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Reference:

Suppression of the uprising led by S.T. Razin in Tambov and Shatsky counties in autumn-winter 1670

Shapovalenko Dmitrii Andreevich

Assistant, Department of History, Moscow City University

34A Altufyevskoye str., Moscow, 127562, Russia

dmitriy.shapovalenko0106@gmail.com
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0609.2023.6.69420

EDN:

GGJESZ

Received:

20-12-2023


Published:

27-12-2023


Abstract: The object of the study is the government's actions to suppress the uprising of Stepan Timofeevich Razin in Tambov and Shatsky counties. The subject of the study is the actions of government troops against the rebels in these regions. The author examines in detail such aspects as: the activities of the voivodes (Y. T. Khitrovo, I. V. Buturlina, E. Pashkov, S. Khrushchev, A. Eropkin and B. E. Myshetsky) and a detailed description of the clashes of the military men of the Russian state with the rebels. Special attention is paid to the successes of the rebels, the number of forces, the number of trophies received after the battles, the interaction between cities, the problems faced by the voivodes, the composition of the troops, including the regional aspect of the serving people, the change in the leadership of the Y. T. Khitrovo regiments to B. E. Myshetsky and the relationship of the voivodes with Moscow.   The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity and consistency. The methods used are logical and historical-genetic. The novelty of this study lies in a detailed analysis of the actions of government troops in Tambov and Shatsky counties. This is especially relevant in connection with the analysis of the situation in neighboring regions, where by the end of 1670 it was possible to localize the Razin movement. A special contribution of the author is a detailed analysis of the source database, which helped in achieving the research goal. The main conclusions of the study are: the situation in these regions that has developed negatively for government troops is due to the large number of military personnel living in Shatsky and Tambov counties who actively joined the ranks of the rebels; the presence of a large number of problems in the regiments and the incompetence of the commanders. Also, as a conclusion, we can note the rather prompt response of the government to such an urgent and rapidly changing situation in the regions.


Keywords:

uprising, suppression, Cossacks, Razin, Shatsk, Tambov, Khitrovo, Buturlin, Myshetsky, Eropkin

This article is automatically translated.

Among the extensive historiography devoted to the uprising led by S. T. Razin, the works of researchers whose area of scientific interest was the study of the Razin movement in certain regions are particularly distinguished. Among them it should be noted: A. I. Solovyov [1], S. I. Porfiriev [2], V. P. Zagorovsky [3, pp. 262-276] and V. A. Gurkin [4, pp. 34-115].

Also in recent decades, the interest of researchers in the military history of Russia before the reforms of Peter the Great has been noted. The XVII century was no exception. Scientists could not ignore the participation of government troops in the suppression of the Razin uprising. Among the military historians who have touched on this topic, it should be noted A.V. Malov [5, pp. 525-555], A. E. Pisarev [6, pp. 161-184] and A. N. Lobin [7, pp. 147-150]. It should also be noted the work of the foreign researcher K. Stevens [8, pp. 267-276], who also reviewed the actions of government troops during the years of the "Razinovshchina".

Of course, the defeat of the rebels at Simbirsk and Razin's injury affected the movement. However, it was too early to talk about a radical change. The rebellion has affected vast territories, attracting more and more "thieves" to its ranks. It is worth noting the presence of traffic features in each of the regions. For example, E. V. Chistyakova mentioned that among the rebels there were a large number of people from among the military, which affected the better weapons and more guns used against government troops in Tambov County [9, pp. 178-179].

E. V. Chistyakova noted that the suppression of the uprising in Tambov and Shatsky counties took place under the leadership of the chief voivode Ya. T. Khitrovo [9, pp. 176-179]. Prior to his appointment to Tambov, the Duma nobleman had gained sufficient experience in combat operations and in voivodeships. In particular, it is worth noting that Yakov Timofeevich Khitrovo took an active part in the years of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667 [10, pp. 192, 216, 310]. Also, being a voivode in Poltava, he took part in the suppression of the Pereyaslavsky riot of 1666 [11, pp. 178-179].

