Priorities of Russia's social policy in the context of global social changes

Dekhanova Natalia Gennad'evna ORCID: 0009-0004-8784-4309 PhD in Sociology Associate professor, Department of Sociology of State Administration, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Leninskie Gory, 1, str.33, of. 503 ndehanova@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Kholodenko Yurii Aleksandrovich PhD in Economics PhD in Economics Docent, the department of Sociology of State Administration, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moscow, Leninskie Gory str., 1, p.33, office 503 hol.u@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

At the end of the last century, against the background of the collapse of the USSR and the world system of socialism, F. Fukuyama put forward a hypothesis about the "end of history" and the advent of a new world order based on the values of the West that won the Cold War - liberal democracy and a market economy, which then seemed to have no alternative. Indeed, the international community has formed a positive image of a legal social state based on the principles of democracy, legal equality of citizens, social cohesion and solidarity, ensuring a high standard and quality of life for the population.  The standards of the material and spiritual culture of the Western consumer society began to be introduced in many states, despite the fact that often political elites, the business community and ordinary citizens were not ready to accept norms and social practices alien to them. This was facilitated by global social interaction, which acquired a dynamic and comprehensive character, becoming the most important factor of profound social changes.

However, initially there was no global consensus in the scientific community regarding the concept of F. Fukuyama on the inevitability of the hegemony of the values of Western civilization and the free market. It was criticized from various methodological positions. S. Huntington, in his concept of the "clash of civilizations", considered the idea of forming a single world civilizational space based on universal values to be utopian, noting the intensification of the confrontation between civilizations, primarily Christian (Western), led by the United States and Islamic^[1]. And. Wallerstein emphasized the exploitative nature and injustice of the global economic system, based on the principles of economic and financial domination of the "golden billion" states, creating insurmountable barriers to the socio–economic development of the world majority and preventing the overcoming of global inequality.  Moreover, he considered the collapse of the established world–system inevitable, noting that "the modern world–system is nearing its end. However, it will take at least another fifty years of near-death crisis, i.e. "chaos", before we can hope to reach a new social order" ^{[2, p.140]}.  

The time of "chaos" has come. The world social order, which was comfortable for industrialized countries in the post-war years and declared by its creators as the only way to universal planetary prosperity, is gradually being destroyed. The attractiveness of the ideas, norms and values of Western civilization is decreasing. The balance of economic forces is also not in favor of the collective West. In 2023, the contribution of developing economies to global GDP reached 58.8%. At the same time, the share of the G7 countries (USA, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Canada) has significantly decreased over the past 20 years ^[3]. A sense of strength in the economy gives confidence in international relations. There is a desire to pursue a more independent foreign policy. It is not surprising that the "holiday of disobedience" has come to various regions of the global South.  The West is no longer perceived as a moral leader and global hegemon. Gradually, in agony, a new world order is being formed, based on the principles of international law, multipolarity and equality of nations. However, radical changes in the global social reality lead to the aggravation of old and the emergence of new social risks both for individual countries and the entire world community.

Earlier, we noted that the global changes in the established social order taking place in the world pose serious risks to the "welfare state" formed in the West after the Second World War, since "the choice of specific measures for the ruling elite is very limited, because the resource base of the "welfare state" is shrinking, which is becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill social obligations to its own citizens" ^{[4, p.49]}. There is a transformation of the basic principles of the modern welfare state – the principles of social solidarity and social justice. It seems that such destructive processes are associated with the rejection of a part of Western society, and above all the ruling elites, from traditional values that were passed down from generation to generation, and on the basis of which Western civilization was formed. This fully applies to the traditional understanding of social justice as the equality of citizens before the law and the law, including in access to social benefits. In this regard, the position of V.S. Martyanov seems to be reasoned, who, noting the destruction of the foundations of the welfare state in Western countries, writes that in theory and social practices, "equality is eroded in favor of various policies of privileges and exceptions for selected estates and minorities, justified either by their increased value to the state ... or by belonging to the elites, which it gives the right to a special order of social security, or imaginary traumas, suppression and humiliation of past generations of certain communities (ethnic, confessional, sexual, etc.)" ^{[5, p.59]}.

