Reports of Swedish diplomats on the events of the First World War (based on the decryption of diplomatic correspondence)

This year marks the 110th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. More than a century has passed, but interest in this epochal and extremely dramatic event, the causes and circumstances of which marked the entry of mankind into the era of globalization, does not weaken. Moreover, new aspects are opening up for study, new evidence and documents that help to study this grandiose event in world history in more detail.

As you know, Sweden took a position of neutrality during the First World War and did not take part in hostilities. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that she "fell out" of the world politics of that time, and the events of the First World War did not concern her at all. In fact, the situation was very ambiguous, and the Swedish Kingdom, for various reasons, was somehow involved in a global conflict.

Already in the period of preparation for the future global clash, which was designed to resolve the accumulated irreconcilable imperialist contradictions, its initiators took care to exclude undesirable interference in it by a number of countries. The authors of the fundamental study "The History of the First World War" noted: "If it was not possible to win over any country that occupied a strategically important position, then the participants of both coalitions sought to deprive the enemy of taking advantage of its position by proclaiming the "eternal neutrality" of this country" ^{[1, p. 58]}. And further: "One of the forms of providing oneself in case of any actions on the part of potential opponents were agreements on maintaining the status quo in a certain area. Such agreements were concluded at different times and in various combinations, for example, on maintaining the status quo on the Mediterranean (France, Italy, England and Spain), on the Baltic Sea (Russia, Germany, Denmark, Sweden), on the North Sea (Germany, Denmark, France, England, Holland, Sweden)" ^{[1, p. 59]}.

In general, the Swedish leadership, despite having different views towards the Entente countries and the bloc of Central powers in the country's political circles, also believed that neutrality was the best way out of the extremely tense international situation during the war. In December 1914, at the initiative of the Swedish King Gustav V, a meeting of three Scandinavian monarchs took place in Malmo (Sweden). The Danish, Norwegian and Swedish rulers confirmed the common desire to "stay out of the war" ^{[2, p.386]}.

However, not everything was so simple. It is known that in the political elite of Sweden there were many supporters of the revival of the lost Swedish imperialism, which in the course of historical events was actually taken away by Russia. As the researchers note, "the Swedish elite at the beginning of the 20th century lived with memories of the former greatness of the superpower (let's add that in the twentieth century the "imperial syndrome" periodically manifested itself in Swedish politics on the world stage. – Ed.). King Gustav V of Sweden and his wife Queen Victoria openly sympathized with the Kaiser of the Second Reich, and already in the 30s Gustav would communicate closely with Hitler's entourage" ^[3]. In their opinion, "Gustav V was the last Swedish monarch who actively intervened in politics. The royal couple relied on the so-called "activists", as supporters of an active foreign policy aimed at restoring the country's status as the leading power of Scandinavia were then called in Sweden ^[3].

In the voluminous study "The History of Sweden" under the scientific editorship of the outstanding Russian specialist in the field of the history of the Scandinavian countries A.S. Kahn, in particular, the obvious "Germanophilism" of the Swedish monarch was noted. The chapter in this edition devoted to Sweden's position during the war is called "Sweden's pro–German neutrality in 1914-1916" ^{[4, p. 419]}. The authors emphasize that Swedish neutrality has always had, in contrast to the firm Swiss, the character, so to speak, of neutrality by circumstances ^{[4, p. 420]}. The conservative and court camps leaned towards an alliance with Germany ^{[4, p.421]}. At that time, the Riksmarschall (head of the court department), the former head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Count Ludwig Douglas, advocated a war in alliance with Germany against Russia..." ^[3]. After the fall of Staaf's liberal cabinet, St. Petersburg was preparing for a possible military rapprochement between Sweden and Kaiser's Germany ^{[4, p.421]}.

However, the research also notes that in addition to "activists" there were many supporters of neutrality in Swedish political circles. According to the authors who studied Swedish politics during the First World War, the struggle of the two noted directions predetermined "the duality and uncertainty of Swedish politics in August 1914" ^[3].

The famous Swedish researcher J. Weibul, in his work "A Brief History of Sweden", published in Russian, wrote that formally Sweden followed the Hague Convention, according to which "the country must be absolutely impartial towards the belligerents." I.e. Sweden claimed the right to trade with both sides of the conflict. But, the author further writes, since the economic blockade of Germany was one of the most effective measures of warfare by the Entente, "formal Swedish neutrality began to favor exclusively Germany" ^{[5, p. 116]}.

