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Military shipbuilding in the Volga region (XVIII-early XX centuries) in Russian historiography

Alekseev Timofei Vladimirovich

ORCID: 0000-0002-0809-2400

Doctor of History

Professor, Department of History and Philosophy, A. F. Mozhaysky's Military-Space Academy is a Military Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

197198, Russia, Saint Petersburg, Saint Petersburg, Zhdanovskaya str., 13

timofey1967@mail.ru
Other publications by this author
 

 
Belenovich Oleg Veniaminovich

Junior research assistant, Military Space Academy named after A.F. Mozhaisky

197198, Russia, Saint Petersburg region, Saint Petersburg, Zhdanovskaya str., 13

timofey1967@mail.ru

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0609.2024.3.69309

EDN:

MGFAIZ

Received:

12-12-2023


Published:

12-06-2024


Abstract: The article is devoted to the problem of the emergence and development of the industrial base of military shipbuilding in pre-revolutionary Russia in the Volga region. Its purpose is to analyze the work of domestic researchers on this problem, to identify on this basis the features of the shipbuilding industry in the region, to create a complete picture of its formation and development. The study was conducted within the framework of the individual periods proposed by the author, the grounds for which were both fluctuations in Russia's foreign policy in the Caspian Sea region and changes in the technical and technological aspects of shipbuilding itself. Special attention is paid to the emergence and activities of two major centers of Volga shipbuilding – the admiralty in Kazan and Astrakhan, attention is paid to the development of their production infrastructure, as well as their personnel and logistical support. The research uses both general philosophical methods of analysis and ascent from the concrete to the abstract, as well as special historical methods: chronological, periodization and comparative historical. It is revealed that organized state military shipbuilding in the Volga region arose both to implement the goals of Russia's eastern policy and to meet the needs for shipbuilding materials of the fleet being built on the Baltic Sea. The limited foreign policy goals in the Caspian Sea region predetermined the specific appearance of the shipbuilding industry formed in the Volga region. The conclusion is made about the commensurate development of the shipbuilding base in the Volga region to the level of threats to Russia's national security that existed in the Caspian Sea region during the period under study. It is emphasized that a specific feature of the shipbuilding industry's production and logistics infrastructure in the Volga region was its focus on providing strategic materials to other shipbuilding centers in Russia, primarily those working in the interests of the Baltic Fleet. The problems and issues of the history of military shipbuilding in the Volga region that require further study are shown.


Keywords:

shipbuilding, shipbuilding industry, admiralty, shipyard, Caspian Flotilla, navy, logging, ship scaffolding, military industry, Caspian region

This article is automatically translated.

Introduction. The issues of the emergence and development of military shipbuilding in pre-revolutionary Russia in the Volga region have been repeatedly raised by domestic researchers. However, the materials scattered over dozens of works do not make it possible to form an overall picture of this process. There are also no special historiographical studies, with the exception of brief historiographical reviews in I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov's monographs, which concerned either the history of shipbuilding only in Kazan [1, pp. 5-8], or the development of the manufacturing industry of the city as a whole [2, pp. 8-21].

Meanwhile, the set of production facilities created in the Volga region represented one of the centers of military shipbuilding in Russia. From these positions, the identified problem is important for creating a complete picture of the formation and development of military shipbuilding in Russia as one of the most important branches of the military industry as a whole.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the work of domestic researchers on the problem of the emergence and development of military shipbuilding in the Volga region and an attempt to create on this basis a generalized picture of the formation of a regional segment of the shipbuilding industry with its specific features.

Methodology. The methodological basis of the research is a combination of general philosophical (analysis and ascent from the concrete to the abstract) and special historical methods (chronological, periodization and comparative historical). The method of ascent from the concrete to the abstract made it possible to identify the most significant features in the process of the emergence and development of military shipbuilding and, on this basis, to present a general picture of this process. The combined application of special historical methods made it possible to consider the process of formation and development of military shipbuilding in the Volga region consistently within the framework of the selected periods based on a comparison of the views of researchers of various directions and eras.

The terms "shipbuilding", "military shipbuilding", "shipbuilding" used in the article are identical and are considered as an integral part of the shipbuilding industry engaged in the design and construction of ships for the Navy (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. In 8 t. T. 7. M.: Voenizdat, 1979. p. 593). The Caspian Flotilla refers to the formation of the navy of pre-revolutionary Russia, created by decree of Emperor Peter I in November 1722. (Military Encyclopedic lexicon / edited by L. Zeddler. Ch. 7. St. Petersburg, 1845. pp. 44-48; Encyclopedia of Military and Marine Sciences / edited by G.A. Leer. In 8 vols. Vol. IV. St. Petersburg: type. V. Bezobrazova and Co., 1889. pp. 166-167; Soviet Military Encyclopedia. In 8 vols. Vol. 4. M.: Voenizdat, 1977. p. 113)

It is advisable to consider the history of the shipbuilding industry in the Volga region in a chronological perspective, highlighting a number of periods in it. Taking as a basis the periodization proposed by I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov in relation to shipbuilding in Kazan [3, pp. 22-23], we present our own version already in relation to state shipbuilding on the scale of the entire Volga region: the end of the XVII century. – 1718; 1718 – the end of the 1740s; the end of the 1740s – the end of the 1770s; late 1770s – early 1820s; early 1820s – early twentieth century.

