Grigory Zinoviev: the torments and tosses of the oppositionist (1927-1934)

Orchakova Larisa Gennad'evna ORCID: 0000-0001-9559-9930 Doctor of History Professor, Department of History, Moscow City Pedagogical University 129226, Russia, Moscow, 2nd agricultural ave., 4 cor 3, room 3413 luchlg@yandex.ru

Sinin Evgenii Yurevich ORCID: 0000-0002-1444-5217 Postgraduate student, Department of History, Institute of Humanities, State Autonomous Educational Institution "Moscow City Pedagogical University" 129226, Russia, Moscow, 2nd agricultural ave., 4 cor 3, room 3413 e.sinin@yandex.ru

The fate of the oppositionists in the CPSU(b) of the 1920s and 1930s is tragic. Under V. I. Lenin, speaking out against the party line was punished relatively mildly: the leader of the workers' opposition, A. G. Shlyapnikov, could not even be expelled from the Central Committee the first time ^[1]. However, already in the mid-1920s, critics of the general line were forced to "disarm in front of the party", and opposition as such was condemned ^{[47, pp. 327-332]}. People began to be expelled from the CPSU(b) and arrested. Those who wanted to return to the party had to publicly renounce their past deeds and views in favor of Stalinist positions ^{[37, p. 156]}. The oppositionists faced a dilemma: the "own" party strikes – it is necessary to take on the sin (even if it did not exist), or persist in it under threat of repression ^{[3, pp. 161-162]}.

Many chose the first path, assuring the Central Committee of their loyalty, even if they had a different point of view inside. According to I. V. Stalin at the XVII Party Congress (1934), "the majority of supporters of ... anti-revolutionary groups were forced to recognize the correctness of the party line and capitulate to the party," the economic successes of the five-year plan "finally demoralized and smashed to dust all and every anti-Leninist group," and "the party is now united as never before" ^{[46, p. 28]}. Many of the former opposition leaders made penitent speeches at the congress: N. I. Bukharin, L. B. Kamenev, A. I. Rykov, G. E. Zinoviev, etc. ^{[46, c. 124-128, 209-212, 492-497, 516-521]}. However, all of them, as well as 1108 of the 1968 delegates, were soon unreasonably repressed on charges of counterrevolutionary activities, and four of the above-mentioned persons and 848 delegates were shot ^{[20, p. 17]}. The repressions were explained by "double-dealing", i.e. insincere agreement with the party's policy while maliciously maintaining their views and conducting anti-party work ^{[14, pp. 276-278, 311-312, 331-332]}. As studies of the beginning of the XXI century have demonstrated and what is worth agreeing with, most of the accusations made were imaginary, but the "double-dealing" itself had its basis ^{[37, pp. 310-312]}.

The phenomenon of "double-dealing" is interesting for historians and politicians as the practice of political behavior of oppositionists in the face of Stalinism. An analysis of the practice of the internal party and political life of the Soviet state at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, using the example of the behavior of one of the party leaders and an active participant in the opposition, makes it possible to trace the immediate decline of the oppositionists. In addition, through the development of relations between the party-Soviet leadership and the opposition, it is possible to show the mechanisms of formation of Stalinism as a form of existence of the Soviet state in the 1930s and 1950s.

Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev belonged to the cohort of the founders and leaders of the Bolshevik Party, nurtured its "monolithic unity". Back in 1924-1925, he demanded public repentance from the opposition, proclaimed the unity of the party as the highest value and declared that "the party is not a discussion club" ^{[9, p. 236; 11, p. 352-356; 43, p. 106]}.  But already at the end of 1925, G. E. Zinoviev criticized Stalin's position on the possibility of the final victory of socialism in the USSR without a world revolution ^{[4, pp. 121, 131-133; 11, pp. 259-348]}. Contrary to his ideological position, a policy of concessions to the kulaks was also pursued.  At the XIV Congress of the CPSU(b) in December 1925, the point of view of Grigory Yevseevich and his supporters (Zinovievites) was condemned ^{[44, pp. 971-973]}. In 1926-1927, G. E. Zinoviev, together with L. D. Trotsky and L. B. Kamenev, composed the "united opposition". However, the opposition did not find broad support, having made a choice in the autumn of 1927: either transition to non-party work, or subordination to the Central Committee on its terms. L. D. Trotsky opposed the conditions of the Central Committee, and G. E. Zinoviev, fearing a split in the party, decided to publicly recognize Stalin's attitudes, but continue the ideological struggle ^{[15, c. 240-242, 245, 248, 253; 27, l. 152; 28, l. 89-91; 29, l. 83-84; 33, l. 72.]}. In the draft of the article "Some facts about the meeting of the Leningrad opposition" dated November 28, 1927, G. E. Zinoviev proposed "to submit to the 15th Congress, because "otherwise the second party is inevitable" <...> to go to ... this, in our opinion, is certain death" ^{[29, l. 83-84]}. At the congress (December 1927), I. V. Stalin in his speech really demanded the complete subordination of the oppositionists, adding: "either that or let them leave the party. If they don't leave, we'll kick them out" ^{[45, p. 82]}. The Congress declared Trotskyist-Zinoviev ideas incompatible with party membership, while G. E. Zinoviev and L. D. Trotsky were expelled from the party even before the congress ^{[45, p. 1318]}.

Since the mid-1920s, Grigory Evseevich's line of conduct could seem inconsistent. In relation to the party, as noted by A.V. Lunacharsky, he is distinguished by "romantic devotion" ^{[17, p. 298]}. But such an attitude towards the party did not exclude participation in party discussions and oppositions. Already in opposition, Grigory Yevseyevich in 1926 analyzed the causes and consequences of the discussions in drafts, asking: "is unity nevertheless possible" ^{[27, l. 82]}. Even at the October plenum of 1927, which expelled him from the Central Committee, he, defending opposition theses, supported the unity of the party and the legitimacy of its leadership ^{[19, pp. 121, 181]}. G. E. Zinoviev considered the creation of a parallel CPSU(b) party unacceptable ^{[25, L. 39]}. The expulsion from the CPSU (b) was a blow to G. E. Zinoviev. After his expulsion from the party, he joined the statement on the cessation of the opposition struggle and asked for reinstatement in the party, to which he was refused with an offer to apply six months later ^{[45, pp. 1319, 1333-1336]}.

Since G. E. Zinoviev was not an ordinary party member, but one of the former leaders, his return to the CPSU (b) and politics was decided at the highest level: by the Central Control Commission (CCCC), the Central Committee, the Politburo and personally by I. V. Stalin. It is this period that is interesting for historical analysis.  There is an internal struggle of thought, soul, understanding of one's own political goals and place in the system.  From the end of 1927 until his arrest in the case of the murder of S. M. Kirov in December 1934, our hero addressed letters and statements, of which quite a lot have been preserved in archival collections, to the party leadership. Their analysis allows us to trace these "tosses" of the state and political leader of the Soviet state. 

***

The November 1927 joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee expelled G. E. Zinoviev, as well as a number of other oppositionists, from the Bolshevik Party. This was a blow to him, but he did not agree with this state of affairs and immediately after being expelled from the party, he began to return to it. On December 23, 1927, he appealed to the Central Committee, and on January 27, 1928, Pravda published a joint letter with L. B. Kamenev condemning Trotskyism ^{[15, p. 257; 35, l. 15-17]}. The moral state of G. E. Zinoviev, according to the testimony of N. I. Bukharin, who met with him in early January 1928, was depressed: he agreed to make any concessions for the sake of returning to the RCP(b) ^{[8, pp. 419-420]}. In the meantime, he and L. B. Kamenev were sent into exile to Kaluga ^{[8, p. 412]}. At the same time, historical events are unfolding, which have been the subject of disputes and clashes for the opposition itself. At the end of 1927, there was a grain procurement crisis and the party leadership was looking for ways to solve the problem. In January 1928, Stalin traveled to Siberia, during which he decided to radically change his relatively soft policy towards the Kulaks ^{[8, pp. 413-415; 41, pp. 148-153, 157]}. The editorial of Pravda dated February 15 outlined the tasks of grain procurement in the spirit of pushing the fist and fulfilling the grain harvest plan at all costs ^[21].