On the second day of the war, August 2, 1914, in Sweden, even "the mobilization of the army and navy was begun, special attention was paid to coastal defense — precisely in the light of the "Russian military threat". However, "with doubts and hesitations, but the ruling elite of Stockholm" approved the declaration of neutrality on August 6 ^[3].

During this period, the country's Foreign Ministry in the conservative government of K.J. Hammarskjold was headed by Knut Wallenberg, who was not only a statesman and diplomat, but also a major banker. He sympathized with the Entente countries, waged a serious struggle with the "activists" who advocated rapprochement with the bloc of Central powers, but did not interrupt ties with Germany, concluding profitable trade and economic agreements. His foreign policy activities are covered in detail in the modern work of A.B. Gekht ^{[6; 7, p. 142]}.

The decisive argument for the decision on neutrality was still not the goodwill of the majority of the Swedish people, as the Swedish historian I. Andersson writes about it ^{[2, p. 386]}, but a well-defined calculation.  I.N. Novikova, a prominent Russian expert on the history of Sweden, notes that "one of the most important prerequisites that allowed Sweden to maintain its neutrality during the First World War was the increase in its economic importance for the warring coalitions. Trade with Sweden meant for Germany a way out of economic isolation and dealt a significant blow to the British blockade policy. The trade and economic importance for the Russian Empire consisted, firstly, in the intensification of mutual trade exchange, and secondly, Sweden became the leading transit country for allied supplies to Russia" ^{[8, p. 61]}.

Thus, Swedish neutrality in the early years of the war was very profitable, because Stockholm managed to trade profitably and provide various economic services to both warring parties. Therefore, the Swedish government was extremely interested in knowing what was happening on both front lines in order to be ready for any turn of events. Accordingly, it was also important for the Russian military and civilian leadership to know what the Swedish side was interested in, its assessments of events and possible actions. This is evidenced by the materials of the interception of Swedish diplomatic telegrams by the special services of the Russian General Staff, sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia for information, which have been preserved in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. These interceptions and decryptions relate mainly to the events of December 1915 and January-October 1916. They were sent to Comrade (Deputy) Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Neratov either through the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the General Staff of the Russian Army, or directly from the General Staff.

The reports of Swedish diplomats touched on the following issues: the situation of the Powers of Consent in the Balkans by January 1916; the fate of Serbia and Montenegro after the defeat of the Serbian army; a retelling of a conversation with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Radoslavov and the Austro-Hungarian envoy and the internal political situation in the warring countries. There is no information about telegrams about events on the Western and Eastern Fronts, apparently because the Foreign Ministry was interested in the assessments of Swedish diplomats in the Balkans in order to understand the view of the situation there, so to speak, "from the outside", to obtain additional information from alternative sources, to clarify the positions of Sweden itself, etc.

In a telegram to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. To Wallenberg, the head of the Swedish mission in Paris, Aug. F. Gullenstolpe, reported in December 1915: "The insufficiently consonant and energetic actions of the Allies in Macedonia, as the events of recent weeks have shown, had sad consequences both for their prestige on the Balkan Peninsula and for the Serbian state and people. It is not even a secret to anyone that Lord Kitchener (Secretary of State for Military Affairs, member of the British Cabinet. After visiting this front, he was inclined to believe that the Allies should retreat from Thessaloniki, and that he expressed this view in Athens, which naturally served as an excuse for King Constantine to take an even more wait-and-see attitude towards the proposals of the powers of Consent than before" ^{[9, l. 3]}.

We are talking about the catastrophic situation of the Serbian army after entering the war on the side of the Austro-German bloc of Bulgaria, as well as the small number and inefficiency of the actions of the Anglo-French troops on the Salonika front, which predetermined the catastrophe of the Serbian army. As for the position of the Greek King Constantine, he was not inclined to cooperate with the Entente before. According to many observers, this was hindered by the fact, as the authoritative Russian newspaper Novoye Vremya writes, for example, that "Greece is not going to be neutral until the end," since King Constantine is convinced of the victory of the Austro-German troops. Events will take place in such a way that after the defeat of the Serbs, the allied forces will be forced out of Macedonia to Greece, where the Greek king will be forced to "draw the sword" against them. And Bulgaria will stretch from the Black and Aegean Seas to the Adriatic and cut off Greece from the rest of Europe. "The current "benevolent neutrality" of Greece," the author of the article believes, "is nothing more than an open preparation for a future attack on the allied forces that landed in Thessaloniki" ^[10]. The position of the Greek king was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that his wife was the sister of the German Emperor William II.

The Swedish diplomat further writes that Italy joined the London Declaration of September 5, 1914, signed by Britain, France and Russia, on the non-conclusion of a separate peace with Germany and its allies. This meant that Italy intended to fully act on the side of the Entente ^{[9, l. 3 vol.]}.

