China's position on the South China Sea issue: from maintaining stability to protecting rights

Chzhou Syaoyui PhD student 117198, Russia, Moscow, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, room 302 xiaoyuz228@mail.ru

Today, in the context of the formation of a multipolar international system and the shift of the center of power to the Asia-Pacific region (APR), contradictions between states in many regions of the world are escalating. One of the main hotbeds of instability in the Asia-Pacific region is the South China Sea (SCM), in which the interests of many countries collide. The inconsistency of the boundaries of economic zones, as well as disputes over the ownership of the offshore, Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Scarborough Reef and Natuna Islands are considered the main destabilizing factors in the region.

This conflict has deep historical background and is closely linked to changes in the balance of power due to the Sino-American rivalry in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The growth of the Chinese economy and the subsequent strengthening of the political power of the People's Republic of China are perceived warily by regional states, which increases the risk of an arms race. The "peaceful rise" of China, proclaimed by the country's leadership in the early 2000s as a reaction to the growing fears of the Chinese threat, took place in the context of its remaining territorial disputes with several countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In these circumstances, it becomes relevant to identify the position of the Chinese leadership regarding disputes in the South China Sea.

On the one hand, Beijing insists on a diplomatic approach to negotiations to resolve disputes over sovereignty and maritime rights with other claimant states. On the other hand, during the most recent round of tensions since 2009, Beijing has taken a clearly forceful approach to establishing de facto control over maritime facilities, which has caused regional suspicion and even fear of Chinese domination. China's new assertiveness has been at the center of regional tensions. Three schools of thought currently dominate the Chinese debate. Pragmatists want to protect China's sovereignty and maritime rights in the region with limited disruption to regional stability. Hardliners want to maximize these rights and establish Chinese control over the area. The moderate wing, recognizing the need to protect human rights, emphasize the importance of securing support from Southeast Asian countries to solve the common national task of China's rise.

The nature of the international political situation in the South China Sea

The South China Sea is called Nanhai (South Sea) in Chinese and covers approximately 3.5 million square kilometers of water that surrounds China and the coastal states of Southeast Asia -Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia. This semi-enclosed maritime space, stretching from the Strait of Malacca in the southwest to the Taiwan Strait in the northeast, is of vital strategic importance. More than 40,000 ships pass through the South China Sea (SCM) annually, which accounts for about 40% of global maritime trade ^[1]. This makes the South China Sea the most important artery of trade and energy security, and the 800-kilometer Strait of Malacca offers the shortest navigation route between Europe and Pacific Asia and the most convenient transit passage for supertankers transporting oil from Africa and the Middle East to resource-dependent East Asian countries.

"The water area of the South China Sea serves as a source of not only energy, but also food resources for the countries of the region, being the main area of their fishing" ^[2], – E.A. Kanaev notes. The waters of the South China Sea, rich in energy resources and fisheries, are a vital source of economic security for neighboring countries. Currently, more than 200 companies are engaged in oil and gas production. However, estimates of proven and probable oil and gas reserves vary greatly due to the lack of region-wide verification procedures. A report released in 2013 by the U.S. Energy Information Administration confirmed a total of 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of gas, in contrast to the higher estimates of the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) in the range of 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas^[3]. Moreover, according to the estimates of the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources of China, there are 23-30 billion tons of oil and 16 trillion cubic meters of gas within the traditional maritime border of China.

In China, ensuring control over the South China Sea, along with the Yellow, East China Sea and Taiwan, is consistently elevated to the category of a national task ^[4], which determines the turn in China's military strategy towards the priority development of naval and air forces on the American model for the consistent displacement of the United States and other applicants from these areas. As R. Kaplan notes, Beijing is now creating the greatest fleet and infrastructure in history, ultimately planning to create a maritime empire and its heart will be the Indian Ocean, through which runs the "pearl thread" of Chinese bases and ports of its allies. Control of the South China Sea will give China wider access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans and weaken Taiwan's defense, limiting the ability of Taiwan's allied forces – the United States and its allies – to support Taiwan ^[5]. At the same time, a head-on collision with competitors in the South China Sea is not among the tasks of Beijing, which has chosen the tactic of creating the most "uncomfortable" conditions for them to stay near its borders by increasing the number of patrols, including submarines, underwater sensors, and anti-aircraft systems. Sovereignty over a geopolitically important region will help strengthen the country's position on the world stage and strengthen its acquisition of the status of a great power due to the increased influence on the regional and global political situation.