Since 1668, he worked in the Tambov voivodeship [11, pp. 106-107, 109-110]. In June 1670, he was part of the troops of P. S. Urusov [11, p. 175]. On August 2, 1670, the Duma nobleman "according to the news of the boyar and voivode with Prince Yuri Alekseevich Dolgorukovo, he [Khitrovo] should be in a meeting" [12, pp. 10-11]. At the end of August 1670, Y. T. Khitrovo should have gone "to the gathering" to Yu. A. Dolgorukov. The Duma nobleman complained about the lack of banners in his regiment [12, p. 45].

It is worth noting that when gathering military men, the duma nobleman faced difficulties common to that time. It was already mentioned earlier that an example of an emergency gathering of troops is the Reitar regiment of S. Skornyakov-Pisarev, assembled from Kozlovsky reitars and spearmen. The fact that this compound was not, among other things, fully equipped with equipment is demonstrated by F.'s interrogatory speeches. Wolfe.

On August 23, 1670, the colonel noted that: "Kozlovsky's regiment has Reitar pistols and carbines, but won't there be 20 or 30 pairs of pistols, and Karobins are the same number. <...> But lat and shishakov don't have a Kozlov regiment. And they have sabers, but not all of them...". The reason for the shortage is due to the fact that firearms were issued in 1668 for the Cherkasy campaign, and Reitara's sabres were sold "for need" in 1669, being under the command of Peter Skuratov in the service in Lebedyan [12, p. 22]. On August 27, the Reitarsky regiment was replenished with 200 Tambov dragoons [12, p. 32].

At the beginning of September, the Tambov garrison consisted of 3,041 people and was equipped with artillery [12, p. 12, 50]. The forces of the Duma nobleman were replenished at the expense of the city nobles and the children of boyars and foreigners: Murom, Meshcheryan, Ryashan, Tambov, Kozlovtsev and Ryazantsev [12, p. 10-12, 28, 49 – 50, 59]. At the end of August, the governor was faced with the fact that representatives of some municipal "corporations" did not show up for service: "they are disobedient, they did not go to your great sovereign's service in the Tank on many expulsions of August to the 26th" [12, p. 29].

Active hostilities in Shatsky and Tambov counties began in late September-early October 1670 [9, p. 176]. On September 27, the voivode of Nizhny Lomov, Andrei Pekin, wrote to Moscow about the appearance of the rebels in the county. To help Ya. T. Khitrovo sent military men to go "to meet" the rebels. The duma nobleman himself went to Shatsk so that "those thieves' Cossacks would not be allowed to enter your sovereign's volost in the Tanbovsky district" [12, p. 84].

On September 30, Y. T. Khitrovo became a "comrade" of P. I. Khovansky. In Tambov, it was necessary to "review and disassemble the military people and paint them in hundreds." The voivodes themselves should have waited for G. G. Romodanovsky, upon whose arrival, it was necessary to move to Shatsky County along the "line". After that, to the Ryazhsky district, where "to be before the decree" [12, pp. 88-89]. The campaign of Governor Romodanovsky to Tambov did not take place, due to the capture of Mayack and Tsarev – Borisov by the rebels: "it is not necessary to go from Ostrogozhsky to Tambov by any measures" [13, pp. 66-68]. P. I. Khovansky's campaign also did not take place, by decree of the tsar he was "ordered to turn to Moscow" [12, p. 136].

 On October 1, the rebels came from Kadomsky district to Shatsky. A detachment consisting of 300 residents, ratar, soldiers and Moscow archers led by I. V. Buturlin and A. P. Eropkin was sent to destroy them. In the order, the voivodes should: "take all sorts of measures and, depending on the case there and according to their own supervision, so that, with God's help, they can search for them, and protect themselves and the sovereign military men and Shatsky district from ruin, and they, thieves and traitors, should be humbled and eradicated in every possible way and from theft from now on."[12, pp. 120-122].On the same day, Kerensky voivode A. Bezobrazov warned Ya. T. Khitrovo about the capture of Saransk and about the further plans of the rebels to move to Tambov [12, p. 101].