The author reports that by decree of December 2, General Joffre was appointed, instead of "commander-in-chief of the northern armies," "commander-in-chief of the French armies," which also include troops in Morocco and in the colonies. He chose General Castelnau as his chief of staff.

According to the author, in Paris at the end of 1915, frequent meetings took place, both between British and French government representatives, and between representatives of the French, British, Russian, Belgian and Serbian armies. This military council met under the chairmanship of General Joffre, and the result of the negotiations was a general decision not to leave the military base in Thessaloniki until the Franco-British expeditionary force had tried all the means at its disposal to carry out its task. This unanimity, according to the Swedish diplomat, "apparently made the desired impression on Greece, and it seems that now they have achieved that the French and British will be given the necessary freedom of action with the right to use railways, etc." ^{[9, l.3 vol.]}.

The author of the report points out: "It is clear from the latest news that the French and British troops are retreating under the energetic onslaught of the enemy. The Western powers, apparently, now intend to limit themselves only to the solid occupation of Thessaloniki and methodical defense, waiting for better times until the fragments of the Serbian army are reorganized. They hope no more, no less, than to paralyze the enemy troops and make them understand that the fate of Serbia and the Balkan states has not yet been decided in the desired sense for them" ^{[9, l.4]}.

Summing up his messages, the Swedish Envoy concludes: "I cannot presume to judge how optimistic such a view is, but one can, however, say that even if the situation in that theater of war becomes seriously complicated, the game is not considered lost, although it cannot be denied that in recent weeks there has been some concern in connection with the critical situation in Macedonia" ^{[9, l. 4]}.

The Swedish diplomat's reasoning is confirmed by the development of events in Greece, where the Powers of Consent, through their representatives, exerted serious pressure on the government of the country, trying to force it to take a more definite position in relation to the actions of the Anglo-French troops on its territory. According to the Russian Word newspaper, allied diplomats told the head of the Greek cabinet, Skoulides, that "if, for any reason, the powers of consent have to transfer military operations to the territory of Greece, they retain full freedom of operations and will not tolerate any embarrassment and objections." They also demanded the same for the Serbian troops. This declaration was accompanied by an "impressive naval demonstration of the Allied fleet" ^[11].

The Balkan theme was also developed in his report by the Swedish envoy to Vienna, Baron Joachim Beck-Friysk, in January 1916. He informs Minister K. Wallenberg of the details of the correspondence between the Montenegrin King Nicholas and the Austrian Emperor about the conclusion of peace after the occupation of the capital of Montenegro Cetinje by the troops of the Central Powers, the details of which were reported to him by an informant from the "Austrian headquarters" in Montenegro. The diplomat quotes the words of the king, in which he "appealed to the chivalrous feelings of the emperor in view of the occupation of his capital and for the sake of concluding peace with the preservation of freedom by his people." Bek-Friysk writes: "To this letter, the emperor replied that he was pleased that the king recognized the futility of continuing the war, but that, however, he left it to the supreme command of the army to establish peace conditions. The latter consisted in unconditional surrender and the surrender of all weapons, with the exception, however, of ancient ones, which constitute hereditary property. Already on January 16, these conditions were accepted by the king" ^{[9, L. 6]}.

After this correspondence, the King of Montenegro went to Italy, and then to France. On this occasion, the Swedish envoy writes: "The fact that King Nicholas has now left further peace negotiations does not change the matter at all, because in any case, the fate of Montenegro is still unclear. I cannot provide anything reliable on this issue, as well as on the fate of Serbia. It seems, however, that it is intended to completely destroy the last state by dividing it. It did not seem quite impossible that Montenegro would have received some part under such a partition, but after the king's flight there is nothing to think about it. He also needs to say goodbye to Lovcen and the Adriatic coast" ^{[9, l. 7-7 vol.]}.

After the defeat of the Serbian army and the fall of Montenegro, the Central Powers began to concentrate their forces against the Thessaloniki Front of the Powers of Consent. Bek-Friysk reports the data he collected: "Everyone here expects that operations against the Allies in Thessaloniki will begin in the very next few days, simultaneously with the continuation of the offensive to clear Albania. The Austro-Hungarian, German-Bulgarian and Turkish army, which is ready for this and consists under the command of Field Marshal Mackensen, has up to 600,000 soldiers, and it is said that field railways have been built for a considerable length in the direction of the Greek border" ^{[9, l. 7 vol.]}.