In modern Russian historiography, there are points of view about the much earlier than traditionally believed emergence of military shipbuilding in the Volga region. Thus, M.A. Kirokosian attributed the beginning of the construction of ships for navigation on the Caspian Sea in Astrakhan to 1557 [4, p. 6]. Moreover, he claimed that "the shipyard with a complex of necessary structures in Astrakhan existed long before the end of the XVI century." [4, p. 7]. And "... since 1624, the Astrakhan shipyard has been known as the "Business Yard", which was headed by a special head, a "comrade", that is, the deputy governor. By this time, shipbuilding and shipping in the Caspian Sea was becoming quite organized" [4, p. 15].

A.A. Voronova gave very tendentious information that "... the shipyard in Astrakhan was founded in 1667. It was a secondary attempt to build sailing warships on the Western model and now on a permanent state basis. Foreign specialists participated in the construction of each individual vessel: a master, two apprentices, a carpenter and a blacksmith" [5, p. 242]. Doubt about the reliability of this statement is caused by the apparent inconsistency of the author's reference to the "Report of the commission chaired by L.E. Nobel on the issue of assistance in the construction of marine and river vessels" with the physical characteristics of this source [6]

In general, the presence of a long tradition of shipping and shipbuilding in the Volga basin was convincingly shown in the work of I.A. Shubin [7]. M.A. Kirokosian quite reasonably noted that "unlike the northern route to Europe, along which the movement of goods in the XVII century was carried out exclusively on ships of European construction, on the Caspian Sea the Russian government initiates the development of its own shipbuilding" [4, p. 6]. However, the vast majority of Russian researchers tend to talk about organized state military shipbuilding in the Volga region only since the era of Peter I.

The end of the XVII century. – 1718 S.P. Sanachin, analyzing the available information about the beginning of Kazan shipbuilding, wrote: "... something at the artisanal level was produced under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich… The advanced assembly of naval military vessels in Kazan began in the era of Peter I. Moreover, it unfolded even before the generally recognized conditional date of the founding of the Kazan Admiralty in 1718." The author considered this to be confirmed by the testimony of the Dutch traveler K. de Bruin about the presence of a shipyard in Kazan already in 1703 [8, p. 177].

The reasons for the emergence of shipbuilding in Kazan at the turn of the XVII-XVIII centuries, N.N. Petrukhintsev saw "... in the eastern policy of Peter at the end of the XVII century – in that still unclear tangle of "eastern plans" of the tsar, which are very vaguely read in the first outlines of his reforms [9, p. 280]. References to the foreign policy factors of the emergence of shipbuilding in the Volga region, along with the availability of an appropriate raw material base, were also heard in V.V. Kistenev's dissertation [10, p. 16].

The earliest information about the construction of military vessels in Kazan was given by S.I. Elagin. When creating kumpanstv for the construction of the Azov Fleet, Peter I and members of the royal house, as large landowners, also took part in the "ship fold". However, "these contributions from the palace volosts were not directed to the construction of ships intended for the Sea of Azov, but in all probability served as funds for the construction of ships on the Volga (in 1697, 10 ships were laid there under the supervision of the Order of the Kazan Palace)" [11, p. 55]. I.V. Bogatyrev called these ships barcaloons and he pointed out the village of Sovita as the place of their construction [12, p. 58]. M.A. Kirokosian also mentioned the construction in Kazan of a special detachment of yacht ships "for sea navigation", designed to combat piracy in the Caspian [4, p. 38]. However, at the same time he spoke about 13 yachts, which in 1700 were brought to Astrakhan and organized into two squadrons [4, p. 39]. The author called the shipyard at the mouth of the Kazanka River the place of their construction [4, p. 39].

However, most authors attributed the real beginning of the construction of marine-class vessels in the Kazan region to 1701. F.F. Veselago was the first to point out the laying of about 80 cargo ships (katov, shmakov and privateer) in Kazan and the nearby village of Uslon in 1701-1702 [13, p. 358]. These data have repeatedly appeared in other works, which cannot be said about the coverage of the further course of shipbuilding.

