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World Politics
Reference:

Sino-Russian cooperation on the Ice Silk Road project in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Chzhan Iven'

ORCID: 0009-0009-8511-0279

Postgraduate student, Department of International Political Processes,SPbU

191060, Russia, Saint Petersburg region, Saint Petersburg, Smolny str., 1-3

evel.zhang@yandex.ru

DOI:

10.25136/2409-8671.2024.1.70115

EDN:

KVLLMB

Received:

12-03-2024


Published:

26-03-2024


Abstract: This article examines the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on Sino-Russian cooperation, analyzes the Chinese Ice Silk Road project and the development of the Russian Northern Sea Route, and based on the above analysis, predicts the further course of cooperation between China and Russia on the Ice Silk Road project. The subject of the study is the Chinese-Russian cooperation on the Ice Silk Road project in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The object of the study is Chinese-Russian cooperation. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as the problems of international relations caused by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine; exchange and cooperation between China and Russia against the background of the conflict, as well as determining the trend of future cooperation between the two countries. Special attention is paid to the situation in the Chinese-Russian Ice Silk Road project against the background of the conflict, analysis and forecast of the possibility of cooperation between the two countries on this project in the future. This article uses the method of system theory, considers Sino-Russian relations as an integral part of the system of international relations, Sino-Russian cooperation on the Ice Silk Road project as a level below the level of Sino-Russian relations, and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a change of circumstances. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has exacerbated the polarization of the world. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine did not have too much impact on Sino-Russian cooperation and even introduced favorable factors into Sino-Russian cooperation, the economic sphere will be the main area of cooperation between the two countries. The conflict directly deprives Russia of its Western partners in the Northern Sea Route, and also further distances China from its Western partners in the Ice Silk Road project. The development of the Russian "Northern Sea Route" urgently needs other countries to fill the gap left by Western countries. Continuing further cooperation in the Ice Silk Road project is a reasonable choice. In the next period of time, China opened a window of opportunity for in-depth cooperation with Russia on the Ice Silk Road project. In the future, China is likely to achieve cooperation with Russia, in addition to energy cooperation in the development of the Russian "Northern Sea Route", such as technical cooperation and other cooperation.


Keywords:

Polar Silk Road, Northern Sea Route, Russia, China, Maritime Silk Road, Sino-Russian cooperation, Arctic, Sino-Russian energy cooperation, Sino-Russian technical cooperation, Russian-Ukrainian conflict

This article is automatically translated.

1. International problems caused by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

The Russian-Ukrainian military conflict is itself a political event. Russia's special military operation is considered by Western countries as a direct threat to Ukraine's national security, undermining the concept of "collective security". Western countries have imposed sanctions against Russia based on their intentions to protect Ukraine's national sovereignty and have increased sanctions as hostilities continue. Currently, 33 countries have announced sanctions against Russia, 27 of which are EU countries. NATO is officially signing the protocol on the accession of Finland and Sweden, the very signal of intention has undoubtedly complicated the international situation. It can be said that the Russian special operation has brought Russia into a kind of politically passive state [1].

The military conflict between Russia and Ukraine has also directly caused humanitarian and economic problems. Currently, Ukraine's neighboring countries accept refugees in an organized manner, but as the conflict continues, Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic and other large countries [2] hosting refugees will inevitably face pressure on social infrastructure: medical care, labor markets and security, which may pose a threat to the national stability of these countries. At the same time, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also stated that the conflict has a serious impact on the global agricultural market, world food security and energy security.

Since both Russia and Ukraine are important grain exporters in the world, and Russia is also one of the largest exporters of energy resources in the world, the current situation has led to a sharp increase in world prices for agricultural products and energy [3]. The sharp rise in energy prices has not yet provoked a real energy crisis in Europe, but a series of sanctions against the Russian energy sector imposed by the EU will seriously affect Europe's energy security in the near future [4].

