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Philosophical Thought
Reference:

The experimental method of G. Galileo in the context of the formation of the concept of the subject in the philosophy of the Modern Times

Samarin Andrei Sergeevich

Senior lecturer, Department of philosophy, Institute of Humanities, Siberian Federal University

82a Svobodny ave., office 428, Krasnoyarsk Territory, 660041, Russia

synthsas@gmail.com

DOI:

10.25136/2409-8728.2024.3.69885

EDN:

JRUTRY

Received:

17-02-2024


Published:

20-03-2024


Abstract: Understanding the subject is of constant interest in modern philosophy. Turning to the subject allows deepening the understanding of the nature of its activity, as well as the creative and transformative relationship of a person to the world. The emergence of the concept of the subject occurs in the Modern era and is associated with the development of the scientific method. Along with resolving the questions facing the epistemology of the Modern era, the subject-object relation arises as a specific way of solving the problem of intensive development of natural philosophy and mathematical disciplines. The research shows the interrelation between the method of intellectual experiment in the concept of G. Galileo and the development of understanding the subject in the Modern era, as well as its change in modern philosophy (20th-21st centuries). By examining the characteristic features and specific examples of the application of the method of intellectual experiment in the research, the degree of influence of G. Galileo on the development of science and philosophy of the Modern era is demonstrated. By using a comparative and analytical method, the interrelation of G. Galileo's intellectual experiment, understanding the subject in philosophy, and the ways of carrying out scientific activities is demonstrated. The content of the concept of the "subject" is expanded through the use of the phenomenological method, allowing to specify the boundaries of the subject's activity and the relationship between the subject and the object in the Modern era and in modern philosophy. The novelty of the research lies in the formulation of the question of the interrelation between G. Galileo's intellectual experiment and the methods of modern experimental sciences. The understanding of the subject as one of the basic categories of philosophy is clarified through the analysis of the ways of working with the subject-object relationship proposed in the philosophy of the Modern era. In particular, Galileo's way of dealing with the subject-object relationship implies taking into account the gap between the subject and the object as a special space, filling which through intellectual experiment, the researcher creates a model of experience relevant to the object of study and available for joint use with other researchers subsequently. The creation by G. Galileo of a model of experience in the process of intellectual experiment is reasoned as one of the basic methods of obtaining new knowledge in natural science disciplines in modern science.


Keywords:

thought experiment, understanding of the subject, subject, object, subject-object relation, Galileo, model of experience, natural philosophy, modern science, philosophy of subject

This article is automatically translated.

Introduction

The topic of our research is the formation of the concept of the subject in philosophy in connection with the development of the method of thought experiment by G. Galileo. The relevance of addressing the subject in the context of Galileo's discoveries lies in combining the idea of models of thought experiment with the understanding of the subject in modern philosophy. While reflection on the understanding of the nature of experiment in science has led to progress in the philosophy of science, understanding the structure of the subject's activity and building a model of this activity remain urgent tasks for modern knowledge [1, p. 97]. The analysis of the process of formation of the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy through the prism of the views of G. Galileo will clarify the content of the concept of the subject and deepen understanding of the principles of the evolution of ideas about the subject in philosophy.

In modern philosophy, a stable interest in the subject's problems is maintained. This is due to the nature of human activity in the form of activity. The ways of carrying out activities and realizing the potential of one's activity, which are explored within the framework of the concept of the subject in philosophy, allow us to better understand the nature of a constructive, creative human attitude to the world. The conditions of modern philosophy and the context of the era of postmodernism as moral, aesthetic and active relativism determine the relevance of the subject's research in the interests of clarifying the nature of his activity, self-determination and genesis. Inattention to reflection in the understanding of the subject leads to a deterioration in the self-determination of the subject as a carrier of activity, carrying out activities according to certain principles and rules.

The appeal to the philosophy of G. Galileo is relevant when considering the issue of the formation of natural sciences in Modern times. The development of the philosophy of Modern times and the scientific method in it is associated with various versions of the concept of experiment . The relationship between the understanding of the subject in modern philosophy and the development of scientific ideas about the experiment lies in the need to "verify" the activity of the subject through reflection on the consequences of this activity.

