Counter-sanctions regulation: comparative legal analysis (Russia and China)

Butakova Yana Sergeevna ORCID: 0000-0002-8686-5384 Postgraduate student at the Faculty of Law of the Higher School of Economics 108814, Russia, Moscow, blvd. Scandinavian, 2 to 4 yanabutakova@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

International economic sanctions against Russia have freed up significant market niches due to direct sanctions, as well as informal corporate boycotts ^{[1, p. 319]}. Finding itself in conditions of partial economic isolation, Russia began to build partnerships with China. In Russia, in unprecedented conditions, the formation of counter-sanctions regulation or counter-sanctions is taking place. Since 2014, the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom and other countries have been imposing blocking and sectoral sanctions against Russia, its institutions, individuals and sectors of the economy, special regulation of imports of goods to and from Russia has been introduced, restrictions on investment, financial, banking operations and others have been imposed. At the same time, the sanctions impact on Russia increased significantly after 2022. China, faced with the sanctions influence much later than Russia (for example, the first Western sanctions against Russia were trade sanctions against the RSFSR in 1917, and the first sanctions against China began to be imposed after the communist revolution of 1949 ^[2]) and began to form legal regulation aimed at reducing the negative effects of international sanctions only in 2021. The impetus for this was the US sanctions against the Chinese economy, in particular the US Law "On the Authorization of National Defense for Fiscal Year 2019" (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA 2019)), according to which the US federal government was prohibited from using equipment from a number of Chinese companies, which significantly reduced Chinese budget revenues ^[3]. Also, in 2019, the United States suspended Chinese companies from participating in public procurement, and on November 12, 2020, Executive Order No. 13959 (Executive Order No. 13959 "Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies") was adopted prohibiting American investors from investing in a number of Chinese companies and sectors of the economy ^[4]. Later, the United States introduced special regulation of the use of Chinese semiconductors and chemical precursors ^[5]. After a long break, the EU also began to impose sanctions against China in 2021. Thus, over the past four years, both countries have faced a significant tightening of sanctions from foreign states and state associations and have been forced to form their own legislation aimed at protecting national interests.

In a broad sense, counter-sanctions regulation can also be considered as sanctions regulation, since both are based on the task of forming a legal, legal basis for imposing sanctions against foreign states, their companies and institutions, as well as protecting their own economy and its subjects. Within the framework of this article, "counter-sanctions" and "sanctions" against China and Russia will be considered synonymous, since neither Russia nor China were the initiators of sanctions, in this context, the regulation of both countries is a response to unfriendly restrictive actions of foreign states.

The legal history of the modern Russian sanctions system should be counted from Federal Law No. 281 of December 30, 2006 "On Special Economic Measures and Coercive Measures" (hereinafter referred to as FZ-281). The next basic act was Federal Law No. 127-FZ dated June 04, 2018 "On Measures to Influence (Counteract) Unfriendly Actions of the United States of America and other Foreign States" (hereinafter referred to as FZ-127). It introduces the concept of measures of influence (counteraction) in response to political and economic sanctions. Since 2014, a number of acts have been issued in the field of sanctioned restrictions on the turnover of agricultural products (for example, a decree No. 560 of the President of the Russian Federation dated August 6, 2014 "On the application of certain Special Economic Measures to ensure security Of the Russian Federation", in pursuance of this Decree, Government Decree No. 778 of August 7, 2014 was adopted with an indication of the list of countries to which the restrictions apply). It is worth noting the Decree separately No. 592 of the President of the Russian Federation dated October 22, 2018 "On the application of special Economic measures in connection with Unfriendly actions Ukraine in relation to citizens and legal entities Of the Russian Federation", by which the authority to form a list of restrictive measures is transferred to the Government. And the Resolution Government of the Russian Federation No. 1300 dated November 1, 2018 "On Measures to implement the Presidential Decree No. 592 of the Russian Federation dated October 22, 2018" has formed a list of legal entities and individuals against whom blocking sanctions have been imposed (blocking of funds, a ban on transferring funds, withdrawal of capital), as well as transactions involving the import of goods into Russia, the manufacturer, seller or sender of which are sub-sanctioned persons). The list has implemented a model of blocking US sanctions, in which it is mandatory to specify registration data and the full name of the sub-sanctioned person.