A.P. Tsvetov and P.Y. Tsvetov note that the main factor contributing to the emergence of conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS) is the intensive economic development of countries and their desire to increase foreign policy influence ^[6]. Despite the slowdown in GDP growth in China, economic indicators remain strong, which reinforces the need for unhindered maritime trade traffic. The South China Sea region is considered by a number of experts, including V.N. Kolotov, as part of the "arc of instability" in the Asia-Pacific region (APR), including the East China Sea, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, which implies the interconnection of conflicts in these areas ^[7].

The geopolitical importance of the South China Sea for China is great and continues to grow: the increasing needs for energy and biological resources, the transit of civilian and military ships, and the passage of aircraft lead to the fact that ensuring their interests in the South China Sea is becoming a matter of national security in many countries.

Territorial disputes over the waters and marine facilities of the South China Sea

From China's point of view, there were no disputes over Chinese sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea until the 1970s, when Southeast Asian countries learned about the potentially huge reserves of energy resources in the area. In 1948, the Government of the Republic of China published an official map with a U-shaped line (also known as the “nine-dotted line”) covering most of the South China Sea. This line formed the basis of the claims of both the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China after the latter was founded in 1949. For several decades after its publication, no country officially challenged it. It was only after May 2009, when the PRC attached a U-shaped line map to two notes verbales it submitted to the United Nations in response to submissions from Vietnam and Malaysia (jointly) and Vietnam (individually) to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, that this line became the main subject of disputes in the South China Sea ^[8].

The Republic of China occupied Taiping Island in 1956 (Itu Aba)—the largest natural object on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. In 1974, the PRC gained full control over the Paracel Islands as a result of a naval battle with the troops of South Vietnam. But it was only in 1988 and again as a result of the naval conflict with Vietnam that the PRC occupied six reefs on the Spratly Islands. In 1994, China took control of the Mischief Reef, located in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines ^[9]. This action alarmed the countries of Southeast Asia and led to negotiations between the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China on a set of rules for the regulation of disputes. The result was the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea, which was signed by China and 10 ASEAN members in 2002. The document stipulated that all applicant States should "commit themselves to exercise restraint in carrying out activities that may complicate or exacerbate disputes and affect peace and stability" ^[10]. The Declaration was not binding, although it provided for the development of a Code of Conduct for the parties in the South China Sea (Code of Conduct in the South China Sea). However, this has not been done so far for various reasons.

A new escalation of the situation around the disputed islands began in April 2012 in connection with an incident between Chinese and Filipino military vessels in the area of Scarborough Reef, which both states consider their sovereign territory. In July of the same year, an official ceremony was held to establish the city of Sansha, which is geographically part of Hainan Province, with its center on Yongxing Island, which is the largest of the Paracel Islands by area. Back in 2005, an airstrip appeared on the island, and since 2013, sightseeing groups from China began arriving on the Paracel Islands. Of course, these actions of Beijing caused particular indignation in Vietnam.

A surge of anti-Chinese sentiment swept the Southeast Asian countries after the release in November 2012 of new foreign passports depicting disputed territories included in the map of the People's Republic of China. As a response to Beijing's actions, Vietnam and the Philippines refused to put visa stamps in new passports of Chinese citizens in order not to recognize China's actions as legitimate. Now visas for Chinese citizens are issued in a separate form.

In May 2012, the Chinese authorities sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, which included a map indicating the Chinese border according to their version. According to this map, China's southern border actually extended to a reef on the coast of the Malaysian state of Sarawak located in Kalimantan, i.e. we are talking about the famous nine-dotted line defining the borders of the PRC in the disputed territory.

China has declared its claim to almost 80% of the South China Sea, asserting its rights to sovereignty over this area. However, the Philippines filed a lawsuit with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, challenging the legitimacy of China's claims on the basis of the "nine-dotted line". In October 2015 The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague decided ^[11] to hear about this case, after which, in July 2016, a verdict was issued: "There is no evidence that China has ever had exclusive control over the waters of the South China Sea" ^[12]. The court ruled in favor of the Philippines, rejecting China's evidence of its rights to the islands and waters of the South China Sea, including the exclusive economic zone in the Spratly Archipelago ^[13]. China did not recognize the court's decision, preferring to resolve international disputes through bilateral negotiations, and considers the Philippines' lawsuit as an act of hostility ^[14].

Changes in China's position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea

To date, China's policy regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea remains consistent, and several key features can be traced in it. Beijing relies on its historical claims to this area, and although this argument gives it a certain advantage as a country with a rich history, from the point of view of international law it carries only emotional significance ^[15].

