The National Movement of the Kurds of Iraq (the Twentieth Century and the Present)

Vedeneev Il'ya Nikolaevich ORCID: 0000-0002-8808-9745 PhD in History Lecturer; Department of Humanities; Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation 143532, Russia, Moscow region, Dedovsk, Keramicheskaya str., 26, sq. 68 ilyas-efendi@yandex.ru

The Kurds are one of the largest nations in the world (the largest in the Middle East) deprived of their own statehood. The total number of the Kurdish population in the region is about 25-29 million people. ^{[1, p. 7]}. It is also necessary to keep in mind the large number of Kurds in the diaspora (in the post-Soviet space, primarily in Armenia and Russia, as well as in Western European countries: Sweden, Germany, etc.).

There is a point of view according to which the Kurds have never had their own statehood, but this is not entirely accurate. Thus, it is reliably known about the existence of a number of Kurdish emirates (Bohan, Bitlis, Ardelan, etc.) in the period that preceded the emergence of such large, supranational state formations in the region as the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran ^{[2, pp. 52-58]}. Subsequently, as a result and as a result of the Battle of Chaldyran (1514), they were incorporated into these empires. However, it is not entirely clear what was the degree of dependence of the Kurdish communities on the central governments in Istanbul and Tehran. It is assumed that their belonging to empires was rather formal (nominal) in nature: while in all matters concerning internal self-government, the leaders of the Kurds (representatives of the traditional Kurdish aristocracy: agi and sheikhs) enjoyed broad autonomy ^{[3, p. 25]}. This could be facilitated by such factors as the rugged, inaccessible terrain of the territories that are the home of the Kurds (the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers), as well as the fact that Kurdistan lay along – was "dissected" – by the borders of two empires. As a result, the desire of the central government (recorded, at least in the Ottoman Empire) to use Kurds for border service is logical. This is exactly the goal pursued by the Hamidiye reform: the creation of light cavalry units of the same name by analogy with the Russian Cossacks ^{[4, p. 80]}.

Thus, it can be said that the Kurds have never possessed a state in the modern sense of the word: nation state. However, can't the same be said about their neighbors? The Young Turks aimed to ensure the unity of the Empire. In this sense, the Turkish Republic, proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 within its modern borders, became the small place on the world map that the late Ottoman elite managed to "cling to" in order to preserve themselves as owners (of material goods) and rulers (holders of political power). Throughout the entire period of the national liberation struggle against international intervention (1919-1923), the question of the subsequent political structure of the country (the fate of the sultanate and the caliphate) remained unresolved. No less uncertain was the question of which territories would eventually become part of the new statehood. It can be said that it remained so until the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement (1926), according to which the government of M. Kemal finally renounced its claims to oil-bearing Mosul (northern Iraq) ^[5].

Despite the fact that history does not know the subjunctive mood, we dare to assume that if the Kemalists had managed to establish control over the more extensive territories of the collapsed Empire (northern Syria and/or northern Iraq) from the very beginning – even before the proclamation of the Republic – the new statehood could have been different (for example, federal, not unitary) character. The following arguments can be given in favor of this hypothesis:

Firstly, the existence of relevant claims (recorded in the "National Pledge"), in particular, the above-mentioned Mosul, the issue of which remained unresolved years after the end of the national liberation war ^[6].

Secondly, regardless of what the Kemalists thought (planned) about the post-war structure of the country, throughout the entire period of the war against international intervention, they widely resorted to religious slogans (fight against infidels, holy war, ghazawat) in order to mobilize mass support. It can be said that this agitation has achieved its goal ^{[7, p. 20]}.

Thus, it can be assumed that if at least part of the territories of northern Syria and/or northern Iraq had been included in the Republic, the new Turkish statehood could have had a different character. This does not mean that such traditional Middle Eastern social institutions as the Sultanate and the Caliphate would certainly have stood. However, due to the fact that the disputed territories (in particular, Kirkuk) were (and remain) inhabited not only by the Turkic population, but also by Kurds and Arabs, it can be assumed that, in the end, the Kemalists would have been forced to offer a more harmonious formula for the coexistence of various peoples within the Turkish nation: which would not be aggressively assimilative in relation to minorities.