In addition, the secondary effect of Western sanctions cannot be ignored."Weakening Russia's economic foundation, depriving it of key technologies and markets, and significantly weakening its ability to wage war"[5] are the main goals of almost all countries that have announced sanctions against Russia. They imposed sanctions on Russia in almost 20 areas, including: in the financial sector, in the trade sector, in the technology sector, in the service sector, in the media, etc.

Speaking about the impact of sanctions at the economic level, we note that although initially sanctions in the financial sector led to a sharp depreciation of the ruble, their side effect is not so obvious. Sanctions against the Russian trade sector have led to serious changes in the existing structure of the energy market. Some large EU countries and Japan were previously major importers of Russian energy resources. The sanctions forced both sides to look for new buyers and sellers. This prompted Russia to "look to the east" and begin actively cooperating with Asian countries in trade, especially in the field of energy.

At the political level, we see the following picture. Faced with sanctions imposed by Western countries, the Russian government announced a list of "unfriendly countries" on a reciprocal basis, thus the confrontation between the two sides became formalized at the legislative level. The harsh sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia have made countries around the world that maintain good relations with Russia fear secondary sanctions, and this situation is no exception even in China, which has significant economic power [6]. It has become extremely difficult for other countries to interact neutrally with Russia and Western countries at the same time, and this situation, forcing small countries to choose sides, has further aggravated the bipolar confrontation in the world. Although the EU decisively imposed sanctions, it was not their beneficiary — high energy prices caused discontent among residents of many EU countries, and the internal political stability of some EU countries is a cause for concern.

Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict forced Russia's neighboring countries to directly feel the impact of the geopolitical crisis, while strengthening NATO's position in the EU. The ambiguity of the nature of the conflict and the sanctions imposed by Western countries have plunged Russia into a situation of international political isolation and at the same time aggravated the polarization of the world. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has destabilized the world. Secondly, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine threatens world food security and energy security. Food security issues mainly affect low-income countries in Africa and the Middle East. Energy security issues affect the internal political stability of European countries. The influx of refugees further exacerbates this problem. Sanctions imposed by Western countries forced Russia to consider abandoning the European market and looking for new markets in Asia and other regions, while Europe was also forced to abandon trade with Russia. It can be said that due to the influence of political factors, the structure of world trade has changed. And finally, the instability of the political situation in Europe and the constant assistance to Ukraine from European countries and the United States have reduced the overall national power of the Western camp. At the same time, the recent attacks by Iran and North Korea have brought new destabilization factors to the Asia-Pacific region.

2. The impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on Chinese-Russian cooperation

2.1 Sino-Russian cooperation in the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine

It is necessary to consider the impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on cooperation between China and Russia in four areas: politics, economics, as well as in the military and humanitarian spheres.

First of all, in political terms, cooperation between China and Russia is mainly manifested in contacts between the leaders of the two countries and the signing of bilateral documents. From March to December 2022, the heads of state of China and Russia met offline during the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) summit in Samarkand, and a video meeting took place at the end of the year. Xi Jinping met with Chairman of the United Russia Party Dmitry Medvedev in Beijing. The Prime Ministers of the two countries met regularly and signed a joint communique. Within the established time frame, the senior leaders of China and Russia held a number of Sino-Russian consultations on strategic security, and the foreign ministers of the two countries repeatedly communicated and exchanged views. As for the issue of Ukraine, the Chinese side has stated many times that "China always determines its position and policy on the merits of the issue": "the Ukrainian crisis must be resolved taking into account its true prerequisites and legitimate concerns of all parties" [7]. The Russian leader also stated that "Russia appreciates China's objective and fair position in international affairs", "counts on close exchanges and contacts with China and actively develops cooperation in various fields" [8].

In the economic sphere, the following situation is observed: in 2022, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia will increase by almost 30% compared to 2021. From March to December 2022, China imported $99.95 billion worth of goods from Russia, of which energy accounted for 75% of the total, while the most expensive import item was crude oil, whose supplies from Russia to China increased by 45% compared to 2021 [9]. During 2022, China's imports from Russia and exports from China to Russia have steadily increased. China remains Russia's largest trading partner, and Russia is China's tenth trading partner. Chinese-Russian cooperation in the financial sector has also demonstrated new milestones: "Settlements between the two countries in local currencies increased by 64% in 2022, and the share of the yuan in Russia's international reserves and domestic circulation is also increasing, as a result of which Russia becomes the third largest market for offshore payments in yuan" [10].

