Abiy Ahmed's Domestic Policy in Ethiopia: Securitization and conflict resolution

Belkov Aleksandr Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0003-7843-6656 Student, Department of Comparative Politics, RUDN University named after Patrice Lumumba 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Moscow, 117198, Russia aleksanderbelkov@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

Ethiopia is one of the largest and most populated countries in Africa. For a long time, it has faced various conflicts related to the division of resources, ethnic crises, political splits and the traditional problems of underdevelopment and multidimensional poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Addis Ababa from 1974 to 2018.  She saw herself as the capital of African diplomacy. It is home to the headquarters of the African Union. Ethiopia has participated in peacekeeping operations many times, stabilized South Sudan, Somalia and other countries in the region. Its history dates back to the time of the Battle of Adua in 1896, when the Ethiopian army defeated the Italian colonizers, and for a long time maintained independence among its almost completely colonized neighbors. At the same time, Ethiopia was one of the poorest countries in the world. A gap has formed between the image of a State sponsor of international security and a country with an endless series of internal civil conflicts and endemic violence that generate refugee flows.

Despite the fact that over the past decade and a half, its economic growth rates have been higher than the average African ones, the country has accumulated a large conflict potential within itself. In 2018, it reached a fairly high level, which led to the transfer of state power in Ethiopia to a new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed. Already in 2019, Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize because he made concessions to resolve the territorial conflict with neighboring Eritrea that had lasted since 1976. The basis of his reforms was a set of liberal and democratic reforms: he released political opponents of the previous regime from prison, lifted the ban on a number of banned organizations and parties, restored independent media ^[1]. A. Ahmed began the widespread privatization of unprofitable state assets, as well as launched the fight against corruption and expanded the political representation of women in government. They even appeared in the government ^[1]. This made him the most popular African politician for Western countries. It would seem that the course taken by the new Prime Minister was supposed to guarantee Ethiopia a cloudless future. A number of acutely overdue domestic political reforms undertaken by Ahmed have generated expectations within Ethiopia and among liberal circles in the West that have not come true. The subsequent events of episodes of civil war and internal destabilization are considered by many analysts as a deviation of the policy of the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia from democratic principles. 

From our point of view, the accumulated contradictions could have been realized in a much more catastrophic scenario, which A. Ahmed's rational policy was able to prevent. We hypothesize that the actions of the Ethiopian leadership can be explained from the standpoint of the theory of securitization and the construction of a regional security complex by B. Buzan and O. Wavera.

The aim of the work is to test the hypothesis that the internal policy pursued by Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia fits into the logic of rational actions according to the theory of securitization by B. Buzan and O. Wavera and is aimed at transforming conflict education into a security regime.  

The object of the study is the internal political contradictions accumulated in Ethiopia from 1974 to 2018.

The subject of the study is a set of political reforms of reactive and proactive actions undertaken by A. Ahmed from 2018 to the present.

Africa, according to the UN forecast ^[2], is the fastest growing region in the world demographically. It will determine not only the demographic potential of the Earth, but also affect the stability of the world order.  According to researchers B. Buzan and O. Wavera, the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa will develop around stable Ethiopia and represent one of the four security complexes of the African continent ^[3]. Therefore, the study of the experience of the Ethiopian leadership in stabilizing the country is very relevant.

 The scientific novelty of the work lies in the fact that the internal policy pursued by A. Ahmed in Ethiopia is considered not from a historical point of view, but through the prism of theoretical propositions that have earned the respect of political scientists around the world, and they are applied on a specific example of the political process launched in Ethiopia in 2018.

Theoretical basis and methods

The basic theory on which the research is based is the theory of regional security complexes by B. Buzan and O. Wavera ^[3]. A realistic approach is used to analyze the internal political situation in Ethiopia, logical and philosophical assumptions are allowed. The main methods are qualitative content analysis of official documents and expert opinions, as well as event analysis.

