The struggle of the government of Alexei Mikhailovich with the uprising led by S. T. Razin in the summer and autumn of 1671.

Shapovalenko Dmitrii Andreevich Assistant, Department of History, Moscow City University 34A Altufyevskoye str., Moscow, 127562, Russia dmitriy.shapovalenko0106@gmail.com Other publications by this author

In the mass consciousness, the movement led by Stenka Razin ends on June 6 in connection with the execution of a "thief" chieftain in the capital. However, his case continued to bother certain regions of the Russian state in the summer and autumn of 1671. It is noteworthy that the Razin rebellion went beyond the internal problems of our country and attracted the close attention of neighboring powers to another "turmoil". The conclusions drawn by the government of the "Quietest" tsar as a result of the suppression of the riot are also very indicative. Thus, this article is aimed at updating knowledge and filling in gaps about the events of the S.T. Razin uprising.

Among the works that touch on the theme of the Razin uprising, it should be highlighted: "Russian history in the biographies of its main figures" ^{[1, pp. 674-686]} and "The Revolt of Stenka Razin" ^{[2, pp. 330-330.]} N. I. Kostomarova, "The History of Russia since ancient times" ^{[3, pp. 349-409]} p. M. Solovyov, "The History of the Stenka Razin Outrage" ^[4] by A. N. Popov and "The Complete Course of Russian History" ^{[5, pp. 661-663]} by V. O. Klyuchevsky.

Each of the above-mentioned researchers belonged to different historical "schools". Due to this circumstance, the movement led by S. T. Razin underwent an individual examination of each of them. N. I. Kostomarov analyzed the Razin rebellion from the point of view of popular culture, S. M. Solovyov saw in the movement exclusively "robbery and rebellion", A. N. Popov tried to describe the events of the "Razinovshchina" in the form of a chronological narrative. The ideas of class struggle, which became relevant in the late XIX – early XX centuries, were reflected in the works of V. O. Klyuchevsky and his students. In their perception, the uprising is a confrontation between the oppressed "lower classes" and the "upper classes".

A new round of interest in the personality of S. T. Razin and the movement under his leadership has been noted in the works of historians throughout the Soviet period. The term "peasant war" was firmly entrenched in historiography only in the 1950s. The works of such researchers as V. I. Lebedev ^[6], E. I. Chernyshev ^[7], V. I. Buganov ^{[8, pp. 51-112]}, A. N. Sakharov ^[9], E. V. Chistyakova ^[10], etc. consider The uprising is exclusively in the context of the class struggle and forms a national hero out of Razin.

Among the works of the above-mentioned authors, the possibility of analyzing this phenomenon from different angles is also demonstrated. For example, E. I. Chernyshev paid special attention to economic issues and considered the participation of the peoples of the Volga region in the uprising. E. V. Chistyakova demonstrated that the movement continued to exist and resist despite the fate of Razin. Such a circumstance became possible due to the independence of the "thieves" chieftains.

Post-Soviet historiography has noted a special interest in the military component of the Razin movement. This trend is due to the active study of the military history of Russia before Peter I. However, most of the works contain ideas formulated in the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods. Among the works written after 1991, it should be noted: "Alexey Mikhailovich" ^{[11, pp. 531-555]} I. L. Andreeva, "Razin movement: a view from the XXI century" N. I. Nikitin ^[12], "Tsar Alexei the Quietest: Chronicle of Power" ^{[13, pp. 453-482]} V. N. Kozlyakova and "The Game of the Tsar: the socio-political struggle in Russia in the second half of the XVII century" ^{[14, pp. 104-159]} by D. A. Lyapin.

The military aspect of the Razin uprising is considered in the following studies: "The armed forces of the Russian state in the XV-XVII century." ^{[15, pp. 183-185]} A.V. Chernova, "Moscow elective soldier regiments in the initial period of their history. 1656-1671" ^{[16, pp. 525-555]} A.V. Malova, "Moscow Streltsy of the second half of the XVII - beginning of the XVIII century. "It's easy to shoot from samopals"" ^{[17, pp. 161-184]} A. E. Pisareva, "The Sovereign, the state, the civil service of Alekseevskaya Russia" G. V. Talina ^{[18, p. 304]} and "Cannons of the first Romanovs" ^{[19, pp. 147-150]} A. N. Lobin.

