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Reference:
Mamatkhanov R.S.
The US military policy toward China and Russia under the Biden administration
// World Politics.
2024. № 2.
P. 67-85.
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2024.2.70987 EDN: KQNFOH URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=70987
The US military policy toward China and Russia under the Biden administration
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2024.2.70987EDN: KQNFOHReceived: 09-06-2024Published: 17-06-2024Abstract: This article offers a comprehensive study of the policy of deterrence toward China and Russia in the military sphere under the Biden Administration. The US military policy toward China and Russia under the Biden Administration consists in increase regular pressure on Beijing and Moscow. The motivation for this policy is expressed in the following way: authoritarian China and Russia are posing a direct challenge not only to the values, interests, security and well-being of the United States, but also to the free, open, prosperous, and secure world order. According to the Biden administration's opinion only integrated deterrence through military and non-military methods and direct competition with China and Russia can maintain the US leadership in world politics. The methodological basis of the study includes analysis of the doctrinal documents which that regulate foreign and military policy of the US, the method of logical analysis and decision analysis. Despite the difference in ideological preferences and foreign policy attitudes between the Democrats and the Republicans, the foundations of the US military strategy toward China and Russia under Trump have passed into the strategic documents of the Biden administration. The main threats to the US and its allies are once again China and Russia. The US emphasizes that China and Russia are powerful nuclear powers which the US faces simultaneously for the first time in its history. China is rapidly developing its military potential and preparing for a military confrontation with the United States, which makes this country the most dangerous threat to the entire world in the very near future. Russia, which has a smaller range of capabilities compared to China, poses an acute military threat here and right now through special military operation, cyber-attacks, activities in gray zones and the deployment of the latest hypersonic missile systems. Keywords: the US military policy, the Biden administration, integrated deterrence, the China threat, acute threat, the Indo-Pacific, Russian national interests, Armed Forces of the US, allies of the US, military developmentThis article is automatically translated. Introduction Currently, the US military policy under the Biden administration in the Chinese and Russian directions is of even greater interest than during the time of D. Trump, due to the following reasons. Firstly, the unpredictable anti-Chinese foreign policy of the United States under D. Trump, the ongoing comprehensive military development of the PRC and the growing military cooperation between China and Russia, the Ukrainian crisis, and then the Russian Federation's military operations in Ukraine, the next aggravation of the military-political situation around Taiwan increased instability, uncontrollability and conflict in the international arena, as well as the role of the military-the power factor, which in turn required the Biden administration to make new and tougher decisions regarding Russia and China. Secondly, the objective process of China's emergence as a new center of power in the world is gradually leading to a decline in the global dominance of the United States, which only strengthens the opinion among the American political elite about the need for a forceful solution to this problem. Thirdly, the creation and use of the latest weapons by China and Russia, the direct or indirect participation of the PRC and the Russian Federation in modern military conflicts, Washington's rivalry with Beijing and Moscow in cyberspace have intensified the technological development of military affairs in the United States, the restructuring of the American armed forces and the prospect of militarization of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region under the leadership of the United States, which puts ensuring international security is at risk, as well as seriously reducing not only the level of mutual trust in the strategic triangle "USA-China-Russia", but also the predictability of the development and outcome of potential military clashes. Fourthly, there is still a discussion in the ruling circles of the United States about determining priorities in the issue of deterring China and Russia. In particular, the US political elite is considering the following questions: is it necessary to restrain the PRC and the Russian Federation at the same time, or is it necessary to focus on one person? What priority areas and tools in the field of military construction and the use of armed forces should the United States choose in order to counter the main revisionist forces in the world represented by China and Russia? Taking into account the events of 2022-the first half of 2024, as well as the publication of doctrinal documents that regulate the military policy of the Biden administration, few works have been published on the analysis of the fully formed US military strategy of the 46th president's team. V.I. Batyuk's works [1-2] are devoted to the analysis of the formation of the US military-political strategy towards China and Russia in the first year of the presidency of J. Biden and the modern American-Chinese military-strategic balance. Russian researchers K.V. Blokhin [3], T.A. Shakleina [4], I.A. Istomin [5], as well as L.M. Sokolshchik and D.V. Suslov [6] consider the challenges and threats to Russia's national security emanating from new guidelines in the military strategy of the Biden