Specifics of Austrian military-political course after the end of the cold war

Zelenov Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Postgraduate student, Department of Foreign Regional Studies and Foreign Policy, Russian State University for the Humanities 143900, Russia, Moscow region, Balashikha, Fadeev str., 19, sq. 7 dima-zelenov17@mail.ru

Introduction

Against the background of the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the bipolar world order, most of the "small states" of Europe faced the need for a systemic transformation of their behavior model in the field of security and defense. A characteristic feature of this process was the creation of conditions for a significant increase in their military-political and political-diplomatic tools, which allows them to participate on a larger scale in stabilizing the situation in conflict states in various regions of the world, but at the same time spend the least amount of resources.

One of these states is the Republic of Austria, which has consistently increased its military and political influence throughout the 1990s and early 2020s. A significant obstacle to this was the neutral status, which, in addition to the advantages of becoming a negotiating mediator, significantly limited the military and political ambitions of official Vienna. In this regard, its reinterpretation and new interpretations became one of the most priority tasks of the Austrian leadership during the designated period. The latter, in turn, determined the degree of involvement in conflict resolution and the activities of relevant international structures in the field of security and defense, thereby forming the contours of the country's military-political course for the long term.

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Since the late 1980s, the Republic of Austria has launched a process of radical restructuring of the forms and mechanisms used in the field of security and defense. The main motive for this step was the dismantling of the ATS and CMEA systems, which became a direct consequence of a series of "velvet revolutions" in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the subsequent collapse of the USSR. Why? Under the new conditions, Austria ceased to be a state on the line of contact between two opposing military blocs, which significantly reduced interest in it as a negotiating platform on military and political issues. At the same time, against the background of a sharp decrease in conflict in the world, mainly in Europe, expected at the turn of the 1980s - 1990s, the Alpine Republic could begin the process of reducing the national armed forces (Bundesheer). This provided the release of funds, which, together with the expansion of economic presence in the newly opened (and actively interned in Euro-Atlantic structures) markets of the former CEE countries, as well as the EU markets, could become an opportunity to overcome the economic crisis ^{[1, pp. 169-170]}, observed in Austria throughout the first half of the 1980s.

These circumstances necessitated the search for a new formula for the implementation of the country's military-political course, combining ways to increase capabilities in ensuring global security, but at the same time reducing the resources spent. The process of its formation is characterized by two key determinants.

The first of them is the transformation of perception and interpretation of the neutral status of the country. During the Cold War, it implied not only military, but also economic and political restrictions, primarily a ban on joining economic and political associations with Germany in any form. For example, it was precisely this understanding, enshrined in Article 4 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty ^[2] and strictly controlled by the USSR, that led official Vienna to refuse to expand cooperation with Western countries and, moreover, their integration or allied associations, especially the European Economic Community. 

At the end of the 1980s, these interpretations began to narrow down, being limited to a purely military dimension. One of the evidences of this is the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the country in 1993, which emphasized not only full support for the Common Foreign Policy in the field of Security and Defense created by the Maastricht Treaty, but (!) also fixed only military obligations arising from neutrality while ignoring economic restrictions, including participation in economic wars ^{[3, p. 104]}. Accordingly, in order to gain the support of potential allies, Austrian diplomacy "tied up" the process of joining the EU with a change in the interpretation of neutrality, thereby "looping" it.

At the same time, official Vienna, despite very active discussions in Parliament, initiated by members of the Austrian Freedom Party, led by J. Haider, refused even to consider on the real agenda the issue of joining the North Atlantic Alliance (albeit with reservations about neutrality, as originally planned in the case of the EU). What are the reasons for this?

Firstly, the factor of the negative attitude of the population towards such a rapid change in the principles of the neutral course of the country played a significant role. Evidence of this is provided by data from social opinion polls, according to which a significant part of the Austrian population (for example, in 1991 – 57% ^{[3, p. 105]}) advocated maintaining neutrality even if they refused to join the European Union (especially NATO), as well as the referendum on joining the EU itself, where only 66.6% of the population voted in favor ^{[4, p.35]}. The latter means that a third of those who voted were actually "against", even taking into account the large-scale propaganda campaign conducted by the authorities and appealing, among other things, to the fact of simultaneous entry into the Union with other neutral countries (Sweden and Finland). In this regard, it is obvious that the real question of joining NATO posed the threat not only of a negative response in the referendum, but (!) and, more importantly, to "roll back" the issue of EU membership.

