Library
|
Your profile |
History magazine - researches
Reference:
Kaleda G.K.
"Rasputin the traitor": the formation of an image in 1914-1916
// History magazine - researches.
2024. ¹ 2.
P. 132-144.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2024.2.69949 EDN: MGRHGK URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=69949
"Rasputin the traitor": the formation of an image in 1914-1916
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2024.2.69949EDN: MGRHGKReceived: 24-02-2024Published: 10-04-2024Abstract: The author of the article studies the process of forming the image of "Rasputin the traitor" during the First World War. The negative image of Grigory Efimovich began to form long before 1914. He was multifaceted: at first, Rasputin's detractors considered him a religious conman who posed as a "man of God", then he was accused of interfering in the management of the Church, as well as influencing the personnel policy of the supreme power. From the moment of the first failures at the front, an image of a traitor who acts in the interests of Germany began to form in relation to Rasputin. The mechanism for popularizing this image was rumors, newspaper publications and public speeches by deputies of the State Duma. The culprit behind the formation of the image of a traitor in relation to Rasputin was largely himself. On the eve of the Great War, the "Elder" Grigory spoke out several times in communication with the press against Russia's participation in the Balkan wars and the conduct of hostilities as such. This research is based on the principle of historicism, the study of written historical sources: office records, press materials, sources of personal origin. In the spring of 1915, the "Sacred unity" proclaimed by the Duma opposition at the very beginning of the war was replaced by "patriotic anxiety", the public began to look for internal enemies, and espionage began. At the same time, Rasputin attracted attention by staging a drunken brawl in a Moscow restaurant. This was the reason for attacks on Grigory Efimovich and accusing him of pandering to the Germans. It is important to note that Rasputin's accusations of betrayal were unfounded, no evidence was presented. The image of "Rasputin the traitor" began to be used by the Duma opposition, which fought for the Ministry of Public Trust. Everyone knew that Rasputin was a friend of the royal family, so the tsar and the tsarina indirectly became the object of criticism. The purpose of using the image of "Rasputin the traitor" was an attempt to influence the adoption of state decisions by the emperor and the government. Keywords: Grigory Rasputin, image, World War I, State Duma, espionage, traitor, dark forces, press, rumours, foreign policyThis article is automatically translated. The image of Grigory Efimovich Rasputin began to form in 1910, when publications with an unambiguously negative assessment of his personality first appeared in the press. Over the next few years, Rasputin's image developed, and more and more new features appeared. The stages of promoting the image of the "elder" Gregory are associated with various socio-political events and scandals, to which he had a direct or indirect relationship. Rumors, newspaper publications and public speeches by deputies of the State Duma contributed to the formation of Rasputin's negative reputation. Initially, Rasputin had an image of a sectarian, a whip who pretends to be an elder, a "man of God", but in fact leads a sinful lifestyle. Then a new feature appeared in the image of Grigory Efimovich: he was accused of interfering in the affairs of the Church, that he allegedly influenced the appointment of bishops. During the First World War, ministers objectionable to the opposition began to compromise their ties with Rasputin. They were accused that they owed their appointment to the "elder" Gregory. However, Rasputin's detractors went further. During the Great War, he was suspected of treason. This paper will analyze the reasons for the formation of the image of "Rasputin the traitor", the mechanism of its promotion and how this image was used to fight against the supreme power. The prerequisites for the formation of the image of "Rasputin the traitor" appeared a little earlier than 1914. The first Balkan War, which began in 1912, caused a great public outcry in Russia. Supporters of pan-Slavic ideas believed that the Russian government should help fraternal Orthodox peoples. However, there was another view on this problem: Russia should not take part in a military conflict. Rasputin also expressed his opinion about the fighting in the Balkans. On December 7, 1912, an interview with him was published in the Petersburg Gazette. When asked by a journalist whether Russia would have to get involved in the war, Grigory Efimovich replied: "Lord save and have mercy on us from this. God grant that Russia may escape this scourge. Every war, even a successful one, is fatal for the cause of love and peace, for the grace of God" [1, p. 192]. Thus, Rasputin publicly expressed his opinion on Russia's foreign policy for the first time. The conflict in the Balkans was the topic of newspaper publications throughout 1913. Grigory Efimovich, in several more conversations with journalists, acted as a principled opponent of the war [2, p. 2. 