The problem of countering political extremism in the Russian Federation in the early 1990s.

Volgin Evgeny Igorevich ORCID: 0000-0002-9690-448X PhD in Politics Associate Professor, Department of the History of Social Movements and Political Parties, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27/4, office 415 plytony@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The collapse of the USSR marked the collapse of the former state order. The former Soviet republics faced such destructive phenomena that seemed simply unthinkable in the conditions of the former socialist way of life. Russia was no exception, where the costs of the transition period were much more acute than in other CIS countries. The loss of "historical" territories and the increasing ferment in the national republics, the war in Chechnya and the growth of ethnic crime, a sharp change in the socio-economic system, which had a high social price – all these factors contributed to the formation of political associations, the participants of which openly expressed aggressive hostility to the changes taking place in the country. Unlike systemic parties that relied on legitimate ways to change the crisis situation, these organizations preferred radical statements and actions, which were often characterized as extremist. In this case, extremism is understood as the ideology and practice of resolving socio-economic, political, national, and religious problems through violent actions or the threat of their use emanating from public associations or individual citizens.

The purpose of this article is to use various materials (normative legal acts and draft laws, periodicals, statistical data, as well as available research literature) on the basis of a comprehensive use of various materials to identify the main problems and contradictions of the state anti-extremist policy in the Russian Federation in the first post-Soviet years. This is necessary in order to answer the question of why this activity was largely formal in a certain period. The acquired knowledge will make it possible to better understand the changes that have occurred in the understanding of political extremism at the state and legal level in the "zero" years. For the most complete disclosure of the problem posed, problem-chronological, formal-legal, institutional and systemic approaches were used. The scientific novelty of the study lies in an attempt to comprehend the state legal policy aimed at countering political extremism as a kind of holistic and, at the same time, extremely contradictory and discrete strategy, which was implemented in a crisis situation in a country literally on the verge.

Attempts to improve the criminal legislation of the RSFSR – RF

in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Despite the fact that the concept of "extremism" was practically absent in Russian legislation until 2002, some experts believe that Soviet criminal law contained a number of particularly dangerous state crimes that can be attributed to a well-known type of crime. The Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1960 (The Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Approved by the Supreme Council on October 27, 1960. Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. 1960. No. 40. Article 591) classified such acts as conspiracy to seize power (in Article 64), terrorist act (Article 66), sabotage (Article 68), sabotage (Article 69), anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Article 70), propaganda of war (Article 71) and some other crimes. However, not all of the above articles have been applied in practice.

In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR dated April 8, 1989, Article 70 of the Criminal Code was named "Calls for the overthrow or change of the Soviet state and social system" (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR dated April 8, 1989 "On amendments and additions to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of the RSFSR" // Library of normative legal acts of the USSR [electronic resource] URL: https://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/usr_15550.htm , accessed: 04/26/2023). Later, the Criminal Code was supplemented with Article 70.1 "Calls to commit crimes against the state." In addition, Article 74.1 "Insulting or discrediting state bodies and public organizations" appeared (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of September 11, 1989 "On Amendments to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of April 8, 1989 "On Amendments and Additions to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of the RSFSR" and its statement in the new edition" // Library of normative legal acts of the USSR [electronic resource] URL: https://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/usr_15877.htm , accessed: 04/26/2023). These adjustments were caused by the time requirement. In early 1989, elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR were held, which were accompanied by the activation of anti-Soviet forces, and in some places there were calls to "hang communists" (Materials of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, April 25, 1989, M., 1998. p. 56).

The amendment of Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR in March 1990 laid the legal foundations for the formation of a multiparty system ^{[1, pp. 90-106]}. There was a need to adopt a law that regulated the activities of political associations and, at the same time, set obstacles in the way of extremist groups. On October 9, 1990, the USSR Law "On Public Associations" was adopted (the USSR Law of October 9, 1990 "On Public Associations" // Kontur Normativ [electronic resource] URL: https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=1136 , date of appeal: 04/25/2023), which prohibited the creation and activity of organizations with the aim or method of action of overthrowing, forcibly changing the constitutional building or violating the unity of the territory of the USSR, the Union and autonomous republics, propaganda of war, violence and cruelty, inciting social (class), as well as racial, national and religious discord. The creation of public paramilitary associations and armed formations was prohibited.