I.A. Shubin wrote that Kazan carpenters were called to St. Petersburg in 1703 and 1715, and in Kazan itself the construction of ships for almost all our seas was concentrated [7, p. 385]. I.I. Yakovlev claimed that since 1706 under the leadership of Vice-Governor N.A. Kudryavtsev in Kazan, the construction of military vessels for the Baltic began, along with the procurement and shipment of ship timber to St. Petersburg [14, p. 78]. I.V. Bogatyrev believed that in addition to the completion and equipping of 80 cargo ships laid earlier, which lasted during 1702-1706, in 1702-1703, more were laid on the vacated stocks about 40 shnyav [12, p. 58]. At the same time, F.F. Veselago also pointed out that in 1706, Captain A. Reis, sent by Peter I, inspected 121 ships in Kazan, of which, however, he recognized only 25 as suitable for military purposes [13, p. 359]. The analysis of this information, along with the data of the Dutch traveler K. de Bruin on the presence in Astrakhan of at least 17 ships launched there along the Volga back in 1703, made it possible for N.N. Petrukhintsev to assert that the total volume of shipbuilding at the Kazan shipyards at the beginning of the XVIII century amounted to about 140 ships [9, p. 289].

Awareness of the scale of Kazan shipbuilding at the beginning of the XVIII century prompted modern researchers to clarify its causes and evaluate its results. I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov believed that "despite the unreliability of the first ships built ..., it was still the first attempt to build naval vessels in Kazan" [1, p. 11]. A.I. Nogmanov characterized as the impressive scale of shipbuilding works and considered them as preparation for the conquest of the Caspian Sea, postponed due to the outbreak of the Northern War [15, p. 265]. N.N. Petrukhintsev justified this position in more detail. "Judging by the number and size of ships, by the scale of work, the Kazan shipbuilding of 1701-1703 was inferior in the period 1700-1707 only to the Azov (but hardly significantly inferior to the Baltic)" [9, p. 284]. Deciding on the nature of the ships built in Kazan at the very beginning of the XVIII century, the author came to the conclusion that "we should still talk about naval shipbuilding in Kazan - especially since the Caspian Sea, both in its depth and in the absence of fleets from likely opponents, did not require battleships, and "shmaks-flutes "could become a kind of ersatz substitute for small frigates" [9, p. 286]. As a result, "Kazan (although with some reservations) should probably be considered one of the first three centers of construction of the Russian Navy..." [9, p. 287]. However, "... the fleet built in Kazan in the early years of the XVIII century with the collapse of Peter's initial "eastern plans" and the cessation of construction of the Volga-Don Canal was clearly excessive for the Caspian Sea" [9, p. 288].

Considering this circumstance, and also trying to justify to some extent the costs of shipbuilding in Kazan, the government decided to use the ships built there to strengthen the Baltic Fleet [15, p. 266]. F.F. Veselago [13, p. 360], V.S. Gusev [16, p. 56], I.V. Bogatyrev [12, p. 58] wrote about the unsuccessful attempt to send two detachments of ships to St. Petersburg in 1706-1713. This plot was studied in more detail by A.I. Nogmanov [15, pp. 266-273] and N.N. Petrukhintsev [9, pp. 290-297]. The first of these authors wrote: "Despite the lack of visible success, the voyages of P. Dornquast, P. Fanres and K. Decker (commanders of ship detachments – Author) gave invaluable experience to the admiralty authorities. They demonstrated that Kazan's capabilities as a center of marine shipbuilding are limited by natural factors. It was not a problem to build a large warship here, the problem was its delivery to the place of future service" [15, p. 274].

N.N. Petrukhintsev also believed that "... the long-term, costly and time-consuming epic of sending the first Kazan ships to the Baltic did not give the expected result… Very significant material and human resources were practically wasted" [9, p. 298]. At the same time, this author revealed a number of positive aspects of the "Baltic epic" of Kazan ships: "... during it, invaluable (albeit negative) experience was gained, which forced Peter to finally abandon the original naval shipbuilding program for the Baltic and Azov seas on large rivers", "... difficulties became obvious "canal" projects for the transfer of deep-sea naval vessels from one marine basin to another using river systems", further stimulation was given to the improvement of the Vyshnevolotsk canal system and, finally, the government was forced to "... adopt a more rational strategy for building a fleet" using Kazan ship timber, in the transportation of which invaluable experience was acquired to the Baltic experience [9, p. 298].

It is no coincidence that by the very height of the "Baltic epic" – by 1709 – researchers traditionally attributed the beginning of the transformation of Kazan into the main center for the supply of timber for St. Petersburg shipbuilding, the harvesting of which since 1712 was entrusted to the Kazan vice-governor N.A. Kudryavtsev [12, p. 59]. A.S. Shishkov, under 1713, mentioned the shipment There are 100 buoys and 50 verey to St. Petersburg with a cargo of 4,480 trees and 4,420 sawn boards for the construction of ships [17, p. 38]. I.I. Yakovlev noted the shipment from 1713 to 1722 of timber sufficient for the construction of 57 ships, frigates and other types of vessels [14, p. 78]. I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov estimated the volume of annual supplies in the amount of the need for the construction of three large ships and a number of small vessels [3, p. 22].