The main purpose of the emerging Russian counter-sanctions legislation is the protection of Russian persons under foreign sanctions. An example is the Resolution Government of the Russian Federation No. 400 dated April 4, 2019 "On the specifics of Disclosure and Provision of Information Subject to Disclosure and Provision in accordance with the Requirements of the Federal Law "On Joint Stock Companies" and the Federal Law "On the Securities Market", which enabled issuers of securities to disclose or provide information in a limited amount in some cases.

The main characteristic of the new period of sanctions was the approval by the Government of the Russian Federation of a list of foreign states and territories committing unfriendly acts against Russia, for which a number of restrictions were imposed (Government Decree No. 430-r dated March 5, 2022 with further additions). Another important document in the formation of the Russian sanctions system of the new era was Presidential Decree No. 252 dated May 3, 2022 "On the application of retaliatory special economic measures in connection with the unfriendly actions of some foreign states and international organizations." It was this Decree that legalized individual sanctions for the first time in the Russian legal system. Also, this decree consolidated the purpose of introducing Russian counter–sanctions - restrictive measures are introduced in order to protect the national interests of the country and in response to hostile and contrary to international law actions. It is worth noting separately the Presidential Decree No. 618 dated September 08, 2022 "On the special procedure for the implementation (execution) of certain types of transactions (operations) between certain persons." From this Decree, the Government Investment Commission began to issue permits for transactions with shares in LLC, in which persons from unfriendly countries participate. On August 4, 2023, a kind of "revolutionary" Federal Law No. 422-FZ "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation" was adopted, which introduces the concept of blocking sanctions and the 50%+ rule (initially denied by the Russian legislator and applied only by the American regulator, and later by the European one).

If we talk about the basic regulations of counter–sanctions regulation in the Russian Federation, then it is worth noting two - the above-mentioned FZ-281 and FZ-127.

China's counter-sanctions regulation is not so extensive and is actually represented by only four acts. The Law on the Law of Foreign Trade of May 12, 1994 (revised in 2004 and 2016) is the first regulatory act of China providing for the possibility of introducing countermeasures in response to prohibitive or restrictive measures of a foreign state in trade with China (Article 7). The Law on Foreign Investment of March 15, 2020 contains broad formulations allowing the possibility of imposing any retaliatory measures in case of restrictions on Chinese investors abroad (Article 40) – "If any country or region takes any discriminatory prohibitive or restrictive measures or other similar measures against the People's Republic of China in terms of investment, the People's Republic of China may take appropriate measures against the specified country or region".

The Export Control Law of October 17, 2020 establishes in Article 48 the possibility of taking countermeasures in response to foreign export controls – "If any country or region threatens the national security or interests of the People's Republic of China by abusing export control measures, the People's Republic of China may take countermeasures against such a country or region in accordance with the actual circumstances.".

The order of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China dated January 9, 2021 "Blocking the unlawful extraterritorial application of foreign laws and measures", which recognizes the unjustified application of foreign legislation in the context of "secondary" sanctions (the risk of including a person on the sanctions list (the United States, and later the EU) for interacting with a Chinese person under sanctions). Also, Article 12 of the Order contains China's ability to introduce countermeasures in this regard – "In response to the unjustified extraterritorial application of foreign legislation and other measures, the Chinese government may take all necessary countermeasures." This order probably originates from EU Regulation No. 2271/96 of November 22, 1996 "On the protection of EU Persons from the Extraterritorial application of the legislation of third Jurisdictions, as well as from lawsuits filed on the basis of such or arising from it", which protects the interests of EU persons from the extraterritorial application of the sanctions legislation of third countries (in fact, the United States) ^[6].

On June 10, 2021, the Law of the People's Republic of China "On Combating Foreign Sanctions" (2021) came into force. This law forms the legal basis for countermeasures against foreign states that impose sanctions against China and is the basis for sanctions and counter-sanctions regulation of the Chinese legal system. The Law consists of 16 articles with the widest possible wording. Prior to the adoption of this law, sanctions against foreign persons were imposed by China through by-laws of state bodies (for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Trade), which referred to the Law on National Security of the People's Republic of China dated July 1, 2015, formally unrelated to counter-sanctions regulation.