In addition, the external and internal conditions for the modern state to perform its social functions are becoming more complicated. Liberal globalization, based on the ideology and practices of economic neo-colonialism, allowed for a large-scale redistribution of resources from the countries of the global South in favor of the states of the "golden billion" to maintain high living standards of the population. The transformation of the system of international relations based on the rules formulated by the "Big Seven", led by the United States, destroys the established world social order and significantly reduces the resource base of the welfare state.

Despite the dynamism and nature of the contradictory changes taking place in modern Western society and the state, which negatively affect the social practices that have developed in them, the quality of life and the level of public welfare, the theory of the welfare state does not lose its relevance and relevance. The philosophical ideas embedded in it are universal, not opportunistic in nature. The dream of living in a just society and a state with a high standard of living and a high degree of social security cannot be removed from the agenda, because it was born simultaneously with the emergence of human civilization. However, dreams and realities do not always coincide. The reason for the discrepancy is simple and utilitarian – the limited resource provision for their execution. This fully applies to modern Russia, which, according to the Constitution, is a social state, "whose policy is aimed at creating conditions that ensure a decent life and free human development"^[6]. Moreover, the policy of the Russian state over the past 20 years indicates an increased social orientation and a desire to fulfill social obligations in difficult socio–economic and political conditions.

Implementation of the principles of the welfare state in the context of sanctions and instability in modern Russia

It is obvious that the ongoing global social transformations, to which we pay considerable attention, fully affect the Russian socio–economic space, especially since it was Russia that acted as their catalyst. Their socio–economic consequences for Russia are ambiguous, although the results of the past two years since the beginning of its existence are cautiously optimistic. If in 2022, contrary to the expectations of the Western expert community, the Russian economy withstood a powerful sanctions blow and survived, then the past 2023 brought generally positive results.  Economic growth was 3.6%. Industrial production increased by 3.5%, while growth in manufacturing reached 7.4%. Inflation dropped to 7.4% from 11.9% in 2022. In general, the situation on the Russian labor market was favorable. Unemployment was 3.2%, and in October – November it fell to the lowest level in the history of the Russian Federation – 2.9%. According to the results of 11 months of 2023, real incomes of the population increased by 4.6%, and real wages – by 7.6%. ^[7].

Paradoxically, the crisis of the global social order, exacerbated by the sanctions war, has created new economic opportunities for our country. The growth of industrial production indicates a gradual revival of industry, which is an encouraging circumstance. After all, deindustrialization, which has become one of the causes of the aggravation of socio-economic problems in modern Western society, has fully affected Russia.  From 1991 to 2022, the contribution of Russian industry to the country's GDP decreased from 38.2% to 28.2% of GDP ^[8].  The decline affected the manufacturing industry to the maximum extent, while enterprises of the fuel and energy complex, chemists and metallurgists felt quite confident in the conditions of favorable conditions on international markets, demonstrating good financial results. This means that in the most difficult foreign policy and economic conditions, the Russian state receives resource opportunities to implement its social functions and conduct an active social policy.

At the same time, we would like to emphasize that in the field of social policy, which is initially based on the principles of redistribution of resources through the budget system, there are no solutions that provide all Russians with prospects for economic and social well-being. Society is becoming more complex, new social groups with high incomes and a lifestyle that is unattainable for the majority of the population are emerging. They have their own interests, which often do not coincide with the goals of state social policy.

 Therefore, there are no universal government decisions and mechanisms for their implementation that can ensure the realization of the social interests of the entire Russian society. Moreover, a significant part of the economically active population of our country lives and works in a tough competitive environment typical of modern global capitalism. The values of Russians have been noticeably transformed over 30 years of reforms. Some researchers note that under the influence of the ideas of liberalism and market fundamentalism in Russian society, the importance of the values of individualism has increased and adherence to the values of so-called social altruism has somewhat decreased ^{[9, p.44]}.  This means that Russians are primarily ready to take care of their relatives and friends, providing them with comprehensive support, and to a much lesser extent - about strangers or unfamiliar people. One can interpret this fact in another way, explaining it by the fact that in Russia in the last 30 years, for a number of objective reasons, social capital and trust at the micro-level (family, relatives, friends) have developed more than at the meso- and macro-levels (norms of relationships, connections, trust in bodies state authorities, social and political institutions: parties, trade unions, churches, etc.)^[10,11].