The "left turn" that began led to the transition of many oppositionists from fighting the Central Committee to cooperating with it ^[6]. G. E. Zinoviev, who stood in anti-Kulak positions during the years of the opposition struggle, positively assessed the conclusions contained in the editorial ^{[27, l. 162]}. And in an article dated March 10, 1928, "The Duty of the Bolshevik," he wrote that the oppositionists needed to recognize: "in these fundamental issues that determine the immediate fate of the party and the state, the Central Committee pursues the correct, Leninist line" ^{[26, L. 4]}. Since ideological differences were eliminated, it was necessary to "firmly and completely obey the Party, do everything to restore the united front of the Leninists, stand in ranks and ranks, take on their share of responsibility for the work and line of the party, as befits a soldier of the proletarian revolution" ^{[26, l. 15]}. G. E. Zinoviev also asked the Secretary General about this: in the Zinoviev fund at the Russian State Pedagogical Institute there is a text about sending letters to I. V. Stalin and N. I. Bukharin on March 1, 1928 with a statement on the elimination of all past disagreements ^{[27, L. 163]}.

G. E. Zinoviev was returned to the ranks and ranks on June 22, 1928, since he had not publicly opposed the general line for the past six months after being expelled from the CPSU(b) ^{[8, p. 423]}. By the end of the 1920s, the adoption of the general line was no longer required verbally, but in the format of "ideological and organizational disarmament". As early as October 23, 1926, I. V. Stalin, arguing at the plenum of the Central Committee with the opposition, demanded from it: "give up your books, your pamphlets, your speeches at the 14th Congress" ^{[8, pp. 380-381]}. G. E. Zinoviev was one of the leaders of that opposition, at the XIV Congress he opposed to the Secretary General in a co-report, and the book "Leninism" written by him in 1925 was called by N. I. Bukharin the gospel of the opposition ^{[18, p. 217]}. It turns out that returning to the party in 1928 required Grigory Yevseevich to give up "his books". However, in an article dated July 15, 1928, "Some features of the current situation (by the time we returned to the party)," G. E. Zinoviev unequivocally wrote: "The majority of the Central Committee itself now repeats much of what we said at the Fourteenth Congress. Stalin's speeches are taken by handfuls from Zinoviev's book Leninism, which ... withstood the test of time and turned out to be entirely true" ^{[26, l. 41]}. Thus, G. E. Zinoviev, in public agreement with the Stalinist line, maintained his own point of view inside, which he considered "Leninist".

Of course, by this time G.E. Zinoviev was an experienced politician and consolidating his own opinion with Stalin's "left turn" became the point of political calculations. The reason for this could be the beginning of the struggle of the Stalinists against the "right bias" of N. I. Bukharin. In June 1928, G. E. Zinoviev wrote in drafts that the oppositionists should not now speak directly about their own rightness on the issue of collectivization, because "regrouping in the party and in its leadership is inevitable, since a new course (on collectivization – approx.) is taken seriously. But – it takes time. Probably, a year is needed" ^{[26, l. 58]}. G. E. Zinoviev hoped that during the stubborn struggle at the top, both he and his supporters could be attracted as valuable players. Indeed, on July 11, 1928, L. B. Kamenev and N. I. Bukharin, still a member of the Politburo, met in Moscow, assuring that the Stalinists would try to attract the Zinovievites to themselves and suggesting that they not attack the "right" ^{[8, p. 422; 15, p. 259-261]}. They did not come to an agreement with N. I. Bukharin, but the plot about their likely involvement in the top continued to be discussed by Zinovievites. L. B. Kamenev wrote on July 18 to former oppositionist A. Ya. Guralsky: "Only fools can believe that St[Alina] has everything left–wing truth, and Buh[arin] has everything right filth. And as if we have to choose between these two "politicians". It's nonsense! We... are basically right <...> B[ukharin] came running without any advances on our part. At a certain moment, his opponents may also come running, also without prior advances on our part, except for the advance that everyone knows: our views in two years" ^{[22, l. 19]}. Lev Borisovich's opinion should be recognized as relevant for G. E. Zinoviev, since they were in tandem both in power and after being expelled from the CPSU(b) since the end of 1927. they were in exile in Kaluga together, making important decisions together. Moreover, G. E. Zinoviev was very informed about the state of affairs at the top, including receiving materials from the former oppositionist R. E. Grinberg, who worked in Moscow ^{[34, L. 47-133]}.  From him came copies of government documents (including even theses to the Politburo), information about the state of affairs of the Trotskyists and the disputes between the Stalinists and Bukharinites that began on the basis of the deployment of collectivization ^{[34, L. 47-49, 62-63, 78-81, 91-93, 104-106]}. G. E. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev did not intend to remain ordinary party members, despite the opinion expressed jointly with L. B. Kamenev: "in party affairs we are put in the position of "foreigners in our native land", and the Soviet work entrusted to us does not correspond either to our circle of interests or to our previous experience" ^{[15, c. 269]}.