Swedish diplomats received the information they were interested in in a variety of ways, including in their conversations with politicians from different countries. In this case, we are talking about conversations between the Swedish Envoy to Sofia, K. Ankarswerd, with Bulgarian Foreign Minister V. Radoslavov and the Austro-Hungarian Envoy to Bulgaria, Count Tarnowski, at the end of February 1916. Note that Sweden's ambiguous position in the conflict and the presence of German supporters in the country's elite may have allowed representatives of the Austro-German bloc to be more They were frank in their conversations with Swedish diplomats. Although it cannot be excluded that in this way they wanted to exert a certain beneficial influence on the Swedes. Russian Russian special services intercepted and deciphered the Swedish diplomat's report, there is a pencil note on the letter accompanying it (possibly made by a representative of the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the General Staff of the Russian Army) - "I think that it would be necessary to transfer the contents to the Allies" ^{[9, L. 9]}.

Vasil Radoslavov has just returned from a trip during which he, together with the Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, visited the "German and Austrian headquarters" (i.e., the supreme command of the armies). He told the Swedish diplomat information about Bulgaria's immediate plans during the war. In particular, the minister said that "the issue of the attack on Thessaloniki has now been postponed indefinitely. Bulgaria does not want to sacrifice human lives, which is inextricably linked to the offensive." According to him, the Bulgarian army will therefore take a defensive position, and it is confident that it will be able to repel possible attacks from the troops of the powers of Consent. "The conquest of Thessaloniki," Radoslavov said, "is not in Bulgaria's interests, even if she had any hope of holding them, as this would cause strained relations with Greece. The Bulgarian government gave reassuring assurances to Greece and confirmed to its rulers that Bulgaria's policy is not as chauvinistic as everyone thinks" ^{[9, l. 9-9ob]}.

Further, the Bulgarian minister noted that "the merger of Macedonia with Bulgaria was inevitable", since it was allegedly "impossible to continue to ignore the demands of the Macedonian party in this regard" ^{[9, L. 10]}. Radoslavov, however, does not say that among the inhabitants of Macedonia there were both supporters of the union with Bulgaria and obvious opponents. He claims that the attempt to reach an agreement with Serbia on the Macedonian issue "failed", and the Bulgarian government saw itself forced to join the Central Powers ^{[9, l. 10]}.

Regarding the Entente's policy on the Greek issue and in justification of his country's accession to the Austro-German bloc, Radoslavov states: "The unbearable oppression under which Greece is now would otherwise fall to the lot of all the Balkan states. By joining the central powers, Bulgaria not only wanted to achieve the possession of Macedonia, but also to eliminate the possibility of vassalage from the powers of "consent"" ^{[9, l. 10]}.

The Swedish envoy told Radoslavov that Bulgaria could probably count on compensation in Albania for the sacrifices it had suffered if it had agreed to advance on Thessaloniki. To this, the Bulgarian politician replied that "Bulgaria does not want to interfere in the resolution of the Albanian issue. She does not need a port on the Adriatic Sea." And participation in the storming of the Albanian Elbasan was caused only by the fact that "Bulgarian troops, who found themselves near this city after the persecution of the Serbs," were forced to enter it for the sake of replenishing supplies. "The population of Albania is an extremely unreliable element, which has brought misfortune to Turkey," the minister said. "The country is ruined, and Bulgaria's acquisition of part of the Albanian territory would oblige it to take care of the food of the population, but in this regard, Bulgaria is satisfied with providing assistance to the war–affected residents of Macedonia. During a visit to Vienna by Tsar Ferdinand, the latter assured that Bulgaria had no claims to any part of Albania, and this assurance was, of course, accepted from the Austrian side with great satisfaction" ^{[9, l. 10]}.

K. Ankarswerd notes that the reaction of the Austrian leadership in relation to the Albanian issue is quite understandable. Austria would not like to have a Slavic state on the Adriatic, as this goes against its international policy.

We can add to his words that Vienna was afraid of Russia's penetration into this region. The Swedish envoy himself notes that until recently Serbia was an obstacle in this policy, "but Bulgaria is also a Slavic state, and no one can be sure that a few years after the war its relations with Russia will not take a different turn than now" ^{[9, l. 10 vol.]}.

Turning to the presentation of the conversation with the Austro-Hungarian envoy in Sofia, the Swedish diplomat notes that "the local Austro-Hungarian envoy Count Tarnowski, who apparently played a prominent role, in all respects more outstanding than his recently recalled German colleague, G. Michahelles, confirmed to me what G. Radoslavov said about the moderate position of Bulgaria in relation to Albania" ^{[9, l. 10 vol.]}. On the issue of Thessaloniki, according to K. Ankarswerd, "the count's statements were less categorical, and he pointed to the difficulty of delivering artillery through Serbia and Macedonia as a sufficient reason in itself to delay the offensive." He further said that, in view of the currently energetic German offensive against France, "Germany probably considers it inconvenient to attack Thessaloniki at the same time" ^{[9, l. 10-10 vol.]}.