A serious disadvantage of this law was the uncertainty of legal sanctions against associations that did not register their charter (the law established a voluntary procedure for registering charters). At the same time, this law has become an important stage in the development of legislation on socio-political associations. The Russian Federation, which had not had a republican law on political parties for a long time, was guided by this legal act until mid-1995. At the same time, Russian parliamentarians quite quickly adopted a Law on the Media, which did not allow abuse of freedom of the media, including for the purpose of spreading extremist ideas (the Law of the RSFSR of December 27, 1991 "On mass media" // Vedomosti RF. 1992. No. 7. St. 300). Whether the "free" Russian press complied with these requirements in the 1990s is a separate question.

The collapse of the USSR did not bring pacification to the Russian political process. Representatives of the executive and legislative authorities could not come to a consensus on further reform of the Russian state. During the deepening confrontation, each side tried to protect itself as much as possible from the "extremist" attacks of the opponent. Thus, the Law of the Russian Federation of October 9, 1992, "On the protection of Constitutional authorities" (the Law of the Russian Federation of October 9, 1992 "On the protection of Constitutional authorities" // Vedomosti RF. 1992. No. 44. St. 2470), adopted at the request of the Congress, did not allow the dissolution of legitimate (Soviet) institutions. The law introduced a new wording of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: "Calls for a violent change in the constitutional order." At the same time, the Criminal Code was supplemented by Article 79.1 "Obstruction of the activities of constitutional authorities." 

As a retaliatory measure, on October 28, 1992, Boris Yeltsin signed a Decree "On measures to protect the constitutional system of the Russian Federation" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 28, 1992 "On measures to protect the constitutional system of the Russian Federation" // Vedomosti RF. 1992. No. 44. St. 2518). This document ordered the executive authorities to take the strictest measures aimed at suppressing the activities of extremist elements (the President used the term "extremism" at the official level for the first time). However, the Constitutional Court ruled that the mention of "extremism" in the absence of an officially fixed legal definition of this term may create legal ambiguity in the implementation of this decree. As a result, the Constitutional Court recognized the concept of "extremist elements" as having no legal significance (Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dated February 12, 1993 "In the case of checking the constitutionality of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated October 28, 1992 No. 1308 "On measures to protect the Constitutional system of the Russian Federation". SAPP RF. 1993. No. 9. St. 825) ^{[2, pp. 62-65]}.

The amendments introduced to the Constitution of the Russian Federation on December 10, 1992 (Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Federation (as amended on December 10, 1992) became a kind of generalization of the norms and rules adopted in order to impede the activities of extremist formations // Docs.cntd.ru [electronic resource] URL: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901700028 , accessed: 04/27/2023). The creation and activity of parties, public organizations and movements aimed at forcibly changing the constitutional order and violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining the security of the state, creating illegal authorities and armed formations, inciting social, national and religious discord, including propaganda of exclusivity and any forms of discrimination based on ethnic, national, racial, religious affiliation, were not allowed. The researchers, comparing these constitutional provisions with the norms of the USSR Law "On Public Associations", drew attention to the following points. Firstly, such a detailed diversification of public associations seemed stylistically superfluous. Secondly, the Basic Law mentioned only the illegal goals that the radicals could set for themselves, but did not say anything about the methods of their direct implementation. Finally, the Constitution did not prohibit the creation of paramilitary groups ^{[2, pp. 25-26]}.

October 1993: Extremism of the government or extremism of the opposition?

