The socio-political situation in Greece according to the report of the Swedish diplomatic mission from Constantinople (August 1916)

Kostrikov Sergey Petrovich ORCID: 0000-0002-3999-0940 Doctor of History Professor; Department of Sociology, Psychology of Management and History; State University of Management 99 Ryazansky Prospekt str., Moscow, 109542, Russia s.kostrikov@mail.ru

The reports of Swedish diplomats intercepted by the special services of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army in 1915-1916 have already been considered by us in previous publications ^{[1, 2]}. It was concluded that "for the Russian leadership, the intercepted reports of Swedish diplomats (let's pay tribute to our then special services) were very important... These documents, among other things, drew attention to those aspects that could be used both in working with the Swedish leadership and in relations with the allies, and provided information about the enemy, especially since the Balkan problems have always been the focus of our diplomacy" ^{[1, p.133]}.

As for the position of the Swedish Kingdom during the unfolding world conflict, it was also presented in our publications ^{[1, 2]}. And you can learn more about it from a number of research papers by both domestic and Swedish historians. ^{[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]}.

Let's just mention the main point that within the Swedish elite and Swedish society there were disagreements about the attitude towards the parties to the conflict: neutral, as well as Germanophile with a Russophobic bias, reflecting the former "phantom pains" of the Swedish failed imperialism. In the end, the Swedish leadership came to the conclusion that neutrality allows you to extract very serious economic advantages and revenues, contributing to the development of industry and the economy as a whole ^{[4, 5, 6, 8]}. This was largely favored by the position held by the head of Swedish diplomacy, K. Wallenberg, who was not only a good diplomat, but also a prominent entrepreneur ^[7].

Swedish diplomatic missions, using their neutral status, actively worked in the warring countries. They closely followed the developments on the fronts and in the countries themselves participating in the hostilities. One of the most important points of tension and intertwining of imperialist interests was the Balkans, or the Middle East, as this region was called at that time. Not only serious military clashes unfolded there, but also political tensions were escalating within the Balkan states, some of which were already actively fighting, and the other was in agonizing thoughts on which side to take, so as not to make mistakes and, eventually, get their piece of loot when the victors would divide the defeated powers. And there were such thoughts in Swedish ruling circles, too. Therefore, it was important to track all the twists and turns of military and political intricacies in this important strategic region.

One of the countries that was experiencing severe internal discord was Greece. Its political elites and public opinion were divided into the Germanophile side, which was almost openly led by King Constantine, the brother–in-law of the German Emperor Wilhelm II, and the supporters of the Entente, in particular Great Britain, headed by the prominent politician Eleftherius Venizelos. The latter repeatedly won elections and headed the Greek government, and since the beginning of the war, it can be said, was in chronic conflict with the royal house.

The situation in this Balkan kingdom was significantly complicated at times by the vague and undeveloped policies of the countries of Accord. As the authors of the fundamental study "History of Diplomacy" noted in this regard, "endless delays in diplomatic negotiations between the Entente countries on the coordination of fronts contributed to the prolongation of the war. A number of inter-allied military meetings were held at the headquarters of the French Commander-in-chief in Chantilly during 1915-1916. Here, decisions were made on a simultaneous offensive in 1916 on all fronts against Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, these decisions were implemented late, unorganized and incomplete. Meanwhile, already in 1916, the Entente was not only numerically, but also technically stronger than Germany" ^{[9, p. 278]}. Later, such a consideration allowed former British Prime Minister Lloyd George to suggest in his memoirs that the Entente could have won the war as early as the end of 1916, or no later than 1917 ^{[9, p. 278]}.

In England and France, groups of "Westerners" arose, i.e. military and political figures who believed that the main one was the Western Front, and "Easterners" who believed that the main blow should be inflicted in the Middle East, primarily in the Balkans. And Russia had to pull back the Austro-German forces when the French and British were having a hard time on the Western Front. General Joffre, a staunch "Westerner" who became commander-in-chief of all French armies on December 2, 1915 ^{[10, l. 3]}, literally fought for every division being withdrawn from the Western Front ^{[9, p.278]}. Therefore, the operation launched by the Entente countries with the opening of the Thessaloniki (Macedonian Front) in the Balkans did not develop in the way their supporters in Greece thought about it.

At the very beginning of the war, Russian Foreign Minister S.D. Sazonov offered the allies to "reward" Greece, if it behaved correctly, by joining southern Albania to it ^{[9, p. 279]}. He "strongly advised" the Serbian and Greek governments to make concessions to Bulgaria and give it part of the Macedonian territories they captured during the Second Balkan War in order to prevent Bulgaria from entering the war on the side of the bloc of central powers (i.e. Germany and Austria-Hungary). But this, according to the researchers, only reinforced the Germanophile sentiments of the Greek royal house. And the supporters of the Entente, led by Venizelos, "were inclined to enter the war, but, of course, not in order to pay for it themselves by ceding Greek territory" ^{[9, p. 283]}.

