On the question of the dialectic of scientific knowledge in Russian philosophy: the problem of the relationship between reflection and rationality

Sverguzov Anver Tyafikovich ORCID: 0000-0002-1040-3044 PhD in Philosophy Associate professor, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Kazan National Research Technological University 68 K.Marx Street, Kazan, 420015, Russia, Republic of Tatarstan atsverguzov@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The work is a continuation of the previous publication ^[1], in which modern research on the problem of scientific reflection was considered in a dialectical context. It was about the context set by the internal contradiction of reflection, expressed by the interrelation of the semantic and semantic functions of reflection. In this paper, it is also proposed to consider modern studies of the problem in a dialectical context. In the context set by the external contradiction of reflection, expressed by the interrelation of scientific reflection and scientific rationality.

In the history of philosophy, there are different interpretations of the concept of "reflection". The fundamental differences are expressed in Hegel's philosophy and dialectical materialism. The analyzed problem lies in the plane of confrontation of dialectical methodologies expressed by these approaches. In this study, the problem is considered in a dialectical-materialistic sense. Hegel limits reflection to the sphere of self-contained thinking. The source of the development of thinking is in thinking itself. Reflection, as an element of the Hegelian dialectical method, characterizes the relationship of concepts as a form of their reflection in each other. From the point of view of this approach, the relationship between reflection and rationality lies in the sphere of "pure" thinking. In dialectical materialism, thinking is considered more broadly as practically oriented thinking. The source of the development of thinking is not only in thinking, but also in practice. Reflection is carried out on thinking reflecting reality. Here rationality characterizes the reflection of reality in thinking. Therefore, the relationship between reflection and rationality goes beyond "pure" thinking. It is in this, and not in the Hegelian sense, that the concept of "external contradiction" is used in relation to the relationship between reflection and rationality.

In the previous work, the results of studying the problem of reflection, obtained within the framework of Russian philosophy of the Soviet and modern periods of its development, were compared. In fact, it was about the confrontation between Soviet and Western traditions. It was stated that the Soviet concept remained out of the field of view of modern researchers. Their attention turned out to be shifted to the problems proposed by the Western, positivist tradition. V.A. Bazhanov, one of the main Soviet researchers of the problem of reflection, characterizes the attitude to Soviet results as "uninteresting" ^{[2, pp. 31-32]}.

Note that Soviet studies of reflection go beyond the time frame of the existence of the USSR [for example: 3]. A feature of the results of the Soviet concept is the identification of two aspects of scientific reflection. Namely, the dialectic of scientific reflection is characterized by a two-level structure. The main interrelated sides of scientific reflection are external and internal. The external side is characterized by the dialectic of relations between scientific reflection and scientific rationality. The inner side is the dialectic of the relations of the sense–setting and sense-revealing functions of reflection.

It should be emphasized that the dialectical nature of reflection means that the separation of these opposites from each other leads to a distorted understanding of the opposites themselves. This can be expressed, for example, by ignoring both the phenomenon of reflection and the phenomenon of rationality in science. The history of Western philosophy of science directly demonstrates this. "From the point of view of the dialectic of reflexive and rational, one can consider neo-positivist and postpositivist concepts of science as emphasizing either the rational or the reflexive side of its development" ^{[3, p. 17]}. As you know, the main ideas of neo-positivism in Western philosophy were formulated within the framework of the activities of the Vienna Circle. He was characterized by the desire to absolutize the rational side of scientific knowledge, to identify a universal method of scientific knowledge, to limit reflection to the analysis of the language of science. But neo-positivism failed to derive the ideal of scientific rationality, the model of a "fully formalized theory" and, thus, get rid of the need for "meaningless" reflection on the foundations of scientific knowledge ^[4].

The main trend of postpositivism was expressed by critical rationalism. If neo-positivism focused on the rational side of scientific knowledge, then postpositivism focused on the reflexive side. If in neo-positivism the problem of scientific rationality was narrowed down to compliance with logical and methodological standards, then in postpositivism the problem of reflection was reduced to a critical moment: genuine rationality presupposes the ultimate critical and reflective position of the subject, "uncompromising criticism". The methodology of criticism led its representatives to abandon attempts to identify criteria for distinguishing between rational and irrational, scientific and unscientific ^[5].