Considering the cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation in the military sphere, we note that in 2022, in addition to the joint exercises of the Navy (naval forces) The PRC and the Russian Federation against pirates at the beginning of the year, the countries also held week-long joint exercises "Oriental-2022" and "Maritime Union - 2022" [11], as well as joint strategic air raids, in addition, China took part in International Army Games organized by Russia. At the same time, during a joint patrol in November, Chinese military aircraft were received by Russian airports for the first time, while Russian military aircraft landed at Chinese airports. Although military cooperation between the two countries is significant, both China and Russia have always stressed that such joint military exercises are not directed against third parties, but are fully aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the region.

From the point of view of culture and humanities, it is worth highlighting the successful meeting of the Subcommittee on Cultural Cooperation of the Sino-Russian Committee for Humanitarian Cooperation, as well as the work on systematic sports exchange between China and Russia within the framework of the Years of Sino-Russian Cooperation in Sports in 2022-2023 and the Chinese-Russian Cultural Gathering that is gaining momentum.

To sum up, it can be argued that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine did not have too much impact on Sino-Russian cooperation and even had a positive impact on Sino-Russian cooperation. High-level exchanges between China and Russia have always been quite close, and after the conflict broke out, this exchange process did not noticeably suffer. Instead, the conflict has rather spurred economic cooperation between the two countries. EU sanctions have led to the fact that Russia, whose economy is based on energy exports, has lost important buyers of oil and natural gas, China has filled this gap and stabilized the Russian economy. In addition, due to Russia's limited access to the SWIFT system, payments in foreign currency practically stopped, which also forced Russia to use its own currency for settlements, which accelerated the process of de-dollarization, the share of local currencies in China and Russia increased. Military cooperation between the two countries has also become more widespread in the context of the conflict. The friendship and mutual trust between China and Russia in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict made the United States even more wary of China, while China and Russia, who also faced a challenge from the United States, naturally united and reached a strategic consensus. The orderly progress of cultural cooperation between China and Russia in the context of the conflict indicates that the Chinese and Russians have not only been friends for several generations, but also have a common vision for the future.

 

2.2 Trends in the development of Sino-Russian cooperation in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

In October 2022, the twentieth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing, at which Xi Jinping made a report. In his speech, it was clearly defined that the current central task of the Chinese Communist Party is to "lead the Chinese people of all ethnic groups through joint efforts to realize the second century-old goal of turning China into a great socialist country of modernity in all respects, to build a country of socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era" [12]. The report outlines the long-term (until 2049), medium-term (until 2035) and short-term (next 5 years) goals and main objectives of China's development. The report shows that the Chinese Communist Party believes that the world has entered a new period of upheaval and change. Among the long-term goals, "promoting world peace and development and contributing to building a community with a common future for humanity" continues to be the main focus related to international exchanges and cooperation. In particular, from the point of view of foreign policy, "independence" is fundamental; from the point of view of international cooperation, China adheres to the basic national policy of openness to the outside world, hopes to develop global partnership and hopes to strengthen cooperation with other countries, not limited to aspects of the economy. In addition, "China will actively participate in the reform and construction of the global governance system" [12]. The main objective of medium- and short-term goals in international affairs is rapid economic development. Short-term goals also include enhancing China's international status and influence, as well as enhancing its role in global governance. In addition, the report also repeatedly mentioned the confrontation between unipolarity and hegemony.