The concept of the Galileo thought experiment

The study of Galileo's concept should begin with his experiment with falling bodies. The fall of bodies in the mechanics preceding Galileo was considered according to the laws of Aristotle's physics, in which the dependence of the rate of fall of bodies on their mass was postulated. Explaining Galileo's disagreement with Aristotle's concept, V.M. Rozin writes: [Galileo] "Describes the free fall of bodies using a mathematical model. When his opponents show that this model does not describe all the observed cases of falling bodies, Galileo does not abandon his principles. He suggests taking into account the resistance of the medium and, most importantly, minimizing its effect technically by creating the necessary conditions (the idea of an experiment as opposed to experience)" [2, p. 84]. Bodies with a higher mass, therefore, had to fall faster than bodies with a lower mass. Conducting experiments with the vertical fall of bodies and not getting unambiguous results, Galileo switched to experiments with the direction of bodies along an inclined plane. It was in this type of experiments that the Italian scientist recorded that the acceleration of falling bodies is the same regardless of mass [3, p. 134] – as we will learn later, it will be accurately measured, will amount to 9.8 m/s and will become one of the cornerstones of I. Newton's mechanics.

The result of G. Galileo's experiments with falling bodies along an inclined plane was empirical in content: real experiments using physical bodies collectively represented a series of experiments, generalizations from which were also carried out inductively. Due to the insufficient development of the measuring instruments used by Galileo, he did not receive satisfactory results to confirm his hypotheses. G. Galilei was forced to accompany empirical experiments with elements of the experiment modeled in his mind. D.N. Drozdova defines the content of a thought experiment as follows: "During a thought experiment, we simulate the application of certain principles or concepts to a specific, but an idealized situation, showing what inevitable consequences we should get from combining our theory with these conditions" [4, p. 44], and denies the thought experiment the opportunity to expand our knowledge about the object of research. On the other hand, N.V. Gromyko's definition has rather a positive connotation in terms of the increment of scientific knowledge: "Galileo's thought experiment is a means of creating the necessary free space in the field of already existing contents, where this kind of new content can be presented to the reader (or listener-student), as well as perceived and mastered by us" [5, p. 110]. A thought experiment acts as an instrument of existing knowledge – in a situation where true knowledge arises from the competition of different positions regarding the same empirical fact. The structure of G. Galileo's most famous works ("Dialogue on two systems of the World" and "Conversations and mathematical proofs of two new sciences") is based on his idea of the form of a thought experiment as a confrontation of different scientific views on the world [5, p. 112].

In the Dialogue on Two Systems of the World, Galileo addresses the question of whether the Moon's light is its own or reflected, as well as whether its surface is smooth as a mirror or full of irregularities [6, p. 586]. The arguments in favor of the fact that the Moon glows with reflected light and its surface is rough are reinforced by G. Galileo using an analogy technique comparing the features of light reflection from a mirror and from the wall surrounding it – in favor of the fact that the wall (uneven, rough) reflects light more strongly [7, pp. 254-263]. V.G. Gorokhov argues that Galileo introduced elements of technology into natural philosophy: "He creates a new epistemological model for generating natural science knowledge" [8, p. 15]. It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that in the research of Galileo's contemporaries and up to the end of the XIX century. scientific institutions and methods of integrating scientific activity were not sufficiently developed so that Galileo's innovations were scaled to all scientific knowledge.

The most famous scientific discovery of G. Galileo was to present new arguments in favor of a heliocentric picture of the world [3, p. 136]. The Italian scientist came to new conclusions regarding the principle of the ratio in space of the orbits of different celestial bodies (planets, Sun, Moon and the Earth itself), based not on direct empirical observations, but based on the fundamental laws of the mechanics of motion of celestial bodies. The generalizing conclusions concluding the laws of motion of celestial bodies in space turned out to be inconsistent with the Ptolemaic (geocentric) picture of the world that prevailed at the time of Galileo's life. The fundamental importance of Galileo's discoveries for the subsequent development of physics was that if the use of the principle of thought experiment questioned the current picture of the world, the truth of which had been unshakeable for centuries, then priority was given to a theory that could have a less developed evidence base at the moment, but was more effective for generating new scientific knowledge and new discoveries [9].