On October 7, Shatsky voivode Andrei Astafyev warned the Duma nobleman Khitrovo that in connection with the capture of Nizhny and Upper Lomov, a threat loomed over Shatsky [12, p. 118]. Two weeks later, the uprising began in the village of Pechininishchi, 20 versts from the city. Due to the government forces sent in advance to Shatsky County, the rebels decided to move to Rybnaya Wasteland and to the village of Algasovo in Tambov county.

It is noteworthy that the rebels managed to rob the "sovereign's treasury" sent by S. S. Skornyakov-Pisarev's guards from Moscow at the end of August 1670 [12, p. 32] The rebels got banners, trumpets, timpani, pistols and carbines [12, p. 196].

On October 17, "thieves' men" led by Mikhail Kharitonov approached Shatsk. Ya.T. Khitrovo sent his military men to them, who "beat and raped" many rebels. The rebels retreated to the Cherneyev Monastery of Shatsky District (now Nikolo-Cherneyevsky Monastery), where they captured one cannon ("iron"), which was brought to Konobeevo. The next day, the forces of the Duma nobleman came to this village, but the rebels evaded the battle: "they fled from that village of Konobeevo and left that cannon in that village." It is noteworthy that the captured gun was delivered to Shatsk and was located in the exit yard. According to the response received from Moscow, it was necessary to transfer it to the Shatsk voivode Andrei Vlasyev [12, p. 330].

On October 22, Tambov Cossacks, soldiers and reitars from Shatsky district, headed by Ya. T. Khitrovo, were sent to the village of Atlasovo. The rebels fortified themselves with baggage and artillery. Realizing the danger of attacks, the duma nobleman decided to set fire to the village. The next day, the rebels, "seeing your great sovereign's men of arms above you, and a cruel attack and great crowding from cannon fire, and a downfall and fire devastation, you, great sovereign, were beaten with a brow in that thieves' fault." Timofey Meshcheryakov, the rebel leader in Shatsky and Tambov counties, surrendered along with all the rebels. However, Ya. T. Khitrovo became aware that the peasants in the villages of Sasovo and Kobyakovo of the Shatsky district had "stolen".

On October 25, the governor sent his military men to these settlements [12, pp. 196-197]. At the end of October 1670, the following appointment of the governor was noted: Ya. T. Khitrovo, together with the Reitarian colonel F. E. Pashkov, being in Tambov, became a "comrade" of I. V. Buturlin, who went with troops to help him [12, p. 202].

The uprising began to spread to Tambov county. So, on October 21, 1670, the arable peasants "stole" and beat the sovereign's military men in the village of Knyazhoy. The Tambov governor sent a detachment of local military personnel to "check on those thieving Cossacks." Yeremey Pashkov also complained about the lack of government troops in the city and its district [12, p. 182].

Y. T. Khitrovo's mercy towards the rebels was not justified. Timofey Meshcheryakov has "changed" again. The plans of the rebels consisted in taking Tambov, removing artillery and gunpowder from there for further advancement to help the "thieves' people" in the Shchatsky district. The rebels managed to approach Tambov on October 29, and during a successful assault on the prison they managed to take possession of 3 guns [12, p. 269].

It is worth noting that Yeremey Pashkov went to a trick. The rebels, led by Timofey Meshcheryakov, approached the city and began to demand its surrender. The governor entered into negotiations with the rebels: "an agreement was concluded with the Tanbovtsy about everything and so that you, sir, by the decree of the great sovereign, do not go to the Tanbov villages and villages" [12, p. 220]. E. Pashkov managed to gain time, which was necessary for the approach of the forces that were supposed to lift the siege from Tambov. Reinforcements were approaching both opponents.