3, p. 377]. Thus, we can say that Rasputin had a clearly formulated position that Russia should not take part in the war on the Balkan Peninsula. Moreover, he spoke out in principle against the conduct of hostilities as such. It can be argued that Rasputin independently began to form his image as an opponent of the war. Rasputin's repeated speeches on the topic of foreign policy provoked a violent reaction in conservative circles of society. In early 1914, an article by P. N. Durnovo, a member of the State Council and leader of the right, appeared in the magazine "Responses to Life", published by the Moscow preacher priest Vostokov, an opponent of the "elder". He wrote that Rasputin "during the liberation war of the Balkan Christians in 1912 with Turkey, he spoke not for Christ, but for the false prophet Magomed." The author characterized the "elder" as a revolutionary who wants to belittle the prestige of the Russian state, calling on its leadership "to betray their kindred brothers to the Turks and Swabians" [3, p. 378]. We see that with his public statements Grigory Efimovich has created another conflict situation around his person. Rumors spread in society that Russia had never entered the war in the Balkans due to Rasputin's influence on the tsar. The Russian representative in France, A. P. Izvolsky, wrote in his memoirs that former Prime Minister S. Y. Witte told him that the main ideologue of the policy of non-interference in the military conflict was precisely the "elder" [5, p. 95]. Just a few months before the outbreak of the First World War, at the end of May 1914, Rasputin again publicly spoke about Russia's foreign policy. When asked by a journalist from the newspaper Novoye Vremya about S. Y. Witte's words in the press about Rasputin's anti-war position, which was shared by the former prime minister himself, the "elder" replied: "National dignity must be respected, but it is not appropriate to rattle weapons" [6, p. 284]. It can be concluded that Rasputin had a reputation for pacifist views even before the outbreak of the First World War. The public a priori perceived such a position of the "elder" critically, because a negative attitude had already been formed towards Rasputin. Grigory Efimovich was accused of touching on issues to which he had nothing to do. Moreover, it was known that he communicates with people from the highest echelons of power, which means that he can influence the formation of the country's foreign policy. The beginning of the First World War was accompanied by a rise in patriotic sentiments. The public fully supported the tsar and the government in their efforts to achieve an unconditional victory over the enemy. The atmosphere of "Sacred Unity" was also marked by such negative phenomena as the growth of xenophobia and chauvinism, and the manifestation of hatred towards Germans. In addition, it was assumed that the war would last a short time. However, public expectations were not met. The death of Samsonov's army in East Prussia, as well as the cessation of the offensive in Galicia due to losses and lack of ammunition, became signs of a protracted military conflict. After the first failures at the front, there was a desire in society to find the culprits. At this point, rumors of betrayal begin to spread. The most hated people are associated with treason, one of whom was Rasputin. Gendarme General A. I. Spiridovich wrote that already in October 1914 rumors began to spread in Petrograd that Rasputin was playing into the hands of the Germans [7, p. 31]. In the spring of 1915, the problems with the supply of the Russian army worsened. The patriotic euphoria from the start of the war is over. Against this background, the myth of the German party is gradually emerging in the public consciousness – a group of people who act in the interests of Germany, preventing Russia from achieving victory in the war. The French Ambassador to Russia, M. Palaiologos, reflected the patriotic anxiety of representatives of the liberal public in his diary [10, p. 76]. The failures of the Russian army at the front also made the opposition public doubt that the government was capable of winning the war. Thus, we can talk about the emergence of two factors that, in the opinion of the public, prevented Russia from achieving victory in the war – these are the activities of traitors, German agents in Russian society, as well as the professional incompetence of the government. Against the background of negative news from the front and an alarming atmosphere in society, on March 26, 1915, a scandal involving Rasputin occurred in Moscow. Grigory Efimovich staged a drunken brawl in the Yar restaurant. According to the commander of a Separate corps of gendarmes, General V. F. Dzhunkovsky, Rasputin's similar behavior was considered by society as "an open, demonstrative speech by the German party, which feels powerful support for itself" [4, p. 563]. Rasputin's prank caused outrage among many people. Moscow priest I. I. Rapture wrote a letter to his ruling bishop, Metropolitan Macarius. The clergyman believed that Rasputin discredited the government by his behavior, which means he was playing into the hands of the Germans, and was an "evil traitor to the Fatherland" [4, p. 631]. The defiant behavior of the "elder" became an additional factor that contributed to the growth of hatred towards the Germans. At the end of May 1915, a German pogrom occurred in Moscow. One of the reasons for this tragic event was the inaction of the authorities, who failed to curb public sentiment. It is worth noting that the government itself fueled them to some extent, for example, by supporting the renaming of toponyms that were of German origin. In connection with the Moscow German pogrom, Gen. In early summer, Dzhunkovsky made a presentation at an audience with the emperor. He told Nicholas II about Rasputin's adventures in Moscow, expressing the assumption that Grigory Efimovich could be "an object used by enemies of the state for the destruction of Russia and the dynasty" [4, p. 570]. From that moment on, the emperor knew that the opinion that Rasputin was an agent of the Germans and that his presence at court was dangerous during the war was shared not only by the opposition public, but also by a representative of the highest bureaucracy. The convocation of the State Duma in the summer of 1915 brought the discussion about the traitor Germans in Russian society to an official level. Deputy A. N. Khvostov, on behalf of the right faction, made a speech from the rostrum of the State Duma on the need to combat German dominance at the state level [11, stb. 360]. Khvostov said that the government should respond to this problem, because people are starting to lynch Germans, which, according to the deputy, is an absolutely unacceptable phenomenon. In addition, Khvostov complained that the government was indifferent to the problem of German dominance in Russia, so the Duma should deal with this issue [11, stb. 374]. The deputy also stated the fact that there are rumors of betrayal among the people, and that the government is corrupt with German money. In this case, we were talking about German capital, which worked, among other things, in the defense industry. On August 17, 1915, an article was published in the newspaper Vechernoye Vremya, from which the reader learned that Rasputin not only enjoys the patronage of the German party, but also propagandizes in the highest circles of society the need to conclude peace with the Germans. Based on this, the author of the article wrote that it is necessary to end the influence of the "elder" [12, p. 3]. Thus, for the first time, Rasputin was publicly accused of treason against Russia's national interests. Conversations in the Duma about German dominance, publications in the press contributed to the spread of rumors about Rasputin's betrayal. Tikhomirov recorded in his diary at the end of August that society was talking about the help of the "elder" to the German emperor [13, p. 111]. After the unexpected dissolution of the Duma in early September, public discontent intensified due to disruptions in the supply of food to cities and rising prices. The atmosphere was filled with all sorts of rumors, including about treason [10, p. 156]. At this time, the right-wing deputy Khvostov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, who managed to earn a reputation as a Germanophobe. Speaking about his program in an interview with newspapers, the new minister highlighted two main points: the fight against high prices and German dominance. Subsequently, during the interrogation of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government, Khvostov told about the activities he had carried out as part of the fight against German domination. On behalf of the minister, Vasilchikova's maid of honor was arrested, who brought letters to Empress Alexandra Feodorovna from her German relatives [14, p. 60]. In addition, Khvostov tried to fight Rasputin, who, according to him, was a tool for espionage, because he was aware of everything that was happening in Tsarskoye Selo, and it was very