G. Galileo's innovations in the development of the concept of thought experiment influenced the development of Modern physics, and as the formulation of thought experiments designed to generalize some worldview important, but not taking place in the material world, experience, entered philosophical knowledge. V.M. Rozin notes that G. Galileo contributed to changing ideas about nature from objective and unchangeable for humans to instrumental and constructive ones: "Galileo's nature is understood not only in a purely natural modality, but also in an artificial one, and the competence of designing natural processes, according to the Renaissance scientist, belongs not only to God, but also to man" [10, p. 103]. G. Galileo was able to to make a significant contribution to the formation of a new understanding of the experience and method of mental modeling, which later became used in the natural philosophy of Modern times. Summarizing the main achievements of the epoch as a whole, A.A. Kuzmin notes: "The basic scientific concepts and definitions that are still used today have developed, technologies and methods of conducting experiments have appeared, a modern mathematical apparatus has been formed, the method of scientific cognition has become generally accepted" [11, p. 13]. It should also be noted that G. Galileo was one of the key figures of the demarcation between philosophy and natural science disciplines that began in the XVII century [12, p. 43].

The concept of Galileo's thought experiment has become an important element for changing the perception of the subject. To gain more objectivity in talking about the subject, we will give preliminary definitions and the basics of the concept of the subject in philosophy.

The concept of the subject. The formation of the concept of the subject in the philosophy of Modern Times

Let's define a subject as an individual actor, a figure who carries out activities aimed at transforming the object of his activity in practice, studying the object in the process of scientific knowledge, or putting himself in the position of an object and reflecting on his place in the world and among other subjects. An object is a thing of the surrounding world that undergoes the consequences of the manifestation of the activity of the subject. The tools by which a subject transforms or cognizes an object are methods.

It should be noted that in philosophy there are different answers to the question: "Who is the subject?" The most common approach localizes the subject in human individuality. According to this approach, a subject is an individual with inherent personal characteristics who is active in relation to the world around him as a separate and unique subject that differs from all other people. The reverse approach involves understanding the subject as a collective entity. In this case, the carrier of activity is not an individual, but a group of people who together represent a transformative force that learns, changes the world or reflects its place in it.

In modern philosophy, there are concepts of non-subjective activity, in which the transformation of the world is connected not with people, but with their relationships and interrelationships. In the subjectless approach, transformative activity is separated from the person as a subject and becomes dominant over the person and society. Figuratively speaking, within the framework of an object-free model of understanding transformative activity, it is impossible to say "I am doing something", but the correct statement would be: "something is being done".

In the philosophy of Modern times, the subject begins to be understood as the reason for the exercise of activity. First of all, the understanding of the subject's activity was rooted in the field of cognition. "On the one hand, individuals (scientists) played an important role in obtaining knowledge, on the other hand, the technology of obtaining natural science knowledge looked deindividual, determined only by the means used (mathematics, evidence, experiment)" [2, p. 78], V.M. Rozin notes regarding the nature of the subject in Modern philosophy.  The epistemological orientation of Modern philosophy made it necessary to pay special attention to the study of the world around us, updating our understanding of the world in various fields of scientific knowledge.

The innovation of Modern natural philosophy is the idea of the subject as isolated from the surrounding world and opposed to what he explores, tries to know: this is how the formation of the subject-object relationship took place. Despite the criticism of the concepts of binarism, in particular, the subject-object relationship, in the context of relativism of modern philosophy [13, p. 49], it is necessary to note the significant contribution of ideas about the opposition of the subject to the object to the improvement of the epistemological paradigm of natural philosophy of Modern times.

The most discussed and analyzed problems of understanding the subject in modern philosophy are two: the problem of bridging the gap between the subject and the object and the problem of the constancy of the subject. The first problem is that the subject-object relationship is unequal: the greater the activity of the subject, the less possible the resistance of the object. Within the framework of the relationship, the subject is as active as possible, while the object is as passive as possible. This creates the possibility of representing the world around us as static, unchangeable, which generates the same static, idealized, utopian vision of the world, which is completely an object, that is, unchangeable, static, passive. Such a vision of the object does not correspond increases the probability of accumulation of research errors from the initial separation, consisting in the absolute activity of the subject and the absolute passivity of the object.

The second problem lies in the fact that in the philosophy of Modern times (especially in I. Kant with his concept of the transcendental subject), the idea of the subject as unchangeable in time and space was rooted – a kind of ideal entity that does not undergo any changes when interacting with the surrounding world. Pushing to the limit the tendency in understanding the subject as an unchangeable and absolutely stable entity leads to the fact that this subject becomes similar to the idea in Plato's philosophy – an absolute entity separated from the "world of things" and does not affect the state of affairs in any way, but only being the kind and cause of activity. The problem of understanding the constancy of the subject calls into question the possibility of transforming the world (object) by applying the activity of the subject. Being interrelated, the first and second problems of the philosophy of the subject at the same time exclude each other: the configuration of the interaction of the subject and the object "stops" the object, and the unchanging and permanent subject "stops" itself.