The main places from where the forces of the rebels were replenished in this region were the area of the Khopra and Medveditsa rivers [12, p. 223]. Government troops, for example, were sent from Moscow ("along with" Ryazan nobles and boyar children) [12, p. 222], Voronezh (1 copper regimental cannon "measuring three arshins", Usmon and Bobyakovsky atamans – 50 people, posadsky people – 100 people, 30 datochny peasants "mounted and armory" Borshev Monastery) [12, p. 239] and Shatsky uyezd (I.V. Buturlin together with "horse and foot people") [12, p. 238]. After learning about the agreements between the rebels and the garrison of Tambov, the Kozlovsky voivode canceled his campaign to the besieged city [12, pp. 235-237].

Despite the fact that Tambov stood firm, the rebels were preparing for repeated hostilities near the city. So, Lysogorsk remained the key gathering place. The "thieves" were actively sending out "lovely letters", in particular, to the Chelny prison. The reply of the regimental commander S. Khrushchev, Ya. T. Khitrovo, dated November 15, 1670, contains information obtained from the interrogation of Senka Tatarinov. The Cossack noted: "that in the Tanbovsky district, the entire collection of serving people and hair peasants starts Tanbov for a week." As the successes of the rebels, the "peasant of the Tanbovsky district of the village of Novoselak" pointed out the burning of the city tower and the courtyard of the clerk Thomas Altukhov, who was in prison [12, p. 272]. According to others: "2 towers were burned in the prison and 3 spinning wheels of the guards, and Podyachev's yard, Altukhov's houses, and the whole row was burned out" [12, p. 282]. Already on the 9th, the "thieves" came from Khopr to the Morshensk gate of the Verkhotsensk parish of the Tambov district and actively replenished their ranks with a number of more than 5,000 people [12, p. 274].

The "thieves' men" began storming the city on November 11, 1670. In his reply dated December 4, E. Pashkov noted: "And from that, my lord, on the day of December to the 3rd of this 179th year, those thieves and traitors began to attack Tanbov day and night with violent attacks and the city was incessantly lit, and the prison was taken, and the prison tower and the prison and many courtyards were burned." The city was defended by 344 people: 200 Moscow and Tambov archers with two centurions of the half-head of G. Salov, 3 fodder foreigners, 120 Tambov children of boyars and clerical huts of clerks, archers and gunners, as well as 16 Ryazan nobles and boyar children sent to the village by I. V. Buturlin from Shatsk [12, p. 361].

On November 4, a battle took place near the village of Rakovo, Shatsky district. On the 20th, the forces of Stolnik and voivode began their advance from Shatsk to Tambov [12, p. 297].

On December 4, the detachment of stolnik and voivode Buturlin approached Tambov. As E. Pashkov noted: "from those thieves and crusaders, I, your serf, with those great state men-at-arms to the rescue of the steward and governor Ivan Vasilyevich Buturlin, I sat out for a long time" [12, p. 361]. Upon the approach of the detachment, the rebels "ran into the woods and gathered in the nearby villages." To capture them, "comrade" Alexey Eropkin was sent along with a detachment.

After lifting the siege from Tambov, the voivode's forces should have moved to the Kuzmina Gati tract of the Tambov district [12, pp. 402-403].

Of course, the key event in the fight against the movement in the central regions was the defense of Tambov, but unrest continued in the counties. Ya.T. Khitrovo, who was sent to Shatsk, noted in his reply dated November 5: "And thieves, my lord, people take large numbers of people to zbory." At the same time, the Duma nobleman complained about the lack of people and asked for help from G. G. Romodanovsky. It is worth noting that the forces of the governor took part together with I. V. Buturlin in the battle near the village of Rakovo [12, pp. 240-241, 268-269].