The main purpose of Chinese counter-sanctions legislation is to protect the sovereignty, security and development interests of the state, as well as to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organizations. Similar goals can be seen in Russian regulation. For example, Article 1 of Federal Law No. 281 stipulates that the purpose of "special economic measures is to respond to (...) an unfriendly action by a foreign state (...) posing a threat to the interests and security of the Russian Federation," and Presidential Decree No. 252 of May 3, 2022 indicates the need to protect public interests, namely, it clarifies that The measures are introduced in order to protect the national interests of the country and in response to hostile and contrary to international law actions of foreign States.

Both Chinese and Russian law define a common legal framework for countering foreign sanctions, which is comprehensive in nature. At the same time, if there is already a significant amount of clarification and specifying by-laws in relation to FZ-281, then this is only expected in relation to the Law of the People's Republic of China "On Sanctions against Foreign Citizens".

There are two basic categories of economic sanctions in both countries. The first is sanctions within the framework of the United Nations. The second is national sanctions. With regard to the second category, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a number of orders in 2019-2023 imposing sanctions against American companies as a countermeasure to certain international economic sanctions. In Russia, in addition to Decree No. 252 of May 11, 2022, Decree No. 851 of the Government of the Russian Federation "On Measures to implement Decree No. 252 of the President of the Russian Federation of May 3, 2022" was adopted. The Resolution establishes a list of legal entities in respect of which the Russian Federation introduces special economic measures – these are 31 companies, most of which belong to the European Gazprom group.

At the same time, a third category of sanctions is being formed in Russia – sanctions of supranational associations. At the moment, within the framework of the Union State, the sanctions of Russia and Belarus against foreign states and their persons are being synchronized. China is not a member of any regional body that imposes sanctions.

China has established a ban on compliance with "unjustified" sanctions of foreign states by the above-mentioned Order of the Ministry of Commerce dated January 9, 2021. Article 9 of the Order stipulates that if any party to the agreement complies with foreign sanctions, thereby violating the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens, legal entities or other organizations, the latter have the right to claim damages. According to this Order, the application of foreign legislation is prohibited if it violates international law, violates the foundations of national sovereignty and security, and violates or may violate the rights of Chinese persons. And Article 12 of the Law on Combating Foreign Sanctions prescribes that if organizations and individuals violate the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens or organizations, Chinese citizens and organizations can initiate legal proceedings in the people's courts with demands for termination of relevant actions and compensation for damages. In Russia, there is no direct ban on compliance with sanctions of foreign states, but draft law No. 102053-8 "On Amending Article 201 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation" provided for responsibility for compliance with sanctions of a foreign state. On June 20, 2022, consideration of the bill was postponed indefinitely, which does not mean that the Russian legislator intends to abandon this bill. It is worth noting here Federal Law No. 32-FZ of March 4, 2022, which supplemented the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation with Article 284.2. The new article provides for criminal liability for calls for the imposition of sanctions. In Russia, responsibility for compliance with sanctions may also arise within the framework of violations of antimonopoly legislation or legislation on state defense orders (for example, if the only Russian manufacturer refuses to supply products to a subordinate Russian person).

The Chinese legislator uses a two-way criterion: whether foreign laws and measures have unjustifiably extraterritorial application; and whether such foreign laws do not unreasonably prohibit/restrict transactions between Chinese and third-country persons. At the same time, in the Order of the Ministry of Commerce dated January 9, 2021 specific foreign laws are not specified, the observance of which is prohibited and this issue is left to the discretion of the Government of the People's Republic of China, which at the moment has not given any explanations in this regard. It is likely that we are talking specifically about US sanctions programs and the risk of compliance with US sanctions under the threat of "secondary" sanctions, which have extraterritorial application and are likely to be blocked in accordance with this Order ^[6].

In China, unlike Russia, there is no mechanism for changing the jurisdiction of cases due to the presence of a sanctions element (Article 248.1 of the APC of the Russian Federation). Thus, the exclusive competence of the Chinese courts in disputes involving persons against whom restrictive measures have been introduced is not legally fixed.