After returning to the party in 1928, G. E. Zinoviev counted on returning to the leadership, taking the side of I. V. Stalin in the fight against N. I. Bukharin, believing that the current policy confirms the correctness of his ideas. However, so far G. E. Zinoviev's agenda was not so much participation in the struggle within the Politburo, as the removal of any suspicion of opposition from himself. Unlike the supporters of L. D. Trotsky who refused to "repent" to the party, G. E. Zinoviev not only did this, but also in draft articles in mid-1928 he was directly proud of it because by refusing to create a second party he eliminated the split of the CPSU(b) ^{[26, L. 58]}. But the sincerity of the "repentance", understood by the Stalinist Central Committee as a complete rejection of the oppositionist's actions and ideas, could be questioned, as evidenced by a number of documents. A poem by an unknown author called "Penitential" has been deposited in the G. E. Zinoviev Foundation in the Russian Academy of Sciences. There are such lines in it: "The old sedition is forgotten - / just write 15 lines. / <...> So, having broken the contract with the past, / I perform an act of repentance / <...> The quiet time has come, / A series of discussions has passed, / I believe that Koba-Stalin / Is always inexplicably right" ^{[30, l. 153-154]}. As can be seen from the above position of G. E. Zinoviev, he publicly "broke off the contract with the past," but he did not have "faith" that "Koba-Stalin is always inexplicably right." His family saw it too. On February 10, 1928, the aforementioned R. Grinberg wrote to G. E. Zinoviev's secretary B. V. Bogdan about the reaction of former oppositionists to the penitential letter of G. E. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev posted in Pravda on January 27: the majority approved this, but "in many letters there are such places: "It can't be that they really abandoned their views, etc."" ^{[34, L. 49]}. The documents show that I. V. Stalin and the members of the Central Committee also did not believe in the sincerity of Zinoviev's repentance. At the beginning of 1929, the Secretary General reacted extremely negatively to information about the meeting of N. I. Bukharin with L. B. Kamenev, known to G. E. Zinoviev, and on December 26, 1929, together with L. M. Kaganovich, they personally expressed political distrust to G. E. Zinoviev ^{[8, p. 440; 15, pp. 261-267]}.

All these circumstances, as well as the peculiarities of G. E. Zinoviev's character, prompted him to new assurances of loyalty. On April 17, 1929, he asked for the floor at the XVI Party Conference of the CPSU(b), in which "I would like to declare my full solidarity with the line of the Central Committee" ^{[31, l. 152]}. But they didn't give me the word. But the opportunity to speak out appeared at the passage of the party purge in the Zamoskvoretsky district control commission on October 23, 1929, where Grigory Yevseyevich stated: "The Central Committee was right, but I was wrong: 1) on the question of building socialism in our country... and on all other issues on which I fought against the Central Committee <...> All the decisions of the Central Committee against the opposition ... were correct, as has now been proven by experience <...> I ... am ready to do absolutely everything possible to eliminate the misunderstanding" ^{[24, l. 8-9]}. Did his party comrades believe him? Most likely not, since on December 25 the Politburo decided to apply a "stricter course" to G. E. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev, and transfer Grigory Yevseevich himself to work outside Moscow ^{[8, p. 440; 15, p. 271]}.