In the works of foreign historians K. Stevens ^{[20, pp. 267-276]}, K. Ingerfolma ^{[21, pp. 132-152]} and N. S. Kollmann ^{[22, pp. 388, 617]} also paid attention to the uprising of S. T. Razin.

A large number of different types of sources, both published and archived, despite the study of the Razin uprising, make it possible to further study it. In fact, sources can be divided into two large groups: domestic and foreign.

The former are represented by an extensive source base, mainly presented in the form of office documents. These include various kinds of letters, replies from voivodes, petitions, decrees, orders of painting, etc. Among the published collections used to write the article, it is necessary to highlight "Materials for the history of the outrage of Stenka Razin" ^[23] and "The Peasant War led by Stepan Razin" Vol. II. Part I ^[24], Vol. III ^[25], Vol. IV ^[26].

Archival materials from two RGADA foundations were also used. F. 111 ("Don affairs") ^{[27][28][29][30][31][32]} It is mainly devoted to the visits of the Don villages to the capital with news. 

By the summer of 1671, the unconditional victory of the government camp over the rebels became obvious to everyone. Against the background of the planned localization and liquidation of the movement in the regions, as well as the capture of the Razin brothers and the execution of Stepan, the rebels, being in a state of despair, tried in every possible way to continue the resistance to Moscow, doomed to failure in advance. Among the measures to stabilize the situation in the territories subordinate to them, it is necessary to indicate the executions, including Metropolitan Joseph and the confrontation of V. Usa and F. Sheludyak to the "thieves" detachments of A. Katorzhny and S. Kochanovsky. Back in the spring of 1671, at the Cossack circle in Astrakhan, the thesis was voiced that this city remained the last stronghold of the rebels in the south. Small groups of "thieves" flocked to Astrakhan from different regions, one of them was headed by Ivan Konstantinov. According to E.V. Chistyakova, their total number reached 8000 people in 370 ploughs ^{[10, pp. 130-134]}.

On January 7, 1671, P. V. Sheremetev was appointed governor of Simbirsk. The garrison of the city consisted of Kazan and Sviyazhsk nobles, children of boyars and foreigners numbering 300 "good people" who should have come to service with "subsistence with all full supplies." There were also Moscow archers from three orders in the city ^{[24, p. 521]}. The boyar was given the regimental banner that had previously belonged to P. S. Urusov ^{[24, p. 524]}.

In the winter of 1670-1671, there was a change of mayors – P. V. Sheremetev arrived instead of M. L. Pleshcheyev. In this regard, the letter to the Simbirsk voivode, dated no earlier than January 20, 1671, is very remarkable. The Simbirsk posadsky people who came to the city from Samara, M. Levontiev and F. Cheboksary residents were sent to the Samara residents to repent of their sins and swear allegiance to the great sovereign. From their questioning speeches, the situation in Samara became known.

The rebellious garrison consisted of: 90 Yaik Cossacks, 10 Don Cossacks, 300 newly recruited and 150 Beloyarans under the command of Ataman Lesko. The total population of the city was about 700 people. A small amount of gunpowder and grain stocks was also noted. The rebels' plans included a campaign to Bely Yar and setting up a "guard" at Five Huts, whose task was not to let anyone to the Don ("beat to death") except the Cossacks. M. Levontiev and F. themselves. Cheboksary spent a long time in prison in Samara, awaiting execution, which was avoided. Thus, since the winter of 1670-1671, the main tasks for the garrison of the city, in addition to the defense of the city, were reconnaissance of the area and bringing the rebels who had left in the Lower Volga region to the "kiss of the cross" ^{[24, pp. 533-537]}.

Fyodor Sheludyak's campaign with his detachment to Simbirsk became the "agony" of the rebels. Together with the captured Razin brothers, a delegation from the Don arrived in Moscow. In particular, on June 2, 1671, Don ataman L. Semenov noted that Sheludyak's detachment moved from Tsaritsyn up the Volga on 170 ploughs ^{[27, L. 2, 21]}. On May 29, they began to approach Simbirsk from the following directions: Bely Yar (70 ploughs), Samara (horse and foot "with 1000 people with ataman Yvashka Kostyantinov", "from the bottom" (Astrakhan, Krasnoyarsk, Chernoyarsk, Tsaritsyn, Saratov and Samara Cossacks in 370 strugs) ^{[25, p. 110]}.