easy for him to find out this information. The most important role of Khvostov in creating the image of "Rasputin the traitor" was noted by General Spiridovich. He wrote that Khvostov was the first to start spreading the information that the "elder" was a German spy. A conversation took place between them, in which the minister convinced the head of the Imperial palace guard that he had evidence of Rasputin's betrayal at his disposal. As it turned out later, there was no actual evidence of Rasputin's guilt, the minister relied solely on rumors [7, p. 48]. Information about Khvostov's activities against the "elder" spread quickly. Monarchist B. V. Nikolsky recorded in mid-February 1916 rumors that Khvostov was fighting Rasputin's influence, trying to prove to the tsar that Grigory Efimovich was an agent of Germany [15, p. 245]. It is worth noting that the environment of the "elder" played an important role in the formation of a stable idea that Rasputin is a spy. The troubles for Grigory Efimovich began with the case of Colonel S. N. Myasoedov, who was suspected of espionage. This man came under suspicion long before the outbreak of the First World War. Myasoedov was in close friendly relations with General V. A. Sukhomlinov, who provided protection to the colonel. In 1912, after the publication of a number of accusatory materials in the press, an investigation began against Myasoedov. However, it turned out that there was no actual evidence of the Colonel's guilt. This story chronologically coincided with the government's pressure on the press in connection with the campaign against Rasputin. Due to this, these personalities turned out to be connected in the public perception [16, p. 420]. In April 1915, Myasoedov was executed on charges of espionage. In fact, sufficient evidence of his guilt was not found again. However, the colonel's reputation played a role in the conditions of general espionage during the war [17, p. 115]. The Myasoedov case reflected on the image of not only the Minister of War Sukhomlinov, but also Rasputin, who were also suspected of involvement in treason. The Myasoedov case played a major role in the development of espionage and discrediting of the supreme power. M. Palaiologos wrote in his diary that the army was wary of meeting the emperor in the spring of 1915. The reason for this was rumors that the tsar's inner circle was involved in treason [2, p. 292]. First of all, it concerned the Minister of War. Despite his merits and professionalism, there was a steady negative attitude towards Sukhomlinov in society. The fact is that even before 1914, he was involved in several scandalous stories. In 1912, he was criticized by A. I. Guchkov. Chronologically, this coincided with the attacks of the leader of the Octobrists on Rasputin [18, p. 281]. After the outbreak of war, it was Sukhomlinov who was considered one of the main culprits of the catastrophic shortage of shells in the Russian army. The government met public opinion halfway, and in the early summer of 1915, the extremely unpopular Sukhomlinov was dismissed from the post of Minister of War. Less than a year later, in April 1916, the former minister was arrested on suspicion of corruption, criminal inaction and espionage. Despite being accused of such serious crimes, in October 1916, just before the opening of the Duma, he was transferred from prison to house arrest [19, p. 246]. This decision of the authorities was perceived as condescension to the traitor. For the public, this was another proof that there are people in the tsar's entourage who lobby for peace with the Germans [20, p. 543]. In 1916, an investigation was launched against a banker close to Rasputin, D. L. Rubinstein, who was suspected of espionage. This man was a millionaire, had a reputation as a conman who corrupts officials and influences the press. During the war, he carried out financial speculations with capital of German origin. A special commission of General N. S. Batyushin, who was engaged in counterintelligence, was created to investigate the banker's crimes [16, p. 304]. The Rubinstein case has attracted a lot of public attention. Protopresbyter Georgy Shavelsky wrote in his memoirs that in March 1916 he went to the front, where they only talked about the Rubinstein case. Everyone understood that the investigation would inevitably lead to Rasputin [21, p. 23]. Evidence of the banker's guilt was collected, but he was released from custody. This caused widespread outrage. The release of Rubinstein became the subject of discussion in the State Duma. Rubinstein was not the only representative of financial circles in Rasputin's entourage. I. P. Manus was also a major businessman who used his acquaintance with Rasputin for his own selfish interests. These wealthy people often visited the apartment