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Reference:
Achonwa E., Awah J., Xue F., Ngoye S.
Migration diplomacy and its role in the ECOWAS region
// International relations.
2024. ¹ 3.
P. 1-15.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2024.3.70777 EDN: XBNKBK URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=70777
Migration diplomacy and its role in the ECOWAS region
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2024.3.70777EDN: XBNKBKReceived: 17-05-2024Published: 05-07-2024Abstract: Migration within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a complex phenomenon, driven by economic disparities, political instability, and social inequalities. This dynamic region experiences both internal and outward migration flows, creating a landscape of challenges and opportunities that demands innovative solutions. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), comprising 13 member countries, has collectively embraced diplomacy in the context of interregional migration. This decision signifies a relaxation of regulations when any member country seeks to engage in migration activities within another member state. As a result, both the sending and receiving countries have experienced associated benefits and encountered pertinent challenges. It is noteworthy that ECOWAS migration diplomacy is considered the weakest interregional diplomacy globally. This article aims to delve into the concept of migration diplomacy within ECOWAS, shedding light on its historical and current status, the opportunities it presents, and the challenges impeding its advancement. Furthermore, it utilizes Nigeria and Ghana as case studies to illustrate these points. This article employs a multi-faceted approach to explore the role of migration diplomacy in the ECOWAS region. It draws upon a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods to provide a comprehensive understanding of the issue. The study begins with a comprehensive review of existing literature on migration diplomacy, focusing on its theoretical framework, practical applications, and specific relevance to the African context. This review includes academic journals, reports from international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and policy documents from ECOWAS and its member states. The analysis further deepens with the examination of specific case studies within the ECOWAS region. Keywords: Migration Diplomacy, ECOWAS, International Relations, Interregional Cooperation, Nigeria, Ghana, Multipolar world, Geopolitics, terrorism, Strategic InterestsIntroduction to the concept Movements into and out of a country have existed since time immemorial and the rate of travel depends on the desire and capacity of the individuals carrying out such movements [1]. However, in situations where the process involved in this movement is stringent or less demanding, there is a corresponding discouragement or enablement of travelling decisions [2]. While borders protect a country from the illegal inflow of people, diplomatic strategies such as dual citizenship, trade policies, and free-movement policies help to circumvent the need for migration procedures such as visa approval [3]. Migration diplomacy thus refers to all efforts and negotiations geared towards regulating the movement of people in and out of a country [4]. It does not solely represent its policies but these are elements of migration diplomacy. Basically, migration policies and issues such as trading and seeking refuge do not automatically translate to diplomacy except they play roles in achieving the migration-related goals of a country [5]. It typically involves bargaining to find a compromise between the interests of the regions involved classified as either the receiving, sending, or transit states [6]. It mostly involves more than one country, with one being recognised as the sending state and the other recognised as the receiving state, and could involve treaties and the relaxation of migration rules. Complex states are those that function in more than one capacity of migration, either as both sending and receiving or as sending and transit state or receiving and transit state [7]. For example, Nigeria functions as both a sending and receiving country in intra-African migration and Senegal is mostly a transit state for people who desire to travel to other continents [8]. Also, Niger is a transit country and the major link between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, bearing a border to four West African countries as well as two other countries outside the region [9]. This diplomacy has been one of the tools used to achieve international relations aims surrounding migration [10]. While many scholars seem to be more interested in the migration of Africans to other continents as is seen in major cases, this movement still happens within the continent. This is a result of its perceived potential benefits in the present and future. In fact, evidence suggests that migration within Africa supersedes that occurring between Africa and other continents [11]. Therefore, This study seeks to unravel the concept of migration diplomacy regarding the migration of Africans to and from other African countries in the ECOWAS region, identify challenges, and make suggestions as to how this diplomacy can be optimised. Study methodology This article adopts the literature review method of obtaining and synthesising evidence. As a secondary study, it employs previously published literature but was however not discriminately sought as only articles published in peer-reviewed journals such as Google Scholar and international relations journals were included such as Genesis: Historical Research, Sage International Journal, and the International Affairs journal. Keywords used in the search included those that made up the research topic such as ‘migration, ‘diplomacy’, and ‘ECOWAS’. The gathered evidence was thus qualitatively synthesised and critically examined to make up the written argument on the