At the moment, in general, we can talk about the formation in Russia of a legal mechanism for blocking sanctions, which are used by the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom and other states. As a rule, they involve freezing assets and banning transactions. A similar tool was developed in China.

China has a well–defined structure of sanctions regulatory bodies - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade, customs authorities, the Ministry of National Security and the People's Bank of China. At the moment, Russia's counter–sanctions system includes a similar structure of regulators - the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Trade together with the Federal Customs Service, the Federal Tax Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government Commission for Monitoring Foreign Investments; the Prosecutor General's Office, which, by virtue of Article 52 of the APC of the Russian Federation, is entitled to challenge transactions, violating counter-sanctions.

As of 2023, the Chinese authorities have not yet issued specific procedures for both adding individuals to the sanctions list and excluding them from it. As for the sanctions imposed in accordance with the Law on Combating Foreign Sanctions, the law indicates that inclusion in the list cannot be challenged and can only be terminated by the authority that made such a decision. Russia also does not provide a mechanism for exclusion from the sanctions lists, but within the framework of general regulation, such exclusion is theoretically possible in court or through an authoritative decision of the relevant regulator (at the moment there is no such practice). It should be noted that in this part, Russian legislation does not violate the basic right – the right to judicial protection and does not prohibit persons included in the sanctions list from appealing both the fact of entry and the normative act itself (within the framework of administrative proceedings).

What is common in counter-sanction regulation in Chinese law and in Russian law is the absence of a single open register of sub-sanctioned persons (the list of sub-sanctioned persons can be found directly in the by-laws and statements/publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The mechanism of "secondary" sanctions is not directly provided for either in Russian regulation or in Chinese. Despite this, the Order of the Ministry of Commerce dated January 9, 2021 contains a mechanism for so–called "tertiary" sanctions - sanctions for compliance with sanctions, i.e. the possibility of imposing sanctions against Chinese and foreign individuals in response to their compliance with the sanctions of foreign states.

In Russia, Federal Law No. 422-FZ of August 4, 2023 introduces the "50%+ rule" to determine the control of a legal entity, which is not included in the Chinese sanctions regulation. The Russian 50%+ rule stipulates that a person is also recognized as a sub-sanctioned person in which the sub-sanctioned persons and (or) organizations have the right, directly or indirectly (through third parties, including those belonging to the same group of persons) to independently or jointly dispose of by virtue of participation in this controlled legal entity of more than 50% of the votes in the supreme body management (Article 9).

We should also focus on the "freezing" mechanism, which is actively used by foreign countries and their associations. The Chinese regulation does not explicitly specify measures to freeze assets, but due to the general regulation, the authorities are given broad powers to take any measures they deem necessary after the inclusion of a foreign person on the sanctions list, which theoretically could include freezing assets. At the moment, there are no such precedents in China, and no implementation rules have been adopted.

For the first time in the practice of Russian counter-sanctions, the mechanism of blocking (freezing) funds in the Resolution was used Government of the Russian Federation No. 1300 dated November 1, 2018 "On Measures to implement the Presidential Decree No. 592 of the Russian Federation dated October 22, 2018", which introduced a new special economic measure – "blocking (freezing) of non-cash funds, undocumented securities and property on the territory of the Russian Federation and a ban on the transfer of funds (withdrawal of capital) outside the territory of the Russian Federation". And the Federal Law "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation" dated August 4, 2023 No. 422-FZ, defined the parameters for freezing assets of sanctioned persons, namely: a ban on transactions with funds, securities, other property belonging to the blocked person, as well as financial transactions carried out in the interests of, in particular the benefit of the sub-sanctioned person. This law also defined the rights of blocked persons, including the right to receive a salary at the rate of 10 thousand rubles per month for a blocked person or payment for medical services also in the amount of no more than the specified amount.

The well-established practice of the countries that are the most active subjects of international sanctions is the mechanism for issuing exceptions/permits from compliance with the sanctions regime (licensing system). As for the counter-sanctions imposed in accordance with the Chinese Law on Combating Foreign Sanctions, the law does not specify a mechanism for exclusion from sanctions restrictions (licensing). But Article 8 of the Order The Ministry of Commerce dated January 9, 2021, stipulates that a person can apply to the supervising department of the State Council to issue a permit for non-compliance with this Order, the decision is made by the department within 30 days. In Russia, the issuance of analogous licenses, namely permits, is provided for by Presidential Decree No. 942 dated December 22, 2022. The Government of the Russian Federation is given the authority to issue temporary permits for certain transactions with persons under Russian sanctions.