G. Galileo's contribution to the formation of the understanding of the subject

Ways to solve problems in understanding the subject can be found by referring to the concept of G. Galileo. We can get acquainted with his way of working with the subject-object relationship and the problem of the constancy of the subject through the prism of a thought experiment. Offering his solutions to the difficulties of mechanics and physics, Galileo used the technique of interpolation, which was the finding of intermediate values among the already available data volume. Operating with the already available volume of scientific data and not expanding it (without adding hypotheses), G. Galileo obtained new knowledge by increasing the self–consistency of existing knowledge through finding intermediate links in the research chain - "guided by the principle of continuity", as noted, following G.V. Leibniz, the peculiarity of this method E. Mach [14, p.116].

The concept of G. Galileo influenced the formation of the philosophy of Rene Descartes – the development in the philosophy of the French thinker of the idea of thinking substance (subject) and extended substance (object) was influenced by the views of the Italian engineer and scientist. Despite the fact that the general direction of Galileo's research interest lay in the field of mechanics, physics, astronomy and optics, and R. Descartes dealt with issues of mathematical knowledge and metaphysics, the similarity of their views consisted in using the mathematical method to verify empirical data, albeit in different ways: G. Galileo used a thought experiment, and R. Descartes adapted for the needs of scientific knowledge, he created an algebraic and axiomatic method.

The interaction of G. Galileo's views on the subject and the views of another of the key thinkers of the New Age, Francis Bacon, is of significant importance. As a methodologist of the emerging empirical scientific knowledge, F. Bacon understood the subject as a passive observer and interpreter who worked within the framework of the analysis and reassembly of empirical facts. Having devoted his main works to the development of methods of scientific thinking, F. Bacon instructed the subject to be strictly connected with the object and to give a correct interpretation to the factual data that scientists received, thus obtaining reliable knowledge through the methodologically correct use of the inductive method.

In contrast with the views of F. Bacon, the characteristic features of G. Galileo's understanding of the subject can be even more clearly distinguished. If the ideas of F. Bacon formed the basis of the method of obtaining scientific knowledge in Modern times, then the view of the method of scientific experiment and the role of the subject in scientific activity by G. Galileo became relevant only in the XX century. If in F. Bacon's epistemology it was assumed that the subject participates in the process of cognition as an interpreter, then in G. Galileo's concept the subject actively creates conditions for obtaining new knowledge and has its own activity.

The methods of obtaining scientific knowledge proposed by G. Galileo were not widespread enough in Modern times, but became relevant in modern experimental science and were subsequently comprehended in the sociology of science [15, p. 149]. The Italian scientist faced the problem of increasing the objectivity of the data obtained; if he used the method of a thought experiment, then questions arose about the possible "bias" of the researcher regarding the results of the experiment. G. Galileo overcame the problem by improving the model of the object participating in the thought experiment. The consistent complication of the object of the cognitive process within the framework of conducting a thought experiment through the abstraction procedure made it possible to achieve greater objectivity by excluding factors affecting the object of study.

Understanding the subject and the structure of scientific activity

Let us repeat our thesis that G. Galileo's views on the nature of scientific experiment corresponded more to the work of scientific collectives of the XX century than individual researchers of the early Modern period. The thought experiment of G. Galileo proposed not to work with an object as a specific physical unit and, through the progressive accumulation of empirical data, refine our knowledge about the object, but to create a mental model of the object and, through working with it, to make the process of scientific cognition itself a model, becoming more intersubjective, accessible to translation from one researcher to another. P.P. Gaidenko writes: "When we say that since the XVII century natural science has become mathematical, we mean first of all the fact that the most important science of nature – mechanics – has since been constructing its subject in the same way as geometry constructed its subject" [16, p. 250]. Galileo's thought experiment plays an important role in changing the model of experience in mechanics. Due to the greater intersubjectivity of the results of scientific research, which the Galileo method allowed to achieve, his method of carrying out scientific activities was suitable for the era of formation and development of scientific collectives, when the joint activity of a large number of researchers united in groups began to play an increasingly important role.