The degree of development of the topic

Various aspects of the political life of Ethiopia are analyzed in a number of works by domestic and foreign authors. Russian researcher R. N. Ismagilova studied the influence of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia on the political situation in its individual states and the country, as well as the changes that occurred in Ethiopia in connection with the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed ^[4-6]. S. V. Mezentsev and P. G. Tsarev drew attention to the problem of the struggle for water resources between Ethiopia and Egypt ^[7]. I. D. Loshkarev and I. S. Kopyttsev analyzed the crisis in Tigray in detail from the point of view of the processes taking place in the elites of Ethiopia ^[8]. S.A. Gorokhov, M. M. Agafoshin and R. V. Dmitriev investigated the scale of the migration problem in East Africa and, in particular, in Ethiopia ^[9]. V. G. Ivanov and V. M. Kassae Nygusie focused their scientific efforts on the problem of refugees that arose due to ethnic violence in Ethiopia ^[10]. B. D. Gardachev, G. M. Kefale and G. A. Kumiye presented their view on the ethnic federalism of Ethiopia ^[11]. Semahagn Abebe describes the consequences of authoritarian policies in Ethiopia in 1991-2018 ^[12]. The article by G. K. Antigegna is devoted to the role of religion in Ethiopian conflicts ^[13]. E. Baye discusses the model of the development state in Ethiopia, highlights its pros and cons ^[14]. The problems that arose as a result of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia were considered by V. Goncharov ^[15].

A special place in the study of political processes in Ethiopia is occupied by the works of foreign political scientists: J. Lie and B. Mesfin ^[16], L. P. Blanchard ^[17], K. O. Opalo and L. Smith ^[18], A. O. Jima ^[19-20], K. Tronvoll ^[21], M. Woldemariam ^[22], Y. Gedamu ^[23], T. ?steb? T. ^[24-27], Y. Tariku ^[28], J. Abbink ^[29], L. Kong and O. Woods ^[30].

1. Ethnic conflicts and separatist movements in Ethiopia

Six years ago, a young charismatic politician, Abiy Ahmed, came to power in Ethiopia, who got not only the central government, but also the accumulated problems accompanying it. This was practically the first experience of transferring power relatively peacefully as a result of a broad social movement, and not through a military coup ^[16]. It should be noted that for the first time in thirty years, a representative of the national majority of the Oromo people, a professional political scientist and leader of the Oromo Liberation Front, became the head of state. The youth of Ethiopia's second largest ethnic group, the Amhara, also played a major role in this social movement.   

1.1Tigray crisis

After a short period of time, the Ethiopian government found itself in the face of an internal political crisis of such magnitude that a number of experts ^[17] began talking about the disintegration of Africa's second largest demographic country and a departure from democracy.

The conflict with the leaders of the Tigray people, who led Ethiopia as part of the Revolutionary Democratic Front of the Ethiopian Peoples (RDFN), brought the state to the brink of collapse. It was this group, consisting of tribal militias from a number of provinces, that overthrew the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. That year, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Tigray (NFLP), Meles Zenawi, became the head of state, who reformed the country on the principle of ethnic federalism, implying the leading role of the subjects of the federation in the internal political life of the state ^[4]. The Tigray militia turned out to be the most combat-ready, and therefore for twenty-seven years representatives of this ethnic group, which makes up 6% of the Ethiopian population, held senior government positions, which caused discontent among the larger Oromo (38%) and Amhara (27%) peoples.

Until the 1990s, the Derg regime relied on the policy of Amharicization of the entire country. The reforms of M. Zenawi have significantly aggravated the ethno-confessional tension between the numerous ethnic groups and nationalities of Ethiopia. The Constitution of 1995 ^[31], despite the legal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, actually legalized it. The ethnic groups were divided into several levels, which were endowed with different rights (Article 30 of the Constitution of Ethiopia) ^[31]. The largest "nations" were given the opportunity to form states that had the right to secede from the federation. Smaller "nationalities" were given the right to create regions, small tribal groups (People) could form districts, territorial borders were allowed to be changed through a referendum (Articles 39, 46 of the Constitution of Ethiopia) ^[31]. All these associations had titular and non-titular "nations". As a result, even such large communities as Amhara, Oromo, Somalia and Tigray, finding themselves in the role of migrants in other territories, had limited rights, which inevitably led to conflicts. This was also complicated by the fact that the same ethnic group could have different confessional groups professing Islam, Christianity and paganism. In addition, among the representatives of the four largest nations, there are projects to create their own states and even reconfigure neighboring countries of the Horn of Africa, such as Eritrea and Somalia ^[4]. Thus, Ethiopia's high level of conflict was historically laid down and inherited by the new leadership of the country along with expectations of positive changes.