In December 2022, Russia hosted a regular meeting of the Committee on Strategic Development and National Projects (hereinafter referred to as the "December meeting"), at which Vladimir Putin announced six national priorities for the period up to 2023. He stressed that these tasks are formulated to achieve national goals by 2030. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly mentioned that economic and financial potential is the key to national power, and therefore expressed the need to "bring interaction with key partners to a new level" [13]. The Russian President also stated that this requires "eliminating restrictions in logistics and finance" [13]. In this regard, Vladimir Putin specifically mentioned the following five aspects. First, the continuation of trade with the EU and the search for new trading partners. After the conflict, EU imports from Russia increased, not fell. Vladimir Putin noted that trade with the EU will continue in the short term, but export plans are focused on Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. Secondly, to carry out international cooperation in the field of energy and agriculture in Asia and Africa. Thirdly, to create a solid foundation for international cooperation through the development of payment infrastructure in national currencies. Fourthly, to ensure the security of logistics, strengthen the internal East-West communication, international North-South communication, develop the Northern Sea Route and ensure comprehensive infrastructure development. The speech also specifically mentions that "Chita, with federal support, can become one of the important logistics centers for interaction with China" [13]. Fifth, while reaffirming its commitment to the goals of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia intends to actively cooperate with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union in various fields.

In accordance with the development goals of China and Russia, China and Russia will continue to maintain deep mutual exchanges in the future, and the economic sphere will continue to be the main focus of cooperation between the two countries. High-level diplomatic contacts will continue, and diplomacy at the level of heads of state is likely to continue to promote cooperation in large-scale projects between China and Russia. In the short term, the economy remains at the center of Sino-Russian cooperation. In the field of trade, Sino-Russian cooperation will focus on energy deals, but it is worth noting that both China and Russia hope to find a wider range of partners. Russia's promise to lift logistical restrictions will significantly contribute to trade turnover and increase trade volume, which compensates for the potential danger of a decrease in the volume of bilateral Sino-Russian trade due to an increase in the number of partner countries. Thus, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia may increase in the future. In the financial sphere, including due to the fact that Vladimir Putin announced the lifting of financial restrictions and the development of payment infrastructure in national currency, the share of payments in national currency in the future of the two countries in trade settlements may continue to grow. Although China and Russia did not mention military defense issues as part of their goals of developing bilateral cooperation, ensuring territorial integrity and maintaining national security are undoubtedly the core of national interests. The current international situation is turbulent, and the United States continues to exert strategic pressure on China. China must strive for closer cooperation with its partners. Based on the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Russia for coordination in the new era and the consistent positions of the two countries, the two countries can develop a greater degree of military and security cooperation in the future. In addition, due to the weakening of measures to prevent and combat coronavirus in China, high-level friendly exchanges between the two countries will resume with renewed vigor. Cultural and tourist exchange between the two countries may intensify in the future, taking into account the fact that the conflict has not affected the famous tourist cities of Russia.

 

3. The impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on Chinese-Russian cooperation within the framework of the Ice Silk Road project and its further development

3.1 The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the Chinese Ice Silk Road Project

Currently, the Chinese Ice Silk Road project is in a kind of deadlock. It was not the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that stumped him, but the coronavirus restrictions that had been in effect since the end of 2019. From 2020 to March 2021, due to restrictions caused by the fight and prevention of the spread of coronavirus infection, the movement of Chinese citizens, especially abroad, was significantly limited, and almost all spheres of life inside the country also did not function fully. During this period, the Chinese Ice Silk Road project has not made significant progress. After the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began, China is still in the process of repeated epidemics, and entry and exit controls are still very strict. In 2022, in addition to the opening of the Chinese-Russian joint laboratory of polar technologies and equipment "One Belt, One Way" and the opening of the construction of the world's first liquefied carbon dioxide carriers No. 1 and No. 2 with a capacity of 7,500 cubic meters [14] (built by a subsidiary of the Chinese State Shipbuilding Corporation DSIC for the Northern Lights program in Norway), the Chinese Ice Silk Road project has not achieved significant results.