China's position on international maritime law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, is questionable. While China participated in the development and ratification of this Convention in 1996, when discussing its contents, Beijing insisted that the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea be permissive or at least notifiable ^[16]. However, due to the opposition of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France, such requirements were not included in the Convention. Despite this, China made a corresponding statement upon its ratification. Nevertheless, Beijing consistently uses a broad interpretation of the Convention, violating its provisions, for example, restricting the right of peaceful passage of warships through the 12-mile territorial sea and not recognizing the freedom of navigation of warships and flights in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). China also seeks to ensure that the South China Sea has an internal territorial sea regime, which raises concerns among other countries because of its importance to their economies and security. In addition, China continues to develop atolls, rocks and build artificial islands in order to recognize them as islands and expand its maritime rights zone.

In 2009, China refused to provide data on the boundaries of its continental shelves to the UN Commission to verify compliance with the Convention ^[17]. Instead, protest notes were sent to Hanoi and Manila with attached maps showing nine-dotted lines. In response, Beijing began to designate 12-mile zones of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone around the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Archipelago on its maps, although they intersect with the EEZ zones and continental shelves of coastal countries ^[18]. Since that time, China has begun to expel foreign vessels from these areas, referring to the provisions of the UN Convention, as well as to hinder attempts by Vietnam and the Philippines to conduct economic activities in the waters of the sea.

China and Vietnam support their position with the help of official documents, such as the Declaration of the People's Republic of China on Territorial Waters of 1958, the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Adjacent Zone of 1992, the Law of the People's Republic of China on the State Border of Special Economic Zones and the Continental Shelf of 1998, and others. In addition, in 2012, China announced the creation of a new city on Yongxing Island (Woody) in the Paracel Islands ^[19], and in January 2013 passed a law allowing patrol vessels of the Chinese Navy to stop, detain and search foreign vessels in case they invade disputed waters without the permission of the Chinese authorities.

The new White Paper on Defense, "Chinese National Defense in a New Era," released by the Information Bureau of the State Council of the People's Republic of China in June 2019, presents Beijing's updated approaches to security in the region and the world compared to the previous version from 2015. It provides a detailed assessment of the situation in the world and the region, which for the first time since the 1980s has been characterized as "turbulent" ^[20]. Chinese military doctrine highlights the unilateral actions of the United States as the main threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region (APR), although the situation is generally assessed as stable. Active cooperation formats such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the ASEAN-China Defense Ministers meetings play a role in ensuring security and peace in the region. With regard to the South China Sea, the situation has stabilized, despite the increase in foreign military presence and repeated incidents at sea, among which "reconnaissance flights and illegal crossings of the maritime borders of the People's Republic of China by foreign ships around reefs and atolls" stand out. The Chinese military has been ordered to respond decisively to any attempts to violate the country's maritime and air borders, and 4,200 patrols have been organized in this direction since 2012.

One of the key strategic objectives, as indicated, is the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity at sea, while the islands of the South China Sea are considered an integral part of China. It is emphasized that the construction of infrastructure, including defense, and patrolling of the water area are legal. At the same time, Beijing supports the principle of dispute resolution through negotiations and consultations with directly interested parties based on respect for historical facts and international law. According to the provisions of the White Paper, the PRC stands for peaceful and stable relations with regional countries, ensuring freedom and safety of navigation and air navigation in accordance with international law. Some experts also believe that in its strategy regarding the South China Sea, Beijing seeks to create a situation that will eventually be perceived by the world community as an irreversible fact, despite contradictions with international law, which implies that the exercise of sovereignty over the South China Sea, at least within the "nine-dotted lines" will become a fact impossible to change ^[21].

In the context of foreign policy, Beijing seeks to avoid internationalization of the South China Sea issue, preferring bilateral dialogues and excluding countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia and India, which are not directly involved in the dispute, from the settlement process. At the regional level, Beijing is ready to consider a partial internationalization of the problem, including its discussion with the parties to the disputes within the framework of ASEAN. In bilateral meetings and on international platforms, China expresses a peaceful position regarding the resolution of territorial disputes, but prefers to avoid destabilizing the situation at the bilateral level. Beijing rejects accusations of hindering freedom of navigation and air navigation in the South China Sea ^[22], although there is a duality of this problem, especially in the context of US demands that contradict the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and require unconditional access of its warships and aircraft.