Ultimately, this led to the events of 2018, as a result of which A. Ahmed gained power. The NFLF refused to join the coalition government and in every possible way sabotaged Addis Ababa's attempts to strengthen the position of the federal center. In November 2020, the NFOT began fighting, trying to regain lost positions ^[18].

The specifics of Ethiopia's military construction over the past twenty years consisted in the fact that most of the generals, officers and experienced soldiers sided with the Tigray separatists, which brought the government of reformer A. Ahmed to the brink of collapse by 2021 ^{[18, 20]}. He was helped to stop the internal political conflict by the successful desecuritization of relations with Eritrea, which not everyone in Ethiopia clearly perceived ^[22]. The assistance of Eritrean troops made it possible to stabilize the front line, and then move on to political negotiations under the auspices of the African Union ^[19]. In November 2022, a peace agreement was signed in Pretoria (South Africa) between the NFLF and the Federal Government of Ethiopia ^[32], which allowed the conflict to be frozen on the basis of reconciliation and a ceasefire. According to the UN data for March 2022, several million refugees arose as a result of this conflict, and thousands of people died ^[33].

1.2 Separatist movements in the States of Amhara, Oromia and Somalia

However, during 2022-2024. Separatist movements have intensified in the Amhara region. The tribal militia did not want to be subordinated to the central command, considering themselves betrayed due to the fact that their military leadership was arrested for trying to seize power in the state. The events began back in 2019, when the commander of the local militia killed the chief of the General Staff of the Ethiopian army, Sir Mekonnen, and the governor of Amhara State loyal to Addis Ababa ^{[28, 34]}. Similar problems exist in several other states, including two large ones – Somalia and Oromia. They are caused by constant attempts by local elites and militias to change existing borders outside constitutional procedures. For example, the Tigray conflict took on such a fierce character also because the Amharic militia FANO, which supported the central government at the first stage, carried out ethnic cleansing of the Tigray people, seizing their fertile lands ^[21]. As a result, according to researcher K. Tronwall, the desire of the political elite of the Amhara region to forcibly change the internal borders of the states created problems for the federal Ethiopian government at home and abroad ^[21]. And Prime Minister Ahmed's attempt to stop this process led to a new conflict, now with representatives of the FANO militia. Endemic violence and local conflicts are superimposed on all this. The settlement process with the Oromo Liberation Army has been put on pause, which has so far made unrealistic demands towards Addis Ababa until the last moment. A state of emergency was declared in Amhara State in August 2023, and the forceful disarmament of the local militia continues there ^[23].

In November 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed addressed the separatists at a meeting of the Ethiopian Parliament, calling them "our brothers", called on them to lay down their arms and use peaceful means to achieve political goals, without prolonging "unnecessary conflicts" that "delay the country on the path" to peace ^[35]. He also admitted that emergency measures had helped to stabilize the situation. Abiy Ahmed provides legal guarantees of security to the participants of the uprisings and their leaders. Thus, in November 2023, progress appeared in the negotiation process with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Dar es Salaam ^[36].

Thus, it is obvious that the complex of issues facing the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and requiring a thoughtful solution from the point of view of domestic policy is existential in nature and needs to develop special approaches, which were applied by A. Ahmed.

2. The influence of the religious factor on the conflict situation in Ethiopia

Modern Ethiopian statehood was formed within the framework of Marxist discourse. This fully concerned the communist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974 - 1991) and the government of the NFLP led by Meles Zenawi (1991 – 2012), which replaced him, as well as Hailemariam Desalegn (2012 – 2018), who transferred power to Abiy Ahmed. Religious discourse was not encouraged by state authorities, was considered an outdated component of cultural heritage and generally contributed to the formation of secularization of the state and the church. Major religious holidays were allowed to be used more as folklore traditional practices and customs. At the same time, religion had great potential and was widely practiced, especially in rural and remote areas. In the 1990s, this potential began to be realized. This was due to the fact that M. Zenawi's regime was more neutral towards religion and lifted restrictions on the registration and construction of new places of worship. This was especially true of the Reformed Church, which received strong support from its co-religionists from the United States and Western Europe. In the end, the active proselytizing work bore fruit. Going to church has become fashionable. Young people began to attend divine services and participate in the life of parishes. The active construction of temples, mosques and prayer houses has begun.