Of fundamental importance for the consideration of Galileo in the context of modern scientific knowledge is the appeal to the understanding of the subject. In G. Galileo's concept, the gap between subject and object is not insurmountable. Conducting a thought experiment allows you to fill the gap between the subject and the object with the results of a cognitive act. Filling the gap is the key to the possibility of constructing an ideal model of the experience or subject of research and the possibility of future operation of this model.

Having presented the influence of G. Galileo on the understanding of the subject and modern scientific research, let us turn to the topic of the role of the subject in modern science. Criticism of binarism and the blurring of the position of the subject in general in modern philosophy do not correlate directly with the situation in scientific knowledge: we cannot say that research in the field of philosophy and methodology of science fixes a certain crisis in the understanding of the subject. On the other hand, the crisis of the subject in science takes the form of opacity of the subject's actions, his activity within the framework of scientific knowledge, for an outside observer.

The change in the understanding of the subject of cognition in modern philosophy of science is associated with the emergence of the idea of the fundamental unavoidability of the observer from the process of conducting an experiment. If the object cannot but be influenced by the subject, his attitudes and characteristic features, then the understanding of the subject-object relationship began to require revision. The concrete reality of the actions and activity of the subject outstripped the reflection of this process: the blurring of the subject-object relationship manifested itself in changing the structure of research teams, the role and place of a scientific researcher in the creation of science.

There are different points of view on how to avoid excessive influence of the subject on the object of scientific research. The tendency to objectify the process of cognition negates the influence of the subject on the process of scientific research and comes from the project of the organization of sciences by F. Bacon. The theory of the "idols of knowledge" by F. Bacon was developed as a method of reducing the influence of the subject on scientific knowledge. A striking example of objectification of the process of cognition is Marxism. In K. Marx's social theory and his view of the development of society, the subjective factor was actually leveled: the objective laws of the development of society governed the masses regardless of the aspirations and desires of an individual.

An approach involving the recognition of the influence of the subject on the object of research and its course can be called understanding or interpretative. Given the inherent nature of the subject's influence, we are faced with the task of taking into account and understanding exactly what it is. The second approach stems from the vision of the subject in the philosophy of R. Descartes and his "cogito, ergo sum", which dictates that the object of research be a self-evident virtuality for the object.

We can designate the third approach as phenomenological, or reflexive. According to the reflexive approach, the subject influences the object (the course of the experiment or the process of scientific knowledge) and knows about his influence, takes it into account and has it in mind when interpreting the results of the study. Within the framework of the reflexive approach to scientific research, we see that the subject of scientific knowledge is located in relation to the object not as the second side of the relationship, but is in the middle between the individual's individual experience and the intersubjectivity of the ideal model of experience.

As you can see, the third approach is related to the concept of G. Galileo and takes into account that the activity of the subject should not be located in the subject itself, but in the space between the subject and the object: the subject, losing his temper, acts as a mediator to create a middle zone between the world of an individual researcher and the world of a non-individual object of research. This is exactly the task set for the thought experiment – to make the results of this experiment and the use of the method as a whole go beyond the limits of one person's activity, to institutionalize it through the creation of scientific models. This is the approach that scientists use in modern natural science disciplines.

Conclusions

A fundamental feature of scientific knowledge has become an instrument of abstraction, the allocation of an object from the whole sum of relations. In Modern science, the main method of producing scientific abstractions was the method of incomplete induction, based on the methodology of F. Bacon. At the same time, during the formation of modern science at the beginning of the XX century, the method of Galileo's thought experiment turned out to be in demand among scientists, which made it possible to construct new knowledge by creating an ideal model of experience.

Changes in the structure of scientific knowledge were followed by a rethinking of the subject, its place in the process of cognition and activity. The subject-object relationship, which presupposes the activity of the subject and the passivity of the object, was replaced by various concepts that questioned the unambiguity of the relationship between the subject and the object.

The problem of the gap between subject and object in philosophy was solved by G. Galileo by improving the method of thought experiment, the results of which, in the form of models of experience, became the middle link between subject and object in the structure of scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding of the subject.

While Modern science was largely the field of activity of individual researchers, modern science relies on the activities of research teams. To reflect and methodologically generalize the way of activity of Modern scientists, F.'s empirical method was more suitable. Bacon. The activities of modern scientists within the framework of the work of scientific teams are described more objectively using the methodological developments of G. Galileo.