Secondly, unlike the North Atlantic Alliance, in which, already in the previous half century, a decision-making and functioning system was formed, tied to the position of official Washington, the European Union was only being formed as a political and military structure.  Consequently, Austrian diplomacy, especially in view of the close coordination of efforts with Germany, which was the "engine" of the EU, could directly influence the process of institutionalizing the Common Security Policy (CFS/EPBO) The EU and, as a result, promote their interests more effectively.

The noted emphasis on the EU allowed the Alpine Republic to solve another task that is fundamentally important from the point of view of neutrality – the creation of formal bases for the use of its military personnel outside national borders. Closely coordinating its approach to the military-political situation in the world with the common position of Brussels, Austria brought to the fore the slogans of "solidarity" of the countries of the "collective West", officially enshrined in the first Defense Doctrine of 2001 since 1975 ^{[5, s. 13-14]}. Fundamentally important in this context was the introduction of the term "solidarized complicity" in the document, which assumed the extrapolation of the concept of borders to the entire space of the Union. With this step, the cabinet of V. Schussel/B. Ferraro-Waldner received an official justification for the use of its military personnel around the entire perimeter of the EU. The next stage in the development of this course was the publication in 2003 of the EU doctrine "A Secure Europe in an improving world", where official Brussels put forward the thesis of the EU's readiness to assume part of the responsibility in ensuring global security ^{[6, p. 4]}. As a consequence of this statement, it was stated that the main threats to the European Union come from outside, and it is necessary to deal with them in the places where they appear, that is, outside the borders of the European Union. The latter obviously implied the intention to deploy the EU's military-political mechanisms, including with Austrian participation, in other regions of the world. Thus, the Alpine Republic, without violating the State Treaty and the Law on neutrality of 1955, received a legal opportunity to participate in military missions in other parts of the globe. At the same time, the official Vienna stressed the commonality of the approach with the EU allies, which was extremely important in the context of the first wave of euroscepticism that unfolded in the country in the early 2000s and even led to sanctions against Austria itself within the framework of the Union ^{[7, p.75]}.

Based on their noted transformations, the second determinant of the Austrian approach has also been formed – a sharp increase in capabilities within the framework of relevant international security structures, which have actually become the practical content of the noted theoretical changes. The implementation of this course took place in two directions. The first of them is participation in the creation of legal contours of security, implemented mainly through the mechanisms of the United Nations and the OSCE. How did this manifest itself?

Firstly, in the location on their territory of the divisions of these organizations directly related to the field of security and defense. Thus, the headquarters of the Forum for Cooperation and Security (1992), the Permanent Council (1993) and the Secretariat (1995) of the CSCE/OSCE were located in the Austrian capital.  At the same time, in addition to the one created in Vienna back in 1980, The Office for Outer Space (1993) and the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) of the Organization were added to the third UN Office in 2011. What is the significance of these structures? On the one hand, Austria has had the opportunity to participate in the process of disarmament, prevention of militarization, and, more importantly, the process of developing legal foundations for the use of new spheres in the case of outer space, which has been so fundamental since the country's formation. On the other hand, this participation involved not only lobbying for their interests, which seemed important for maintaining the image of a peacemaker state, but (!) and the implementation of direct control (through the OSCE Secretariat and the UN Office) of the implementation of the agreements reached and, as a result, making "point-by-point" adjustments to this process "on the spot". The latter, I think, acted as a kind of compensation for the very low role of Austrian diplomacy in the very process of making key decisions on the most important issues in the military-political field. 