A similar project – in the same historical period – could theoretically be implemented by the Arabs. So, during the Arab uprising of 1916-1918, the British promised its leader, Sharif of Mecca Hussein ibn Ali, the creation of a kingdom that would include vast territories inhabited by Arabs, but this promise was not fulfilled. On the contrary, the region was divided into mandated territories (France received Syria, Great Britain – Iraq), which subsequently became independent states. We assume that, in the case of the creation of a single Arab kingdom, its leadership would pursue a more loyal policy towards ethnic and religious minorities (similar to what happened during the heyday of the Brilliant Porte). In comparison, from the experience of the twentieth century, it is reliably known that small states – into which the Ottoman Empire was divided by Western imperialist powers – became national states "a priori", which, in particular, resulted in the formation of a "titular nation" in each of them (based on the people, whose number was the majority in the country) coupled with the oppression of national minorities. Of course, this does not mean that every nation-state is xenophobic and aims to assimilate minorities "by definition", but the Kurdish question in the twentieth century, unfortunately, serves to confirm this thesis rather than refute it.

In other words, the question, from our point of view, should be clarified, put in the following plane: not why the Kurds did not have their own statehood, but why – if none of the peoples of the region had their own national state at the beginning of the twentieth century – the Turks and Arabs managed to establish modern statehood, and the Kurds – No?

As a result of the political upheavals of the first quarter of the twentieth century, the Kurds found themselves separated by the borders of four states in the Middle East: Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. Despite the fact that the national aspirations of this people were recognized internationally (for example, the Sevres Peace Treaty of 1920 recognized the Kurds' right to self-determination), the Kurds and their leadership proved unable to take advantage of the historical chance that fell to their lot ^{[8, pp. 326-327]}. In retrospect, we can say that it was at the end of the First World War that the Kurds had the maximum chances of gaining their own statehood, but they remained unrealized.

It is impossible to specify any one reason here, rather there was a complex combination, a constellation of objective and subjective circumstances intertwined with each other and not quite the same in all parts of Kurdistan. As the basic objective ones, I would like to note the political disunity of the Kurdish society, which, in turn, was based on the economic isolation of each production entity (patrimony, land ownership of ag, sheikhs). This does not mean that capitalist relations did not penetrate into the area of Kurdistan (this is not the case), but the actual commodity production, commodity-money relations were limited ^{[9, p. 43]}. It seems that there was no single market and, as a result, a common (economic in nature) interest that could consolidate the positions of individual representatives of the Kurdish nobility on political issues (including despite their personal antipathies towards each other). As a result, none of the Kurdish sheikhs (including the largest ones) possessed either political sanction (which could wear the religious form of undisputed leadership) or brute force of physical coercion (in sufficient quantity) to force other fellow class members to recognize their authority without significant resistance.

As a result, when British administrators and political commissars in Iraq turned out to be interested in bringing order to Kurdistan ("lifting" the status of Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji for this purpose), they very quickly became convinced that the power of even the most influential Kurdish leader does not extend beyond 20 miles from his ancestral possessions ^{[10, p. 78]}. To this we can add a subjective factor, namely the obstinate character of the sheikh himself (to a certain extent also derived from the lack of an orderly political hierarchy in Kurdistan), as a result of which Barzanji rebelled from British rule and proclaimed himself the "king of Kurdistan" ^{[11, p. 171]}. However, his uprising was not successful (to a large extent, if not to a decisive extent, precisely because the rest of the representatives of the ethnic nobility did not support him).