The October 1993 events were the result of irresponsible actions by the president and parliament, when each participant in the conflict, claiming the truth and infallibility of his actions, defended his own (at the same time, very subjective) vision of the future of Russia. Deputies, controlling the legislative process, repeatedly introduced beneficial amendments to the "soft" Constitution, often neglecting the regulations. The President, "striving to eliminate the political obstacle that prevents the people from deciding their own fate" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated September 21, 1993 "On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation" // Yeltsin Center [electronic resource]: https://yeltsin.ru/archive/act/41068 , date of appeal: 30.04.2023), eliminated the constitutional system itself.

Noteworthy is the tactics of the President, who, in order to ensure state and public security, again (as in August 1991) had to resort to restricting the activities of individual political associations. On October 4, 1993, Boris Yeltsin signed a Decree "On urgent measures to ensure the state of emergency in Moscow" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated October 4, 1993 "On urgent measures to ensure the state of emergency in Moscow" // SAPP RF. 1993. No. 40. St. 3751), According to which, the Ministry of Justice, on the recommendation of the commandant of the state of emergency area, was instructed to suspend the activities of public associations that took part in mass riots and other illegal actions, as well as to resolve the issue of liquidation of these organizations in accordance with the procedure established by law. On the same day, police Lieutenant General A. Kulikov, appointed commandant of the Moscow state of emergency area, suspended the activities of sixteen organizations. However, due to the fact that the police authorities were poorly versed in the intricacies of Russian party genesis, errors were present in the names of individual institutions ^[3].

On October 4, 1993, the Ministry of Justice issued an order suspending the activities of eight socio-political associations. The Department for Public and Religious Associations of the Ministry of Justice was instructed to consider the possibility of liquidating these organizations in accordance with the established procedure. (Decree of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation dated October 4, 1993 "On the suspension of the activities of certain public associations in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated October 4, 1993 "On urgent measures to ensure the state of emergency in Moscow" // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 1993. October 6).

The researchers note that the list of the Ministry of Justice looked more correct (both by the names of parties and movements, and in fact) than the list of A. Kulikov. At the same time, no further attempts were made to liquidate these structures in court, and the temporary ban on their activities expired with the end of the period of the state of emergency (October 18) ^[3].

 However, on October 19, 1993, the President issued a decree (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated October 19, 1993 "On certain measures to ensure state and public security during the 1993 election campaign" // SAPP RF. 1993. No. 43. St. 4080), in accordance with which he deprived six associations mentioned at the disposal of the Ministry of Justice, the right to participate in elections to the Duma. Electoral associations (blocs) that included the formations mentioned in the decree were not subject to registration. Persons who were charged in connection with the "armed rebellion" on October 3-4, 1993 could not be registered as candidates for deputies. Experts noted the illegal nature of the President's actions that did not follow from the Law of the Russian Federation "On the State of Emergency" ^{[2, p. 36]}. For his part, we note that Yeltsin in October 1993 (as in August 1991) relied on the right of the winner, which allowed him to ignore the current legislation.      

The problem of countering nationalism in the criminal legislation of the RSFSR

A specific form of extremism is nationalism and xenophobia. This problem was especially relevant in Russia, where most radical organizations professed militant nationalism. Without going into the history of the evolution of criminal law norms that were relied upon for this crime in the post-revolutionary, interwar and post-war period, we note that in 1960 the new Criminal Code of the RSFSR came into force, which contained Article 74 ("Violation of national and racial equality"), which provided punishment for both propaganda and agitation, which was conducted for the purpose of inciting racial or national hostility or discord, as well as for directly or indirectly restricting the rights or establishing direct or indirect advantages of citizens depending on their race or nationality. The undoubted advantage of this disposition was the absence in its formulation of a mention of the premeditation of such actions, which took place in the USSR Law of December 25, 1958 "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes" (USSR Law of December 25, 1958 "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes" // Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1958. No. 1. Article 8). Nevertheless, in the Soviet years, Article 74 referred to the inactive. Propaganda declared the "final solution" of the national question in the USSR, and therefore the authorities tried in every possible way to hide the presence of nationalist motives in violent crime ^{[4, pp. 74-75]}.