In the context of our research, the question of the dynamics of the transition from one scientific paradigm to another is of interest. The analysis of the reasons for the transformation of scientific knowledge can shed light on the ways of broadcasting an intellectual product in European culture and the forms of reception of this product by specific researchers. This question goes beyond the scope of our research, but affects an essential aspect of the philosophy of science, which consists in the formation of science as a social institution and a direct productive force in modern society, which can serve as an object for future research.

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5. Gromyko, N.G. (2010). Breakthrough knowledge: Galileo Galilei's thought experiment against the power of the Inquisition. Bulletin of the Russian State University for the Humanities. Series: Political Science, History, International Relations, Foreign Region Studies, Oriental Studies, 1(44), 109-122.
6. Piccolino, M., Wade, NJ. (2008). Galileo Galilei’s vision of the senses. Trends in neurosciences, 11, 585-590.
7. Galilei, Galileo. (2018). Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Translated from Italian by A.I. Dolgov; introduction by Ph.D. in chemistry I.S. Dmitrieva; notes by A.I. Dolgov, Yu.G. Perelya, I.B. Pogrebysky]. Moscow: RIPOl klassik.
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16. Gaydenko, P.P. (2003). Scientific rationality and philosophical reason. Moscow: Progress-Tradition.

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The reviewed article is devoted to the connection of natural science research and philosophical and methodological attitudes of Galileo, as well as the influence of his developments on the formation of the doctrine of an active cognizing and acting subject in Modern philosophy. The topic of the article is undoubtedly relevant. Galileo is one of the key figures in the history of the formation of not only science, but also philosophy of Modern times, and an attempt to return to the consideration of his scientific practice and its philosophical and methodological understanding can only be welcomed. The peculiarity of the article and the main merit of its author can be considered the desire to build reasoning based on careful consideration of the real experimental practice of the great scientist. Familiarity with the article leaves no doubt that it will be met with interest by many readers. However, before publishing the article, I would like to recommend that the author correct some errors and inaccuracies. First of all, I would like to suggest making changes to the title of the article, which in its current form does not seem quite successful. It could look, for example, as follows: "The significance of Galileo's experimental method for the formation of the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy." Further, one of the subheadings ("The problem of the subject in philosophy: history and modernity") should also be changed, this is an unnecessarily broad formulation that goes beyond the boundaries of the topic of the article, and part of the material in this section can also be removed without prejudice to the whole. The author uses the expression subject-object dichotomy several times, this is a misunderstanding, "dichotomous division" (briefly, "dichotomy") is the name of a well–defined procedure in formal logic, in this case we should talk about the "subject-object relationship". Another obvious mistake is attributing the "principle of continuity" to Mach, when in fact it was first formulated and given this name by Leibniz. Finally, the conclusion is clearly unsatisfactory, extremely formal, and it should be written anew. There are a lot of inept stylistic constructions in the text: "by appealing to the views of one of ... we plan to deepen our understanding"; "despite the fact that we agree with this statement, we still have to pay attention that ..."; "the most famous and controversial discovery of G. Galileo regarding his reputation in scientific and public circles..."; "summing up and linking the various elements of our research together, we note that G. Galileo, introducing his methodology of scientific experiment, created a model of experience necessary for..." – two adverbial phrases with homogeneous terms, besides also a completely non-academic "necessary for"! Of course, not all such fragments are listed here, the text needs significant stylistic editing. The bibliographic list could be enriched with foreign publications. Summing up, it should be noted that the presented article has good prospects for publication, but it still needs to be finalized in accordance with the comments made.