administration. Special attention should be paid to the detailed monographs of the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the general editorship of Yu.V. Morozov and V.I. Batyuk [7], as well as under the responsible editorship of T.M. Mamakhatov [8], which comprehensively analyze the new role of China and Russia in world politics, comprehend the growing potential of the PRC and the Russian Federation in military affairs, It also examines the struggle of the United States with the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation for global leadership and its impact on security and the international political situation both around the world and separately in the Indo-Pacific region. New solutions in the field of military construction and prospects for U.S. military policy under J. Biden, taking into account the ongoing qualitative and quantitative modernization of the Chinese military-industrial complex and strengthening of Russia's military potential, are explored by such foreign authors as E. Medeiros [9], B. Basler [10], B. Groves [11], R. Shriver and D. Blumenthal [12]. The choice of research methodology (includes a scientific and ideological (theoretical) basis and scientific methods) is justified by the complex and multilevel nature of the research goal, which covers the doctrinal, international legal, institutional, practical and political directions of the US military policy towards China and the Russian Federation. The complex nature of the research objective determined the choice of a set of general scientific and special scientific (historical and political science) methods. The scientific and ideological basis of the research was the neorealistic concept of the theory of international relations as a whole and without certain accents placed by individual schools. It is this approach that allows us to consider the US military policy towards the PRC and the Russian Federation under the administration of J. Biden at a time when the world is witnessing the erosion of international institutions, international law and conditions for the stability of the entire international system. At the same time, there is a shift in international politics towards state-centric models of management of international political processes, which is most consistent with the provisions of the theory of neorealism. Firstly, such general scientific methods as induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, and comparison were used. As in research in other sciences, they help to draw general conclusions from empirical material on US-Chinese and US-Russian relations in the military sphere. Secondly, special scientific methods were used. The article used such historical methods as comparative historical and chronological approaches in the study of the evolution of US military policy towards China and the Russian Federation from D. Trump to J. Biden. Among the methods of political science, decisional and institutional approaches, as well as case studies, were used. The decision method allows us to determine the system of making foreign policy decisions of the US presidential administrations in relation to China and Russia, namely: the main participants, the decision-making process, the decisions themselves and their implementation. The institutional method is used to reveal the structure and structure of organizations, unions, and agreements between the United States and its partners, which were created in opposition to China and Russia. The case study is used to characterize the general trends and properties of the subject through the study of individual cases in American military policy in the Chinese and Russian directions under J. Biden. The scientific novelty of the research is as follows: First, a comprehensive study of US military policy in the Chinese and Russian directions under the administration of J. Biden was conducted and it was shown that, despite all the contradictions and disagreements in the party and political preferences of D. Trump and J. Biden, the idea of confrontation with the PRC and the Russian Federation unites them. Secondly, the mechanism of development and decision–making by the Biden administration in military policy in the Chinese and Russian directions has been revealed. Third, previously unused doctrinal documents of the executive branch of the US government have been introduced into scientific circulation. Thus, in this article, the following research questions will be answered: which of the threats is the highest priority for the United States: Chinese or Russian? What are the priorities and tools in the field of military construction and the use of the armed forces? How will the new US military strategy affect the security of China and Russia? To answer these questions, it is necessary to solve the following research tasks: 1. To identify the factors of a political, institutional and strategic nature that influenced the formation of the military policy of the administration of J. Biden. 2. To explore the doctrinal foundations of the US military policy towards China and the Russian Federation under the administration of J. Biden. 3. To study the main directions of the implementation of the US military policy under J. Biden and the specifics of the decisions taken in the Chinese and Russian directions. Conditions for the development of the military policy of the Biden administration The military policy of the Biden administration was developed slowly due to several factors. The first of them is the unpreparedness and confusion of President Biden's entourage, who are overly involved in the fight against D. Trump. As a result, due to the inability to quickly develop the foundations of a new American military policy, the United States under Biden had to act situationally, namely on the principle of responding to the most important challenges. As a result, negative domestic political circumstances led to the fact that most of the fundamental US documents in the military sphere were published only in the second year of Biden's presidency, and some of them even in the third. The second factor was the increased geopolitical instability in the international arena. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, the counterproductive US negotiations with Russia and China in 2021, the Ukrainian and Taiwanese crises forced the US military and politicians to constantly update in real time the declared US military-political course towards China and Russia. The third factor is the problems in the military-political sphere, which the Biden administration inherited from Donald Trump. First of all, this was due to D. Trump's radical foreign policy and frequent reshuffles in the administration, including in the military-political bloc. In particular, two defense ministers and four acting defense ministers have been replaced in D. Trump's team. However, the following events and processes occupy a special place among the acute military and political problems of the period of D. Trump's presidency, which negatively affected the development of the military strategy of the Biden administration in the Chinese and Russian directions: 1. The sharp and rapid deterioration of relations with China. In the period from 2017 to 2021, American policy in the Chinese direction has radically changed. In response to the qualitative and quantitative military development of China, Washington, under D. Trump, moved to a long-term rivalry with China in the military sphere. The expansion of American armed forces and forward-based assets in the Indo-Pacific region; US participation in territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas; military support for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia and India as counterweights to China launched a new era of US-Chinese military rivalry, which had an extremely negative impact to ensure regional and international security. Mutual strategic trust between the United States and China has finally disappeared. The countries of the Indo-Pacific region themselves, where the confrontation mainly took place, found themselves in strategic uncertainty for the first time in a long time, namely in conditions when it is necessary to choose one of the sides. 2. The decline in the importance of traditional military alliances and alliances led by the United States. D. Trump's harsh statements that NATO has a lot of problems [13], and the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on those members of the North Atlantic Alliance who do not make a sufficient contribution to the financing of the military bloc [14], led to the distancing of European partners from Washington. 3. Regression in the field of limiting and reducing the level of strategic offensive weapons and nuclear weapons control. Under Donald Trump, the United States did not propose any initiatives to increase mutual trust by limiting offensive weapons. On the contrary, from 2018 to 2019. Washington has actively modernized its nuclear forces, spending about $24 billion on this, and in August 2019, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). Moreover, the military-political bloc of the D. Trump administration raised the issue of the possibility of a preventive nuclear strike against the enemy within the framework of a "limited nuclear war", which caused criticism not only from China, Russia and even Washington's European and Asian partners, but also from American political elites. Thus, a whole range of problems of a foreign and domestic political nature required Biden's team to make final decisions related to the development of a clear US military policy. General characteristics of the US military policy under the presidency of J. Biden Both the military and politicians were closely involved in the development and implementation of the military doctrine of the Biden administration. A special role was assigned to Secretary of Defense L. Austin, former and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, namely M. Milli (2019-2023) and C. Brown (2023-present), U.S. Secretary of State E. Blinken and National Security Adviser to the President of the United States J. Sullivan. The listed military and political figures have a common vision on a number of topics related to US military policy:
As a result, the common vision of the military and politicians ensured the creation of a holistic military strategy, which includes a consistent course towards China and Russia, the foundations of which are transferred from one document to another. The doctrinal foundations of the military policy of the Biden administration were reflected in several documents at once, namely the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States-2022 [15], the National Security Strategy-2022 [16], the National Defense Strategy-2022 [17], which includes a Review of Nuclear policy-2022 and a Review of missile defense Defense-2022, the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region-2022 [18], the National Intelligence Strategy-2023 [19], the National Cybersecurity Strategy-2023 [20] and the Military Strategy-2022 [21]. In total, three main conceptual foundations of the US military strategy towards the PRC and the Russian Federation can be identified on the basis of the noted documents. First, the entire strategic environment of the United States has been transformed, because the world itself has changed dramatically. The economies of countries can both grow rapidly and fall rapidly, new high technologies have become crucial in the issue of modernizing weapons, and climate change and the emergence of new viruses force us to reconsider the principles of warfare. However, the main factor that shapes the security agenda is the rivalry between democratic and authoritarian countries [16]. It should be noted that the main authoritarian states, according to the Biden administration, are China and Russia, the most dangerous of which is the PRC. Secondly, the main