Judging by the "Arctic Strategy White Paper" published by China in 2018, the Ice Silk Road project seeks cooperation not only with Russia, but also with other "Arctic countries" [15]. Before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, China's relations with six Arctic countries (apart from Russia and the United States) were not stable - international emergencies easily affected bilateral relations. Although relations between China and Russia are close, they are also very complicated. At the same time, the United States believes that various facilities built by China in the Arctic may have a dual purpose and pose a military threat to the United States [16]. Since the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the strategic mutual trust between China and Russia has obviously deepened, but the United States has also become more and more wary of Chinese threats. Among the eight Arctic countries, except Russia, the United States and Canada, the remaining five countries are EU members, while the United States, Canada, Iceland and Finland are NATO members, and Norway and Sweden are applying to join NATO. Thus, Russia's confrontation with the EU and NATO and China's position in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict inevitably affect China's relations with other Arctic countries. Considering the influence of the United States in the EU and NATO countries, in the future it may be difficult for China to achieve substantive cooperation with other Arctic countries except Russia.

 

3.2 Current status of the development of the Northern Sea Route project

After the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, although the Arctic Council did not announce any sanctions against Russia, in June 2022, the other seven Arctic countries unanimously announced: "We intend to continue our activities in the Arctic Council in a limited format on projects that do not involve Russia's participation" [17]. In August 2022, the Russian government issued a new edition of the "Northern Sea Route Infrastructure Development Plan for the period up to 2035" (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan 2022"). The old version of the "Northern Sea Route Infrastructure Development Plan for the Period up to 2035" (hereinafter referred to as the "2019 Plan") was published in 2019, and it was expected that most of the projects in the plan would be completed between 2020 and 2024. Compared to the previous version, the "Plan 2022" specifically requires that an annual report be provided for all projects listed in the plan, allowing you to track the dynamics of project implementation. The "Plan 2022" not only operates with much larger amounts of investments than the old version, but also has a clearer structure and more detailed content. According to the content of the two editions of the Northern Sea Route development plan, there are currently two key goals for the development of the Northern Sea Route: one is an annual increase in cargo turnover of the Northern Sea Route, and the other is to strengthen the corresponding infrastructure construction. Infrastructure construction mainly involves two aspects: the first is the construction of transport infrastructure such as ports, roads and railways, the second is the construction of cargo ships and icebreakers. "Despite the external influence, the growth of Russian cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route was observed throughout the past year. By the end of 2022, cargo traffic along the NSR (Northern Sea Route) increased by 966 thousand tons at the expense of Russian companies. The increase compared to 2021 was 3%" [18], while cargo flows increased mainly due to LNG shipments. At the same time, some large companies refused to work with Russia: "Shell withdrew from the authorized capital of the joint venture with Gazprom Neft – Gydan Energy [19], working on the Yenisei project on Gydan in the north of the Krasnoyarsk Territory," also announced its withdrawal from Arctic LNG-2 due to "inability to carry out financial transactions arising from economic sanctions". Japan's Mitsui, JOGMEC and France's Total Energies.

In 2018, Vladimir Putin called the Northern Sea Route "the key to the development of the Russian Arctic and the Far East" [20]. In it, the Russian government sees "the main means of implementing a whole range of state policy priorities in the north, and in the future — a transport artery of global importance" [20]. It is obvious that the Russian Arctic, the Far East and the Northern Sea Route are of great importance for the overall development of Russia. From 2021 to 2023, according to the principle of rotation, Russia should serve as chairman of the Arctic Council, however, due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia has lost the right to effectively preside over the Arctic Council. Since Russia occupies about 60% of the territory in the Arctic, the development of the Arctic region is an internal matter of Russia, so the loss of the presidency does not have a significant impact on the development of the Arctic region of Russia. The publication of a new version of the Northern Sea Route Development Plan in August also confirms this fact. Judging by the scope and content of the "Plan 2022", the Russian-Ukrainian conflict not only did not affect the development of the Northern Sea Route, but even made Russia more aware of the importance and urgency of the development of the Northern Sea Route, which contributed to its development.