G. E. Zinoviev, in response, only intensified attempts to demonstrate remorse. In a letter to I. V. Stalin dated December 28, 1929, he called him the leader of the party and asked him to give himself confidence, and in June 19230 he asked G. K. Ordzhonikidze for the floor at the XVI Party congress ^{[32, l. 15; 36, l. 171-172]}. But they did not show confidence, and they did not give words again.  It can be seen that as the party's rhetoric against the oppositionists became tougher, G. E. Zinoviev strengthened public agreement with the line of the Central Committee and the General Secretary personally. However, he was also not returned to the leadership, the "regrouping" planned by him for a year led to the establishment of Stalinist autocracy: the "collective leadership" previously proposed by G. E. Zinoviev was no longer relevant for the Secretary General ^{[2, p. 173]}. Consequently, Grigory Yevseyevich had to adjust his political behavior if he wanted to return to political work.

Just at the turn of 1929-1930, G. E. Zinoviev got a good chance. L. D. Trotsky, who was exiled from the USSR, released his memoirs "My Life". They almost immediately got into the USSR and were distributed with the knowledge of the Central Committee ^{[39, p. 236]}. In the summer of 1930, the great Soviet Marxist historian S. A. Piontkovsky read "My Life" and gave a negative review ^{[7, pp. 334-336]}. In December 1931, in a speech to historians, the closest associate of the Secretary General, L. M. Kaganovich, called L. D. Trotsky's memoirs "a vile and boastful pamphlet." The direction of criticism was set by I. V. Stalin himself: his article "On some issues of the history of Bolshevism" (1931), which criticized "Trotskyist smuggling" in Soviet historical science, was a response to the memoirs and a number of other works by L. D. Trotsky ^{[16, p. 4, 61]}.

The documents testify to the possibility and, most importantly, the desire of G. E. Zinoviev to participate in the anti-Trotskyist campaign. From 1929 to 1934, he had access to the collection of L. D. Trotsky's journal Bulletin of the Opposition, collected in the party archive ^{[12, p. 294; 23, l. 13, 25]}. In March 1930, G. E. Zinoviev also got acquainted with the memoirs, leaving a devastating review on them, hoping: "Stalin will not leave Trotsky's book unanswered. But I think that, in any case, I am obliged, for my part, to respond to Trotsky. I have no hope of printing an answer now. But I will write it down anyway" ^{[39, p. 236]}. No traces of the publication of Zinoviev's answer could be found.

It can be assumed that it was I. V. Stalin who gave G. E. Zinoviev the very sanction to familiarize himself with Trotskyist materials in order to keep him in a psychological "tone"; time after time, the refusal of his services given to G. E. Zinoviev could cool the political ambitions of the oppositionist. The "tone" and cooled ambitions are clearly visible in the lines from the draft of G. E. Zinoviev's unsent letter to I. V. Stalin (December 10, 1930): "a year ago, I told you straight out, without any frills, that 1) I see your rightness in the struggle against opposition and, in particular, against me, 2) having fully understood this, I have long ago humbled my "pride" and internally recognized the justice of the insults inflicted on me, 3) I want and will work conscientiously under the leadership of the Central Committee and yours personally at every the work that you give" ^{[32, l. 26ob]}. A similar plot can be seen in his letter to I. V. Stalin dated May 4, 1932, where he asked for "any kind, even the most modest job in the IKKI or in one of the fraternal parties (for legal or illegal work)," while assuring that "not the slightest step in any kind of work... I won't do it if I'm not 100% sure that it corresponds to the line of the Central Committee" ^{[32, L. 55ob-56]}.