Secondly, the Alpine Republic, through these organizations, has become very active in supporting and promoting peacekeeping initiatives in resolving regional (tending to global) conflicts. In relation to the UN, this resulted mainly in the support of mediation and anti-nuclear initiatives. Thus, Austria was one of the main lobbyists among the "small" neutral countries in the process of signing an agreement with Iran to resolve issues of its "nuclear program", which resulted in the signing of the "Comprehensive Plan of Action" (JCPOA; July 2015) in Vienna. It should be noted that in addition to the general goal of emphasizing its peacekeeping status and the course towards arms limitation, Austrian diplomacy tried to implement more pragmatic tasks: on the one hand, to remove from the agenda the official reason for Washington's expansion of the missile defense system in Eastern Europe (in particular, in Romania) and, as a result, to reduce tensions in Russian relations and the United States, which has been particularly aggravated since 2014. On the other hand, official Vienna sought to ensure a kind of "binding" of specific agreements to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT; 1996), promoted since the mid-1990s. How? In addition to the location of the CTBT Organization itself in Vienna, the promotion of the Treaty was closely coordinated with the already mentioned UNODA. Accordingly, the noted relationship with the JCPOA (Iran has been a member of the CTBT since 1996) ensured the connection of the UN institutions located in Vienna into a single system in practice, in which Austrian diplomacy would play a very significant role. Taking into account the latter, another peace initiative seems very logical – the holding of the Vienna Conference on Syria (2015) in between the Geneva 2 (2014) and Geneva 3 (2016) negotiations within the framework of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG). Despite the absence of a decision on the key issue – determining the order of formation of the future restoration of the country's political system – Iran was involved in these negotiations for the first time ^[8], which later became one of the "pillars" of the Astana format on Syria. Obviously, this involvement of official Tehran was also an attempt to "consolidate" the achieved success of the JCPOA.

Meanwhile, the noted initiative had another practical achievement – the launch of the process of agreeing by all participants in the negotiations on "common opponents" ^[9], which must be fought on the territory of the Syrian Republic, first of all, the recognition of the IG terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation and Jabhat al-Nusra affiliated with it. The latter clearly reflects the second goal implemented by Austria through the UN – the development of a universal approach to conflict resolution, which, of course, would dramatically increase the likelihood of a real and compromise settlement of conflicts.

In relation to the OSCE, the key practical tool for implementing the military-political course was "pre-summit diplomacy" ^{[10, pp. 43-44]}, which represented preliminary conferences in the Austrian capital on the eve of the Organization's summits. Taking into account the status of the OSCE, which, unlike the UN, conducts exclusively monitoring missions, Austria began to focus on solving two issues in it – consolidating the balance of forces (that is, preventing the "imbalance" of the world order) and developing, as in the case of the UN, a universal approach to security, but in the theoretical field and with a more specific by regional reference. Already during the first series of conferences in 1988 – 1990. (on the eve of the 1990 Paris CSCE Summit) by harmonizing the very concept of "conventional weapons" and "flank indicators", the basis was created for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990) – the main limiter of the growth of conventional weapons in Europe in the 1990s - early 2010s. In 1996 and In 1999, in similar formats, before the "summits" in Lisbon and Istanbul, respectively, there was an attempt to adopt a full-fledged doctrine ("white paper") ^{[11, p. 6]} on military and political issues, spreading throughout Europe and thus acting as a regional specification of the provisions of the UN Charter.

The second track of Austria's activities within the framework of relevant international security and defense structures is related to the direct participation of the country's military personnel in the settlement of armed conflicts, implemented through EU and NATO instruments. In the 1990s, in connection with the already mentioned process of the formation of the EU Strategic Security Council, the main efforts were applied to the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance. After the official Vienna joined the Partnership for Peace program (1995) and its expanded version (1998), Austria began to actively participate in NATO military activities, and precisely outside its traditional "area of responsibility". In other words, Austria did not take a large-scale part in the exercises in Europe, thereby avoiding additional costs and obligations, but received the right to use its military personnel in other regions of the world. So, already in 1997 and 1999, Austria became a full-fledged participant in the military missions deployed by the Alliance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stabilization Force SFOR; 1996 - 2004) and Kosovo (Kosovo Forces KFOR; since 1999), respectively, and in 2001 Austrian officers were sent to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF/ISAF, 2001 – 2014). In the process of the country's participation in these events, two features draw attention to themselves. Firstly, only two regions were geographically covered – the Balkans and the Middle East. At the same time, taking into account the number of Austrian soldiers and officers involved – about 230 people ^{[12, s.256]} and 490 people ^{[13, s. 267]}. in the Balkan missions and only 2 officers in Afghanistan ^{[14, S. 267]} – it becomes obvious that the Austrian leadership considered the Alliance solely as a tool to promote its interests in the Balkans, and the Afghan direction had only a symbolic character of solidarity associated with the events of September 11, 2001. Secondly, if during the period of the NATO mission in BiH the number of Austrian military decreased (from 231 in 1997 to 10 people in 2003, that is (!) 23 times), then in the last year (2004) this number increased to 250 people, exceeding even the maximum figure of 1997. The reason for this? The fact is that it was in 2004 that the NATO mission was replaced by the first ever EUFOR-Althea mission under the auspices of the EU. As noted above, it was the EU that was considered by the Austrian leadership as the most priority mechanism, and when the opportunity presented itself to support the real involvement of the Union in the settlement of the conflict, the Alpine Republic tried to make the most of it. In addition, the factor of the Bundesheer 2010 military reform, which began in 2003, was also important, as part of which a large–scale reduction of territorial defense forces and the creation of crisis and rapid response forces, "sharpened" for combat operations outside Austria and the EU itself, began. Accordingly, the mission launched by the European Union in Bosnia became the first opportunity to "test" a new model of military construction.