Although the volume of cargo transported along the Northern Sea Route will increase as planned in 2022, with regard to international cooperation in the field of infrastructure construction, almost all Western countries have withdrawn from projects related to the Russian Northern Sea Route. The withdrawal of Western countries leads not only to a reduction in the volume of future cargo transportation and a reduction in project financing, but, more importantly, to the loss of advanced technologies provided by the West, especially in shipbuilding. Despite the fact that Russia's partner countries have the potential to replenish the volumes of cargo lost by Russia along the Northern Sea Route and financing, they cannot help with filling in the missing technologies. Thus, the speed of development of the Northern Sea Route may slow down somewhat. At the same time, it should be noted that currently the infrastructure construction of the Northern Sea Route is mainly based on Russian enterprises themselves, or rather on some local enterprises in the Arctic. In addition, relevant personnel training projects have already been formulated in the "Plan 2022", so the Northern Sea Route will continue to develop systematically.

 

3.3 The impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the future of Sino-Russian cooperation within the framework of the Ice Silk Road Project

In 2017, Chinese leader Xi Jinping received an invitation from Russia to jointly build the Northern Sea Route, as a result of which the two countries officially reached an agreement on the joint construction of the Ice Silk Road project. Although the Chinese Ice Silk Road project and the Russian Northern Sea Route project have many points of intersection and common interests, the goals and objectives of these two projects do not completely coincide. The "Ice Silk Road" refers to the sea routes crossing the Arctic Circle and connecting the three main economic centers of North America, East Asia and Western Europe." The Ice Silk Road project is aimed at the economic development of the Arctic sea routes and includes related issues of China's cooperation with countries with access to the Arctic [21]. The "Northern Sea Route" refers to the Northeast Passage near Russia (it is one of the three existing Arctic sea routes). The Northern Sea Route project is an offshoot of the Russian Arctic Strategy, designed to serve the development of the Arctic region of Russia. The Chinese Ice Silk Road project started only in 2017. Due to the negative impact of the coronavirus epidemic and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the current development of the Ice Silk Road project is very slow. Although the "Fourteenth Five-year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the general plan of long-term goals for the period up to 2035", published in early 2021, briefly mentions the Ice Silk Road project, in the "Report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China", published in October 2022, it It is not mentioned. The goals of the Ice Silk Road project are still relatively vague. Although the Russian plan for the development of the Northern Sea Route was officially proposed in 2019, Russia's use of the Northern Sea Route has a very long history, the development of the Northern Sea Route was actively conducted during the Soviet Union. In August 2022, Russia once again unveiled a development plan for the Northern Sea Route. The development scheme of the Northern Sea Route is already visible from the "Plan 2022", while the goals of further development are extremely clear. At the December meeting at the end of 2022, the Northern Sea Route was also declared one of the key points of the national development goals for 2023. It is obvious that the Northern Sea Route is not only the focus of Russia's current development goals, but also one of the priorities in the field of national interests in the long term.

As part of the cooperation on the Ice Silk Road project, China and Russia have entered the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 projects, the latter of which is under development and construction. At the moment, the main model of Sino-Russian cooperation within the framework of the "Ice Silk Road" can be called China's investments in exchange for oil and gas produced in Russia, while the two countries rarely cooperated in the field of technology [22].

Although the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has destabilized the situation in the world, and the threat of bipolar confrontation is becoming more and more serious, at the same time, this conflict has contributed to the emergence of Russia and China to a deeper level of strategic mutual trust and extensive cooperation between the two countries. The conflict directly deprives Russia of its Western partners in the Northern Sea Route, and also further distances China from its Western partners in the Ice Silk Road project. Since China does not have territories in the Arctic, the implementation of the Ice Silk Road project can only rely on cooperation with Arctic countries, while new partner countries are urgently needed for the development of the Russian Northern Sea Route to fill the space left after the withdrawal of Western countries. Continuing further cooperation in the Ice Silk Road project is obviously a reasonable and mutually beneficial choice. China's economy is huge, and its energy needs are in no way comparable to the needs of Russia's Eurasian partner countries. In addition, China's technological resources should not be underestimated. In the future, the development of the Russian "Northern Sea Route" may directly depend on China's participation. It can be said that China has opened a window of opportunity for in-depth cooperation with Russia on the Ice Silk Road project and will soon achieve cooperation with Russia in the field of technology as part of the development of this project.