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In the reviewed article "The experimental method of G. Galileo in the context of the formation of the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy", the subject of research is the formation of the concept of the subject in philosophy in connection with the development of the method of thought experiment by G. Galileo. The purpose of the study is not explicitly stated. The theoretical and methodological foundations of the study are not explicitly indicated. The research methods used are mainly the analysis of the works of Russian philosophers who wrote on the topic of the development of science and scientific methods. In general, the relevance of studying the subject in the context of Galileo's discoveries lies in the fact that it combines ideas about models of thought experiment with a modern understanding of the subject in philosophy. And the activity of the subject, the construction of a model of this activity, remains relevant for modern scientific knowledge. We agree with the author(s) that the analysis of the process of forming the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy through the prism of G. Galileo's views will clarify the content of the concept of the subject and better understand the principles of the evolution of ideas about the subject in philosophy. The scientific novelty of the publication is associated with the substantiation of the position on the relevance among scientists of the method of Galileo's thought experiment, which allowed the construction of new knowledge by creating an ideal model of experience. But, and this is rightly justified in the article, the changed structure of scientific knowledge has led to a rethinking of the role and place of the subject in the process of scientific knowledge, and the traditional subject-object relationship has begun to be replaced by various concepts that express doubts about the unambiguous connection between the subject and the object. This allows us to conclude that the method of Galileo's thought experiment played a significant role in the formation of the concept of the subject in philosophy. This study is characterized by a general sequence, which is given by a consistent description: 1) the concept of Galileo's thought experiment; 2) the process of formation of the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy; 3) Galileo's contribution to the formation of the understanding of the subject; 4) the role of the subject in the structure of scientific activity. The article will be of interest to specialists in the field of epistemology and philosophy of science, as well as those interested in the problems of these sections. But I would like to draw attention to the incorrectness of using the term intellectual experiment (instead of the concept of "thought experiment" as a type of cognitive activity in which the key situation for a particular scientific theory is played out not in a real experiment, but in imagination). The term intellectual experiment in science and philosophy is not used synonymously with the term thought experiment (no philosophical dictionary defines this term).. The bibliography of the work includes 16 publications and consists mainly of works by Russian philosophers who wrote on the topic of the development of science and scientific methods. Thus, the appeal to the main opponents from the area under consideration is fully present. There is a missing link in the work: "The fall of bodies in the mechanics preceding Galileo was considered according to the laws of Aristotle's physics, in which the dependence of the rate of fall of bodies on their mass was postulated []." Conclusion: The article "The experimental method of G. Galileo in the context of the formation of the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy" has scientific and theoretical significance. The work can be published after either rejecting the use of the term "intellectual experiment", or proving its synonymy with the established term thought experiment.

Third Peer Review

Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

The subject of the study of the article "Galileo's experimental method in the context of the formation of the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy" is the scientific and philosophical work of G. Galileo. The author considers Galileo both as a scientist, physicist and astronomer, and a theorist of scientific knowledge. Turning to Galileo's development of the method of thought experiment, the author of the article shows what importance it has for the formation of the concept of "subject" as an active participant in scientific knowledge. The research methodology combines the methods of historical analysis, which make it possible to evaluate the ideas of G. Galileo in the context of his time and comparative analysis, including extrapolation of the author's ideas to the present, showing the relevance of the problem under consideration. The relevance of the research is the formation of the concept of the subject in philosophy in connection with the development of the method of thought experiment, the author associates with the conjugation of the idea of models of thought experiment with the understanding of the subject in modern philosophy. It can be added that the change in the understanding of the subject of cognition in modern philosophy of science, associated with the emergence of the idea of the fundamental unavoidability of the observer from the process of conducting an experiment, makes Galileo's ideas in demand by modern theorists of science. The scientific novelty of the article consists in demonstrating the interrelation of G. Galileo's reflections in the field of science, the theory of knowledge and the interpretation of the subject in New European philosophy. The style of the article is typical for scientific publications in the field of humanitarian studies, it combines the clarity of the formulations of key theses and their logically consistent argumentation. The structure and content fully correspond to the stated problem. In the main part of the article, the author identifies four sections in which he consistently analyzes the very concept of Galileo's thought experiment, then the formation of the concept of the subject in Modern philosophy, Galileo's contribution to the formation of the understanding of the subject, and, finally, the understanding of the subject and the structure of scientific activity. In the second section of the work, the author examines the correlation of Galileo's ideas with reflections on the subject of knowledge by G.V. Leibniz, R. Descartes, F. Bacon. Important for the formation of a new European understanding of the subject, according to the author, is that the activity of the subject is thought of as located not in the subject itself, but in the space between the subject and the object. This idea is first encountered in the concept of Galileo, who, conducting a thought experiment, fills the gap between subject and object with the results of a cognitive act. The bibliography of the article includes 16 titles of works, which is quite representative of the topic under study. The appeal to the opponents is present to a sufficient extent and indicates that the author of the work is well acquainted with existing studies of the work of G. Galileo. The author cites studies by V.M. Rozin, D.N. Drozdov, N.V. Gromyko, P.P. Gaidenko, in which the significance of G. Galileo's ideas in the development of the concept of a thought experiment is comprehended. The article is written in simple, clear language, so it will be accessible to both philosophers and non-specialists. It will be useful for young researchers who turn to developing their own research methodology and historians of philosophy and philosophy of science.