A similar situation took place in Turkish Kurdistan, where during the uprising of Sheikh Said Pirani there were Kurdish (i.e. ethnic, national in content) performances under Islamic (i.e. religious in form) slogans. At the same time, Said's uprising was unsuccessful not so much due to the lack of coordination between representatives of the Kurdish aristocracy, but due to the fact that the Kemalist counterintelligence promptly uncovered the conspiracy of the Azadi committee, which was supposed to take part (if not initiate) the uprising ^{[12, p. 198]}.

In general, the national movement of the Kurds of Iraq underwent several stages of development and evolution in the twentieth century. A characteristic feature of the movement – compared to the national struggles of other peoples in history – is that in all four countries it was largely isolated from other (Kurdish) movements of neighboring countries. This was due to both objective and subjective circumstances, among which it should be noted, firstly, the different level of development of the Kurds themselves, their communities in different countries, and, secondly, the conditions (primarily political regimes) in which they had to exist. So, there is no need to say that, firstly, each of the four mentioned countries in the region had their own cultural (including military) traditions, and, secondly, during the twentieth century, the regimes in each of the mentioned countries changed, moreover repeatedly. On the one hand, it can be said that the national movement of the Kurds was, to a certain extent, "out of sync" (while it was suppressed in Iraq, flourished in Turkey, etc.), and, on the other, it must be recognized that the "general awareness" of the Kurds about what is happening in neighboring countries/parts The divided ethnogeographic area of Kurdistan has always existed ^{[13, pp. 232-233]}.

Among the main stages of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq, the following can be distinguished:

The first (initial) stage (the last quarter of the XIX – the first half of the XX centuries) is characterized by: (a) the decisive role of tribal leaders such as M. Barzani and Sheikh Said; (b) Islam acts as a means of mobilizing the masses ^{[14, p. 172]}.

The second stage, associated primarily (but not exclusively) with the name of Mustafa Barzani (the so-called "September Revolution" of 1958-1975), is characterized by the gradual maturation of the modern (national) Kurdish identity. The majority of Kurds are rallying around the goal of achieving autonomy from Baghdad; regular paramilitary units, the Peshmerga, are being formed on the basis of the tribal militia.

The third stage (1975 – present) is characterized by the formation of the leading political actors (parties) of the Kurds in their modern form, in which they persist and continue to play an important role in the politics of modern Iraq and a decisive one – at the level of the Kurdistan regional government. We are talking about the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

When considering the phenomenon of Kurdish nationalism, there is a great temptation to sharply contrast "reactionary" and "progressive" features, but in reality both were tightly intertwined with each other to the point of complete inseparability. So, in retrospect, it is logical to attribute to "reactionary" the disunity of the Kurds, the underdevelopment of productive forces in Kurdistan, as well as social relations (which exist about production: within the framework of the actual production process and permeate the entire society). On the other hand, the "progressive" features should include, in fact, Kurdish nationalism, its maturation and the formation of national consciousness. However, there are a number of contradictions here.

Thus, a number of "reactionary" features do not seem to be excessive at the present time. The split between the leading actors of Kurdish politics - the KDP and the PUK – remains unresolved, which, in turn, are supported by the clans (Barzani and Talabani, respectively). The districts in which these parties receive support are also unchanged, which indirectly indicates the strength of patronage and clientelist networks (created from tribes) on which these parties (clans) rely ^[15]. In turn, in the parties themselves, power is invariably inherited by representatives of the clan. Thus, in the case of the KDP, there was a transit from Masoud Barzani, the youngest son of Mustafa Barzani, to his son and nephew Nechirvan and Masrur Barzani; in the case of the PUK, from Jalal Talabani to Bafel Talabani. The maximum that can take place is competition between cousins (as it took place in the Pskov region between Bafel and Lahur Talabani, from which Bafel emerged the winner). All this indicates that the modernization of Kurdish society is still very far from completion.