The level of G. E. Zinoviev's political claims was noticeably decreasing, and he agreed with the basics of the current political line. But through the agreement, repentance and assurances of loyalty to the party, Grigory Yevseevich's own thoughts broke through, criticizing his particular policy ^{[8, pp. 450-452]}. Moreover, in September 1932, he invited L. B. Kamenev to read to him the information received from Ya. Stan's notebook with the opposition platform "Stalin and the crisis of the proletarian dictatorship" written by M. N. Ryutin ^{[15, pp. 273-274]}. G. E. Zinoviev had previously become acquainted with opposition literature, but the new political realities did not even allow this, demanding full ideological subordination to the Central Committee. Therefore, when the platform of the "Union of Marxist-Leninists" was revealed by the OGPU, the verification also affected those who knew about it, including G. E. Zinoviev ^{[8, p. 456]}. During interrogations at the Central Committee on October 3 and 5, he first denied familiarity with the text, and then confirmed it ^{[8, pp. 458-459]}. When asked why he read it then, G. E. Zinoviev replied: "I have an interest as a politician" ^{[8, p. 460]}. This phrase is an example of "torment" characteristic of G. E. Zinoviev: he was no longer a politician, and the party ordered him to leave his own opinion, but he considered himself to be one and did not stop formulating his assessments of what was happening.

However, it was the Ryutin case that essentially put an end to G. E. Zinoviev's prospects of returning to the top. On October 10, 1932, he was expelled from the party again for non–reporting and, unlike the last time, he was exiled much further - to the Kazakh city of Kostanay ^{[15, pp. 280-282]}. Did G. E. Zinoviev realize that his political destruction had begun? Most likely, yes. Before being sent into exile, on December 3, 1932, G.E. Zinoviev wrote a letter to the Central Committee Secretariat in which he stated: "I am clearly aware that if, after all that has happened, I ever violated party discipline again, it would mean permanently expelling myself from the ranks of the CPSU, and whoever breaks with the Bolshevik Party died as a communist."^[5] Even more: we can say that there was a fracture inside G. E. Zinoviev. The same letter shows a significant change in rhetoric: G. E. Zinoviev now does not expect to return to the party leadership, but "understood to the end that the accomplished unity of the Party and the entire Comintern around Comrade. Stalin is a fact of world-historical significance – for T. Stalin really turned out to be the best student and faithful follower of Lenin's work."^[5] In a letter to I. V. Stalin dated May 8, 1933, he wrote: "if, after all that has happened, I can still count on any leniency from old comrades, then, of course, for the last time" ^[5]. The same thoughts are voiced in a letter published in Pravda on May 20 by G. E. Zinoviev: "... I got carried away and began to believe that the truth was on my side... and not on the side of the party, its Central Committee, Comrade. Stalin, the true successor of Lenin's cause," expressing the hope that he would receive "the opportunity and the right to communicate with the party, with the working masses" ^[10]. G. E. Zinoviev, although politically discredited and psychologically broken, still wanted to return to the party, but even in this situation could not refuse the opportunity to express your opinion, even if the limits were small.

In May 1933, he was returned from exile, but not to the ranks of the CPSU(b) ^[5]. For the sake of the second, G. E. Zinoviev resorted to a proven means – to invite I. V. Stalin to publicly assure him of his loyalty, asking the Secretary General for the floor at the upcoming XVII Party Congress on December 8, 1933 ^[5].  And this time his request was granted: on December 14, he was returned to the CPSU (b), and at the end of January 1934 he was allowed to speak at the congress ^{[8, pp. 469-470]}. In the congress speech, G. E. Zinoviev repented of "anti-party mistakes", the desire to "impose his special understanding of Leninism on the party", pointed out that he was punished by the party "absolutely rightly", called I. V. Stalin the true successor of V. I. Lenin, and described the current "triumph of the party" as "a triumph of leadership, a triumph above all of that who headed this leadership" ^{[46, pp. 492-497]}.

The Congress speech was elaborated in detail by G. E. Zinoviev from the point of view of legitimizing the Stalinist course, in exchange expecting dividends in the form of political work ^{[12, pp. 287-288; 38, p. 135]}. But why then did Stalin, who had previously ignored Zinoviev's repentances and did not believe them, give him his word this time? It should be noted that at the XVII Party Congress, all major former opponents of the Secretary General were given the opportunity to speak. Researchers see here primarily pragmatics: I. V. Stalin needed to demonstrate the party's solidity in the face of growing threats from outside ^[40]. One more aspect should be highlighted. The XVII Congress was called the "congress of winners" at the time of its work. However, it would be more correct to say "the winner" - I. V. Stalin. The Secretary General could see that all his former opponents were already broken and did not pose a political danger, so their congress speeches would not only not weaken the positions of the party leadership, but also strengthen his personal power. The recognition of the correctness of I. V. Stalin from the mouth of the same G. E. Zinoviev sounded weighty. Grigory Yevseyevich was already broken enough for proper speeches. This was noticed by the editorial board of the Opposition Bulletin published by L. D. Trotsky: "Zinoviev, who for a number of years was in open or semi-disguised opposition to the Stalinist bureaucracy, finally recognized, after a brief stay in exile, that Stalin's party regime is the best of regimes" ^[13].