Already on May 31, the rebels were near Simbirsk. One of their main tasks was to interrupt the supply of supplies and reinforcements to the city.

The garrison under the command of P. V. Sheremetev was in active defense. The besieged, in particular, the Moscow Streltsy ordered by N. Kolobov, made sorties. It is noteworthy that the trenches left near Simbirsk since the autumn of 1670 have not been dug and were actively used by the rebels ^{[28, l. 5]}.

The siege is especially notable for the fact that the rebels decided to buy time and entered into negotiations with the garrison of the city and P. V. Sheremetev, in particular ^{[25, p. 109]}. However, these measures were in vain, government troops from Tetyusha advanced to help Simbirsk, and Yu. N. Baryatinsky "hurriedly" marched from Tambov ^{[25, pp. 102, 115]}. It is noteworthy that on May 24, 1671, the governor was initially sent with his forces to Tsaritsyn ^{[26, p. 63]}. Unfortunately, there is significantly less information about the defense of Simbirsk in the summer of 1671 than in the autumn of 1670. However, it is known that on June 9, the rebels launched a night assault, which was unsuccessful ^{[25, pp. 110-111]}. The rebels were "near Sinbirsk, all the guns, guns, and gunpowder were beaten off" ^{[28, l. 6]}.

The rebels were defeated. E. V. Chistyakova formulated the following reasons for their defeat: 1) the general decline of the movement associated with the weakening of forces, 2) the role of the personality of S. Razin, 3) the command of the siege of F. Sheludyak handed F. Sveshnikov and I. Bylinin ^{[10, pp. 134-135]}. In this regard, the articles sent from Moscow after June 23 on the outcome of the fighting are very interesting. In the capital, the loyalty of the garrison of the city was highly appreciated, and Alexey Mikhailovich "graciously praised" all participants in the defense of Simbirsk. However, the government could not help but react to P. V. Sheremetev's correspondence with the rebels. It is worth noting that there were no serious sanctions against the governor: "And they did not do much, and they, the boyar and the governor, would not do so in the future...". Also, according to the articles sent from Moscow, it was necessary to build a church (the defenders of the city "promised to build it during the siege"); it was also necessary to transfer all the "thieves' bread" into granaries and count military men, stocks of gunpowder and lead, etc. ^{[25, pp.108-110]}.

The rebels withdrew from the city ("standing by the Meadow side") and after two days of waiting headed for Samara ^{[25, p. 109]}. For a better understanding of the further actions of the government forces, it is necessary to describe the situation that took place in the regions affected by the uprising.

After the defeat of the rebels at Simbirsk in the detachment of F. Sheludyak numbered about 2,000 - 3,000 people who went to Tsaritsyn ^{[28, l. 5]}. In this regard, the atmosphere prevailing in the cities located downstream of the Volga is very remarkable. From the information received from the Don villages that came to Moscow, it followed that the local population either completely or partially did not support the rebels: "... having been frightened, they ran from Sinbirsk from their brethren and, in their guilt, finished off the great sovereign with a brow, and the Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, Saratov, Samaritans all went to their homes, and left them to wait for the sovereign's mercy..." ^{[28, l. 5-6]}. Also, the reports of the chieftains indicate the small number of "thieves" garrisons. In Tsaritsyn: "there are a small number of thieves in the remainder, all fled separately", Samara: "about a hundred people remained in their homes", the Yaik Cossacks returned to Yaik ^{[28, l. 6]}. The inhabitants of the cities were waiting for the arrival of government troops, expressing a desire to "finish off their brows" in their wines and promising to be faithful to the great sovereign. Residents of the cities of Tsaritsyn, Samara and Saratov carried out all their words and "finished off with a confession" ^{[25, p. 116, 119, 131-132, 136, 142]}.

A very interesting and revealing episode occurred in Tsaritsyn. The local "thieves" administration planned to send local residents to Astrakhan. However, the Tsaritsyn people, with the support of the Cossacks, faced the forces of the "thieves" ataman M. Osipov and defeated them. The result of this event was the imprisonment of some rebels who did not want to turn themselves in to the great sovereign: "... they took many of their comrades alive and beat them and the thieves are sitting before your great sovereign by decree at their Tsaritsyn behind a strong guard" ^{[29, l. 3]}.