The Western tradition in modern Russian philosophy can be expressed in different ways. For example, O.E. Stolyarova, in the interrelation of reflection and rationality, absolutizes the reflexive side of the development of science. And within the problem of reflection, he absolutizes the semantic function. E.G. Turkan analyzes the development of science only from the point of view of the phenomenon of rationality. "The second provision concerns the possibility of adopting "rationality" as a universal criterion of scientific progress. The doubt about the applicability of this criterion to the assessment of achievements of scientific knowledge in general is asserted and justified, at the same time, the application of this criterion to private sciences seems possible" ^{[6, p. 65]}.

Western studies of reflection in general, from the point of view of the dialectical-materialistic approach, did not go beyond the meaning-setting function, that is, beyond the traditional understanding of reflection. In Soviet philosophy, A.P. Ogurtsov argued about the need to overcome the traditional understanding of reflection, about the complementarity of the semantic and semantic-revealing works of consciousness ^{[7, p. 17]}. V.T. Salosin pointed to the "methodological function of science" ^{[8, pp. 71-72]}. V.A. Kinosian characterized this function with the term "methodological demarche of science" ^{[9, p. 38]}. In general, when analyzing this problem, Soviet researchers pointed to the principle of self-reflexivity of scientific knowledge. Reflection in the traditional sense, according to H. Kronblith, is second-order knowledge in relation to first-order knowledge, which, in turn, must also be confirmed by reflection, and so on ad infinitum, which serves as a source of total skepticism ^{[10, pp. 12-14]}. Ignoring the main, that is, the semantic function turns reflection, in Hegel's words, into a "bad infinity", i.e., having no rational limitations. It is not surprising that the results of the traditional analysis of the phenomenon of reflection, even according to Western estimates, turned out to be unsatisfactory, "the phenomenon has lost its radicalism and clear contours" ^{[11, p. 96]}. O.E. Stolyarova aptly characterized this situation as an "epistemological impasse" ^{[12, p. 82]}.

The position of O.E. Stolyarova turned out to be in the center of our attention, since it was around her position that the so-called "panel discussion" unfolded on the pages of the journal "Epistemology and Philosophy of Science" No. 4 for 2022. In our opinion, she is a vivid exponent of the traditional understanding of reflection in modern Russian philosophy.

If we talk about the internal contradiction of reflection, then O.E. Stolyarova's position is contradictory [read more: 1]. On the one hand, it seems to imply, if we speak in terms of a dialectical-materialistic approach, the interrelation of the meaning-setting and meaning-revealing functions of reflection: "... philosophical reflection, even directed at itself, cannot fail to take into account the results of empirical sciences" ^{[13, p. 50]}. "...Limiting philosophical reflection to the field of epistemology inevitably leads to skepticism. To avoid paralyzing skepticism, it must be assumed that philosophical reflection, along with the epistemological role, plays an equally important ontological role ... At the same time, it is not so much an epistemological justification as a genetic explanation of knowledge and reveals the involvement of the cognizing subject in the real world" ^{[12, p. 81]}. "All respected commentators, being philosophers, in one way or another expressed the general idea that philosophical reflection, even self-directed, should take into account the practices and results of empirical sciences" ^{[13, p. 54]}. But, on the other hand, it ultimately does not go beyond the traditional understanding of reflection, reducing it to a semantic function: "... behind every scientific fact there are prerequisites, or social factors hidden from "naive" scientists. But social factors are not just facts. It is a cultural, political, ideological, and communicative background that serves as a source of explanation for both facts and scientific theories summarizing facts" ^{[13, p. 52]}.

For her, the relationship of the sense-making and sense-expressing functions means duplication of functions, an unacceptable reduction of the sense-making function to the sense-expressing one. "Reflexivity does not duplicate the original, "naive" position to which it is directed and is not located inside it. She objectifies her subject, takes it, so to speak, in a ready-made form in order to "turn the stuffing back." An external position is a necessary prerequisite for a reflexive act, a source of explanatory power over a "naive" position" ^{[14, p. 27]}. From the point of view of V.A. Bazhanov ^{[2, pp. 32-33]} and V.N. Porus ^{[15, p. 44]}, O.E. Stolyarova's position ignores the principle of self-reflexivity of scientific knowledge.