At the same time, the results of sociological surveys show that, despite the fact that part of society believes that relatives and friends should help people belonging to socially vulnerable groups or who find themselves in a difficult life situation, the majority holds the opinion that supporting such people is the duty of the state – 50 and 73%, respectively ^{[12, p.85]}. The data of sociological studies conducted by VTSIOM in 2021 are indicative in this regard, which revealed the utilitarian nature of the attitude towards the state among young people, who perceive it "as a source of benefits, responsible to citizens, expect from it care, protection and maintenance of order. Thus, 96% of respondents agreed with the statement that the main duty of the state is always to take care of everyone and provide social support" ^[13]. These sentiments should certainly be taken into account by the state when choosing priorities for social policy.

Over the decades of large-scale radical reforms, a new type of socio-economic human behavior has been formed in Russia, corresponding to the Western consumer society, which is characterized by rationalism and pragmatism. Although the narrative of a special Russian civilization and political culture is increasingly being promoted in the scientific literature. Thus, A.V. Torkunov and D. V. Streltsov emphasize that "Russia, by virtue of its historical path and geographical location, has a unique socio–political culture, not European or Asian" ^{[14, p.7]}. There are grounds for such a position. Not all modern Western values are accepted by Russian society. However, most Russians associate themselves with European rather than Asian culture, which is not unusual: Peter the Great also chose the European path of development for Russia.  But European culture is not only about developed institutions of democracy, high standards of living and well–being. This is primarily rational behavior in the field of socio –economic activity. Of course, financial gain ("monetary interest") is not always the main motive of economic behavior. But, as noted above, the state generates resources for the implementation of urgent and long-term social goals through their fiscal redistribution, the excessive scale of which undermines motivation for active entrepreneurial and labor activity. This is evidenced by the experience accumulated over the past decades in the implementation of social practices of the "welfare state". And it should be taken into account when developing and implementing state social policy in our country.

In modern conditions, the main goal of the social policy of the modern Russian state should be to ensure sustainable social development. This is possible only in conditions of social cohesion of Russian society. Meanwhile, the risks for Russia will remain in the foreseeable future. Moreover, given the unpredictability of the consequences of global social changes, they will multiply and become more complicated. Currently, Russians have a fairly high level of trust in government institutions. According to a survey conducted by VTSIOM in February 2024, Russian society has a high level of trust in both individual politicians and state institutions. Thus, 79.4% trust V.V. Putin, and 61.8% of Russians trust M.V. Mishustin. The level of trust in the institutions of the President of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the Government of Russia is slightly lower – 76.9 and 52.8%, respectively, but this is a very high indicator, indicating the close cohesion and solidarity of Russian society^[15].

In order to preserve the social cohesion and solidarity of Russians in conditions of instability and resource constraints, it is necessary to identify the right priorities of social policy. Thus, the most important priority of the social policy of the Russian state is the support of its participants and their family members.  From the very beginning of the special military operation, it was highlighted as an urgent and priority area of state social policy.  To this end, a set of relevant social measures was implemented in 2022-2023.  These include life and health insurance at the expense of the state budget, credit and tax holidays, the provision of benefits for the payment of transport tax, for the payment of residential premises and major repairs, suspension of obligations for the period of participation in the CBR on previously received subsidies and grants from regional budgets, free social services for needy spouses and parents of the CBR participant, budgetary places for children's education in universities, exemption from kindergarten fees for children of participants of the SVO, including in case of their death, and a number of other social protection measures at the expense of federal and regional budgets ^[16]. At the same time, with all the importance of the above-mentioned measures of social support for the participants of the SVO, their active inclusion in the peaceful life of society and the state becomes the main task. Participation in military operations, service for the benefit of the Motherland should become a special social elevator. In this regard, the program of the President of the Russian Federation "Time of Heroes" can play an important role, the purpose of which is "to train highly qualified, competent managers from among the participants of the SVO for subsequent work in state and municipal authorities, as well as state-owned companies" ^[17].