Unrest in the region persisted. On July 20, 1671, Tatars and Bashkirs numbering 1,000 people came to Verkhny Lomov, captured local residents and drove the herds into the steppe. After them, together with his regiment, Yu. N. Baryatinsky moved out of Saransk. And as of July 30, he was in Penza ^{[25, pp. 135-136]}.

It was restless in Tambov county. At the end of June, E. Pashkov wrote to Moscow about the Kalmyks' attacks on people from Khopra to Tambov. The governor noted: "And along the Tanbovsky fortresses, my lord, along the earthen rampart there are Tanbov soldiers, small men, and those, my lord, not many people have a gun, while others stand without a gun and without horses." Despite the fact that the state-owned weapon "sprayed". The situation was aggravated by the fact that 500 muskets were issued to Colonel Yu's soldiers. Grabovs who went on a campaign as part of the troops of Yu. N. Baryatinsky ^{[25, pp. 115-116]}. In July, P. V. Sheremetyev also wrote about the threat to Tambov from "thieves". The rebel detachment under the command of Serik numbered about 500 people with 7 guns and planned to operate in the area of the Tambov line ^{[25, pp. 129-130]}.

It is worth noting the very ambiguous relations with the Kalmyks that developed in the summer of 1671. It became known that on June 2, the Crimean and Nagai Tatars, together with the Kalmyks of the two taysh (Boss and Duar), crossed from the "Crimean side to the Nogai side" and wanted to go to the "Ukrainian cities" ^{[27, L. 3, 21]}. At the same time, the interaction between the Don Cossacks and the Taish Ayuka, Solom – Tsereney and Batyr was noted. Given the limited supply of stocks to the Don, the project is very attractive for both sides. In particular, a trip was made to the "Malybashki uluses" ^{[29, l. 4, 10]}.  It is worth noting that such unions, among other things, should have contributed to bringing the Kalmyks to "sherti" so that they "would be under your sovereign's high hand forever and serve" ^{[29, l. 11]}.

By the end of the summer of 1671, Astrakhan remained the last stronghold of the resistance. After his death on August 1, V. The position of the chief ataman of the "thieves" and the mayor was occupied by F. Mangy. At the end of August ("in the summer of 7179, not long before Simeon's Day"), I. B. Miloslavsky's forces approached the city ^{[23, pp. 256-257]}. In an attempt to resist them, F. Sheludyak sent a group of rebels to struga, which was not crowned with the desired result. The forces of the governor stood "above the city" and gained a foothold on the shore "three fields from Astrakhan in the meadow country of the Volga River to the mouth of the Boldy River" ("three versts on the Balde River" ^{[31, l. 3]}). By order of I. B. Miloslavsky, an earthen city was built ^{[23, p. 257]}.

The government attracted about 30,000 people to storm Astrakhan, against 6,000 rebels. I. B. Miloslavsky, having completed fortification work ("an earthen city across the Volga River against his regiment, on a Salt river"), decided not to storm the city, but to starve it: "And the great emperor's military men built a city against Astrakhan and on both sides of that city are the guns of Butz" ^{[26, p. 102]}. The governor also sent people "more often" to the rebels, whose task was to convince the residents of the city of its surrender to government troops ^{[23, p. 257]}.

The rebels made repeated forays to the camp of government troops, both by water and by land. Such attacks were successfully repelled by the Moscow Streltsy. A large number of rebels came to the governor "to get drunk on all sorts of glagoly." It became known that a riot was planned in the city ^{[23, p. 257]}. At the end of September 1671, F. Sheludyak, through the Persian ambassador and merchants, addressed the governor with a proposal for negotiations and a possible truce: "And ataman Fyodor Ivanovich serves the emperor faithfully. And so that to him, Fedor, to send a gracious decree to the emperor and to encourage him, Fedor, and he will do good in everything with his work and service" ^{[25, pp. 156-157]}.