of the "elder" on Gorokhovaya Street, gave him expensive gifts, donated large sums of money [22, p. 346]. The closeness with Rasputin was in the eyes of the public, on the one hand, additional proof that the capital of these people was earned dishonestly. Everyone was annoyed by such an uncompetitive advantage. On the other hand, Rasputin also suffered reputational damage from meeting people whom everyone considered scammers and scammers. This gave the public reason to think that the "elder" was involved in the criminal business of these entrepreneurs, that he lobbied for their interests in the highest echelons of power for money. General D. N. Dubensky recorded in his diary a conversation with an entrepreneur from financial circles, who told the general about the proximity of banker Manus to the Germans, from whom he received money. It was with these funds that Rasputin was allegedly kept [23, p. 391]. It is also worth mentioning I. F. Manasevich-Manuylov, who was a secret agent of the police department. Using his awareness, this man engaged in blackmail, extortion [16, p. 267]. Since 1906, he began working as a journalist. When Sturmer was appointed Prime Minister, Manuilov officially took over the position of his assistant. He was responsible for Rasputin's protection [14, p. 281]. In August 1916, Manuilov was arrested for extorting a large sum of money from a bank. However, he was soon released. This decision was made due to the influence of Rasputin [24, p. 89]. Rumors that Rasputin is a spy have also affected the army. In his memoirs, Fr. Georgy Shavelsky recorded an episode in early May 1916, General A. A. Gerngross, in the presence of the army commander, many officers and soldiers, ridiculed Rasputin. His joke was supported by all those present [21]. This indicated a lack of respect for the emperor, because everyone knew that the "elder" was a person close to the royal family. General A. A. Brusilov also shared the opinion about the negative impact of spreading rumors about Rasputin on the morale of the Russian army. He wrote that the officers constantly discussed the Empress, Rasputin, and his influence on the change of ministers. However, according to the general, the soldiers did not care much about these issues [25, p. 258]. General A. I. Denikin assessed the spread of rumors of betrayal in the Russian army differently. In his memoirs, he wrote that Rasputin's influence did not affect the state of the army due to the efforts of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Gen. M. V. Alekseev, who were both principled opponents of the arrival of the "elder" at the Headquarters. There were rumors of treason, but they related to Alexandra Feodorovna. It was said that the tsarina insisted on a separate peace with Germany [26, p. 17]. At the official level, Rasputin's accusations of betrayal were made on November 1, 1916. From the rostrum of the State Duma, Octobrist S. I. Shidlovsky accused the government of ignoring the joint demand of all deputies for the trial of former Minister of War Sukhomlinov. Some deputies supported Shidlovsky's words from the spot. Cadet V. A. Stepanov added: "Traitors cover for traitors." He was supported by a deputy from the labor faction A. S. Sukhanov: "Rasputin does not allow it" [27, stb. 10]. These words provoked a negative reaction from the chairman of the Duma, who called Sukhanov to order. We see another confirmation that the figure of Rasputin in the eyes of the public was associated with the influence on the course of the Sukhomlinov case. The leader of the labor faction, A. F. Kerensky, supported the criticism of the government. He stated that the ministers should resign because "they are traitors to the interests of the country" [27, stb. 33]. After these words, the chairman deprived Kerensky of the floor. This was already an open accusation against the government, violating state legislation. The most scandalous statements were made by P. N. Milyukov. He called the former Minister of War Sukhomlinov a traitor. In addition, Milyukov spoke about the statement of 28 chairmen of provincial administrations, which was made on October 29 in Moscow. This document spoke of "terrible suspicion, ominous rumors of betrayal and treason, about dark forces fighting in favor of Germany and seeking to prepare the ground for a shameful peace by destroying national unity and sowing discord, have now passed into a clear consciousness that the enemy's hand secretly influences the direction of our state affairs" [27, stb. 38]. Next, Milyukov began talking about an article from a German newspaper called "Manuilov, Rasputin, Sturmer." Milyukov spoke about Manasevich-Manuilov's ties with the German ambassador. Thus, the assistant to the current Prime Minister, who was previously arrested and accused of extortion, was