For G. E. Zinoviev, it was no longer a question of maintaining his own political line. He only wanted to stay afloat. In April 1934, he was appointed to the main party theoretical journal Bolshevik ^{[8, p. 473]}. However, problems began there too: G. E. Zinoviev began to defend his previous views on the issue of the world revolution (its inevitability in the conditions of a new imperialist war), whereas the Secretary General saw the root of the issue not in the world revolution, but in building a system of collective security in Europe ^{[8, p. 475]}. When, in July, the publication of materials critical of the foreign policy of tsarist Russia appeared in the Bolshevik. In the spirit of the inevitability of a world revolution in the event of a new world war, the Central Committee considered G. E. Zinoviev responsible. He was removed from the editorial board of the journal ^{[8, pp. 477-480]}. New petitions to I. V. Stalin did not bring success ^{[8, pp. 484-487]}. Grigory Yevseyevich has long been out of trust.

The final political death of the hero was the events of December 1, 1934. Zinovievites were wrongly accused of organizing the murder of S. M. Kirov: As current research shows, the killer acted alone and did not even belong to the circle of G. E. Zinoviev ^{[42, pp. 262-263]}. But the very accusation of Zinovievites in this tragedy by I. V. Stalin looked like a logical continuation of the game that had been going on in previous years: Grigory Yevseevich was tormented, he was given chances to show loyalty, he showed it while maintaining his own "I", then distrust was expressed to him, and he intensified repentance, gradually losing himself. G. E. Zinoviev "lost" himself precisely in the Kirov case. In January 1935, G. E. Zinoviev was given ten years in prison. On August 25, 1936, Grigory Yevseyevich was shot.

Conclusion

The activity of G. E. Zinoviev in the period from the end of 1927 to the end of 1934 was a vivid example of the political behavior of a communist oppositionist, on the basis of which a number of conclusions can be drawn:

1)                G. E. Zinoviev's behavior during the period under review was determined by the main goal – to return to the party, preferably to a leadership job.  The basis for achieving this goal was G. E. Zinoviev's recognition of the impossibility of further opposition struggle, which could lead to a split of the CPSU (b), as well as general agreement with the policy of collectivization and industrialization that had begun.

2) To achieve this goal, G. E. Zinoviev often appealed to various governing bodies, including I. V. Stalin. The specific content of G. E. Zinoviev's requests was closely related to the situation inside the party leadership and changed accordingly, from which we can conclude about the conscious nature of his numerous "repentances" and statements about the rejection of all opposition activities.

3) G. E. Zinoviev really hoped not just to return to the party, but to its leadership, considering the policy pursued to be a reflection of his ideas and taking the side of I. V. Stalin in the fight against N. I. Bukharin. However, the party leadership did not politically trust G. E. Zinoviev, which was regularly brought to his attention. In response, G. E. Zinoviev intensified attempts to prove his loyalty to the Secretary General, which led to a conflict with his political ambitions. The party leadership saw these ambitions and tried to break them, which it managed to do.

4)                At the same time, it is incorrect to consider G. E. Zinoviev's political behavior in the period under review as classic "double-dealing". G. E. Zinoviev did not conduct anti-party work and did not reject the foundations of the party line, however, there was a struggle within him between public "repentance" and preserved ideological attitudes. Most vividly manifested in the first years after the defeat in the internal party struggle, it led at the end of 1932 to a psychological breakdown and abandonment of one's own political self, but also aimed at returning to party activity. Finally, Zinoviev's "torments" and "throwing" stopped at the end of 1934 in connection with the accusations of the murder of S. M. Kirov: he died as a politician.