The principle of self-reflexivity means that the semantic function is the main one for scientific knowledge. The function involves the isolation and reconstruction of the consciousness embedded in it from the actual scientific rationality. For O.E. Stolyarova, this is, in fact, not a full-fledged consciousness, but only a "naive", simple position. From the point of view of Soviet researchers, it should be directly about subjectivity, in the position of which the real subject of cognition should stand. This is subjectivity, the complete reconstruction of which is possible, in our opinion, only in the transition to a new rationality, when the embedded subject really takes, in the terminology of O.E. Stolyarova, an "external position" in relation to the former rationality. At the same time, the "external position" will have internal objective, and not subjective, in fact, externalistic grounds, as assumed by O.E. Stolyarova.

If we talk about the relationship between reflection and rationality in scientific knowledge, then its meaning lies in the transition to the reflexive plan of the rational form of the movement of scientific knowledge. "The rational in some situations ceases to be so in others. Scientific activity forms its own prerequisites and foundations in the course of its self-change, which are revealed and developed in the course of reflection" ^{[3, p. 13]}. At the same time, the rational stage of movement is the main one. "In the process of its development, science seems to "introduce" methodological ideas and problems of varying degrees of generality (including philosophical ones) into the scientific community" ^{[3, p. 5]}. A change of reflexive guidelines accompanies the real development of science, and not vice versa. "The specificity of the self-reflexivity of science lies not so much in the control of scientific consciousness over the formation of prerequisites for scientific knowledge (this is almost completely impossible), as in an objectively conditioned mechanism of self-regulation of scientific knowledge" ^{[3, pp. 12-13]}. "Reflection in violation of understanding acts as a constructive means of restoring the subject's involvement in the conceptual structures of knowledge" ^{[3, p. 13]}.

Soviet research suggests the existence of a "consciousness" in science, directly woven into the fabric of scientific knowledge. "It makes sense to consider (in addition to the subject actually acting in science) subjectivity, constituted by the norms and principles of scientific rationality. At the same time, the essence of reflection of a real subject lies in the actualization of a cognitive position, subjectivity, responsible for the target orientation of the real movement of scientific knowledge. In the course of reflection, penetration into the internal structure of scientific activity and identification of its target orientation is carried out. The real subject of cognition, regardless of the socio-cultural realities and attitudes of his own consciousness, when changing the historical type of scientific rationality, is forced to take the position of a new subjectivity (which is a continuation and completion of the studied objectivity). Thus, rational cognition is provided by the transition to the plan of reflection and the general purpose of reflection is to isolate from the real process of scientific cognition such a set of structures (entities), by working with which, through their fully conscious reconstruction, development, an understanding of the rational in science is achieved" ^{[3, pp. 20-21]}. "... The essence of reflexive activity lies in the actualization of the foundations of scientific rationality" ^{[3, p. 6]}. V.N. Dukhanin claims about the existence of the function of scientific reflection, which consists in penetrating into the internal structure of scientific activity and identifying its target orientation ^{[16, pp. 115-116, 119]}. E.A. Alekseeva says that reflection "requires reconstruction of the directly existing, "actual" consciousness" ^{[17, p. 91]}. V.V. Ilyin speaks about the "constituted by the norms of scientific cognition of the mind" ^{[18, p. 110]}.

From the point of view of the dialectical-materialistic approach, in the most general form, the source of knowledge is practice. Here is the main contradiction between the subject and the object, the need to resolve which generates the very need for cognition. The conditioning of consciousness by a person's practical attitude to the world leads to the fact that consciousness changes if this practical attitude changes. In scientific knowledge, the subject is forced to reckon with the object, to adapt his goals to it. A radical change in activity can objectively change the content of the rational, and after it, the reflexive sphere. There is a leap towards qualitatively new theories suggesting a different type of rationality and reflection. From this point of view, for example, the scientific revolution at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries occurred not only as a change in the type of rationality, but also as a change in the reflexive guidelines of scientific knowledge.

