Economic aspects of the effectiveness of forced labor in the Soviet camp system in the first half of the 1950s. (based on the Southern Kuzbass Corrective Labor Camp of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR materials).

Ryabova Yuliya Vladimirovna PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of “Management in Social and Economic Systems, Philosophy and History”, Ural State Transport University 66 Kolmogorova str., Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk region, 620034, Russia YuRyabova@usurt.ru Other publications by this author

The study of a special sector of the Soviet camp economy based on the use of forced labor still remains in the field of view of modern historians. Until the end of the 1980s, the issues of labor use of convicted citizens at economic facilities of the USSR were not subject to publicity and discussion. Russian historical science covered only the work of freelance citizens, which for a long time seemed to be the only type of labor relations in the Soviet state.

Foreign historians (D. Dallin and B. I. Nikolaevsky, B. Ya. Yakovlev, B. Troitsky, etc.) on the contrary, starting in the 1940s, they did not abandon attempts to highlight the topic of forced labor in the Soviet Union, but without access to a documentary base, they relied on the subjective testimonies of eyewitnesses who found themselves abroad, on their memoirs, which often led to a distortion of reality. They were primarily interested in the scale of forced labor in the USSR, its quantitative data reflecting the total population held in Soviet labor camps, as well as specific correctional labor camps, special settlements and colonies, their organizational structure and functions.

The access to archival materials opened in the late 1980s allowed domestic and foreign researchers to obtain reliable information about the production and economic activities of the GULAG, the Soviet penitentiary system, political repression, and the essence of Stalinist totalitarianism. Fundamental works by V. N. Zemskov ^[6-8], O. V. Khlevnyuk ^[24-26], G. M. Ivanova ^[9-13], A. B. Suslov ^[18-20], N. Y. Belykh ^{[1, 2]}, A. K. Sokolov ^{[16, 17]}, S. I. Kuzmin ^[14], S. A. Krasilnikov ^[15], N. V. Upadysheva ^[21], R. S. Bikmetov ^[3] and other authors, based on national and regional material, revealed various aspects of forced labor in the Soviet Union. Foreign researchers, in particular, R. Stettner, S. Ertz, M. Jacobson, N. Werth, E. Applebaum, G. Persson, M. Sprau, P. Gregory ^{[5, p. 179]} also joined the study of the issues of the Soviet camp-industrial complex.

Many issues related to the Soviet totalitarian system have received sufficient coverage in historical science, but the problem of the production and economic activities of individual camp complexes and colonies, and especially their economic feasibility, remains less studied. The question of the effectiveness of the GULAG system as a whole is not only of interest to researchers, but also remains controversial. One cannot disagree with the opinion of O. V. Khlevnyuk, who believed that "if the quantitative proportions of the forced labor economy, as one hopes, sooner or later will be calculated accurately enough, then the general assessments of this economy, the problems of its effectiveness and role in the implementation of Soviet industrialization, are likely to remain controversial, due to the uncertainty and ambiguity of the very the subject" ^{[23, p. 45]}.

Indeed, each of the historians puts a different meaning to the concept of "the effectiveness of forced labor." According to Fedotova I. N., "economic efficiency should be analyzed in conjunction with such a concept as the effect of production. It refers to the result of the production process, i.e. the amount of work performed. Efficiency is defined as the ratio between the result and the cost of all resources used in the production process: material, financial and labor. Thus, the effect and efficiency represent, respectively, the absolute and relative values characterizing social production" ^{[22, p. 559]}.

A.V. Suslov, addressing the issue of the effectiveness of the use of forced labor, noted that "for historical research, it is often more important not even to clarify the ratio of result to cost, which actually corresponds to the definition of efficiency within the framework of economic theory. Most of all, we are interested in the comparative side of the matter: was forced labor more effective (i.e., essentially more productive) than the labor of freelance workers" ^{[18, p. 258]}.

Belykh believes that "the conversation about the effectiveness of forced labor, apparently, should be conducted not in the plane of a purely economic understanding of this term, but from the point of view of what was meant by "efficiency", primarily by the country's top political leadership. ...It becomes clear that, solving a number of specific economic tasks ("industrialization", "resource mobilization", "colonization of raw material regions", etc.), the Kremlin leaders had in mind certain political priorities, and in their approach to solving questions about the expediency of large-scale use of forced labor, they proceeded primarily from the possibility of using it administratively.mobilization resources. At the same time, production efficiency was considered not as a cost-to-result ratio, but as a forced solution to current political and economic problems" ^{[1, pp. 48-49]}.