The interethnic conflicts that broke out during the years of "perestroika" on the territory of the Union republics demanded tougher responsibility for crimes committed on the basis of national enmity and hatred. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR dated April 8, 1989, Article 74 was amended, which were ambivalent in nature

(Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR dated April 8, 1989 "On amendments and additions to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of the RSFSR" // Library of normative legal acts of the USSR [electronic resource] URL: https://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/usr_15550.htm , accessed: 04/29/2023). Firstly, criminal liability was established precisely for deliberate actions "aimed at humiliating national honor and dignity." Secondly, qualifying (aggravating) signs of this crime were introduced, which allowed us to conclude that the legislator had increased responsibility for the acts in question. However, according to legal scholars, responsibility for the main corpus delicti provided for in Article 74 was adjusted precisely in the direction of mitigation ^{[5, p. 654] [6, p. 31]}.

Nevertheless, even in the last years of the USSR, when a wave of ethnic violence swept over some Union republics, the number of sentences under this article remained insignificant. So, for almost thirty years (from 1962 to the first half of 1991), the all-Union judicial practice counted only 109 cases of conviction under the article on violation of national equality. Of these, 50 cases (45%) occurred in the period from 1987 to the first half of 1991. In Russia, during all this time, only 9 sentences were handed down under Article 74, and only one of them occurred during the years of "perestroika" ^{[7, pp. 139-140]}.

Updating legislation on countering radical terrorism

nationalism and law enforcement practice (1993 – 1995)

Notable adjustments aimed at countering nationalism were introduced into the criminal law by the Supreme Council shortly before its dissolution. On August 27, 1993, Article 74 was called "Violation of the equality of citizens on the basis of race, nationality or attitude to religion" (the Law of the Russian Federation of August 27, 1993 "On Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR and the Code of the RSFSR on Administrative Offenses // Vedomosti of the Russian Federation. 1993. No. 37. St. 1466). Intentional actions aimed at inciting national, racial or religious hostility or discord, at humiliating national honor and dignity, propaganda of exclusivity or inferiority of citizens on the basis of their attitude to religion, nationality or race were criminalized. Thus, the objective corpus delicti was expanded in the form of "propaganda of exclusivity or inferiority of citizens on the basis of their attitude to religion, nationality or race." The researchers emphasized the importance of this disposition, since any chauvinistic propaganda defends the superiority of "their own" at the expense of the inferiority of "others" ^{[2, p. 28] [5, p. 654]}.

Nevertheless, in the first post-Soviet years, criminal cases initiated under Article 74 continued to stall. If earlier this norm was not applied for ideological reasons, now it did not work because of an unsuccessful formulation. Firstly, only intentional acts committed with the aim of inciting national enmity or discord were recognized as criminally punishable acts. Such a disposition became a serious stumbling block in the course of court proceedings, since the accused "tightly" denied malicious intent, and therefore the defense based on this thesis seemed quite strong. Secondly, the objective side of the crime did not even contain an approximate list of criminally punishable actions "aimed at inciting hostility or discord." In the absence of clear criteria, the composition of the crime looked extremely vague, which allowed law enforcement officers to apply a selective approach, bringing to justice both for open calls for violence motivated by national enmity and hatred, and for "everyday nationalism". According to O. Shmunevsky, investigator of the Timiryazev interdistrict Prosecutor's office in Moscow: "The whole thing is that murders ... are easier to investigate... And over the "seventy“fourth" you can break your head. Prosecutors are in no hurry to send such cases to court, where everything ends ... with an acquittal" // (Vyzhutovich V. Justification of scoundrels // Izvestia. 1994. August 2; Chelnokov A. "Kind, lovely people in ties" // Izvestia. 1995. March 15) ^{[8, p. 41; 4, pp. 76-78, 81-82] [9, p. 344]}.