Also in November, Y. T. Khitrovo should have interacted with Ivan Likharev, sent to Kadom and Temnikov, "sopcha" in order to "eradicate thieves in the end" [12, pp. 260-261]. However, the movement within the county was complicated by a large number of rebels. Ya. T. Khitrovo in his reply to Yu. A. Dolgorukov directly pointed out: "And to send them to the regiment to the boyar and the voivode to Prince Yuriy Alekseevich, it is not necessary to protect traitors from peasants" [12, p. 274].

On November 19, the rebels left the village of Rakovo and moved out of Shatsky District towards Verkhny and Nizhny Lomovye.  In his reply (November 27), Y.T. Khitrovo noted: "And Shatskoy, my lord, the county has been cleansed by the grace of God and your great sovereign's happiness." On the same day, the governor sent the Reitarian regiments of F. Zykov and V. Chelyuskin together with Kozlov spearmen, gunners, soldiers (1126 people in total) [12, p. 314] to Krasnaya Sloboda and Kerensk [12, p. 312, 337-338]. There was also a painting "how many people remained in Shatsky in the regiment". According to its results, there were 1,326 people [12, p. 313].

In November, S. Khrushchev began active military operations. According to reports received from Lysogorsk, the Kozlovsky voivode quite accurately indicated the key directions of the rebels' movement: one part went to the siege of Tambov, and the other to the Chelnavskaya line and to the Kozlovsky district. For their "protection", the governor requested help from Y.T. Khitrovo, I.V. Buturlin and G.G. Romodanovsky [12, pp. 264-265, 269-270, 272, 318-320].

On November 17, a battle took place near Chelnavsky across the Chelnavoy River. The clash lasted "from noon to dawn."  The rebel managed to capture two guns from government troops [12, p. 282]. The forces of governor Khrushchev moved to Tambov the next day [12, p. 354], after helping to lift the siege, realizing the "desolation", the military men had to return to Kozlov so that the rebels "in Kozlovsky district over Kozlovtsy did not commit any evil and ruin" [12, p. 356-357]. The governor, together with the forces entrusted to him, set out from Tambov on December 5 [12, p. 365].

On the 9th, Ya. T. Khitrovo marched from Shatsk to the village of Zarubkino in Kadomsky district. With further advancement along the line towards the Upper and Lower Scrap Yards [12, p. 379]. Two days later, Y. T. Khitrovo's forces successfully captured a spot in the "big forest", in his reply he especially noted the actions of the Smolensk gentry of Colonel Denis Shveykovsky [12, p. 417].

On December 13, the governor sent a cavalry detachment (Smolensk gentry and two Reitarian regiments) to investigate Kerensk, during which enemy forces were discovered in the village of Achadove. During the "big battle", Y. T. Khitrovo decided to send reinforcements to help the cavalry. The rebels fortified themselves in the village with a wagon train, which was stormed by government troops. The battle lasted from morning to evening. The actions of Denis Shveykovsky's Smolensk gentry are noteworthy: the cavalry approached the fortified positions of the rebel pikemen and "the pikes of the thieves were flogged and the wagon train was broken" [12, p. 417].

The rebel positions were taken, some were killed, the rest surrendered with banners and various weapons.  The next day Kerensk was taken without a fight. Once again, a detachment of the Smolensk gentry of D. Shveykovsky was moving ahead of the main forces. The keys to the city were given away, and the colonel's cavalry was the first to enter Kerensk. The governor noted the special effectiveness and loyalty of this military unit: "they clearly and hastily fought, not sparing their heads, and declared their faithful service to you, the sovereign" [12, pp. 415-418].

An important event was the transfer of the regiment to Y. T. Khitrovo B. Myshetsky. In Moscow, they justified the change of command and the recall of the Duma nobleman to the capital as follows (the letter was written on December 16): "And for your old age and illness, we have indicated, great sovereign, to you, our noble and voivode, come to us, great sovereign, to Moscow" [12, p. 420]. The transfer of control and troops was to take place near the city of Kerensk [12, p. 450].