topic. Intra-African migration Africa is a continent recognised for its high migration rate, especially in terms of emigration due to the high percentage of unemployment, insecurity, and poverty [12]. For some, the migration out of their home countries is temporary [13]. However, in other cases, some of these immigrants become diasporas and spend most of their lives outside their countries of origin. Africa has quite some diasporas and the African Union (AU) recognises their role in developing their homelands, therefore introducing diaspora diplomacy as a part of migration diplomacy [14]. Historically speaking, prior to the attainment of independence from their colonial masters, the intra-regional migration of West Africans was as a result of searching for greener pastures in terms of finding security and good soil for farming activities [15]. Years later, this desire to migrate would still exist but in a more sophisticated manner such as the exchange of mineral resources, educational talent, and employment opportunities [16]. Flahaux and De Haas (2016) published the statistical trend of intra-African migration, reporting an estimate of 6,176,385 cross-migration as of 1960, 7,966,359 in 1980, and 10,500,000 in 2000 [17]. Other statistics showed that, in 2020, an estimated 21 million Africans resided in other African regions than their countries of origin, recording a migration rate of 88% between 2010 and 2022 [18]. It is further reported that 80% of African migrants are not interested in moving to another continent. This showed a progression in the rate of travel and even more in West Africa, partly attributed to the short distances between the countries and close similarities in culture and language [19]. ECOWAS migration diplomacy Migration across West African countries after the colonial era became rather rigid as the new government of member states aimed at protecting the opportunities and indigenous benefits that were available for their citizens [20]. It therefore became necessary to establish a means of promoting the pre-existing interactions between these countries to preserve their relationships [21]. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are formed by the African Union (AU) to improve harmony and unity among African countries segmented into different regions [22]. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is one of such committees in order to implement migration diplomacy among other aims and is a good example of such as there is cross-migration freedom entailing the entitlement of any individual from a member state to reside in another member state for up to 90 days without requiring a visa or permit among other provisions [23]. It was formed by West African countries in 1975 as a treaty to improve trade policies among the countries, also referred to as member states. This was aimed at easing the divide conferred by the diverse colonisation of the member states by the English, French, or Portuguese colonisers [24]. The three levels of the treaty provisions are outlined as the freedom of entry and settlement into any member state, the freedom to seek and take on employment, and the freedom to engage in economic activities. The visa-free policy during cross-migration among the member states has been recognised as a major driver of this reality. Following the establishment of the treaty, in 1985 and 2000 respectively, a travel certificate and ECOWAS passport were introduced as means of achieving the said ease of movement [25]. The ECOWAS passport is recognised as being the only requirement for movement into any of the member states and the rights of the holders are protected as a result. This no-visa movement across the states has shown immense impact as the statistics reported by Kramo (2022) showed that 90% of migration into West African countries are from other members of the ECOWAS, leaving 10% to places outside the regions [26]. Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria are both the leading sending and leading receiving countries. Another peculiar concept is the almost equal percentage of cross-migration within countries. For example, the highest number of migrants to Nigeria comes from Ghana and vice versa [27]. ECOWAS is the African region with the highest implementation rate of migration diplomacy and West Africa holds a record of harbouring the most mobile Africans. Its migration diplomacy hangs on the integration theory that comprises the compromise of the member regions in a union in terms of loyalties and policies to favour all parties involved and thereby achieve harmony. This compromise is made due to the perception of a high benefit-to-risk ratio. Again, the relationship among the member states was described by Kramo (2022) as a benefit/hero narrative, indicative of a mutual benefit in the receiving and sending states [28]. Hence, it is desired by the member states that progress be made regarding the ECOWAS migration diplomacy. In view of the said progress, aside from the economic relations fostered by the committee, a monitoring group was also formed after the Liberian civil war and this was targeted at maintaining military stability in member states to prevent such incidents as anarchy and terrorism [29]. There are also other forms of united engagements such as the West African Football Union (WAFU) and the West African Festival of Arts and Culture established in Lagos, Nigeria, in the 1970s. A part of the provisions of the ECOWAS treaty is industrial advancement, therefore providing trade policies to enhance economic activities such as informal cross-border trade facilitated by organisations such as the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) in collaboration with the community [30]. These are exemplary cases of the means through which intra-regional integration is pursued by the community. The above chart was given by Kramo (2022) to illustrate the migration statistics in West Africa, which is further illustrated in Table 1 as an extract from the pie chart.