At the same time, the Alpine Republic began to actively participate in EU military training missions deployed in African states (Somalia, Mali, Mozambique) since 2010. What is the interest of the official Vienna? In addition to the newly emphasized emphasis on the mechanisms of OVPB/Like Germany, Austria has been given the opportunity to increase its military presence outside Europe without using its military personnel for their intended purpose, that is, to participate in military clashes. The latter made it possible to avoid losses in personnel and any significant involvement in the conflict and, at the same time, taking into account the mission's focus on security sector reform, to ensure the long-term presence of the mission in the country.

The largest of these types of events was the mission to Mali (European Union Training Mission Mali/ EUTM Mali since 2013), where from 7 to 38 people went ^{[15, s. 451; 16, s. 478; 17, s. 461; 18, s. 366, 735; 19, s. 254; 20, s. 253; 21, s. 266; 22, s. 268]}. It is significant that the dynamics in terms of the growth rate of the personnel involved was observed during the years of the greatest increase in the country of terrorist elements associated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS banned in the Russian Federation – 2016 and 2019. At the same time, in the first case, a significant increase (1.5 times – up to 15 people) was supplemented by the country's connection to the UN MINUSMA mission, which again emphasized the country's attempt to "link" the activities of various international structures with each other. The above example clearly shows that the official Vienna increases the military tools used only in case of their real threat to the EU.

Conclusion

Thus, during the 1990s and early 2020s, the Republic of Austria carried out a significant restructuring of the model of application of its military-political instruments. Starting with the revision of interpretations of the country's neutral status in favor of exclusively military interpretations at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, Austrian diplomacy managed to "tie" this process to accession and integration into the EU. This relationship led to the formation of a model of "differentiated neutrality", which implies a significant expansion of military and political instruments available to official Vienna, including even the use of the Bundesheer outside national borders, and subsequently the entire EU space.

This concept received concrete content within the framework of activities in relevant international structures.  As part of the course to create an image of a peacemaking country, Austria, using the UN and the OSCE, began to support and promote peaceful initiatives in the field of arms control and disarmament (especially the CFE Treaty and the CTBT regime), which ensured the country's participation in creating a legal framework in these areas. At the same time, by having the institutional units of these organizations on its territory, the Austrian side sought to control the implementation of these agreements, and in the case of "pre–summit diplomacy" within the OSCE, even influence the negotiating agenda in the field of European security.

At the same time, the country began to actively participate in the military missions of the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU. Concentrating exclusively on the post-Yugoslav space in the 1990s, Austria began sending contingents under the auspices of these organizations to Afghanistan in the 2000s, and since the 2010s to African countries (Mali, Mozambique). At the same time, against the background of the formation of the mechanisms of OVPB/As well as the beginning of the reduction of the country's armed forces within the framework of the Bundesheer 2010 reform, the accents of Austrian diplomacy have significantly shifted in favor of the EU, which was reflected in a sharp increase in involvement both in the EU mission in BiH and the already mentioned activities of the Union in Africa. At the same time, military training activities, which began in the 2010s, became the most optimal model for the military-political presence of the Alpine Republic in other states, allowing, with close coordination of the approach with Germany, to avoid the direct use of its military personnel, but at the expense of involvement in security sector reforms, to ensure a long-term presence.