For violations of the Law on Combating Foreign Sanctions, when Chinese persons do not use countermeasures, they can be prosecuted, but at the moment the Criminal Code of China does not include criminal offences related to non-compliance with Chinese countermeasures and, accordingly, the types of criminal penalties in this regard are not fixed. But if Chinese persons violate the Order of the Ministry of Commerce dated January 9, 2021, they can be applied: an administrative warning, an order to change behavior within a specified period or a fine (Article 13). In Russia, such liability is provided for by industry legislation. For example, administrative measures for violation of special economic measures are carried out by the Bank of Russia. Among them are regulations, restrictions on activities for up to six months, a fine of up to 5 million rubles, and other measures.

In Russia, according to the new version of Article 3 of Federal Law No. 281, the objects of counter-sanctions are: a foreign state, an organization, a foreign citizen, a stateless person, legal entities controlled by foreign organizations, citizens, and stateless persons. According to Articles 3, 4, 5 of the Chinese Law on Combating Foreign Sanctions, the objects are: persons and organizations that directly or indirectly participate in the development, decision-making and implementation of discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese citizens or organizations; spouses and immediate relatives of the above-mentioned persons; organizations in which the above-mentioned persons act as senior management or de facto controlling persons; as well as senior management or persons exercising actual control of the above-mentioned organizations.

According to Article 6 of the Chinese Law on Combating Foreign Sanctions, a non-exhaustive list of countermeasures is fixed, which includes: migration restrictions, such as visa refusal, refusal of entry, visa cancellation or expulsion; property and financial restrictions, such as the arrest or freezing of movable, immovable property and other types of assets that are in the territory on the territory of China; prohibition or restriction for organizations and individuals in China to participate in relevant transactions, cooperation or other activities with such persons and organizations; any necessary measures. At the same time, the most frequent countermeasures introduced by China are visa and economic restrictions ^[7].

The entire Russian sanctions/counter-sanctions system can be divided into: visa, migration sanctions (personal sanctions); currency restrictions; restrictions in the field of property rights; export and trade restrictions, corporate restrictions and prohibitions. The practice of forming sanctions regulation in Russia proceeds from the fact that federal legislation provides for an exhaustive list of special economic measures, but at the same time authorized authorities have the right to impose other restrictions and counter-sanctions.

It should be noted that there is no single conceptual and categorical counter-sanction apparatus at the level of Russian regulation. Thus, two concepts have been legislatively formed - special economic measures (FZ-281) and measures to influence (counteract) unfriendly actions of the United States and other states (FZ-127). These legal categories are similar, while "special economic measures" are a universal category. Also, in Russian practice and doctrine, the terms restrictive measures, sanctions, and counter-sanctions are used ^{[8, p. 97]}. In China, there is no such confusion of terms and the term "反制措施" (literally translated as "countermeasures") is widely used.

The mechanism of introducing counter-sanctions is similar in the case of counter-sanctions regulation in Chinese law and in Russian law. In Russia, the mechanism for the introduction of special economic measures is fixed in FZ-281. The decision to introduce special economic measures is made by the President on the basis of proposals from the Security Council of the Russian Federation "with mandatory immediate notification" of the Federation Council and the State Duma of such a decision, the latter also have the competence to make proposals for the introduction of restrictive measures (art. 4 FZ-281). In 2022-2023, most of the restrictive measures were introduced by presidential decrees and specified by regulators within their competence.

According to the Law on Combating Foreign Sanctions (Articles 4, 9), the decision on the introduction of countermeasures is made by the relevant departments of the State Council of China. At the same time, the function of informing about the introduction, termination or modification of countermeasures is carried out by order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a rule, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announces sanctions at its press conferences ^[9].

Both countries declare that the imposition of sanctions is not conditioned by any political considerations and is aimed solely at protecting the economy and national interests ^[10].