also suspected of treason. Milyukov also mentioned the names of the book. Andronnikov and Mitr. Pitirim, which was written about in a German article. The leader of the Cadets drew the attention of deputies to the reaction of the German press, which welcomed the appointment of Sturmer instead of Sazonov to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs [27, stb. 40]. The speaker also touched upon the personality of A. D. Protopopov. Milyukov expressed suspicions that the minister might be connected with the enemy because of contracts with the German adviser in Stockholm. The leader of the Cadets said that his accusations against this group of people were also shared by the British ambassador [26, stb. 45]. Milyukov accused the government of unwillingness to continue the war. He saw this as the reason why the government was unwilling to meet the public halfway. According to Milyukov, the authorities prevented the organization of the country by the forces of the public, believing that this could lead to a revolution. Therefore, the government preferred chaos and disorganization. After that, the famous phrase sounded: "What is it: stupidity or treason?" [27, stb. 47]. Concluding his speech, Milyukov said that the opposition will fight the government to the end, because this is the only way to avoid concluding a separate peace and international shame for Russia. It should be noted that Milyukov did not hide his intentions to accuse not only Rasputin and people close to him from the highest echelons of power, but also Alexandra Feodorovna of involvement in the betrayal. He quoted a German newspaper in which there were words about the connection of the tsarina with the camarilla of traitors, in German, in order to avoid sanctions from the chairman and law enforcement agencies [28, p. 445]. The scandalous speech was not printed in the newspapers. Therefore, these essentially unfounded accusations were perceived by the public as the truth, because the ban on their publication showed the desire of the authorities to hide the true information. These actions contributed to the spread of the most incredible rumors about the content of the speech by Milyukov and other deputies. It should be noted that Milyukov's decision to accuse the authorities of betrayal was not spontaneous. The leader of the Cadets made a trip abroad a few months before the opening of the session of the State Duma, the main purpose of which was to collect information about contacts between Germans and Russians regarding the conclusion of a separate peace [28, p. 439]. In addition, Milyukov coordinated his speech with representatives of the allied states in Russia [27, p. 231]. Analyzing the diary of the French Ambassador M. Palaiologos, we can say with confidence that in Russia he not only supported the liberal opposition, but also fully shared its view of Rasputin's role at court. The British Ambassador J. Buchanan held the same opinion. He believed that Rasputin had no direct ties with the Germans, but his knowledge of state and military affairs was used by the "elder's" entourage, who transmitted this information to the enemy [29, p. 151]. On November 4, the Minister of War, General D. S. Shuvaev, visited the State Duma and made a speech in which he assured the deputies that the enemy was broken and the Russian army would definitely achieve victory. The opposition perceived this visit of the minister as an expression of solidarity of the armed forces with the deputies, as well as support for anti-government rhetoric. Newspapers began to circulate a rumor that the Minister of War approached Milyukov during a visit to the Duma and allegedly expressed gratitude for the speech he gave on November 1 [9, p. 3]. Milyukov's speech triggered another round of rumors about treason. Throughout November, Tikhomirov recorded in his diary several times the fact that rumors of betrayal were spreading. On the 12th, he recorded that the tsarina was allegedly in secret correspondence with the German Emperor Wilhelm, informing him about military affairs. As for the figure of Rasputin, there was even more talk about him [13, p. 304]. On November 19, Deputy Purishkevich spoke from the Duma rostrum. He talked for a long time about the pressing problems of the country, about the miscalculations of the authorities, about speculators who use wartime to profit dishonestly. According to the deputy, failures at the front and in the rear are associated with the influence of "dark forces", whose representatives are "people who are being discharged with German money, betraying Russia" [27, stb. 287]. Unlike Milyukov's scandalous speech, most of Purishkevich's speech had already been printed in newspapers. On November 21, Tikhomirov wrote that rumors continue to spread. According to him, the main reason for