On the other hand, "progressive" and "regressive" traits were sometimes embodied in the same person. As the researcher of the problem G. Stansfield wrote on this occasion, it is tempting for us to imagine M. Barzanji as a nationalist, which, in fact, he was not in any respect: neither in terms of origin (he was a sheikh), nor ideology (Islam played its role), nor a way to achieve goals (the bet on the tribal militia) ^{[16, p. 62]}. In turn, the purpose of Barzanji's activity was to establish "his own fief" ^{[11, p. 169]}. To a somewhat lesser extent, this concerned M. Barzani, who – also being a representative of the traditional aristocracy and a tribal leader – nevertheless was able to successfully fight against the central government, which would have been impossible if he had not been able to enlist the support of the majority of the Kurdish population (i.e., in the end, the Kurdish elite) ^{[12, p. 94]}. Moreover, it can be said that during the period of the "September Revolution" led by M. Barzani (1958-1975), a group of Kurdish leaders was formed, represented by a number of members of the Political Bureau of the KDP (I. Ahmed, J. Talabani), who would later create opposition to Barzani's autocratic rule, under more left-wing and radical (Maoist) slogans ^{[12, p. 103]}. All this, eventually, will lead to a split in the national movement: in 1975, the PUK will be founded in Damascus by the oppositionists (together with N. Mustafa).

Despite the fact that this party appears to be "more nationalistic" than Barzani (for example, regular military units – the Peshmerga – were created for the first time under the leadership of I. Ahmed and J. Talabani), one should not go to the opposite extreme ^{[16, p. 70]}. While Ibrahim Ahmad is characterized by D. McDowall as a representative of the urban secular intelligentsia of the city of Sulaymaniyah, about J. Talabani knows that his father was a sheikh from the Koy Sanjak family ^{[11, p. 319]}. Representatives of the Talabani family have been known since the XVIII century, among them were famous poets, as well as members of the government in Baghdad ^{[17, pp. 184-185]}. Nevertheless, it is true that at present the representatives of the PUK (now represented by B. Talabani) are the most left–wing representatives of the national movement of Kurds in Iraq, who maintain close contacts (with the mediation of the United States) with the left-wing Syrian Kurds from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ^[18]. This is also the reason why the leadership of the PUK is accused by the modern Turkish leadership of having links with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), recognized as a terrorist organization in Turkey and most European countries, as well as recently banned in Iraq ^{[19, 20]}.

As for Kurdish nationalism at the present stage, it can be stated that, as of now, its apotheosis is the project of Kurdish autonomy, which was implemented as a result of the Gulf War (1990-1991), as a result of the creation of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. Already in 1992, a local legislative assembly was formed, which functions to this day ^{[21, p. 7]}. The real triumph of the national movement can be considered the Constitution of 2005 – the adoption of which became possible as a result of the invasion of Iraq by the international coalition led by the United States – in which the status of Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomy within a unified Iraq was officially fixed at the highest level.

It can be said that in the late noughties and early tenths of the 21st century, Kurdish nationalism was experiencing the best time in its history. This applies not only to Iraqi Kurds, but also to Turkish and Syrian ones. In Turkey, the government in the 90s and noughties made concessions in the field of cultural policy, as a result, it became possible, in particular, to broadcast television in the Kurdish language. This was also facilitated by the development of Internet technologies, the emergence and spread of the broadband Internet. Kurdish-language media outlets and political parties whose voters are Kurds have emerged and continue to exist in Turkey: the Democratic Party of Peoples (DPN), DEM Partisi. Currently, there are attempts to "tighten the screws" on the Kurdish issue in Turkey (Kurdish politicians are sentenced to terms comparable to life; on the eve of the last presidential election, there was a threat of closure of the pro-Kurdish party) ^[22]. However, it seems that the freedoms that the Turkish Kurds have managed to obtain so far, they will no longer give up. At that time, fighting between the Turkish State, the Turkish armed forces and the PKK resumed in 2015.