Indeed, from mid-1991 to mid-1993 (i.e., in almost two years) there was not a single case of conviction under Article 74. As of February 1993, the prosecutor's office opened 18 criminal cases in Russia on the grounds provided for in Article 74, but none of them reached court. In 1994, 15 criminal cases were opened under this article, but there were no convicts. In 1995, 15 cases of this category were sent to the court and only two convictions were achieved (while both defendants were amnestied in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory) (Materials of the parliamentary hearings "On the prevention of manifestations of fascist danger in the Russian Federation". M., 1995. p. 81), ^{[7, c. 139] [10]}.

In law enforcement agencies, such cases were called "rotten" and even "anti-patriotic" (Khudokormov A. Will Russia be a fascist state? // News. 1994. August 18). Taking into account this circumstance, the lawyers themselves sometimes insisted that their clients be charged with this particular, albeit serious, but completely "non-working" article. Seeing a clear dissonance between the reality, which was literally flooded with radical publications and parties, and the lack of proper reaction from law enforcement agencies, some publicists and human rights activists argued that Russian security forces intentionally "condone fascists" (Proshechkin E. Fascists are calm so far // Moscow News. 1994. May 5-12; Chelnokov A. Nazis killed people // News. 1994. September 9th).

Representatives of the Prosecutor's Office (as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSK – FSB), in turn, referred to the imperfection of legislation, which made it impossible to apply effective measures against fascist elements. Often, law enforcement officers simply shifted responsibility to each other (Orlyuk S. It is not the prosecutor's business to look for those responsible on the barricades of the civil war // Novaya Daily Gazeta. 1994. January 15; Vyzhutovich V. Justification of scoundrels // Izvestia. 1994. August 2) ^{[11, p. 36]}. On the other hand, researchers point to the absence of any data confirming deliberate connivance (and, moreover, sympathy) for extremism on the part of law enforcement agencies ^[3]. Speaking about the "inaction" of law enforcement agencies in relation to open Nazis, it should be remembered in what a difficult situation the law enforcement system of the Russian Federation was in the 1990s. Constant underfunding, outflow of qualified personnel, poor material and technical base and, most importantly, the crime wave that swept the country during this period - all these factors did not allow law enforcement officers to deal closely with extremists, whose "symbolic" offenses against the background of the "great criminal revolution" raging in Russia did not seem so significant. The current situation was very accurately noticed by the metropolitan prosecutor G. Ponamarev: "Dozens of murders are committed in the city every day, and we are dealing with barkashovites" (Orlyuk S. It is not the prosecutor's business to look for those responsible on the barricades of the civil war // Novaya Daily Gazeta. 1994. January 15).

On the other hand, the same Barkashovites and other nationalists were prosecuted when they committed serious criminal offenses (murders, robberies, etc.). However, the investigation, in order not to burden "understandable" criminal cases with "politics", often refused to take into account the Nazi beliefs of ethno-radicals as the direct motive for their crimes. And the leadership of the party structures, even the most odious, did not welcome the illegal actions of its members. Whenever the same Barkashovites turned out to be involved in high-profile criminal cases, the "associates" promptly disowned them (E. Solomenko From politics to criminality // Izvestia. 1994. March 18; Chelnokov A. "Kind, lovely people in ties" // Izvestia. 1995. March 15; Arkhipov I. Went to the deputies, got into prison // General weekly newspaper. 1994. March 4-16) ^{[12, c. 8-9, 11-12, 14, 17, 74] [3]}.

Presidential power as a factor in countering the fascist danger

In conditions of insufficiently effective work of law enforcement agencies, the presidential power, which was repeatedly strengthened during the constitutional reform, could become a consolidating force in the fight against political extremism. The "presidential" Constitution prohibited the creation and activity of public associations whose goals and actions were aimed at forcibly changing the foundations of the constitutional system, violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining state security, creating armed formations, as well as inciting social, racial, national and religious discord (Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 // Website "Constitution of Russia. All editions" [electronic resource] // URL: https://konstitucija.ru/1993/1 /, accessed: 1.05.2023).