danger for the United States now is not any regional threats, but authoritarian states with revisionist foreign policies that are focused on rebuilding the world order in accordance with the values and norms of their authoritarian political regime. In addition, authoritarian countries are trying to oust the United States from regions of the world where Washington has its own interests; deprive the United States of the opportunity to project force to combat the regional aggression of autocrats; surpass the United States in military and technological terms; create security threats directly to the United States of America and its allies [21]. Consequently, the United States will implement integrated deterrence against China and Russia, which involves an individual approach to deterrence by military and non-military methods in all areas of war (on land, in the air, at sea, in space and in cyberspace) both at the global level and in a number of regions: in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East, Africa and the Arctic. The third is that the wars of the future will take place with the participation of the world's leading powers in disputed territories, will be protracted and pose an immediate danger to the United States itself, and the outcome of the battle will determine the ability to effectively use new technologies. Thus, the changed strategic environment and new threats to the United States require a constant build-up of its own power based on long-term financing of the American military sector. The main goal of this particular vector of military construction is to win the fight against China and Russia for the future world order, which is directly related to the main slogan of the military policy of the Biden administration: "Adapt now or lose later" [21]. Directions and activities of the US military strategy towards China and Russia The main measures of the US military policy towards China and Russia are being implemented by the Biden administration in the following areas. 1. Comprehensive technological modernization of the US military sector The Pentagon is concerned about the successes of China and Russia in the development of hypersonic weapons; the expansion and modernization of the nuclear arsenal; the development of China and the Russian Federation technologies in the field of information and psychological operations, cyber espionage and cyber hacking; the emergence of competencies in Moscow and Beijing in the field of military space operations due to the emergence of anti-satellite and laser weapons, advanced means and technologies of electronic warfare. In addition, the United States regards as a challenge China's plans to create the largest air force in the Indo-Pacific region, including through the active production of attack drones, and the development of the navy, which continues to surpass the American one. According to the US Department of Defense, the noted successes and plans of China and Russia in the field of military development have one goal – to surpass the United States militarily not only in the Indo-Pacific region and the Euro-Atlantic, but also around the world. As a result, Washington is more focused than ever on increasing its military superiority in both qualitative and quantitative terms. To achieve this goal, the United States has begun to implement a set of measures aimed at the technological modernization of the American military sector. First of all, the United States, under Biden, has increased its military budget in a record way precisely by increasing the cost of comprehensive modernization of the armed forces. Thus, the military budget from 2022 to 2024 showed steady growth: in 2022 – 768 billion US dollars [22], in 2023 – 858 billion US dollars [23], in 2024 – 886 billion US dollars [24]. Table 1 shows the dynamics of expenditures on the main activities aimed at the technological modernization of the US Armed Forces.
Table1. Dynamics of US military expenditures aimed at the technological modernization of the military-industrial complex, billion US dollars
Source: The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) [22-24]
The most noticeable increase was in the cost of updating the US space forces and capabilities, modernizing missile and anti-missile systems, rearming and expanding naval forces, developing a nuclear triad and conducting new scientific research and development. The modernization of the US space forces and capabilities in the period from 2022 to 2024 required an increase in costs from US$ 16.7 billion to US$ 26.1 billion, i.e. by 56.2%. Budget allocations are aimed at deploying new groups of military satellites, developing a satellite navigation system for military purposes, supporting the US Department of Defense Space Development Agency, and creating systems to track the use of hypersonic, laser and anti-satellite weapons. The upgrade of the missile and anti-missile systems required an increase in costs from US$ 20.3 billion to US$ 30.6 billion (a 50.7% increase) and from US$ 10.9 billion to US$ 14.8 billion (an increase of 35.7%), respectively. Budget allocations are aimed at the modernization of the Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD anti-missile systems, SM-3 anti-aircraft guided missiles, as well as the development of hypersonic cruise missiles, the first unit of which was received for the US Armed Forces in December 2023. [25]. In particular, the PrSM surface-to-surface missile is launched from the launchers of the M142 HIMARS and M270A2 MLRS multiple launch rocket systems, has a flight speed of 5M and a range of up to 800 km [25]. These indicators are inferior to both Chinese and Russian counterparts. In particular, the Chinese hypersonic missile DF-17 has a flight range of about 2 thousand km and a speed of more than 5M, and the Russian Dagger – 2 thousand km and 9M. The United States places special emphasis on the rearmament and expansion of its naval forces, the costs of which increased