China, within the framework of ASEAN, seeks to separate the positions of individual countries regarding the South China Sea. For example, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Cambodia in 2012, it was not possible to achieve unity of opinion due to Phnom Penh's refusal to include the issue of the Code on the agenda, unlike Hanoi and Manila ^[23]. China adheres to an unyielding position, actively continuing the development of controlled islands, including military measures, despite statements about the peaceful settlement of disputes and a sharp reaction to attempts by other countries to assert their sovereign rights in this area. Xi Jinping's military reform focuses on strengthening naval and air forces, which underscores Beijing's priority in protecting its interests at sea.

The central plot on the South China Sea issue in 2016 at the international level was the proceedings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the claim of the Philippines against the PRC (the latter refused to participate in the proceedings). According to the court's decision of July 12, China cannot claim territory within the so-called nine-dotted line. Any construction on the reefs and shoals of the Spratly Archipelago, including the creation of bulk islands, is illegal, as are the actions of the Chinese military to restrict access to the Scarborough Reef by Filipino fishermen.

The position of the new President of the Philippines, R. Duterte, helped to mitigate the complication of the international political situation in the region, who, after coming to power in the summer of 2016, almost immediately changed the tactics of communication between the Philippines and China, to which the latter readily responded, promising loans and credits, and in return made a number of peaceful steps. For example, in November 2016, China promised not to prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing in the Scarborough Shoal area, that is, in the Philippine exclusive economic zone. This was, in fact, the only step China took in accordance with one of the decisions rendered by the tribunal — the recognition of the traditional rights of Filipino fishermen to conduct fishing in this area of the South China Sea.

At the same time, the arbitration decision led to increased criticism of China from the United States and its allies. The main argument of these remarks was China's non-compliance with the decisions of international institutions. In September 2016, in an interview on the eve of the G-20 summit in Hangzhou, President Obama called on China to respect the arbitration decision. He also spoke about this during a personal meeting with Xi Jinping. At the initiative of Japan, the "seven" leading countries issued a statement calling the tribunal's decision a "useful basis" for resolving territorial disputes in the region, and several speeches by officials once again emphasized the need to act strictly on the basis of international law. But none of these statements had the slightest effect on China's behavior ^[24]. Despite this, China actually continues to ignore the arbitration rulings on its lack of legal rights to marine resources in the South China Sea.

However, China's approach to building relations with the applicant countries for the South China Sea has changed. The main indicator of the changes was the proactive involvement in the creation of a unified regional international regime in the South China Sea on the basis of the Declaration adopted earlier. Thus, after a 10-year period of coordination, in August 2016, following a meeting of the Foreign ministers of China and ASEAN, it was possible to approve a framework draft Code of Conduct for the parties in the South China Sea.  Despite the fact that after that the parties continued to discuss the legal status of the future agreement, the approval of the draft was a significant breakthrough after many years of stagnation in the development of the "rules of the game" in the South China Sea, and allowed the parties at the 31st ASEAN Summit (November 2017, Manila) to announce the start of negotiations on the Code. In 2018, the parties made progress in agreeing on the draft Code and setting a goal to complete negotiations on the final completion of negotiations in 2021 ^[25].

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the signing of the final Code was postponed. In 2022, the parties held a meeting on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties (DOD). During this meeting, the participants reaffirmed their commitment to resolving territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations of directly interested sovereign States, and also pledged to continue work on the early adoption of a real and effective COC based on consensus ^[26]. Thus, the adoption of a generally binding document that would regulate the behavior of the parties in the South China Sea has been postponed indefinitely.

Anyway, this step demonstrates that China has chosen a comprehensive tactic, including both diplomatic interaction with interested parties and the continuation of economic and military activities in the South China Sea. With this tactic, China is trying to exclude the influence of non-regional actors on negotiations and the regional balance of power and sign a compromise agreement ^[27].

Thus, it should be noted that the problem of the South China Sea needs to be resolved as soon as possible, otherwise it will continue to be a hotbed of instability both regionally and globally. The South China Sea is included in the zone of priority directions of Chinese foreign policy, which has direct geostrategic significance for the country, and therefore any actions on the part of regional and extra-regional actors are considered hostile by them. At the same time, in an effort to position itself as a peaceful and responsible power that only restores historical justice to the Chinese people, China claims that its actions are not aggressive, since the territories are under Chinese sovereignty on a legitimate basis. The decision of the Hague Tribunal in 2016 was of great importance and was an important event in the evolution of the international legal conflict in the South China Sea. It prompted China to adopt a more cautious tactic, focusing on maintaining diplomatic contacts with ASEAN member countries in order to avoid the internationalization of the conflict by the United States.