Historically, the dominant denomination in the country was the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which for fifteen hundred years of domination considered itself the pillar of Ethiopian statehood, despite several decades of Marxist rule. Traditionally also present, especially in the southern and eastern regions, Islam was perceived more marginalized, because Orthodox peoples have been the mainstay of Ethiopian statehood since ancient times. Until 1974, the Ethiopian Patriarch blessed the imperial power. After the collapse of the Derg regime, Ethiopian Orthodoxy received the support of traditionalists and also attracted young people to its ranks, most of whom did not like the activity of Protestants and Muslims in traditionally Orthodox states and cities.

Since the early 1990s, the Islamic Ummah has experienced a religious renaissance. Neighboring Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies began financing the construction of mosques and madrasas ^[26], which also allowed an increase in the number of parishioners and religious communities. Together with them, the ideas of radical Islam began to penetrate into Muslim regions. Orthodox Christians have their own zealots of faith, ready for violent actions.

All this led to the formation of a certain interreligious tension by the early 2000s. At the same time, from the point of view of Muslims and Protestants, they are fighting against the hegemony of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and defending their religious rights ^[30]. And from the point of view of the Orthodox, they protect the tradition, protect the state from the invasion of a religious Other ^[29]. This was superimposed on the rapid development of the Internet, which became an additional platform for the polarization of public sentiment. There was a phenomenon when representatives of the same ethnic group found themselves in different confessional communities. Protestant churches began to form a large number of parishioners in the southern regions, where Muslims and representatives of pagan beliefs traditionally lived [ibid.]. This could not but lead to new conflicts.

 In the 2006 – 2010s, bloody conflicts broke out between Protestants and Muslims in the southwestern state of Oromia in the city of Jimma ^[24]. It is significant that the conflict began between representatives of the Oromo people, Protestants and Catholics. As a result, this led to a series of confrontations with human casualties and the destruction of religious sites. Orthodox Christians from another ethnic group, the Amhara, suffered. These events have pushed a number of supporters of Ethiopian Orthodoxy to radicalize. On the one hand, in a number of Orthodox areas, the population is converting to Protestantism and Islam. On the other hand, where the Orthodox are a minority, they are persecuted. In northern Ethiopia, the Orthodox banned the construction of mosques and Protestant churches in the cities of Lalibela and Aksum. These cities have received a special status of Orthodox shrines. The practice of street demonstrations during holy holidays was also introduced there. Very often, these processions became the causes of riots and conflicts. In 2018, young Muslim radicals killed church rectors and burned churches in the Muslim state of Somalia, in 2020, in the Orthodox region of Harare, a procession on a holiday turned into an attack on Muslim mosques ^[27], in 2022 there were attacks on Muslims in the Christian city of Gondar ^[24]. Therefore, in 2023, in Addis Ababa, the mayor's office imposed restrictions on the march in honor of the religious Orthodox holiday of Meskel, which often ended in clashes and bloodshed ^[37]. Thus, it can be concluded that the last decades have led to an increasing role of the religious factor in the life of Ethiopia. Along with ethnic conflicts, it is becoming the most important point where the State's efforts should be directed to desecuritize this dangerous process. 

3. Securitization of internal threats in Abiy Ahmed's policy

The future Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, was born in Jimma, whose mother is an evangelist from the Amhara people, and his father is a Muslim from the Oromo people ^[4]. Therefore, he understands all the complex issues when confessional differences are superimposed on ethnic contradictions. The city of Jimma can show Ethiopia in miniature, as representatives of three leading faiths and two major nations live there. According to data for 2023, there were 43% Orthodox Christians in Ethiopia, about 33% Muslims, and 20% Protestants ^[25].