The negotiations did not take place. Winter was approaching. The number of people fleeing from the city to the camp of I. B. Miloslavsky has increased significantly. Especially noteworthy is the mercy of the governor in relation to the Astrakhan people who came: "Many thieves from the city of Astrakhan went to his boyar in the regiments, he also commanded them to feed and drink ...". People who fled the city reported information about the willingness of residents to finish off their brows in their wines and surrender the city to government troops. The governor also received support in the form of the forces of Prince K. M. Cherkassky. I. B. Miloslavsky decided to go to the city together with his men-at-arms. A floating bridge made of ploughs was built across the Kutumov River, along which the troops had to move to Astrakhan ^{[23, pp. 257-258]}.

On November 27, 1671, I. B. Miloslavsky, with priests, Streltsy heads, along with all the men-at-arms, began his journey to the city from the Baldy River. In fact, this campaign was the solemn entry of government troops into the former "thieves'" Astrakhan for so long. The governor was warmly welcomed by the local population. The entry of military men was more like a procession. I. B. Miloslavsky kept his promise of mercy towards the residents of the city, hanging only on the walls of the city and the gates of Astrakhan centurions and archers. He also saved F.'s life. Sheludyak, who was executed already in 1672 by decree of the new governor Ya. N. Odoevsky ^{[33, pp. 452-453]}.

When analyzing the Palace Ranks, it is possible to determine the further fate of the liquidators of the uprising in "180" (1671-72). I. B. Miloslavsky, along with I. M. Korkodin and V. L. Pushechnikov, remained in charge of Astrakhan until his replacement by Ya. N. Odoevsky. They had clerks with them: P. Samoilov, S. Sharapov, V.Protopopov, writing heads: I. Rumyantsev and A. Oshushkov (under I.M. Korkodinov). Streltsy of the following orders were in the city: V. Vorobin, B. Korsakov, L. Sekerin and A. Dokhturov. M.Pleshcheyev, A. Golovin and B. Zhedrinsky were appointed voivodes in Simbrisk, M. Glebov was the deacon. In Tsaritsyn, M. Glebov, in Saransk, G. Kosagov ^{[33, pp. 452-453]}.

For a more complete description of the events in the autumn of 1671, it is necessary to consider the situation on the Don in more detail. On September 17, I.B. Miloslavsky turned to the Don Cossacks in Cherkassk for help in the siege of Astrakhan. However, no reinforcements came. The Don people explained this behavior by the threat posed by the Crimean Khanate. The Cossacks pointed out that the Crimean Tatars ("a thousand and a hundred"), together with P. Doroshenko's Cossacks ("half a thousand people") crossed the Don before reaching the Cossack town near Azov. However, these forces planned to make a campaign against the Kalmyk taysh Boss and Duar, who, having brought "wool" to the great sovereign, roamed near the Terek ^{[27, L. 3, 21-23]}.

Within the framework of this article, the consideration of foreign policy is not of a basic nature, but it helps to better understand the situation on the Don by the summer of 1671. Despite the fact that Moscow's forces were focused on suppressing the uprising, special attention continued to be paid to foreign policy. In the winter of 1670-1671, information was obtained from the interrogation of Ignat Shulga about the upcoming campaign of the Turkish Sultan against Khotyn and Kamenets – Podolsky. It also became known that P. Doroshenko, along with his faithful foreman, agreed to be a subject of the sultan. The Polish king, who supported M. Khanenko, began to prepare a campaign against P. Doroshenko. The retaliatory measure was the preparation of a joint campaign by Turkey and the Crimean Khanate to Podolia in the spring of 1672 on December 10, 1671. The Ottoman Empire officially declared war on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ^{[34, pp. 13-17]}.

On March 20, 1671, thanks to K. Hristovorov, it became known that P. Doroshenko did not plan to support S. Razin, continuing his course towards rapprochement with Turkey. The translator described the Hetman's behavior very colorfully: "Yes, on the same rada, Stenka Razin wrote a letter in which he, the thief, writes about help. And that Doroshenko's sheet, read it, tore it up." However, after this meeting, the hetman sent envoys to the sultan for purposes unknown to Moscow ^{[25, p. 37]}. It is worth noting the readiness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to assist in suppressing the uprising. In the list of articles received by S. Polkov, it was explicitly stated: "... that the tsar's majesty would send troops to them to ask for that thief, but at the same time the Lithuanian troops were all ready; and if the tsar's majesty had deigned to send it, and those Lithuanian troops against that thief were sent" ^{[25, p. 47]}.