S. A. Shevyrin came to the conclusion that "the efficiency of the production activities of camps and colonies was extremely low, and often negative. ...the effect of the production activities of correctional labor institutions was. The effect is in the sense of saving money for the maintenance and correction of prisoners and obtaining some funds that at least partially recouped the costs of penitentiary practice. Also, the forced nature of the prisoners' labor also made it possible to save money on creating acceptable living and working conditions for freelance citizens. But in the end, the resulting economic effect (savings rather than effect) could not be compared with the damage received. The main type of damage was the death of hundreds of thousands of people. One of the most important economic effects of the use of forced labor was the long—term anomaly of the country's economic growth - extensive growth, when an increase in the product produced was achieved by increasing the number of people employed in production, rather than using new technologies and equipment. Which could not but lead to a crisis in industrial relations built on coercion in the age of technology and technology development" ^{[27, pp. 196-197]}.

The above brief and far from complete analysis of the available points of view clearly demonstrates the existence of controversy and the existence of different approaches around the problem of the effectiveness of forced labor in the Soviet GULAG system. In this discourse, according to the author, the proponents of two approaches are identified: economic and political. Supporters of the former rely on the foundations of economic theory and consider efficiency as the ratio of result to cost, while adherents of the latter – as an accelerated solution of important political and economic tasks. But, in any case, the solution to this issue cannot be unfounded and groundless, it must be based on reliable facts, statistical data, comparative characteristics for certain categories of special agent, industries, regions, etc. Here, researchers face difficulties related, firstly, to the objectivity of Gulag statistics, with overestimated indicators, with the presence of so-called "bullshit", and secondly, with the absence or extreme limitation of sources. Since 1954, according to the Orders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the instructions attached to them, regular destruction of documentation, including production documentation, which could provide answers to many questions, took place in correctional labor institutions. Therefore, a microlevel study of preserved materials on individual camps and colonies helps to restore data on the degree of efficiency of prisoners' work, which in the future, by comparison and analysis, will allow us to draw objective conclusions at the macro level.

In this regard, based on specific historical material, in particular, on the documents of the South Kuzbass ITL of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for 1950-1956 preserved in the archive of the GUFSIN for the Kemerovo region. We consider it necessary to cite certain aspects of the effectiveness of forced labor from an economic point of view.

Let's turn to a brief description of the camp. The South Kuzbass ITL of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was one of the largest camps in the Kemerovo region. It was located in remote areas of Mountainous Shoria and operated from 1947 to 1968. The camp went through several structural reorganizations (in 1953, 1954, 1956, 1957) and continued its work after the dismantling of the GULAG system. The basis of its activity was logging production based on harvesting, transportation and processing of wood. In addition, ITL was engaged in agricultural and woodworking production. The basis of the camp's working fund was made up of prisoners, whose number by 1952 had reached more than 24 thousand people. Until 1953, the camp annually increased its production capacity, increased the volume and range of commercial products. The reorganization of the Gulag system in 1953 led to a crisis in the production activities of the Yuzhkuzbasslag, to a change in its structure and departmental subordination, but despite the existing organizational difficulties, the camp retained its functions and continued to perform production tasks.

As part of the study of the problem of the effectiveness of forced labor, the author considers it necessary to specify the costs that were spent on the maintenance of the camp and the contingent. There is a misconception that using the labor of a special agent did not require special financial expenses from the state, that it was enough to bring prisoners to the place of deployment of the ITL, build barracks, fence with barbed wire, place paramilitary guards, determine the front of work, issue a working tool and monitor the performance of production tasks. But in fact, there were significantly more items of expenditure only for the maintenance of the contingent, and the state allocated quite a lot of money for this. Undoubtedly, favorable conditions for work and recreation were not created for convicted workers, but only minimal conditions for ensuring their vital activity, and even those did not always meet sanitary and hygienic requirements, which led to high morbidity and mortality.