It cannot be said that scientific consciousness is able to fully control the initial prerequisites for the formation of scientific knowledge. The presence of a scientific method does not guarantee the planned result, since the method must be formed in accordance with the qualitative originality of the subject. The development and substantiation of scientific knowledge is a single process. Fundamental theories cannot be classified as programmed. Therefore, they cause revolutionary upheavals in scientific consciousness. For example, quantum mechanics was created under the pressure of an array of experimental data and contrary to the methodological (reflexive) attitudes of the previous physical picture of the world. Therefore, when we say, for example, that "the revolutionary scientific discoveries of the late XIX – early XX centuries and the further development of science and technology led to a crisis of rationality and a revision of its boundaries" ^{[19, p. 271]}, then we should add "to the crisis of reflection corresponding to this rationality."

To substantiate this approach, it is necessary to turn to the practice of education of fundamental scientific theories. An illustrative example is the history of the creation of quantum mechanics, which lies at the foundation of modern physics. In a non-relativistic form, it was created for almost thirty years from the idea of quanta by M. Planck in 1900 to the formulation of the uncertainty principle by Heisenberg in 1927. History shows that quantum mechanics was supposed to be a temporary theory, which was to be replaced by previous classical concepts. Among the opponents of quantum mechanical concepts was, for example, A. Einstein, who received the Nobel Prize for his results in the field of quantum mechanics. He formulated his reflexive "external position" in a philosophically figurative way: "God doesn't play dice." However, the further development of science did not accept this position. Nor did it accept his position on general relativity when he tried to deduce a stationary model of the universe from it.

O.E. Stolyarova distorts the understanding of rationality, closes it on herself, introduces the concept of a "vicious circle of rationality", the exit from which is carried out only thanks to the "external position" of the subject of reflection. "The article discusses the problem of circular proof, which arises in the philosophical discussion of rationality, its ideals and standards. When trying to define what rationality is, we are forced to refer to its ideals and criteria, the rationality of which must be established in advance through rational procedures. This situation is characterized as an epistemic circle of the instrument and the result and is compared with the situation of regression of the experimenter. The experimenter's regression is a circular reasoning in which it is possible to judge the correctness of the scientific results obtained only on the basis of the correctness of the procedure for obtaining them, and it is impossible to judge the correctness of the procedure for obtaining them without reference to the results obtained. Thus, supporters of the objectivity of the result obtained and their opponents have no reason to make a reasonable choice from the alternatives presented. The epistemological problematization of the experimenter's regression indirectly problematizes the theory of rationality, since science and the criteria of rational choice adopted in it act as standards of rationality in itself. It is shown that the epistemological justification for overcoming the experimenter's regression is carried out by referring to "external factors" that are rationalized by the epistemologist" ^{[19, p. 141]}. In our opinion, there is no "closed rationality". Rationality is always incomplete and explicitly going beyond the "circle" is carried out by the real development of scientific knowledge in the transition to a new type of rationality.

O.E. Stolyarova distorts the understanding of scientific rationality, denying the relationship between the various stages of its development. Rationality in relation to the previous stage of the development of science is interpreted as "alternative rationality". Accordingly, it also distorts the understanding of scientific reflection, limiting it to the framework of this rationality. "The fact is that a contradiction was originally included in the structure of scientific rationality. Having declared itself as a new method of cognition, for which experience is the only absolute authority, science rejected the previous cognitive tradition as speculative and authoritarian and established a new space of truth. In this space, the truth was not set a priori; it was revealed (or created) in the process of systematic assimilation of experimental data by empirical subjects and in the course of free discussion, which was supposed to lead to a reasonable agreement. However, the accepted "rules of the game" significantly limited freedom. Attention to the oppositional point of view was recognized as meaningful only if this point of view was formulated in terms of a new cognitive paradigm. In other words, the truth was constructed a posteriori, but only in predetermined (a priori) conditions and in no other way. Being an alternative rationality in relation to the previous tradition, science relied on critical thinking and alternative points of view, but at the same time excluded any cognitive alternative that went beyond the new model of scientific knowledge" ^{[20, p. 269]}.