from $34.6 billion to $48.1 billion between 2022 and 2024, i.e. by 39%. Washington intends to regain its maritime supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region. It is planned to modernize and purchase six submarines USS Virginia (SSN-774), which are capable of carrying BGM-109 Tomahawk attack missiles, and five destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) equipped with SM-2 anti-aircraft missiles and AGM/RGM/UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Together with destroyers and submarines, Gerald R. Ford-type aircraft carriers, Constellation-type frigates, San Antonio-type amphibious transport docks and America-type universal amphibious assault ships are being modernized. Spending on the modernization of the nuclear triad in the period from 2022 to 2024 showed an increase from $27.7 billion to $37.7 billion, i.e. by 36.1%. The F-35B dual-purpose fighter-bomber, which can carry nuclear bombs, is being upgraded. In this area, a new B-21 Raider strategic bomber is being developed, which will be characterized by low visibility and the ability to carry both conventional ammunition and hypersonic and thermonuclear weapons. Attempts are continuing to create a new LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (replacing LGM-30G Minuteman III), which, according to experts, may not be released by the planned 2030 due to a sharp increase in the cost of production of the missile itself and an increase in the cost of creating related infrastructure from 118 million US dollars to 177 million US dollars [26]. In addition to the LGM-35A Sentinel, a new air-launched cruise missile with an AGM-181 nuclear warhead is being developed, which, according to various sources, has an explosive power from 5 to 150 kt and a high subsonic flight speed and a range of at least 2.4-2.5 thousand km [27]. The first Columbia-class strategic nuclear submarine is also being developed, which is planned to be commissioned in 2031. 16 UGM-133 Trident II missiles with a range of 12 thousand km will be installed on board the submarine. In total, the United States plans to build 12 such submarines. The impressive growth from 2022 to 2024 was in research and development. This item of expenditure increased by 29.4% (to 145 billion US dollars), which makes it one of the largest among the allocations aimed at modernizing the US Armed Forces. Artificial intelligence, innovative materials, hypersonic technologies, quantum technologies, human-computer interaction, advanced software in the field of cybersecurity, microelectronics, biotechnology, new means of communication, including 5G and 6G, are highlighted as priority research and development. Thus, the modernization of the US military sector in these areas directly indicates that Washington continues to prepare for a possible direct clash with China and Russia. The United States, through the modernization of almost all types of its weapons and branches of the armed forces, is focused on participating in the regional, irregular and global conflict with the PRC and the Russian Federation. 2. Strengthening military alliances and partnerships Under Biden, the United States continued the policy of D. Trump's team to prepare for a possible military conflict with Beijing and Moscow by creating a cordon sanitaire around the PRC and the Russian Federation with the participation of the states of the Indo-Pacific region and European countries, so that in the event of a direct confrontation between the United States and China and Russia, they would be hit by rapid massive strikes from several sides at once directions. The main decisions of the United States in this regard were: First, it is the creation in September 2021 of the trilateral military alliance AUKUS, which includes Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. AUKUS has become another alliance, along with QUAD and ANZUS, which the United States uses to project combat power from several points at once and increase the interoperability of its armed forces with the armies of allies and partners. In particular, the United States has begun deploying its military aircraft to Australia as part of AUKUS. In particular, by 2026, the United States will build the infrastructure necessary to accommodate B-52 intercontinental strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear charges on the territory of the Tindal Air Force Base, where the US military is located [28]. Further, in December 2023, US Secretary of Defense L. Austin announced that in 2024, AUKUS participants would conduct a series of trilateral naval military exercises and tests of new types of military equipment, including unmanned systems and artificial intelligence algorithms for tracking enemy submarines. It is important to note that discussions are underway among AUKUS members about the potential expansion of the union by including the main counterweights to China, namely Japan, South Korea, India and New Zealand [29]. We emphasize that the United States in August 2023 We have already agreed to expand military and economic cooperation with South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region following the Camp David summit, which provides for close cooperation with AUKUS and QUAD. In a joint statement adopted at the end of the summit, the parties declare that China's assertiveness is the main problem on the way to establishing peace and order in the Indo-Pacific region, and in response to this, Japan and South Korea join US initiatives to oust Chinese goods, including high-tech, from global chains supplies; organization of joint advanced research; creation of a hotline to discuss responses to military threats from the PRC [30]. Secondly, in response to the expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal, the development and use of the latest hypersonic weapons by Russia, cyber espionage, information attacks, active interference in the electoral processes of other countries, unofficial