Like Radoslavov, the Swedish envoy notes, Count Tarnowski suggested that "the war will not last long." The Austrian count believes that "after the decisive success now in France, for example, the occupation of Paris after the breakthrough of the French front, France does not have enough moral strength to resist, which would create a decisive superiority of the central powers and, consequently, peace" ^{[9, l. 10 vol.]}.

Summing up his conversations with both high-ranking officials, K. Ankarswerd concludes that such a view seems to him "too optimistic." He writes: "... By the way... it is not known whether Germany will be able and willing to make such a sacrifice of people as would require a breakthrough of the French front. The more hopes are placed on the German offensive against France, and the larger it takes on, the more obvious it becomes that the burden of the war has had a heavy impact on the central powers. To this it should be added that Turkey can be considered almost completely exhausted, and that plans for an attack on England in Egypt are hardly possible now to carry out with the hope of success" ^{[9, 10 vols.]}.

Swedish diplomats were interested not only in the events on the fronts, but also in the internal political life of the warring powers. Baron Beck-Friysk, the Swedish envoy to Vienna, in August 1916 wrote to the Swedish envoy to Petrograd, General Brenstr?m, about rumors according to which Count Andrassy could be appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary and about the so-called "Hungarian opposition" (i.e. supporters of Hungarian independence, who took a position of a more moderate and peaceful foreign policy politics).

The author of the letter notes the increased activity of Count Andrassy, who represented the "Hungarian opposition" in foreign affairs, who in his actions "went so far that perhaps he will even undertake an information trip to Berlin." This gave rise to rumors in Vienna that Andrassy could replace Baron Burian as head of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry. The author believes that the head of government, Count Tissa, who had influence on Burian, "is inclined to work together with the leader of the opposition." However, according to the author, the emperor is unlikely to agree to change the foreign minister now ^{[9, l. 15]}.

Among the Hungarian opposition, after the actions of Andrassy, who wanted "the participation of their leaders in foreign policy," a split arose. A group of "ultra Magyars", as Beck-Friysk calls them, led by Count Mikhail Karolyi, "have long been" leading a "Russophile policy", claiming that "Hungary is not at all interested in war" and threatening "to force Austria and Germany to make peace with a separatist world, and thus change an ally, who has already saved Hungary from the Russian invasion two ^{[9, l.15]} times." The author notes that "Karolyi's group is like a minority within a minority. The only thing that can be feared from these persons is an undesirable debate in the Reichstag - they hope, however, that Count Tissa will be able to warn them, if not in any other way, then by arresting the rebels as state traitors ^{[9, l. 15 vol.]}.

The study of the submitted documents makes it possible to assess the range of issues of interest to Swedish diplomats and the Swedish government, the degree of their awareness, the quality of information sources and the level of understanding of the content of the events taking place. These documents are very important for clarifying Sweden's position during the First World War. Since there were supporters of both the Entente and the Austro-German bloc in the Swedish elite, it can be understood from the documents under consideration that during this period it became increasingly obvious to Swedish diplomats that despite all the difficulties, including in the Balkans, the preponderance of the Entente countries was more likely. This conclusion was very important for the Swedish government, since the Entente allies, primarily the British, almost completely blocked Swedish trade by the end of 1916. J. Weibul writes that in 1916 "there was an acute shortage of food", some goods were distributed by cards. ^{[5, p. 116]}. In The History of Sweden, edited by A.S. Kahn, it was emphasized that, from the formal legal side, the Swedes were right in their neutrality, "stubbornly unwilling to submit to British control; however, in this case, the international law of neutral trade ultimately served the imperialist interests of the Quadruple Alliance and doomed Swedish workers to hunger and cold"^{[4, p. 423]}. As a result, in 1917, the Hammarskjold government was forced to resign due to the hunger riots. The new government established relations with the Entente and imports resumed.

And for the Russian leadership, intercepted reports from Swedish diplomats (let's pay tribute to our then special services) were very important, because Russia was also largely dependent on Swedish trade. These documents, among other things, drew attention to those aspects that could be used both in working with the Swedish leadership and in relations with the allies, and provided information about the enemy, especially since the Balkan problems have always been the focus of our diplomacy.