 Using the example of the Yuzhnokuzbassky ITL (Table 1), it can be said that in addition to the primary costs of transporting and staging prisoners, feeding them, providing them with clothing, funds were required to create communal living conditions, medical and cultural and educational services, purchase and repair of production equipment. Starting in 1950, expenses for the payment of wages to workers were added to the above—listed costs, and since 1955 - additional funds for liberation, for industrial and general education training, contributions to the fund for assistance to the liberated. According to the data given in table 1, the actual costs of maintaining the contingent sometimes exceeded the planned ones (for example, in 1951, 1955, 1956), and in some cases, on the contrary, brought savings (1950, 1953, 1954). The amounts spent by the state ranged from 7,0967 thousand rubles.  up to 109619 thousand rubles .

Note the curious fact that from 1951 to 1955 there was a significant planned reduction in the cost of food and supplies for the camp contingent.  In 1950, 68564 thousand rubles were planned to be spent on food and 20,805 thousand rubles on material supplies, then already in 1951 these amounts decreased to 12501 thousand rubles and 3083 thousand rubles, respectively, and by 1955 they decreased to 5,400 thousand rubles for food and 1,900 thousand rubles for material supplies. In fact, the costs of these items of expenditure, starting in 1951, exceeded the plan and led to cost overruns. It is possible that such a decrease in funding is due to the transition of ITL to the payment of wages to prisoners and the deduction of funds from it for food and clothing allowances (Table 2).

Table 1. List of expenses of the South Uzbek ITL of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for the maintenance of the prisoner contingent (1950-1956) (thousand rubles)

*according to the author's calculations

Source: TA GUFSIN CO. F. 14. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 191 (314); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 8; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 30. L. 318 (15); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 235; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 5; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 53. L. 66; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 62.

Table 2. Amounts of monetary deductions from the imprisoned contingent in the South Uzbek ITL of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1950-1956) (thousand rubles)

* there is no plan

Source: TA GUFSIN CO. F. 14. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 201 (332); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 15; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 30. L. 324 (21); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 246; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 14; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 53. L. 73; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 60.

In addition to the direct costs of maintaining the contingent, the Yuzhkuzbasslag had a number of additional costs. These are the costs of communication, transport, maintenance of horses and dogs, armament, repair of buildings and structures, office, food, utilities, medical, cultural and educational services for administrative, managerial and maintenance personnel, as well as production, economic, operational and educational expenses. Table 3 shows the amounts of money spent on the maintenance of the camp in the period from 1950 to 1956. As we can see, the amounts spent by the state on the maintenance of the camp in different years ranged from a minimum of 113,381 thousand rubles in 1953 to a maximum of 160,376 thousand rubles in 1952.

Table 3. Funds spent on the maintenance of the South Kuzbass ITL of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in 1950-1956. (thousand rubles)

Source: TA GUFSIN CO. F. 14. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 191(313-314); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 8; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 30. L. 318 (15); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 235; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 5; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 53. L. 66; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 62.

Another issue that I would like to draw attention to is the self–sufficiency of the labor of the imprisoned contingent, due to the proceeds from the sale of manufactured products. In Yuzhkuzbasslag, in addition to the roundwood forest, a wide range of industrial products was produced: ordinary lumber grades 1-5, mine floor, shingles, special capping, container board, snow shield, Finnish shavings, cooperage, furniture, agricultural products and more. ITL, according to the concluded contracts, supplied products to enterprises, customers and individuals. Table 4 contains data on the gross amount of the contingent's output in rubles for which ITL produced products in the period from 1950 to 1956. We can see that the target indicator of the Southern Assembly has never been achieved.

Table 4. The gross amount of output by the prisoner contingent in the South Kuzbass ITL in 1950-1956. (thousand rubles)

Source: TA GUFSIN CO. F. 14. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 201 (332); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 15; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 30. L. 324 (21); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 246; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 14; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 53. L. 73; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 60.

But the interest here is not only the size of the sums of money for which commercial products were produced annually by the contingent, but their ratio to the cost of maintaining prisoners and servicing the general needs of the camp. Table 5 shows summary figures for these items of expenditure, which clearly demonstrate that the income received from the work of convicts did not always cover the costs of their maintenance, and the total cost of servicing the Yuzhkuzbasslag significantly exceeded them. According to the author's calculations, in 1950 — by 43,997 thousand rubles, in 1951 — by 42,503 thousand rubles, in 1952 — by 43,323 thousand rubles, in 1953 — by 3,2229 thousand rubles, in 1954 — by 33751 thousand rubles, in 1955 — by 36,453 thousand rubles, in 1956 G. — by 50185 thousand rubles .