participation in conflicts in the "gray zones" and the Russian Federation in Ukraine, the United States has outlined the protection of "every inch of NATO territory" [16], to turn a special military operation into a strategic failure. In particular, the United States of America has expanded NATO's combat capabilities on the eastern flank and strengthened cooperation with the Alliance countries on issues of deterring Russia in the economy, defense industry and high technology. With the filing of the United States, Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, the Alliance's cooperation with Ukraine was expanded through the creation of the NATO-Ukraine Council, European countries of the military alliance began to conclude security agreements with Ukraine (Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain and Latvia have signed such a document with Ukraine). We also note that the United States intends to transfer the armed forces of NATO countries to American standards and weapons by all means. For example, the United States is trying to replace outdated small arms of the US Armed Forces and most of its allies – the M4 and M16 – with more effective and promising options that will be based on a new 6.8 × 51 mm caliber cartridge. The SIG XM7 assault rifle, which has been in service with the US Army since 2022, won as part of the US Armed Forces "New Generation Squad Weapons" program. Washington is trying to make the new cartridge standard for the entire NATO bloc, where the 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge dominates, by supplying new American assault rifles to the countries of the Alliance. The SIG XM7 chambered in 6.8 × 51 mm is already used in selected units of the armed forces and police of Australia, France, Germany, Denmark, Canada, Estonia, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Thirdly, the United States continues its military support for Ukraine and the Republic of China and the use of these countries as an anti-Russian and anti-Chinese battering ram. A fundamentally new solution to the issue of arms supplies to Taiwan is the implementation of all new deals with the help of exclusive presidential arms transfer powers, through which the United States sends weapons to Ukraine. Military support to Taiwan is now provided free of charge, and not in the form of trade and economic cooperation. However, there is one limitation. According to the law of the US Congress "On Increasing the stability of Taiwan", weapons can be supplied to Taipei free of charge only for 5 years and for a total amount that does not exceed 2 billion US dollars per year [31]. At the same time, another distinctive feature of such a mechanism is that weapons are shipped directly from American warehouses. Therefore, the customer can receive the requested tools within a few days after the signing of the relevant decree by the President of the United States. All deliveries are paid directly and exclusively from the US budget. In total, the United States, under Biden, supplied weapons to Ukraine and Taiwan for a total of about 105.5 billion US dollars and about 5.2 billion US dollars, respectively. Thus, the entire US policy of consolidating the anti-Chinese and anti-Russian coalition among its allies and partners in fact indicates that Washington's military-political hegemony has been shaken. The Biden administration, unlike D. Trump's team, really managed to launch anti-Chinese and anti-Russian military-political integration under the auspices of the United States with the involvement of both the countries of the Indo-Pacific region and other interested parties from the Euro-Atlantic area. The transition of the armed forces of NATO countries and not only to American standards and weapons, the regulation of mechanisms for the joint use of military technologies, the successful conviction of American allies and partners that China and Russia are aggressors and the main causes of future wars in the IT and Euro–Atlantic directly prove to us how much Washington's elites are concerned about the thought of losing their leadership not only in military matters, but also in general in ensuring the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region and the Euro-Atlantic area, as well as in the world. 3. Competition in the Arctic The Arctic attracts more and more attention from the United States, Russia and China, because the strategic importance of the region for the military and economic security of these countries is growing from year to year. In addition, with the advent of D. Trump, Mexico has ceased to be considered as a region where US cooperation with China and Russia is possible, even despite all sorts of difficulties in Washington's relations with Beijing and Moscow. From now on, the Arctic is a potential theater of military action with the participation of Washington, Moscow and Beijing. Biden's Arctic policy fully respects the continuity of D. Trump's course. According to the Biden administration, China and Russia pose direct military threats to the United States in the Arctic. As an American response to the military strengthening of China and Russia in the Arctic, certain decisions in the field of military construction serve. First, the main priority is to expand the American icebreaking fleet to five vessels [32]. Currently, the American icebreaking fleet includes the Polar Star heavy polar icebreaker (commissioned in 1976) and the USCGC Healy medium icebreaker (commissioned in 1999). Only since August 2023, the American company Bollinger Shipyards has begun construction of a new heavy icebreaker USCGC Polar Sentinel [33]. The planned commissioning of the new vessel is scheduled for 2027. Secondly, the United States intends to increase its military presence in the Arctic by conducting freedom of navigation operations, organizing joint military exercises with its regional partners and allies, Canada being the main one in the region, and developing an intelligence and