At the same time, the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory was approaching. In this regard, the open sale of Nazi literature near Red Square, as well as the presence of "blackshirts" freely walking around the center of Moscow, could bring a clear dissonance to the celebrations. It was necessary to take temporary, but at least some measures. On March 23, 1995, the President signed a Decree "On measures to ensure coordinated actions of public authorities in the fight against manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism in the Russian Federation" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated March 23, 1995 "On measures to ensure coordinated actions of public authorities in the fight against manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism in the Russian Federation RF" // NW RF. 1995. No. 13. St. 1127). This normative act introduced into circulation two well-known, but relatively new concepts for domestic legislation: "fascism" and "extremism". As for the latter, it was Yeltsin's second (since 1992) attempt to establish this term in legal practice. Despite the fact that now no one tried to challenge the constitutionality of the decree in court, fixing such ambiguous terms at the state legal level without attempting to disclose them could hardly help law enforcement officers in the fight against fascism and extremism. "What is to be guided by – Dahl's dictionary?", Deputy Prosecutor General A. Rozanov wondered (Yamshanov B. Where is the prosecutor's office looking?  // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 1999. February 2).

The decree provoked only a short-term response from law enforcement agencies and special services. In fact, it all came down to an "anti-fascist" campaign dedicated to the celebration of the anniversary of the Victory. The reason for this, in addition to the traditional bureaucratic inertia, the workload of investigative bodies with "real" criminal cases and the lack of consistency in the actions of the main fighters against fascism, was that soon after the decree was published, the heads of the main law enforcement agencies were replaced: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and the Prosecutor General's Office. And the liberal press was wary of the President's initiative. Others suspected Yeltsin of a clumsy attempt to distract public attention from the war in Chechnya (Timofeeva L. Scarecrow, do I know you? // An independent newspaper. 1995. March 1) ^{[9, p. 341] [13]}.

Another obstacle that prevented the presidential government from advancing its legislative initiatives was Boris Yeltsin's strained relations with the new Duma. On June 7, 1995, the President introduced a bill to the lower house, which proposed to supplement the current Criminal Code with new elements of crimes, including: propaganda of fascism and the organization of fascist associations. The presidential bill was sent to the Chairman of the State Duma I. Rybkin with a request to consider it as a matter of priority. However, these initiatives were "stuck" in the Committee on Legislation and were not considered by the lower house (Amelina A. How the State Duma fought fascism // Russian Agency for Legal and Judicial Information [electronic resource] URL: https://rapsinews.ru/legislation_publication/20160616/276307343.html , date of the request: 2.05.2023).

The First Duma and the problem of adopting anti-extremist legislation

After the election of the new parliament, work on the law on the prohibition of extremist organizations was supposed to move to the State Duma. Indeed, the First Duma often talked about the growth of political extremism and the threat of the spread of fascism. However, this rhetoric has been used by various politicians mainly against their opponents. So, the liberals called the communists and Zhirinovites "fascists", and those, in turn, accused the "Gaidarites" of fascism. As for specific legislative initiatives, the deputies of the First Duma were extremely cautious on a well-known issue, because they understood that any anti-extremist act could be directed against the party and political opposition, i.e. themselves. Therefore, parliamentarians preferred to make point-by-point changes to the current legislation, reacting to the unstable domestic political situation (for example, correcting articles of the Criminal Code that provided for responsibility for terrorism or for participation in illegal armed formations) (Federal Law of July 1, 1994 "On Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR" // Kontur Normativ [electronic resource] URL: https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=5137 , date of appeal: 05/3/2023; Federal Law of April 28, 1995 "On Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR" // SZ RF. 1995. No. 18. art. 1595) ^{[2, p. 39]}.