their occurrence was the speeches of deputies of the State Duma. It is worth noting that the rumors did not concern the sovereign, but Alexandra Feodorovna, who allegedly insisted on concluding a separate peace with Germany. She was supported by Rasputin and Mitr. Pitirim. Tikhomirov concluded that all unpopular personalities became involved in these rumors [11, p. 307]. The topic of searching for internal enemies became the main one and gradually acquired new details. On December 10, 1916, the French ambassador M. Palaiologos wrote in his diary that banker Manus is an agent of Germany, who ensures Rasputin's communication with the Germans, as well as initiates various intrigues in society. In addition, he is the main distributor of German subsidies [2, p. 648]. We see that Rasputin's entourage contributed to the fact that he was associated with the unclean money of an unscrupulous businessman. On December 16, 1916, the deputy of the State Duma, Cadet M. S. Ajemov, said during a speech that it was impossible to be a patriot while being part of the government. According to the deputy, Interior Minister Protopopov adhered to the Russian orientation when he was in opposition, but as soon as he became a member of the government, he was forced to change his views on the German orientation [27, stb. 1217]. Next, Ajemov touched on another figure hated by the opposition – Sukhomlinov. He said that newspapers were forbidden to write about this man, who was suspected of betrayal. Moreover, rumors are spreading about the termination of the investigation of the Sukhomlinov case. Ajemov said that this is not the only case of such a decision by the authorities. The deputy pointed to the case of the banker Rubinstein, who was arrested due to charges of espionage, but was soon released by special order [27, stb. 1218]. The deputy linked Rubinstein's release from custody to the influence of Rasputin, who received a bribe from the banker. Speaking about the cases of treason, Ajemov also said that the tsar was going to appoint the recently dismissed chairman of the Council of Ministers, B. V. Sturmer, to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This statement caused outrage among deputies [27, stb. 1219]. Thus, Deputy Ajemov accused the authorities of aiding traitors. He showed that Rasputin patronizes traitors whom law enforcement agencies are trying to bring to trial for espionage. It should be noted that Duma Chairman Rodzianko also shared the opinion that Rasputin was a spy. In communication with the CHSK investigators, Rodzianko expressed the belief that Rasputin acted in the interests of Berlin. The power of the "elder" was the ability to influence the Empress [30, p. 128]. Rodzianko admitted that he did not have reliable facts about Rasputin being a spy. His conviction of the treasonable activities of the "elder" was based solely on rumors. He said that he had received information that Rasputin was receiving money from abroad [23, p. 129]. In addition, he was surrounded by people who had connections with foreign countries. After analyzing the sources, it can be concluded that in 1916 the image of "Rasputin the traitor" was finally created. This was due to several reasons. Even before the First World War, Grigory Efimovich opposed war as a way to resolve international conflicts. In conversations with journalists, he condemned the Balkan states that launched a war against the Ottoman Empire. The results of the fighting during the Great War did not meet the expectations of society. People had to face all the hardships of a protracted war, for which Russia was not ready. The government did not take responsibility for the army's failures at the front, so the search for an internal enemy began. This manifested itself in an increase in hatred of the Germans and espionage. The public considered many unpopular people to be traitors, Rasputin became one of them. The image of the traitor initially began to form spontaneously, but then it began to be used by certain people as a tool to achieve their political goals. Interior Minister Khvostov played a crucial role. An additional factor was Rasputin's entourage, which had a bad reputation. The opposition skillfully used the image of "Rasputin the traitor" in the political struggle. The accusation of betrayal has become the most terrible for members of the government. The authorities did not find a way to respond to these accusations. The only solution was to ban the publication of parliamentary speeches in newspapers. However, on the contrary, this only contributed to the dissemination of even more unreliable information. The image of "Rasputin the traitor" was used by the opposition as the last tool to influence the government in order to achieve a responsible ministry, i.e., to expand its powers. References