As we can see, O.E. Stolyarova denies the ability of scientific reflection, built into the framework of scientific rationality, to go beyond this framework. To do this, reflection supposedly should not rely on rationality. "At the same time, critical thinking embedded in scientific rationality, which once provided science with a victory over the authoritarianism of tradition, has the opportunity to act as an opponent in relation to science itself. The power of critical thinking lies in its reflexive ability to take an external position in relation to itself as its object and thereby eliminate the monopoly on truth. This is exactly what happens in the times of late modernity and postmodernity, when scientific rationality becomes the object of critical thinking" ^{[20, p. 269]}. As we have already said, the "external position" is carried out objectively, explicitly during the transition to a new stage of scientific rationality. Reflection naturally takes an "external position" in relation to previous rationality. As for this rationality, the reflection built into it, in our opinion, always has the signs of an "external position", since no rationality is complete and must be actualized by reflection.

O.E. Stolyarova believes that reflection built into rationality ("naturalization of reflection") It is not a reflection, since genuine reflection is the justification of knowledge. "Naturalization of reflection involves translating it into terms of actually existing, that is, observable, physical processes. It is shown that with this approach, the specificity of reflection as second-order knowledge is erased. Knowledge of the second order, translated into terms of observation, has no qualitative difference from knowledge of the first order and does not carry any normative burden" ^{[21, p. 54]}. From our point of view, the essence of "naturalized" reflection does not change, since the real subject carries out reflection even from the position of built-in subjectivity. O.E. Stolyarova interprets this position as primitive, "naive", as taking on faith ready-made knowledge. "Thus, reflection is the opposite of naivety – taking on faith other people's beliefs or directly experiencing certain impressions" ^{[21, p. 58]}. We repeat, there is no "ready knowledge", there is no rationality, since completed knowledge must be created, reconstructed through reflective, critical work.

O.E. Stolyarova, in the relationship between reflection and rationality, distorts the role of reflection, since it reduces it to a semantic function. Recall that from her point of view, the prerequisites of scientific knowledge are in the external socio-cultural context of science: "... behind every scientific fact there are prerequisites, or social factors, hidden from "naive" scientists. But social factors are not bare facts. It is a cultural, political, ideological, and communicative background that serves as a source of explanation for both facts and scientific theories summarizing facts" ^{[13, p. 52]}. "...Naive and reflexive modes cannot coincide with each other. In the naive mode, we cannot know the context that generates our knowledge, but in the reflexive mode, this unarticulated context becomes the subject of attention and is articulated" ^{[21, p. 64]}. Thus, it turns out that scientific knowledge is a product of reflection. "If reflection articulates contexts, or reveals the assumptions of a particular knowledge that it is trying to understand and explain, then for it these contexts, these assumptions are well-founded in advance. They are justified insofar as they explain and describe the existing (explicable) knowledge, which by the very fact of its existence confirms the existence of the conditions generating it (if there is an effect, then there is a cause)" ^{[21, p. 64]}. "If we fix the consequence – knowledge of the first order, then its cause exists and is revealed by knowledge of the second order. If we are talking about the causes, then we are dealing with the ontological work of reflection" ^{[21, p. 66]}. As we can see, from her point of view, "ontological work" is not a product of the rational movement of scientific knowledge itself, but a product of reflection external to science.

Moreover, O.E. Stolyarova believes that the explanation of knowledge by reflection lies beyond the criteria of truth-falsity. "Starting from the undoubted fact of knowledge, transcendental reflection moves towards its foundations, which act as a source of explanation of knowledge" ^{[21, p. 65]}. "But the criteria of truth or falsity are not applicable to the sources of explanation, or the generating conditions of knowledge. Generating conditions perform an explanatory function. They are neither true nor false. They exist insofar as there is knowledge that they explain (as there are grammatical rules due to the fact that there is a natural language described by them)" ^{[21, p. 65]}.