As for the fight against political extremism, the First Duma, which consisted of communists, agrarians and Zhirinovites by a third, did not show much activity on this issue. The new Law "On Public Associations" (Federal Law of May 19, 1995 "On Public Associations" // Federal Law of the Russian Federation. 1995. No. 21. St. 1930), developed by the Committee on Public Associations and Religious Organizations, in terms of provisions prohibiting the creation and activity of extremist organizations, fully reproduced the relevant article of the Constitution. The only thing is that the responsibility of unregistered public associations was fixed here better than in a similar union act (this was important, since most radical groups operated without registration).

In addition, according to the new law, the name and symbols of a public association should not offend morality, as well as national and religious feelings of citizens. According to experts, these restrictions sounded vague and could hardly be consistently applied in courts. The situation was somewhat clarified by the Federal Law of May 19, 1995 "On Perpetuating the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War", which prohibited the use of Nazi symbols "in any form". However, this act did not provide for legal liability for the use of such paraphernalia (Federal Law of May 19, 1995 "On Perpetuating the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" // SZ RF. 1995. No. 21. St. 1928).

The deputies of the Moscow City Duma seemed much more productive and consistent, who on May 24, 1995 unanimously approved as a legislative initiative the draft law "On the prohibition of the activities of extremist public associations in Russia." The author and developer was the deputy of the Moscow State Duma, chairman of the Moscow Anti-fascist Center E. Proshechkin (Enikolopov S. Political color blindness // Moscow news. 1995. June 4-11).

On July 5, 1995, this document, as well as draft laws "On the prohibition of propaganda of fascism in the Russian Federation" (V. Zorkaltsev, KPRF) and "On responsibility for the spread of fascist ideology, political practice and organizational activities of fascist organizations" (V. Zhuravlev, LDPR) were submitted to the plenary session of the State Duma (State Duma. Verbatim report of July 5, 1995 // State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation [electronic resource] URL: http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/3036 /, accessed: 05/15/2023).

Without going into the details of the above-mentioned bills, we note that each of them had its drawbacks. Thus, V. Zorkaltsev's version did not provide for criminal liability for propaganda of fascism, which was punishable only by a fine or administrative arrest (Materials of the parliamentary hearings "On the prevention of manifestations of fascist danger in the Russian Federation". pp. 87-89) ^{[2, pp. 98-101]}. V. Zhuravlev's bill, on the contrary, assumed criminal punishment, but for unfounded accusations of fascism by any organization or citizen (obviously, a member of the LDPR faction was trying to discourage some "democrats" from calling their "party boss" a fascist). E. Proshechkin's law, in view of the prospect of an expansive interpretation of its individual articles, could be used to prosecute not only radicals, but also representatives of the left opposition.

As a result, all three options were rejected. The First Duma did not return to this issue until the end of its work. Nevertheless, the contradictory results of the 1995 parliamentary elections, when, despite the total defeat of all radical parties (with the exception of the LDPR) and their nominees in single-mandate districts, about 16% (or 11.6 million voters) expressed support for associations and candidates who openly declared their "irreconcilable" position on a number of key issues of internal (national) and foreign policy (Polivanov S. Fascism has not passed // Moscow news. 1996. March 3-10), (Politics // [electronic resource] URL: http://www.politika.su/fs/gd2rezv.html , date of appeal: 05/24/2023), dictated the need to continue working on anti-extremist legislation.  

Conclusion

So, the problem of countering political extremism has become extremely relevant in the "late" USSR and post-Soviet Russia. During the collapse of the Union state, various destructive (national separatist) forces escalated, which the decentralized law enforcement system of the USSR, deprived (after the prohibition of the CPSU) of a unified party and political leadership, could no longer resist. On the other hand, it was during this period that a well-known deideologization of articles of criminal law took place. In this regard, Soviet criminal law took a big step forward, which testified to the real democratization of the former state-legal (in fact, authoritarian) model.