 Ahmed relies on extensive political experience and professional knowledge in his politics. He is a certified political scientist who received a master's degree in Transformational Leadership and Change from the University of Greenwich (UK) ^[4]. In 2010, he became a member of the Ethiopian Parliament from the state of Oromia, and in 2016 he was elected Vice-governor of the state of Oromia. A. Ahmed participated in the moderation of the bloody sectarian conflict in his hometown. Based on this experience, he defended his doctoral thesis "Social capital and its role in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms on the example of interreligious conflict in the Jimma Zone" in Addis Ababa in 2017 ^[4].

The arrival of Abiy Ahmed into big politics and his occupation of the post of Prime Minister significantly changed the role of religion in the conflictogenicity of Ethiopian society. Among the huge number of problems in Ethiopia, four existential threats stood out: hunger and lack of clean water, a complex of foreign policy threats, ethnic conflicts and religious conflicts. It was impossible to solve all the problems at the same time. A politician with practical experience, who knows the specifics of the three main faiths of Ethiopia from the inside, securitized two internal problems: he removed corrupt officials from the NFL from power and decided to use knowledge of religious practices as a tool to achieve ethnic and interfaith peace. A. Ahmed reformed the "Interreligious Council of Ethiopia" ^[39], which included the additionally reorganized Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs of Ethiopia ^[24]. Muslims have a head - Sheikh Hajj Ibrahim Tufa, who on March 8, 2024 led the reconciliation process of two Muslim states – Somalia and Afar, which have a protracted territorial dispute ^[38]. As a result, a reconciliation commission was launched and military operations between tribal militias were stopped. For the first time in the history of the country, Muslims were equalized with Orthodox and Evangelicals. In addition, A. Ahmed overcame the split among the Orthodox bishops of the Oromo people, who wanted to create a competing Orthodox church in order not to conduct divine services in the Amharic language ^[24]. The high authority gained among religious leaders and the elimination of the split within traditional religious organizations allowed Abiy Ahmed to use the influence of the "Interreligious Council of Ethiopia" in resolving the Tigray and Amharic crises. This has become a significant lever for stabilizing internal conflicts. 

Conclusion

 The concept of securitization, introduced in the theory of international relations, refers to the process of turning some problems into significant security issues, which can lead to the mobilization of political and public support for their solution. Sometimes, in order to achieve the most important results, some issues need to be desecuritized, that is, they need to stop being considered as a key threat. Therefore, Abiy Ahmed, having several important problems, tries through proactive and reactive actions to reduce the severity of some problems or postpone their solution in time. It is important to note that Ahmed uses his knowledge and respect for religious values as a tool to achieve political goals. At the same time, he is now focused on solving internal problems, which is what caused foreign policy concessions to his more assertive neighbors. Having conceded to Eritrea in the territorial dispute ^[6], he desecuritized the age-old enemy and turned him into an ally to resolve the most acute Tigray conflict. He did not clash with Sudan over the disputed region on the border between Sudan and the state of Amhara, which allowed the federal center to switch its efforts to the fight against Amhara separatism.

Ahmed does not avoid the use of force if it is dictated by existential danger. This fully explains his tough decisions at the moment of aggravation of the Tigray or Amharic issues. However, he accepts international mediation and does not seek to finish off his opponents, giving them legal guarantees of security. The large number of refugees and war crimes from different sides, when three regions (Amhara, Afar and Tigray) suffered as a result of the Tigray war, is due to the specifics of the actions of military militias, which traditionally in Ethiopia consider representatives of neighboring peoples as spoils of war. This is what caused the response of the federal center to the allied militias of the Amhara and Oromo peoples in the past.

Being Amharic on one side and Oromo on the other, Abiy Ahmed does not give preferences to any of these major peoples, because he sees Ethiopia as a single state, not a confederation. By practicing evangelicalism, he does not make it a state religion, but equally helps in the search for confessional unity of Orthodox, Muslims and Protestants. Abiy Ahmed took over the country at a time of severe systemic crisis, which has not yet been eliminated. Ethiopia was not a federal prosperous state, but was a conflictual entity with the prospect of disintegration into dozens of tribal failed states, like neighboring Somalia.  With his political course, Ahmed is trying to bring Ethiopia from the position of a conflict entity into a security regime.   

Thus, in the domestic policy of A. Ahmed, approaches based on strengthening the central government are traced, which, from the point of view of the theory of B. Buzan and O. Wavera, makes Ethiopia a functional entity capable of responding to existential threats and successfully developing.