Table 5. The actual amounts of expenses for the maintenance of the prisoner contingent and the amount of gross output in the South Kuzbass ITL (thousand rubles)

Source: TA GUFSIN CO. F. 14. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 191 (313-314), L. 201 (332); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 8, L. 15; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 30. L. 318 (15), L. 324 (21); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 235, L. 246; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 5, L. 14; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 53. L. 66, L. 73; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 60, L. 62.

Moreover, the ratio between income and expenses of the camp as a whole is of great importance, which takes into account not only the amount of gross output, but also other income in the form of income from counterparty work, retail network and additional expenses, for example, production costs, fines and penalties, etc. Table 6 shows the difference between the income and expenses received by the Yuzhkuzbasslag for 1950-1956. The indicators and figures from which the camp accounting was calculated are not available in the sources. The information shown in table 6 demonstrates the annual predominance of actual expenses over income. Moreover, the planned figures, with the exception of 1951, immediately laid such a negative result. But even the expected planned expenses often in fact had a significant excess. According to the author's calculations, in 1950 the plan was exceeded by 7041 thousand rubles, in 1951 — by 37042 thousand rubles, in 1952 — by 6925 thousand rubles, in 1953 — by 20894 thousand rubles, in 1954 — by 1767 thousand rubles, in 1955 — by 20241 thousand rubles, in 1956 — by 21636 thousand rubles.

Table 6. The ratio of income and expenses in the South Kuzbass ITL in 1950-1956. (thousand rubles)

*"-" — expenses

**"+" — income

Source: TA GUFSIN CO. F. 14. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 201 (332); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 15; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 30. L. 324 (21); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 36. L. 243; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 14; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 53. L. 73; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 64. L. 60.

Then the question arises as to how the camp economy functioned, the production activity of which did not even pay for its existence, not to mention the reimbursement of economic costs and profit. According to the data given in table 7, the Yuzhkuzbasslag annually received financial resources from the state budget and from the departmental unit under whose jurisdiction it was located. Despite the State's policy of self-sufficiency of correctional labor camps, the State provided them with regular financial assistance, without which this system could not have continued to exist. Here it is impossible not to agree with the above opinion of N. Y. Belykh, who pointed out the expediency of using forced labor from the point of view of solving current state political and economic problems. Indeed, the South Kuzbass ITL was organized in 1947 to ensure year-round uninterrupted supply of wood to the mines of the south of Kuzbass, which was extremely necessary for the functioning of the coal industry in the region. Due to an acute shortage of workers, the previously existing logging trust could not fulfill this task. The formed camp was able to organize logging activities in the shortest possible time and, by creating a wide transport network, ensure uninterrupted delivery of wood to customers. The rapid solution to the problem of shortage of workers in the logging industry of the Kemerovo region through the use of forced labor favored an increase in the volume of logging, as well as an increase in the number of industrial areas, an expansion of the range of agricultural and industrial goods produced.

Table 7. The amount of financial income for increasing the household fund in terms of working capital in the South Kuzbass ITL in 1950-1956. (thousand rubles)

*according to the author's calculations

Source: TA GUFSIN CO. F. 14. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 75-76; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 20. L. 22 (16); F. 14. Op. 1. D. 30. L. 142; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 39. L. 50; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 50; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 66. L. 16; F. 14. Op. 1. D. 75. L. 14 (19).

Thus, determining the effectiveness of forced labor in the Soviet economic system is a complex and controversial issue that requires a large-scale and comprehensive analysis at both the regional and national levels. The preserved statistical materials characterizing the forced labor system from the inside are of particular historical value. Using a specific example, some aspects of the economic activity of the camp economy related to expenses and income were considered. The analysis of the documentary material of the South Kuzbass ITL of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for 1950-1956 clearly showed that the use of forced labor was not cheap, and, moreover, free for the Soviet state. The State spent significant amounts for the operation of camp production and the maintenance of the prisoner contingent. The gross amount of output received by the camp for the products produced did not cover the costs even for the maintenance of the contingent (1952 was the exception), not to mention the total amount of money spent on the maintenance of the ITL. The camp existed at the expense of government grants and subsidies received annually. The income from production activities that Yuzhkuzbasslag received did not cover its expenses, and the losses were planned. All this suggests that the purpose of organizing ITL's production activities was not to make a profit, but to fulfill the set state tasks. In particular, the South Kuzbass ITL of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR was able to solve an important production task – to increase the volume of logging and, thereby, contribute to the smooth operation of the coal industry of the Kemerovo region.