Table 1: Migration Data in Western Africa.
Table 2:Ranking of the migrant population in West Africa
During cross-migration, there is a mix of cultural values and wider exposure that increases familiarity between both receiving and sending countries as relevant pieces of information are exchanged between both regions [31]. As a result, economic transactions can be carried out, such as trade exhibitions, and partnerships are formed, increasing investments and exchange of talents [32]. In such cases, there is room for the diversification of resources via foreign investment, thereby reducing business risks and improving regional economies [33]. The trade benefits have however been sparsely maximised as it is reported that the intra-regional trade interactions within the African region are the least among others in other world regions, standing at 17% between 2015 and 2022. The statistical analysis by Olubiyi et al. (2023) proved that an increase in intra-African migration would boost exports and recommendations were made in that regard [34]. This economic strength further boosts political strength and soft power. Urbanisation is also further boosted indirectly as a result of the economic and cultural upgrade due to consistent interactions. There is mutual fulfillment as the immigrant's standard of living is improved and the demand for manpower is met by the receiving country [35]. Hence, progress in the migration diplomacy of the ECOWAS regions would lead to higher economic growth and development of each state involved. Furthermore, in terms of education, the exposure and collaboration available through cross-migration could open the door to more research opportunities and experiences. While receiving countries may use this opportunity to increase their talent pool, sending states to utilise the opportunity to improve their indigenous skills, thereby reducing unemployment via higher qualifications [36]. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is an example of an initiative for driving research via grants and conferences, furnished by mainly diasporas [37]. Through such remittances, the diasporas enrich their countries of origin via knowledge and even in other aspects such as the economy. Finally, communication barriers are reduced via frequent interactions between member states but the members of ECOWAS however recognise English as an official language and this may not be a major concern [38]. More specifically, the countries with English as their main language of communication often have high migration among themselves and vice versa for French-speaking countries [39]. The barriers are also further reduced as the countries possess close cultural values. Challenges Despite the recognised importance of migration diplomacy, it faces strong challenges that impede its potential. The ECOWAS free-movement policy has been reported as being poorly implemented [40]. Although the first and second phases of the policy have been materialised, highlighted as the visa-free 90-day visit and the right to stay in any member state, the third phase of full settlement is still faced with challenges This has been attributed to the cases of internal disunity in member states, thereby causing a distraction to the focus on enriching international interactions. Also, dual citizenship is a restraining factor in the appointment of diasporas in key government positions due to perceived conflict of interest as a result of shared loyalty [41]. In relation to environmental factors, the recent coronavirus pandemic in 2020 was one of the challenges faced by the member states of the ECOWAS as borders were shut and travel restrictions were implemented throughout the years [42]. This caused a major setback in intra-regional trade and the exchange of resources, leading to increased levels of poverty and economic instability [43]. The relaxation of migration policies has however been set in motion in recent times. Economic and political instability in member states [44]. Political instability in countries like Nigeria, Mali, and Côte d’Ivoire led to forced displacement of its residents recorded to seek asylum in neighbouring countries such as Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, and Ghana. For example, the rising and increasing popularity of insurgent groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and terrorist groups such as the Fulani herdsman and Boko haram confers instability and discourages partnerships with other countries [45]. Furthermore, the community is made up of developing low- and middle-income countries with high foreign debts, which could account for the low regional trade benefit and has in fact been labelled the poorest in the world. According to Obikaeze, there are fewer available opportunities to grow as a result [46]. For example, Niger has a very poor economic worth and has been mostly explored as a transit country rather than a destination for immigrants [47]. In addition to this, some scholars opine that true economic integration is far-fetched for the member states except a significant level of economic breakthrough is achieved. To further complicate this situation, records of trade dishonesty exist in the form of counterfeit and substandard products being merchandised, thereby influencing the preferences of