On December 14, I.V. Buturlin became aware of the intentions of the rebels to retake Tambov [12, pp. 411-412]. According to E.V. Chistyakova, the replacement of Ya.T. Khitrovo by B. Myshetsky, among other things, is connected with the inability to secure Tambov and should have accelerated the process of suppressing traffic in his county [9, p. 190]. At the same time, S. N. Shcherbakov considered that the campaign against Tambov by B. Myshetsky was connected with the need to intercept the rebels fleeing from the Middle Volga region [15, pp. 171-172]. On December 19, by decree of the order of Secret Affairs, Prince Myshetsky had to act together with I. V. Buturlin in order to "create a trade and eradicate theft" [12, pp. 449-450].

On December 22, A. Astafyev pointed out the presence of rebels in the village of Borki, 40 versts from Shatsk. Two days later, Y.T. Khitrovo offered to send a mounted detachment from Kerensk to help the Shatsky voivode [12, p. 456]. On the same day, B. Myshetsky was sent from Krasnaya Sloboda.

On the 26th, the Duma nobleman Khitrovo handed over the troops to Prince Myshetsky. In total, 2,000 people came under his control, not counting the Odoevites. The next day, government forces moved to Shatsk "hastily", it is worth noting that all the problems were known to Yu. A. Dolgorukov In his reply to Moscow, he indicated a small number of people in B. Myshetsky's detachment, which was associated not only with a large number of wounded, killed and escaped, but also with the fact that some military people were They were released home "for supplies" and the lack of artillery: "there is no one to do fishing with thieves without footmen and without cannons." Thus, this circumstance demonstrates a rather critical situation in Shatsky and Tambov counties by the end of 1670 [12, pp. 473-474].

Summing up this article, it is worth noting the prospects of studying the uprising of Stepan Razin in the regional aspect. An extensive source base helps fill in the gaps within this topic and forms a more complete picture of the essence of the phenomenon.

The example of the Tambov District is very typical in terms of the problems that the government of Alexei Mikhailovich had to face. The lack of people and their under–equipment, the mistakes of the commanders - these and a number of other problems could not help accelerate the fight against the Razin movement.

Faced with the harsh reality, Moscow was forced to take prompt measures to stabilize the situation in the region. It was necessary not only to deal with real problems, but also to predict their possible occurrence. A striking example of the government's actions is the removal of Y. T. Khitrovo from office and his replacement by B. E. Myshetsky.

It is worth noting that despite the complexity of the situation in the region, Tambov, being a key city in the county, did not surrender to the "thieves". The uprising in Tambov County would be suppressed only in the early spring of 1671.