Some progress of the national movement also took place in Syria, where, as a result of the events of the "Arab Spring" (2010-2012), a civil war began, during which the northern and eastern regions of Turkey (the cantons of Jazira, Kobani and Haseka) proclaimed an Autonomous Administration of northern and eastern Syria, also known as Rojava (Kurd. "The West") ^{[23, p. 13]}. On the one hand, the autonomy managed to defend its independence in the intense struggle against ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation), as well as under the constant threat of incursions from Turkey (which repeatedly took place, moreover, with the occupation of part of the territory of Syria) ^{[24, p. 241]}. On the other hand, a political settlement that could finally put an end to the fighting remains elusive, despite periodically circulating rumors that the central government in Damascus and the leadership of Rojava are allegedly close to reaching some kind of compromise ^[25]. It is known that the Kurdish leadership demands guarantees of autonomy for the northeastern region after the end of the conflict, while the government of Bashar al-Assad insists that the country's structure should remain unitary. The situation is further complicated by the continued presence of the US and Turkish armed forces in Syria ^{[26, p. 6]}. At the same time, the lack of a solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria (whether in favor of Kurdish nationalism or in spite of it) is in itself an obstacle, without overcoming which the final end of the civil war is not possible.

As for Iraqi Kurdistan, starting approximately in the autumn of 2017, the geopolitical situation of the recognized Autonomy began to deteriorate. The "geopolitical position" here refers to the relations of Autonomy with neighboring states and, above all, the negotiating position towards the central government in Baghdad, since, despite its formally autonomous status, Iraqi Kurdistan remained (and continues to remain) dependent on the federal authorities on a number of critically important issues. This also includes maintaining internal stability in Autonomy, but it is hardly possible to consider it in isolation from external relations and ties.

It can be said that at the moment the key problem (moreover, it has arisen relatively recently) is the cessation of the export of oil produced on the territory of the Autonomy to international markets (via an oil pipeline, through the oil terminal of the Turkish port of Ceyhan). Thus, in the spring of 2023, the International Arbitration Court (Paris) ruled that the agreement between Turkey and Iraq on the conditions of operation of the oil pipeline (1973) had been violated. The claim filed by the Iraqi side was satisfied, and now Turkey is obliged to pay a fine of about $ 1.5 billion ^[27]. Experts expressed the opinion that the Turkish leadership would not resume exports until it achieved a reduction in penalties (despite the fact that a second lawsuit is also under consideration, providing for compensation for the period after 2016). Somewhat later, reports were received that Turkey allegedly no longer has objections to resuming exports. Opinions were also expressed that the final resolution of the issue would be possible due to the visit of Turkish President Recep Erdogan to Baghdad, which took place in the spring of 2024. Nevertheless, no decisions on the resumption of exports were announced following the negotiations.

From our point of view, regardless of what the real reasons for the cessation of exports are, it is of practical importance that now the Autonomy and its leadership are, in fact, at the full power of the federal government. It cannot be said that the situation was radically different earlier. So, in 2019, Iraqi Kurdistan faced a delay in payments from the federal budget (which is provided for by the current constitution) and this, in turn, led to riots on the territory of the Autonomy (in particular, arson attacks on the offices of the ruling parties) ^{[28, pp. 244-245]}. The systemic problem of Kurdistan is the bloated public sector (the budgetary sphere) and, as a result, the Autonomy was unable to fulfill financial obligations to its own population: even during the period when it exported oil outside the control of the state oil export company (SOMO).

It is logical to assume that the federal center sought to establish (restore) control over Kurdistan, but it cannot be said that it possessed sufficient force for coercion on its part to be effective. In turn, after the verdict of the international arbitration, the balance of power between the center and the Autonomy changed radically. In fact, tranches from the federal budget are now the only source of income for Kurdistan.

It is important to note that Baghdad's additional concerns could be related to an attempt to hold a referendum on the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan in the fall of 2017, if successful, northern Iraq could theoretically secede from the country. But this did not happen: first of all, due to the categorical rejection of its results by all neighboring countries. As a result, the "freezing" of the results was announced by the leadership of the Autonomy itself (despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Kurds voted for full independence). From the point of view of practical politics, the main result of the referendum was the removal of Masoud Barzani and the coming to power of the next generation of leaders with the same surname (the above-mentioned Nechirvan and Masrour).