It is not surprising that in modern pro-Western philosophy there is a certain equalization of myth with science. "However, archetypes – despite the fact that they refer to principles, patterns, integrals and timeless ideals – demonstrate amazing flexibility in relation to radically new changes in human existence, breaking the boundaries of the possible. The eternal images of mythological thinking carry boundless ambiguity and variability of their manifestations. They include in their semantic field the dynamics of historical events, unpredictability and randomness, novelty and spontaneity" ^{[22, p. 272]}. From our point of view, firstly, as we have already said, not every reflection is accepted by science. Secondly, science itself becomes more "fantastic" with development, more complex and richer in meanings than any myth.

As for the criticism of O.E. Stolyarova's position, we see it in modern Russian philosophy from the side, for example, of the "interval approach". Thus, V.A. Bazhanov does not agree that in a "naive position", i.e., within the existing rationality, it is impossible to carry out full-fledged reflection. "Olga Evgenievna draws attention to the fact, related to the strong program in STS, that her followers could not distance themselves from the subject of their study and take an out-of-position attitude to it, i.e. this judgment should be understood so that they remained "inside" their program and could not exercise genuine reflexivity, reach an external position. In this regard, important developments can also be found in Russian philosophy. I am referring primarily to the interval approach (M.M. Novoselov, F.V. Lazarev), which provides a clear distinction between intra- and non-interval situations operating, generally speaking, with abstractions with different resolving properties and therefore allowing analyzing subject areas from "external positions" and carrying out full-fledged reflection with some advance with a given "epistemological accuracy" ^{[2, p. 35]}.

Note that the interval approach has roots in Soviet philosophy, as indicated by its developers E.B. Agoshkova and M.M. Novoselov. "It seems that over the past half century, through the efforts of interval analysis, the apparatus of abstractions has received a more complete (than before) theoretical formulation" ^{[23, p. 51]}.

The concept of "abstraction interval" is central to the approach. "The key in this methodological trend was the concept of the abstraction interval as an expression of the semantic completeness of concepts and their simultaneous "closure within boundaries"" ^{[23, p. 46]}. During the transition from the old theory to the new one, or from the old rationality to the new one, the interval of abstractions serving as means of reflexive analysis changes. "The development of the theory and its extension to a wider subject area means that when building a new theory, we consider a different range of conditions and, accordingly, we get a different range of the content of theoretical laws. The principle of conformity as a methodological principle of science just means that a return to the previous interval of conditions will lead to the previous interval of the content of the theory" ^{[23, p. 56]}. As we can see, here, in fact, we are talking about the relationship between the various stages of the rational movement of scientific knowledge, and the types of reflection corresponding to them.

In our opinion, the interval approach confirms the dialectic of the relationship between reflection and rationality in scientific knowledge. Within its framework, the interrelation of all elements of the cognitive process is confirmed. "At the same time, the question arose of itself about the completeness of the coverage of methods and criteria of all acts of the cognitive process. The search for white spots in the epistemology and methodology of science has once again become an urgent task. The result was the creation of two fundamental directions in methodology – a systematic approach to the objects of knowledge and an interval approach to the acquired knowledge" ^{[23, p. 45]}. Based on the analysis of physical theories, E.B. Agoshkova and M.M. Novoselov draw a conclusion opposite to that of O.E. Stolyarova. "As for the physical theories themselves, their formal structure (mathematical physics) is less significant for our purposes than their substantive side (theoretical physics), which opens up space for philosophical analysis with utmost clarity, which leads us to the conclusion that the boundaries of knowledge are born not outside, but inside the structure of the theory" ^{[23, p. 48]}.

In the previous article ^[1], we concluded that it is productive to resume dialectical research on the problem of reflection. In Soviet philosophy, the dialectical essence of scientific reflection was shown, its objective significance in the mechanism of functioning of scientific knowledge. And the task of that article was to show an analysis of the problem of scientific reflection in modern Russian philosophy from the point of view of dialectics. In conclusion, it was said about the possibility of continuing the study in order to show, from the point of view of dialectics, a modern analysis of the problem of the relationship between reflection and rationality. In this paper, we have tried to accomplish this task. The research was conducted on the basis of the results of dialectical studies of the problem of reflection in the domestic philosophy of the Soviet period. In the end, it is possible to strengthen the previous conclusion by stating the need to resume dialectical research in Russian philosophy not only on the problems of philosophy of science.