The collapse of the USSR did not bring pacification to the Russian political process. On the contrary, after the fall of communism, Russia entered a period of instability caused by a deep socio-economic and constitutional-political crisis. At the same time, despite the widespread use of the term "extremism" in the political lexicon, it never found an appropriate legal basis in those years. This made the fight against manifestations of political, national or religious intolerance as specific types of crimes somewhat difficult. Although the Russian legislator during the "August republic" subjected the relevant articles of the Criminal Code to a certain updating, which, however, did not always seem successful.

During the confrontation between the executive (presidential) and legislative branches, each side considered itself the "true power" (i.e. the most legitimate), and therefore tried to declare the actions of the opponent and his allies illegal, i.e. extremist. The president, who emerged victorious from this battle, could not only stigmatize the "red-brown" opposition, but also had the opportunity to establish constitutional and legal restrictions on public (including party and political) activities. It must be said that the "presidential" Constitution of 1993, combined with the new Federal Law "On Public Associations" of 1995, contained an exhaustive list of unacceptable political, national or religious activism. In this regard, it can be assumed that there was no special need for the additional adoption of some special "anti-extremist" ("anti-fascist") law.

Nevertheless, despite legal restrictions, dozens of radical (pro-fascist) associations operated freely in the country, as well as Nazi literature was published and openly distributed. Law enforcement agencies, responding to accusations of inaction, coming mostly from representatives of the liberal public, referred to the absence of such concepts as "extremism" and "fascism" in Russian legislation. However, in our opinion, such answers were nothing more than excuses, whereas the roots of the problem lay much deeper.

Firstly, the crisis state of the Russian law enforcement system played a role, the main institutions of which (the Prosecutor General's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Security Service – FSB) were in a state of constant reform and frequent leadership changes. At a time when the "authorities" did not have enough funds and resources to fight the "great criminal revolution" that swept the country, thugs with swastikas (but did not violate public order), as well as traders of Mein Kampf and other Nazi paraphernalia, even if not far from the Kremlin, although they spoiled the capital "the landscape," however, did not pose, in the opinion of law enforcement officers, a real danger.

Secondly, various political groups and their leaders were usually behind criminal charges of inciting the same national hatred. These high-profile cases attracted media attention. In this regard, investigators and prosecutors, accustomed to dealing with "ordinary criminality", least of all wanted to participate in "politics", at the risk of being accused of restricting the constitutional rights of citizens. Therefore, law enforcement officers tried to transfer such high-profile cases to various kinds of expertise, as a result of which they successfully fell apart. Thirdly, it can be cautiously assumed that against the background of rampant ethnic crime and the war in Chechnya, many law enforcement officers could surreptitiously support individual slogans relayed by nationalist parties (it was not for nothing that the same Barkashovites loved to talk about their connections in law enforcement agencies).

Finally, the legislation on public associations itself, which established restrictions on the activities of radical formations, was extremely unsatisfactorily observed in Russia in the 1990s (however, like many other laws). The Ministry of Justice, designed to monitor the activities of various parties and movements for compliance with their statutory provisions, remained the weakest link in the executive branch in the early 1990s. The functions of the Ministry of Justice were mainly limited to the registration of public associations. If we consider that many radicals acted without registration or were registered at the regional level, then they completely fell out of the field of view of the federal department, whose regional departments, given the well-known decentralization of the Russian Federation in those years, practically did not obey the "head office".

The above-mentioned factors created a demand in public opinion for the development of additional "anti-extremist" legislation. The President and deputies of the First Duma made their proposals. However, legislative activity inevitably turned into a hostage to the political struggle that was waged both between the executive and legislative authorities, as well as between parliamentary factions. For it was impossible to imagine that the President, on the one hand, as well as the Communists, Zhirinovites and liberals, on the other, could come to a consensus in those years on such extremely controversial concepts as "political extremism" or "fascism". All this extremely confused the legislative process, effectively leading it to a dead end in the mid-1990s. The current situation was exploited by various kinds of radicals, who continued their illegal activities unhindered.