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The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is one of the most serious factors of our time, which has an impact on relations between countries. Western countries view this conflict as a threat to Ukraine's national security and have therefore imposed a number of sanctions against Russia. The continuation of the conflict deepens the contradictions between Russia and the countries of Western Europe, intensifies Russia's orientation from West to East. China remains Russia's most serious and consistent partner, and ties with it have intensified in many areas. The article examines cooperation between Russia and China within the framework of the Chinese Ice Silk Road project, which is aimed at the economic development of the Arctic sea routes and related issues of China's cooperation with countries that have access to the Arctic. Russia also has its own Arctic project, and given that Russia's Ice Silk Road project is aimed at the economic development of Arctic sea routes and includes related issues of cooperation between China and countries with access to the Arctic, including Russia, since the implementation of the Chinese project is virtually impossible without Russia. The subject of the study is the Chinese-Russian cooperation of the Ice Silk Road project in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Research methodology. The author of the reviewed article, unfortunately, did not disclose the research methodology and methods that he used in this article, it is clear from the content of the article that the author relied on the principles of science, objectivity, historicism. The work is based on the theory of political realism, which considers international relations between countries in the context of the priority of their own interests and on this basis, relations with other countries are being built, i.e. on the basis of mutually beneficial interests. The relevance of the study is determined by the geopolitical and economic situation, which has led to a deepening of relations between Russia and China, in connection with Russia's reorientation to the East and China's becoming a key partner of Russia and a major player in the Asian region, as well as China's focus on increasing its role and influence in the international arena. Scientific novelty is determined by the formulation of the problem and the objectives of the study. Style, structure, content. The style of the article is scientific with some descriptive elements. The structure of the work is aimed at achieving the goals and objectives of the study and consists of the following sections: 1. International problems caused by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict; 2. The impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on Chinese-Russian cooperation: 2.1 Sino-Russian cooperation in the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, 2.2 Trends in the development of Sino-Russian cooperation in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict; 3. The impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on Sino-Russian cooperation within the framework of the Ice Silk Road project and its further development: 3.1 The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the Chinese Ice Silk Road project, 3.2 The current state of development of the Northern Sea Route project, 3.3 The impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the future of Sino-Russian cooperation within the framework of the Ice Silk Road project. The names of the sections correspond to their contents. The text of the article is logically structured and consistently presented. In the article, the author explores and reveals the relations of Western countries towards Russia in connection with the conflict, analyzes sanctions on Russia and other countries, notes that countries that maintain good relations with Russia have to fear secondary sanctions and China is no exception. The current situation is characterized by the fact that many countries are faced with the fact that they simultaneously need to interact neutrally with Russia and Western countries, not everyone can find a balance and small countries are forced to choose one of the sides, which exacerbates the bipolar confrontation in the world. The article examines the relations between Russia and China in the field of economics, finance, culture, etc. Special attention is paid to the Chinese Ice Silk Road project and the Russian Northern Sea Route project, and a forecast of relations between the countries within the framework of Sino-Russian cooperation is given. The author writes that Russia's conflict with Ukraine has led to the transition of Russia and China "to a deeper level of strategic mutual trust and extensive cooperation between the two countries." The author of the article emphasizes that in fact, "China has opened a window of opportunity for in-depth cooperation with Russia on the Ice Silk Road project and will soon achieve cooperation with Russia in the field of technology as part of the development of this project." The bibliography of the article contains 22 sources that seem sufficient to study the problem under study and enabled the author to achieve the goals and objectives of the study and draw objective conclusions on the topic under study. The appeal to the opponents is presented at the level of the collected information on the research topic and the results obtained. The bibliography of the work is also an appeal to the opponents. Conclusions, the interest of the readership. The article will be of interest to specialists and a wide range of readers interested in the development of Russian-Chinese relations in the modern period.