Realizing that Bulgaria's entry into the war on the side of the Austro-German bloc would dramatically change the situation in the Balkans and could lead to serious consequences for Serbia, he again headed the government after the elections in August 1915. Venizelos told the Entente envoys that he was ready to fulfill Greece's allied obligations and provide assistance to Serbia in accordance with the treaty between these countries signed in 1913. But he asked the Entente to land troops in Thessaloniki, at least a 150-thousandth contingent ^{[9, p. 284]}. But the Allies landed in significantly fewer numbers than expected.  In the end, 80 thousand troops turned out to be in Thessaloniki. This, according to experts, allowed Bulgaria to launch military operations against Serbia in mid-October 1915 and, eventually, together with Austro-German troops, defeat the Serbian army.

As a result of the slowness and inconsistency of the Entente's actions, not only Serbia was lost, but also a territorial connection between Germany and Turkey was established ^{[9, p.285]}. The Entente troops were forced to retreat in a number of sections of the Thessaloniki front and tried to strengthen themselves in the area of Thessaloniki. As evidenced by the correspondence of Swedish diplomats with the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom, "it is clear from the latest news that the French and British troops are retreating under the energetic onslaught of the enemy. The Western powers, apparently, now intend to limit themselves only to the solid occupation of Thessaloniki and methodical defense, waiting for better times until the fragments of the Serbian army are reorganized. They hope no more, no less, than to paralyze the enemy troops and make them understand that the fate of Serbia and the Balkan states has not yet been decided in the desired sense for them" ^{[10, l.4]}. 

At this time, serious internal events are beginning to unfold in Greece. On August 30, an uprising began under the leadership of officers who were supporters of Venizelos, who was forced to resign at the end of 1915. E. Venizelos himself led an uprising on his native island of Crete. Similar uprisings began on other Greek islands. All of them were directed against the policy of King Constantine and his supporters ^{[11, pp. 145-146]}.

The special services of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander intercepted a report from the head of the Swedish mission in Constantinople, K. Ankarswerd, addressed to the Swedish envoy in St. Petersburg, General Birdstrom. A copy of the transcript of the text was sent by Acting Chief of Staff General P.I. Averyanov to Comrade Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Neratov. The report covered the situation in Greece during the events described above. The author of the report emphasizes that the information contained in it was obtained from a certain "Greek-Ottoman source" ^{[10, l. 36]}.

Considering the anti-government uprisings that have begun in Greece, Ankarswerd suggests that it may be "the falling away from official Greece of Crete and the Greek islands that saves Hellenism." In other words, the independence of Greece as a state. In his opinion, the goal of the "Venizelos revolutionary movement" is "to cause Greece's intervention in the war at the last minute and prevent the country from suffering extreme humiliation and missing the opportunity to receive any benefits after the war." The diplomat emphasizes that Greece cannot go against the powers of Consent. She cannot remain "passive". He believes it is erroneous to consider Venizelos' movement directed solely against the personality of the king. We are talking about resistance to the policy that the king defends "with incredible tenacity," although it does not meet "the Greek national interests and the undoubted majority of the desires of the people, has, indeed, a very small number of supporters, with the exception of personally loyal circles to the king." In confirmation of this, Ankarswerd notes that even the king's aide-de-camp, Admiral Kondouriotis, joined Venizelos ^{[10, l. 36]}.

It should be noted that the Swedish diplomat has a mature understanding of the current situation and all the circumstances, external and internal, around the situation in Greece. It is clear that he is aware that the Entente is winning, and Greek society, for the most part, wants this victory.

As for the opinion of the powers of Consent on the Greek events, according to Ankarswerd, they probably would not so much like Greece to enter the war on their side, as they would like to "get guarantees" that the Greek troops "will not attack the troops of Consent from the rear" ^{[10, l. 36]}.

The author of the report believes that the king will have a choice: either "submit to the movement started by Venizelos, or abdicate the throne. In the first case, his position, for a man of character, would be almost unbearable, and the popularity he gained after the Balkan war is replaced by a completely opposite attitude" ^{[10, l. 37]}. In conclusion, he cites the following information: "In Sofia, they think, as far as I know, that the Greek king will join, perhaps, with part of his army (about 60,000 people) to the central powers and lead an offensive against Thessaloniki or against the Italians in Albania" ^{[10, l. 37]}.

But the situation unfolded according to a different scenario. In early November 1916 Venizelos announced the creation of an interim government, first in Crete, and then in Thessaloniki. On November 23, this government declared war on Bulgaria and Germany. In December 1916, France and Britain recognized the Venizelos government. Armed detachments of Venizelos supporters became part of the forces of the Allied Salonika Front. The Entente countries organized a blockade of continental Greece, forcing King Constantine to flee the country ^{[11, p. 146]}. Greece ended the war being among the victors.

The considered report, together with other information, provides a comprehensive picture of events in Greece for the Swedish government in order to take any measures and take the necessary position from the point of view of the country's interests. This report was also important for our military and diplomatic authorities to understand the reaction of the Swedes to the events in Greece, to see their objective assessment of the outcome of this situation, and of the entire war as a whole. The information received gave Russian diplomacy the opportunity to use it in its relations with partners and to have an idea of the prospects for the development of the situation in the Balkans.