Another social priority of the Russian state is overcoming inequality and poverty, although in recent years the problem of social inequality has somewhat lost its severity, as evidenced by the results of a number of studies conducted. According to surveys, about a quarter of Russians believe that Russian society has become more fair in recent years. At the beginning of 2024, there were 26% of them, compared to 16% in 2018. This does not mean that Russian society is perceived as unambiguously fair, because 44% of Russians believe that there are no tangible shifts in the direction of forming a more just society^[18]. Accordingly, the request to reduce inequality is still relevant and cannot be removed from the agenda by the State. No less, and perhaps even more acute, is the problem of overcoming poverty in modern Russian society. Its official level in 2023 was 9.8%^[19]. However, the subjective perception of poverty differs markedly from official indicators. Russians believe that more than half of the country's population lives below the poverty line, although only 19% indicate that among their acquaintances about 50% of families live in poverty, and 29% do not have poor people at all ^{[20, p.42]}. According to the FOM study, 33% of respondents classified themselves as poor (1% as rich); 40% of respondents are sure that in most cases the poor do not have the opportunity to improve their well–being, 52% - that in most cases, a person has the opportunity to overcome poverty ^[21].

The situation looks paradoxical. It is impossible to explain it by the population's ignorance of socio-economic realities. Without a doubt, the cost of living in the Russian Federation is insignificant and allows a person to satisfy only basic needs, without providing him with a decent standard of living. In addition, a significant number of Russian citizens receive incomes slightly exceeding the minimum consumer budget. They are not officially considered poor, but if they get into a difficult life situation (loss of work, serious illness, childbirth, problems with relatives and friends), their standard of living decreases, which is noticed by others. Therefore, increasing personal incomes of citizens, including through legislative increases in the subsistence minimum and minimum wage, strengthening the targeting of social protection measures for vulnerable social groups, including increasing the scale of financial support for the elderly, should continue to be a priority area of state social policy in our country. 

The demographic problem does not lose its urgency. Although sociological research data still suggests that family is the number one value for Russians (67% of Russians, regardless of place of residence, level of education, age, gender and income level, according to a VTSIOM survey conducted in October 2023, put a strong family in the first place in the system of basic values)^[22]. Interestingly, the age correlation can be traced in the answer to the question about family as a life goal: 70-77% of young people (18-34 years old) share this point of view; among those over 60 years old – 94%; in general, across all age groups – 87%. Answers to the question about the ideal number of children confirm the thesis of a significant the discrepancy in developed countries between the ideal, desired and real number of children, which indicates a significant potential for family and demographic policy and that current measures are not working. So in this survey, the ideal number of children can be said to be ideal for society: "50% choose a large family as a standard: including with three children (40%), 4-5 children (8%), 6 or more – 2%. Another 38% believe that there should be two children in a family; there are practically no supporters of childless and one-child families among the respondents (5% and 2%, respectively) ^[22].

However, statistics showing real figures, not ideal ones, tell a different story. Since 2020, there has been a steady negative trend of population decline in the country. From January 1, 2020 to January 1, 2023, the number of permanent Russian population decreased by one and a half million people, excluding four new subjects of the Russian Federation, for a number of reasons, and primarily natural decline, including 500.3 thousand people in 2023 alone.  The natural population decline in January 2024 increased by 21.9% compared to January 2023 ^[23]. For the world's largest resource-rich State, this is extremely worrying. The state's measures in the field of family and demographic policy aimed at increasing the birth rate, supporting motherhood and childhood, can hardly be called effective if assessed in the medium term. The number of registered marriages is decreasing, while the number of divorces remains almost unchanged. So, if in 2011 9.2 marriages and 4.7 divorces were registered per 1000 people of the population, then in 2022 – 7.2 marriages and 4.7 divorces, respectively, that is, the share of divorces increased from 51 to 65%. The birth rate has significantly decreased to 8.8 births per 1,000 people in 2022, while in 2012 this figure reached the maximum value since the end of the last century – 14.7^[24]. In this regard, the total fertility rate, which in 2023 in Russia amounted to 1.41, is more indicative^[24].

Conclusion

Of course, such disappointing statistics cannot be solely related to the disadvantaged financial situation of families, especially young ones. The reasons for the negative trend should be sought deeper – in the transformation of the value orientations of Russian society and, above all, youth. Budgetary support from the state will not solve the accumulated problems in the field of family and demography, although its scale should be increased. There is a difficult coordinated work of the state authorities and civil society aimed at reviving the family as an important social institution. This is a long process with an unobvious result. 

Thus, when developing and implementing social measures, the Russian state should avoid inflating "bubbles" of social obligations, because this generates social dependency and inflated social expectations among a significant part of society, as evidenced by the negative experience of the European "welfare state". In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind the limited budget resources and avoid "life on loan". Consequently, the state social policy should become more rational, targeted, and "focused" on solving the most acute social problems of modern Russian society.