warning system for the Aerospace Defense Command of North America [34]. Already in September 2023, the US Department of Defense organized a new office of Arctic Strategy and Global Sustainability to protect its interests in the Arctic and build up military forces and forward-based assets that are located near the region. At the same time, in 2021-2022, to carry out Arctic missions, the United States organized the 11th Airborne Division and deployed two squadrons of F-35 aircraft (27 aircraft each) at Eielson Air Base in Alaska - in addition to F-16 fighters, A–10 attack aircraft and KS-135 tankers stationed at this base. The air base is located in close proximity to the Elmendorf-Richardson military base, which houses the headquarters of the United States Joint Forces Command in Alaska (ALCOM) and 40 fifth-generation F-22 fighters are deployed. As a result, the United States, in competition with China and Russia in the Arctic, relied on a power strategy. The mentioned guidelines come into direct contradiction with the American accusations against the PRC and the Russian Federation about the militarization of the region. Blaming China and Russia for the militarization of the Arctic, the United States itself is in fact stepping up its military presence, which only reduces strategic stability and increases the wariness of Beijing and especially Moscow, two thirds of whose nuclear arsenal is located on the Kola Peninsula. Conclusion The US military policy under Biden vividly demonstrated that the United States in the very near future will definitely not reverse its hard course towards China and the Russian Federation, which only accelerates Washington's movement towards direct confrontation with Moscow and Beijing. This is confirmed by all the decisions made by the Biden team in the military sphere, the implementation of most of which will last at least until 2030-2035, as well as a clear consensus within the American establishment and among the closest US allies in Asia and Europe. In general, in the military-political sphere, the Biden administration fully adheres to D. Trump's policy of containing China and Russia. The United States has increased its military spending in a record manner, which in 2024 amounted to 80.5% of the total budget of the US government. The military budget fully meets the priorities of the Biden team to achieve total military superiority of the United States over China and Russia. On the one hand, technological modernization, including through advanced scientific research and development, will affect the nuclear weapons complex, the air force, naval, space and land forces, missile and anti-missile complexes and cybersecurity systems. However, so far, such a technological upgrade of the US military sector is being implemented slowly and with an emphasis on old equipment and weapons. Indeed, new weapons that will once again confirm the superiority of the United States in military terms will be tentatively adopted only closer to 2030. At the same time, there is a possibility that China and Russia will already be able to present their new developments with a high degree of readiness. On the other hand, the Biden administration managed to create anti-Chinese and anti-Russian coalitions among its European and Asian allies, but these include only countries close to the United States: EU countries, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea. Other states, especially in Southeast Asia, are not ready to risk profitable economic relations with China and the Russian Federation. However, even in cooperation with its allies and partners, the United States has increased its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the Euro-Atlantic and the Arctic in order to clearly and clearly demonstrate to China and Russia its intentions to present a united front against them during any of the conflicts involving the PRC and the Russian Federation. China and Russia have taken into account the aggressive foreign policy orientation of the United States towards these countries and both countries have taken the path of qualitative improvement of strategic cooperation, realizing a multipolar world. This is confirmed by the latest agreements between Moscow and Beijing on deepening cooperation in the field of defense and expanding bilateral military exercises, which were reached following Vladimir Putin's visit to China in May 2024. At the same time, due to the freezing of cooperation between the United States and China on fundamental regional and global issues of military cooperation, a window of opportunity opens for Russia on such important topics for the Russian Federation as the fight against international terrorism; stabilization of the situation in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the post-Soviet space; military cooperation with the delimitation of zones of influence in these regions; popularization and direct implementation of the ideas of a multipolar world within the framework of BRICS, ASEAN, SCO and APEC; mutually beneficial adaptation to US sanctions through de-dollarization and development of alternative financial institutions; export of Russian energy resources and weapons to China; implementation of joint projects in the field of science and technology; joint development of the Arctic. In addition, in the event of a direct military clash between the United States and China (for example, due to another Taiwan crisis), Russia can mediate in resolving the conflict, which will become the main trump card of the Russian Federation. As a result, Biden's military strategy towards China and Russia only increased the distance between Moscow and Beijing from Washington, accelerated the militarization of the Indo-Pacific region, the Euro-Atlantic and the Arctic, and again forced European and Asian countries to make a final choice in favor of Russia and China or in favor of the United States. References
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