In addition to the aforementioned ban on independent exports, another stumbling block in relations between Baghdad and Erbil (the capital of the Autonomy) is currently the question of which financial ecosystem should be implemented in the territory of Kurdistan. Thus, on February 21, the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq issued a ruling according to which payments to employees of the budgetary sphere of the Autonomy (about 1 million people) should be made directly from the Federal Ministry of Finance. As a result, there is competition between two platforms: My Account (proposed by the leadership of Autonomy) and Tawtin, which means "localization" (Baghdad initiative) ^{[29, 30]}. It is clear that when choosing one or another option, it will not be so much about the convenience of end users (although this may also play a role), as about who will eventually – owning the platform – track the relevant financial flows. This innovation seems to be a breakthrough in the sense that now transactions will be carried out directly, in electronic form (without attracting cash, banknotes). On the other hand, it will also allow access to a huge amount of information that may be of interest to the Ministry of Finance, as well as the central government as a whole.

Among other cases undermining Iraqi Kurdistan as a successful nation-building project, it is necessary to mention the acute contradictions between the KDP and the PUK on the issue of holding regional elections. While the leadership of the PUK insists on their immediate implementation, the leaders of the KDP take the opposite position ^[31]. As a result, the elections, which were not held on time and were repeatedly postponed, most clearly characterize the kind of "state of emergency" that has developed in the territory of the Autonomy, which can also be characterized as the domination of the will of the leaders of the parties (clans) over any laws, institutions and formal procedures.

Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn:

Firstly, the Kurdish national movement in Iraq is a complex, contradictory process that has gone through a number of stages in its development. Theoretically, constructive features and destructive, development-oriented and reactionary ones can be "abstracted" in it, but in fact they have always gone side by side, if not contradictory, in many leaders of the national movement. A characteristic feature of the movement is that some "reactionary" features persist in it to this day, such as the clan structure: if not of the whole society, then at least of the elites (as evidenced by the principle of inheritance "from father to son", which is equally shared by both the KDP and the PUK).

Secondly, the national movement of the last century and a half can be conditionally divided into the following stages: the initial (1880-1946), during which the genesis of the movement took place; the "September Revolution" (1958-1975) led by Mustafa Barzani and the Political Bureau of the KDP, when the Iraqi Kurds (for the first time ever the national movement of this people, in all four countries) successfully raised the issue of granting autonomous rights; modern (1980 – present), at which the leading political actors of Kurdish politics in Iraq (KDP and PUK) took their modern form.

Thirdly, with regard to the prospects of Kurdish nationalism at this stage – both the idea and the political practice, the "project" (using the example of Iraqi Kurdistan) – a downward trend can be recorded over the past decade. It was preceded by the heyday of the national movement (and not only in Iraq), the apotheosis of which was the adoption of the 2005 constitution, in which, for the first time, the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan was officially recognized at the highest level (which remains unprecedented for the rest of the ethnogeographic area of Kurdistan). Theoretically, this peak of the national movement could have been surpassed: if the Referendum on Independence in 2017 had received practical confirmation and development. However, this did not happen due to the extremely unfavorable foreign policy environment. It can be said that from that moment on, the positive trend was finally replaced by a negative one and the central government in Baghdad increased its pressure on the leadership of the Autonomy, which at the moment has achieved its goal in the decision of international arbitration, which deprived, de facto, Autonomy of the only significant independent source of income. Needless to say, Erbil's complete economic dependence on Baghdad will also have consequences in terms of reducing the possibility of political maneuvering of Autonomy.

In turn, overcoming the negative trend is hindered by the disunity of the Kurdish society, which remains deep. At the same time, it seems that there is no other force in the region that could contribute to the consolidation of the Kurds (at least within Iraq): at least, until they themselves demonstrate a good will to get closer.