partner states and adversely affecting further transactions [48]. Also, the interaction of foreign countries such as that which exists between Europe and West Africa may be challenging to the intra-regional interactions. Neocolonialism breeds conflict of interest as the intercontinental interests may differ from those of the interregional. A typical example is given as the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and ECOWAS where Nigeria and some other member states foresaw a bias and refrained from signing, thereby leading to the prevention of the economic oppression faced by Ghana in their poultry industry as a result of signing the agreement [49]. Again, the issue of irregular migration is a popular one despite the low requirements for migration. There are high reports of trafficking of women and children who migrate to engage in sex work and hard labour with informal wages. These individuals are said to have no passports and are either transported via bush paths and other alternative routes or allowed to move across the borders via bribery [50]. This further contributes to the countries' lack of migration data in the regions. Finally, bias also exists as some would rather not be associated with others due to perceived dominance and intimidation. This is illustrated in the repulsion of Nigeria from other West African countries as a result of its relatively high popularity, numbers, and influence [51]. Migration diplomacy will hence be explored as it applies to two out of the 5 ECOWAS destination countries harbouring foreigners [52]. Case Study 1 - Nigeria People in Nigeria migrate mostly for employment opportunities and because of instability much more than for educational purposes. However, several cases have arisen to emphasise the security issues in Nigeria which have made it less desirable as a sending and receiving member state. There is a cross effect of this situation as the insecurity encourages the mass emigration of the citizens which is in turn greeted with a hesitant reception in the destinations. In like manner, there is a discouragement of immigration of citizens of other member states. The ECOWAS migration diplomacy on the one hand seeks to reduce human trafficking and migration risks. On the other hand, one of the factors fuelling these occurrences is the porosity of the country’s borders which pave the way to the easy entry and escape of terrorist groups and bandits, as well as also allowing the smuggling of arms and drugs [53]. This porosity is further facilitated by the corruption associated with access such as receiving bribes to allow illegitimate entry into the country [54]. For groups arising within the country, religious and ethical discrepancies also fuel certain incidents such as the Fulani herdsmen attacks. The majority of terrorist groups are suspected to not be indigenes but must have migrated during the civil war such as Boko haram [55]. These operations are mostly recorded within the borders shared with the Republic of Benin and further neglected by the weak law enforcement in Nigeria. A high rate of human trafficking to other countries, involving the other ECOWAS member states as transit and destination countries has been reported with tales of deceit, labour and sexual abuse, reaching almost 800 cases in 2013 and, according to the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), recording at least 100,000 annual trafficking cases. Bribe. The border between Nigeria and Benin only affects moving vehicles and not humans [56]. As a result, firearms and drug smuggling are easily achieved via the free passage given to individuals. Nigeria was attractive due to its oil reserves but the economic instability has been detrimental to this alluring feature. Currency devaluation represents a decline in the equivalent of a country's currency value during an exchange with a foreign currency and the history of the increment of naira devaluation to other currencies such as the United States dollar has been outlined as a critical issue [57]. The country has long faced progressive economic crises such as oil spillage in Niger Delta as well as progressive currency devaluation [58]. According to Anagun, one of the effects of such a crisis is the decline in immigration. In an attempt to tackle this trend by boosting the economy, the border was closed between August 2019 and Dec 2020 to drive local production, especially rice [59]. The impact of Boko Haram on migration diplomacy in Nigeria Conflicts are seen as an inevitable aspect of society and human relations. However, when extreme and without control, they become a source of loss to individuals, societies, and systems, thereby underscoring the importance of their resolution [60]. In 2021, Nigeria was recognised as the country with the fifth-highest number of deaths in the world due to terrorism and in 2022, the sixth most terror-impacted country [61]. This record has significantly been linked to the group known as Boko Haram. Introduced in 2002, Boko Haram has become one of the major terrorist groups in Nigeria, having also obtained international recognition. In 2009, the group switched from its previous mandate against Western education to waging a national war in response to the execution of its leader [62]. This group holds the highest contribution