References
1. Solovyov, A. I. (1908). Stenka Razin and his accomplices within the current Simbirsk province. Simbirsk, Russia: Provincial Printing House.
2. Porfiryev, S. I. (1916). Razinshchina in the Kazan region. Kazan, Russia: Typo-lithography of the Imperial University.
3. Zagorovsky, V. P. (1969). Belgorod trait. Voronezh, Russia: Voronezh University Publishing House, 1969.
4. Gurkin, V. A. (2000). Simbirsk trait. Moscow, Russia: Russian Institute of Cultural Studies; Ulyanovsk: Middle Volga Scientific Center.
5. Malov, A. V. (2006). Moscow elected regiments of the soldiery system in the initial period of its history. 1656-1671. Moscow, Russia: Drevlekhranishche.
6. Pisarev, A. E. (2021). Moscow archers of the second half of the 17th – early 18th centuries. You can shoot self-propelled guns with dexterity. Moscow, Russia: Yauza: Eksmo.
7. Lobin, A. N. (2022). Guns of the first Romanovs: Russian artillery 1619-1676. Moscow, Russia: Yauza: Eksmo.
8. Stevens, K. (2023). Wars for the formation of the Russian state. 1460-1730. St. Petersburg, Russia: Academic Studies Press, Bibliorossika.
9. Chistyakova, E. V., & Solovyov V. M. (1988). Stepan Razin and his associates. Moscow, Russia: Idea.
10. Kurbatov, O. A. (2019). Russian-Polish War of 1654-1667. Moscow, Russia: Runivers.
11. The Peasant War under the leadership of Stepan Razin: collection of documents.V. I. (1954). Moscow, Russia: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
12. The Peasant War under the leadership of Stepan Razin: collection of documents. V. II. Part I. (1957). Moscow, Russia: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
13. The Peasant War under the leadership of Stepan Razin: collection of documents. V. II. Part II. (1959). Moscow, Russia: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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The seventeenth century in Russian history was not in vain called "rebellious": not to mention the Time of Troubles, this is the copper riot, the salt riot, and the Stepan Razin uprising that entered folklore. Whether Razin's uprising really refers to a "senseless and merciless Russian rebellion" or whether he had conscious goals - this question has been repeatedly raised in the works of various researchers. However, among other things, the regional specifics of Razin's detachments are of interest. These circumstances determine the relevance of the article submitted for review, the subject of which is the suppression of the uprising of S.T. Razin in the suppression of the uprising in Tambov and Shatsky counties. The author aims to reveal the historiography of the issue, analyze the tactics of the parties, and determine the reasons for the defeat of the rebels. The work is based on the principles of analysis and synthesis, reliability, objectivity, the methodological basis of the research is a systematic approach, which, according to academician I.D. Kovalchenko, is based on "consistent disclosure of the properties, functions and changes of the studied reality in the process of its historical movement, which allows us to get as close as possible to reproducing the real history of the object," and its The distinctive sides are concreteness and descriptiveness. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the very formulation of the topic: the author seeks to characterize the regional aspects of the uprising led by S.T. Razin using the example of Tambov and Shatsky counties. Considering the bibliographic list of the article as a positive point, its versatility should be noted: in total, the list of references includes 13 different sources and studies. From the sources attracted by the author, we note the published documents on the history of the uprising of Stepan Razin. Of the studies used, we will point to the works of A.I. Solovyov and S.I. Porfiriev, whose focus is on various aspects of studying the actions of the rebels. Note that the bibliography is important both from a scientific and educational point of view: after reading the text of the article, readers can turn to other materials on its topic. In general, in our opinion, the integrated use of various sources and research contributed to the solution of the tasks facing the author. The style of writing the article can be attributed to scientific, at the same time understandable not only to specialists, but also to a wide readership, to anyone interested in both the history of the uprising of Stepan Razin, in general, and its regional aspects, in particular. The appeal to the opponents is provided at the level of the collected information received by the author during the work on the topic of the article. The structure of the work is characterized by a certain logic and consistency, it is possible to distinguish the conduct, the main part, and the conclusion. At the beginning, the author defines the relevance of the topic, shows that although "the defeat of the rebels at Simbirsk and the injury of Razin affected the movement," it was still premature to talk about a radical change. The paper shows that "the key event in the fight against the movement in the central regions was the defense of Tambov, but unrest continued in the counties." The author draws attention to the fact that "the lack of people and their under–equipment, the mistakes of the commanders - these and a number of other problems could not help accelerate the fight against the Razin movement." The main conclusion of the article is that the study of the regional aspects of Stepan Razin's uprising is very promising: "An extensive source base helps fill in the gaps within this topic and forms a more complete picture of the essence of the phenomenon." The article submitted for review is devoted to an urgent topic, will arouse readers' interest, and its materials can be used both in lecture courses on the history of Russia and in various special courses. As a comment, we will point out archival documents that have fallen out of the author's field of view, but at the same time this is also a prospect for further research. In general, in our opinion, the article can be recommended for publication in the journal "Historical Journal: Scientific research".