Also, Chinese sanctions are always aimed at achieving specific changes in the partner's policy in a limited period of time. When the set goal is achieved, or when the international situation changes, sanctions are lifted ^[11]. The same approach is observed in Russian politics (for example, Presidential Decree No. 39 dated February 06, 2019 "On the abolition of certain special economic measures against the Republic of Turkey"). At the same time, to date, there have been no precedents in Russia for the cancellation of counter-sanctions imposed after 2022.

Conclusion

The key difference between the Chinese approach to the formation of a counter-sanctions system is its focus on prohibiting compliance with the sanctions of foreign states. There is no such prohibition in Russian regulation (but several similar bills have been submitted to the legislature for consideration) and the legislative emphasis is on protecting the country and individuals from unfriendly actions of foreign states.

Both countries initially followed the path of non-application of the American 50%+ rule, which was subsequently introduced in Russia in August 2023, while both jurisdictions currently lack the principle of extraterritoriality of sanctions legislation.

A feature of both Chinese and Russian regulation is the emphasis on its countersanctionality, i.e., resistance to unfriendly actions/sanctions of foreign states and protection of the interests of national individuals. Both countries declare the inadmissibility of the introduction of unilateral restrictive measures and position their sanctions as a necessary and necessary countermeasure aimed solely at protecting national interests.

An important difference between the Chinese legal counter-sanctions regulation from the Russian one is that the former, by analogy with the European and American ones, allows the imposition of sanctions against the spouses and next of kin of the sanctioned persons. This mechanism could be borrowed by Russian regulation as reflecting modern realities when family property is redistributed to non-sanctioned family members.

The list of regulators in both Russia and China is similar, while in Russia the process of introducing countermeasures is more formalized at the level of federal legislation and by-laws.

China's experience in the unified use of the term countermeasures ("反制措施") seems relevant. Within the framework of Russian counter-sanctions practice, the term "special economic measures" could become such a unified term, as it is more universal. Both Russia and China lack a single regulatory act regulating all aspects of the policy of counter-sanctions. In the countries under consideration, there are several basic laws and by-laws issued on their basis and for the purpose of their implementation. This model is similar to the American model, where there are also several basic laws and further regulation is being formed, including at the level of acts of the President of the United States (unlike, for example, the European system, where new sanctions and sub-sanctions persons are included in new editions of the relevant Regulations).

At the same time, the Chinese regulator should adopt the Russian 50%+ rule, which reflects the modern world realities of structuring and doing business. The introduction of a mechanism similar to the Russian one in terms of consolidating the exclusive competence of courts in disputes involving persons against whom restrictive measures have been introduced seems relevant for the protection of Chinese sanctioned persons.

The wording of Chinese legislation is as broad as possible and allows for the introduction of a wide range of counter-sanctions against a wide range of individuals, and law enforcement procedures, including mechanisms for implementing measures and monitoring their compliance, are opaque, which complicates predictability and certainty in the field of both foreign and Chinese business processes. At the same time, Chinese counter-sanctions regulation is a mixture of official restrictive measures provided for by law and unofficial ones in the field of trade influence and manipulation ^[7]. Russian regulation to a much greater extent formulates a specific, exhaustive list of regulatory powers and grounds for the introduction of counter-sanctions. Both Russia and China go to extremes in legislative technique - in Russia, counter-sanctions regulation is found in dozens of acts (many of which are designed like "making changes to ..."), in China, on the contrary, there is a limited number of acts and in total no more than several dozen articles, but with the most abstract formulations. In this regard, the targeted counter-sanctions regulation in Russia, although not perfect, is at the same time more successful than the Chinese one. It seems relevant for both countries to adopt a single regulatory act reflecting all the basic aspects of counter-sanctions regulation.

Thus, the Chinese counter-sanctions regulation, although different from the Russian one, has a number of common features with it. Russian regulation is also more advanced and transparent in terms of mechanisms for the introduction and control of counter-sanctions. The undeniable advantage of Russian counter-sanctions regulation is undoubtedly its official consolidation within the framework of the legal system, while in China a significant part of the sanctions are outside the official legal regulation and are located in the plane of political decisions on the country's trade policy.