1. Firsov, S. L. (2020). Grigory Rasputin: pro et contra, anthology. St. Petersburg, Russia.
2. Paleologue, M. (2003). The Ambassador's Diary. Moscow, Russia. 3. Varlamov, A.N. (2012). Grigory Rasputin-Novy. 4. Dzhunkovsky, V. F. (1997). Memoirs. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Russia. 5. Izvolsky, A. P. (1924). Memoirs. Petrograd – Moscow, Russia. 6. Radzinsky, E. S. (2000). Rasputin: Life and death. Moscow, Russia. 7. St. Petersburg newspaper. 1913. October 13 (26). No. 281. p. 2. 8. Gaida, F. A. (2003). Liberal opposition on the way to power: (1914 – spring 1917). Moscow, Russia. 9. The State Duma. Convocation IV. Session IV. Verbatim reports: At 3 p.m. 1: Meetings 1–16 (from July 19 to September 3, 1915). Petrograd., 1915. 1399 stb. 10. Evening time. 1915. August 17 (30). No. 1211. p. 3. 11. Tikhomirov, L. A. (2008). Diary. 1915-1917. Moscow, Russia. 12. The fall of the tsarist regime. Verbatim reports of interrogations and testimony given in 1917 in the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government. Vol. 1–7. Edited by P. E. Shchegolev. (1924–1927). Moscow - Leningrad, USSR. Vol. 1: Interrogations: A. N. Khvostov, E. K. Klimovich, A.D. Protopopov, S. S. Khabalov, A. T. Vasilyev, B. V. Shturmer, V. L. Burtseva, A. N. Naumova, book by M. M. Andronikov. (1926). 13. Spiridovich, A. I. (1960). The Great War and the February Revolution. 1914-1917. New York, USA. pp. 31-48. 14. Nikolsky, B. V. (2015). Diary. 1896-1918. In 2 vols. 2. St. Petersburg, Russia. 15. Tereshchuk, A.V. (2006). Grigory Rasputin: The last "elder" of the Empire. St. Petersburg, Russia. 16. Shatsillo, K. F. (1967). "The case" of Colonel Myasoedov. Questions of history, 2, 103-116. Retrieved from http://www.august-1914.ru/shacillo2.html 17. Shulgin, V. V. (1990). Years. Days. 1920. Moscow, Russia. 18. Fuller, U. (2009). The inner enemy: Espionage and the decline of Imperial Russia. Moscow, Russia. 19. Kolonitsky, B. I. (2014). "Tragic eroticism": Images of the Imperial family during the First World War. Moscow, Russia. 20. Shavelsky, G. I. (1954). Memoirs of the last protopresbyter of the Russian Army and Navy. New York, USA. In 2 vols. 1. 414 p. t. 2. 412 p. Retrieved from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shavelsky_gi/index.html 21. The fall of the tsarist regime. Verbatim reports of interrogations and testimony given in 1917 in the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government. Vol. 1–7. Edited by P. E. Shchegolev. (1924–1927). Moscow – Leningrad, USSR. Vol. 6: Interrogations and testimony: gr. P. N. Ignatiev, gr. S. I. Velepolsky, N. V. Plehve, A. N. Khvostov, A. A. Reinbot (Rezvogo), V. M. Volkonsky, I. N. Ladyzhensky, N. E. Markov, A. A. Neratov, A. N. Verevkin, A. I. Guchkov, P. N. Milyukov, D. N. Dubensky. (1926). 22. Bokhanov, A. N. (2015). Grigory Efimovich Rasputin is a New one. Myths and reality. Moscow, Russia. 23. Brusilov, A. A. (1963). Memoirs. Moscow, Russia. Retrieved from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/brusilov/14.html 24. Denikin, A. I. (1921). Essays on the Russian troubles. Paris, France. 25. The State Duma. Convocation IV. Session V. Verbatim reports: Sessions 1-19 [in one lane]. (1916). Petrograd, Russia. Stb. 10-1219. 26. Milyukov, P. N. (1990). Memoirs (1859-1917). In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Russia. 27. The fall of the tsarist regime. Verbatim reports of interrogations and testimony given in 1917 in the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government. Vol. 1–7. Edited by P. E. Shchegolev. (1924–1927). Moscow - Leningrad, USSR. Vol. 2: Interrogations: A.D. Protopopova, kn. M. M. Andronikov, A. T. Vasilyev, I. F. Manasevich-Manuilov, A. A. Makarov, K. D. Kafafova, M. A. Belyaeva, N. D. Golitsyn, N. A. Dobrovolsky, I. G. Shcheglovitova. 1925. 28. Buchanan, J. (1997). Memoirs of a diplomat. Grigory Rasputin: A collection of historical materials. In 4 vols. 2. Moscow, Russia. 29. Russian Vedomosti. (1916). November 8 (21). No. 258. p. 3. 30. The fall of the tsarist regime. Verbatim reports of interrogations and testimony given in 1917 in the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government. Vol. 1–7. Edited by P. E. Shchegolev. (1924–1927). Moscow - Leningrad, USSR. Vol. 7: Interrogations and testimony: A. I. Shingareva, N. N. Chaplin, F. A. Golovin, Gen. A. A. Polivanov, gr V. N. Kokovtsova, M. V. Rodzianko, N. B. Shcherbatov, A. R. Lednitsky, A.V. Lyadova, Gen. D. S. Shuvaeva. (1927).
Peer Review
Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
|