The fears of the Donets were very justified. In contrast to the above examples, in early June 1671, the government received information about the threat posed by the Crimean Khanate. Invited to the Russian service, scientist N. Spafari noted the constant interaction and exchange of information concerning the uprising of S. Razin between Bakhchisarai and Istanbul. From his interrogative speeches it followed: "And as if he, the khan, sees the time, how he could strike the Moscow state with a war with Stenka and with the Astarakhan and Nagai Tatars and with the whole Crimea..." ^{[25, p. 82]}.

The possibility of requesting support from the Don Cossacks in the autumn of 1671 became feasible thanks to the oath of the Don to Moscow. This event was one of the key results of the suppression of the Razin uprising.

On June 25, 1671, G.G. Romodanovsky received a letter from the great emperor about the need to send G. I. Kosagov to the Don to issue the sovereign's salary to the Cossacks. Together with a small detachment, the colonel went to Cherkassk ^{[26, p. 80]}. The envoys reached the Don on August 24, 1671 ^{[32, l. 2]}. The Don Cossacks joyfully greeted the delegation: "... from the Cherkassy town 3 versts with honor, and came to the Cherkassy town, for such a sovereign health, the Dan Cossacks shot from a large and small order." The upper and lower Cossack towns kissed the cross to the royal envoys ^{[25, pp. 159-160]}. The Don army should "serve faithfully and be glad in everything and want good." For loyalty to the great sovereign, the Donets were given money and bread wages, as well as gunpowder and lead, which they accepted "with great joy" ^{[25, p. 163]}. The government also allowed communication with the Don according to the written records ^{[25, pp. 167-168]}. G. I. Kosagov's mission to swear in the Don Cossacks to Alexei Mikhailovich ended on November 8, 1671 ^{[32, l. 16]}.

An important result of the uprising, on the eve of the brewing war with Turkey, was the process of optimizing the supply and management of the army. Its result was the building of vertical power and the universalization of the armed forces. A.V. Malov pointed out that the result of the analysis and "shuffling" of soldiers' and dragoon regiments in 1671 was the withdrawal of both elected soldiers' regiments from the subordination of the Ustyuzha couple, the Stable Order and the Order of Secret Affairs under the control of the Streletsky order (he began to manage the entire regular infantry). The changes also affected the Reitarsky order – the lower ranks, previously in charge of the Category, became included in it. Also, the settled infantry of the new system was instructed to be in charge in the Foreign order ^{[35, pp. 178-179]}.

To summarize this article, readers should focus on the conclusions. It is obvious that the role of Stepan Razin's personality was very important for the rebels. However, having lost its main "ideological inspirer", the movement continued to exist and resist the government forces, which essentially turned into the agony of the rebels.

Thanks to the experience gained during the autumn – spring of 1670-1671, the military people of the Russian state have already developed effective ways to combat the rebels. The skillful actions of the voivodes, in particular, P. V. Sheremetev and I. B. Miloslavsky, deserve special mention. Both with honor and dignity, with a difference of several months, were able to defeat the rebels at Simbirsk. These events, in the autumn of 1670 and in the summer of 1671, became one of the key plots in the fight against the Razin "turmoil".

The mission of G. I. Kosagov deserves special attention. All communications with Don were carried out through an Embassy order. For a long time, the Donets were Moscow's allies in its struggle on the southern borders against the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Tatars. It was only a matter of time before the residents of the Don took the oath of allegiance to Moscow. Due to the prevailing situation associated with the suppression of the uprising of S. Razin and the loyalty of K. Yakovlev and the increasingly strained relations with the Ottoman Empire, G. I. Kosagov's activities on the Don to bring the local population to the oath of allegiance to the tsar became very timely.

It is also worth noting the close attention of the neighboring states to the Razin uprising. The Crimean Tatars, taking advantage of Moscow's puzzlement in the fight against the movement, were in constant correspondence with the Sultan. Resorting to the help of the Astrakhan and Nogai Tatars, it was planned to "strike the Moscow state with war."

Taking into account the foreign policy threat and the conclusions drawn after the suppression of the Razin movement, the government promptly resorted to a much-needed process of optimizing the supply and management of the army. Thus, Moscow tried to solve the problems that accompanied the Russian army throughout the "rebellious" century.