to the social and political instability of the country as there is a shift from boosting the economy to providing survival support to victims. High levels of insurgency have ravaged the northern region of Nigeria, particularly in States identified as Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY states) leading to the existence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps as houses, farms, and properties were damaged during the recurring attacks [63]. Subsequently, there were attacks in other national regions such as the attack on the federal capital territory, specifically at the headquarters of the United Nations (UN) in 2011 and other attacks in states like Kaduna, Kogi, Yobe, Bauchi, Taraba, and Plateau, calling for an urgency in mitigating the persisting threats of the terrorist group [64]. Despite the country’s military efforts to curb this group, the attacks heightened vulnerability and instability and in 2020, an estimated 38,683 people had lost their lives and 2.5 million others displaced with 244,000 becoming refugees and 952,059 children having to drop out of school. National security is one of the top priorities of any country and this means that all forms of security threats must be addressed without compromise [65]. This attempt to protect the country thus serves as a medium to suspend migration diplomacy because of the suspicion of immigrants. As a result of the perceived contribution of foreigners to this unrest, Nigeria expelled immigrants from Chad, thereby reversing the existing diplomacy and introducing tension between the countries [66]. This further extended to Cameroun as economic activities faced a decline from the time when the bridge between both countries was bombed. Nigerian refugees in Cameroun were in turn forced to return [67]. This is due to the encroachment of the regional insecurity via attacks from the terrorist group. In addition to the compromise of migration diplomacy, internal economic activities were adversely affected and this diminished the ability to engage in intra-regional trade [68]. Reports show however that the closure of the national borders between August 2019 and December 2020 was followed by even higher records of insurgency. Again, the closure did not stop importation as the value of imported goods recorded during the said time of border closure was up to 1.85 trillion naira, suggesting ongoing illegal and corrupt activities. On top of that, reports of arms importation also existed, thereby suggesting an insidious origin and nature of the Boko Haram insurgency [69]. it is important to specify that terrorist organisations are banned in the ECOWAS region and other countries like Russia and China. Case Study 2 - Ghana Ghana holds a commendable record for the level of migration diplomacy implemented by the country as it has registered over 300,000 individuals from other member states as being eligible to work [70]. Kayayoo migration is also recorded as an intra-national migration from areas of less economic and social potential to the urban areas of the country [71]. Conflicts of interest led to the preference of their citizens during employment. Low job opportunities however still exist due to the national economic status [72].
Recommendations With respect to the problems of bias and conflicts of interest, it was recommended that an advisory board for conflict of interest, and advocacy for refugees and migrant rights [73]. The Migration Dialogue in West Africa (MIDWA) is such a group and can be saddled with the responsibility of resolutions in that light [74]. More focus should thus be placed on achieving integration via interactions and compromise to achieve the shared goal. Also, the removal of barriers at the regional borders would reduce the need to engage in bribery and illegal means of migration. Ghana has been committed to improving the convenience associated with being visited by the indigenes of other member states of the ECOWAS and this has received its commendations [75]. Ultimately, political integrity should be a common goal in individual states as better governance promotes political stability which in turn leads to higher economic growth and attraction to other states [76]. Anonymous improvement opportunities would be to set up establishments jointly owned by countries that share a border such as schools, markets, and travel terminals [77]. In conclusion, the concept of migration diplomacy in the ECOWAS regions has been a noble cause. Formed from the quest to improve intra-regional integration via more accommodating migration policies and provisions, there have been records of positive impacts in terms of individual and regional growth. However, constraints to the full implementation and achievement of the potential of this diplomacy arise which must be tackled for more significant progress to be made. It has thus been identified that the individual member states must improve their internal political and economic stability in order to be fit for further value creation and acquisition, thereby encouraging future interactions. With this adjustment, the West African region is bound to experience higher levels of development in terms of cultural, industrial, economic, and other pertinent aspects.
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