. This information was even leaked to state TV channels and various information resources. After February 24, 2022, fake news filled the information space of Kazakhstan. This can be seen as an information war, which is not limited only to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but also affects neighboring states. For example, a deepfake about Vladimir Putin and the "results of the Ukrainian-Russian meetings" appeared, which quickly spread online (Factcheck.kz 28.02.2022 https://factcheck.kz/fastchesk/dipfejk-vladimira-putina-s-itogami-ukrainsko-rossijskoj-vstrechi-rasxoditsya-v-seti/). There have also been allegations that Kazakh military equipment is allegedly being sent to the territory of Ukraine (Stopfake.kz 03/20/2022 https://stopfake.kz/ru/archives/11804 ) that a map of the partition of Russia was shown on Chinese television (Factcheck.kz 30.04.2022 https://factcheck.kz/mify/pravda-li-chto-na-kitajskom-televidenii-pokazali-kartu-razdela-rossii /). Various fake stories were spread about people trying to avoid mobilization, for example, a huge traffic jam on the border between Russia and Kazakhstan (Factcheck.kz 22.09.2022 https://factcheck.kz/sluxi/ogromnayaavtomobilnaya-probka-na-granice-rossii-ikazaxstana-proverka-foto-ot-factcheck-kg/). Monitoring of the press of Kazakhstan during this period confirmed the conclusion of a number of studies that "the multi-vector nature of modern mass media causes repeated repetition, replication of false information, forms networks of lies in which it is difficult for a modern person to navigate and decide where the truth is and where the lie is" [1, p. 5]. It also confirms the need to increase fact-checking efforts in the professional environment [11]. Given the volume of data and the amount of information processed, it is difficult to fit the whole situation and analyze how the discourse of "hate speech" and disinformation was built. However, in this paper we have presented some of our main findings regarding the various trends of hate speech and disinformation in the media. Conclusions and recommendations In 2022, Kazakhstan faced new geopolitical and information challenges: armed border conflicts, disinformation and "hate speech". All these risks have led to an even greater polarization of Kazakh society, socio-political tension and a decrease in the level of trust in the official media. The key factor in changing the situation may be increasing the information literacy of the population and its promotion through cooperation with civil society institutions, the implementation of universal media education programs. References
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