After the "volley construction" [9, p. 284] of ships at the beginning of the first decade of the XVIII century, I.V. Bogatyrev noted in 1706-1711 the almost complete absence of state shipbuilding in the Volga region [12, p. 59]. The author attributed its resumption to the summer of 1712, when, under the leadership of the Dutch shipwright K.Y. Truin and apprentice V. Shipilov, the construction of 100 buoys and 50 verekas began. Later, they built 2 flutes, several katas, and the Kazanskaya yacht, brought to St. Petersburg in 1713 [12, p. 59]. A.S. Shishkov mentioned the dispatch of M. Cherkasov's apprentice from St. Petersburg to Kazan in 1714 to build 15 scampways [17, p. 114].

In 1714-1716, ships were built at the shipyard in Kazan for two expeditions of Prince A. Bekovich-Cherkassky [17, p. 158; 13, p. 361-363; 18, p. 234]. Moreover, according to I.V. Bogatyrev, the second expedition included only vessels of a new design [12, p. 59]. In addition, in 1716-1718, under the leadership of the boat master R. Hadley, boat shipbuilding began to develop and the supply of boats to St. Petersburg began. Finally, in 1717, the construction of a new type of tugboat for the Volga basin began [12, p. 59].

Assessing the period of Kazan shipbuilding in general, K.Z. Nasyrov believed that Kazan was assigned the role of auxiliary production for the needs of the St. Petersburg Admiralty and at the same time the main role in the construction of ships for the Caspian Flotilla [19, p. 209]. N.N. Petrukhintsev believed that "earlier shipbuilding" "... laid the practical foundations and Apparently, it formed a cadre of craftsmen and workers for a solid shipbuilding tradition in Kazan, which continued its almost continuous development and eventually led to the creation of a large shipbuilding center in Russia, named the Kazan Admiralty [9, p. 299].

1718 – the end of the 1740s. In Russian historiography, since the 19th century, there has been a stable idea that the Kazan Admiralty was established in accordance with the decree of Peter I addressed to Kazan Vice-Governor N.A. Kudryavtsev on January 31, 1718 [20, p. 115; 21, p. 158; 7, p. 385; 22, p. 69; 16, p. 56; 12, p. 59; 10, p. 16]. However, recently a number of authors have put forward their own, different from the traditional, points of view on the dating of this event. S.P. Sanachin argues that the foundation of the Kazan Admiralty in 1718 has not been documented [8, p. 177]. The author emphasizes the fact that even such a term as "Kazan Shipyard" is not found in the documents of the first two decades of the XVIII century. S.P. Sanachin dates the first official mention of the Kazan Admiralty in the documents of the Maritime department to 1727 [8, p. 178]. As for the decree of January 31, 1718, according to the author, it only regulated the harvesting of ship timber in the Kazan province and marked the beginning of the settlement of timber harvesters – the future Admiralty [8, p. 179]

K.Z. Nasyrov, on the contrary, pushes the date of the foundation of the admiralty in Kazan to the end of the XVII century, namely to March 31, 1697, when Peter I issued a "decree" to the Prince of Lviv, determined by the governor in Kazan "On the management of state and zemstvo affairs" [19, p. 211]. Regarding the decree of January 31, 1718, the author associates himself with S.P. Sanachin and considers it the basis for the establishment of the Kazan Admiralty settlement [19, p. 214].

To some extent, the opinion of A.I. Nogmanov can reconcile different points of view on the date of establishment of the Kazan Admiralty: "... the formation of the Kazan Admiralty should be considered as a purely bureaucratic event, a kind of signboard change that followed the establishment of the Admiralty Board in December 1717 and the reorganization of the maritime department" [15, p. 277]. At the same time, I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov insisted that "... preparation for the Persian campaign required the creation of not just a shipyard, but a large production shipbuilding base with an appropriate material base ..., a certain staff of permanent workers and employees" [23, p. 355]. Such a position does not seem to be meaningless, since a number of researchers tended to exaggerate the very fact of the establishment of the admiralty, to give it the character of a "trigger mechanism" in the activation of military shipbuilding in the Volga region [20, p. 115].

Meanwhile, in 1717-1719, the construction of ships continued in Kazan, primarily to provide expeditions to describe the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. Among the ships laid down and built in these years, researchers named bots, tugboats [17, pp. 223, 284], gukor, yachts, damshouts, boats [12, p. 60], galliots, galleys, schmaks [16, p. 56].  In the same years, there were qualitative changes in the organization of shipbuilding works and the composition of the shipbuilding base in the Volga region. First of all, it concerned the staffing of shipbuilding. Already M.N. Pinegin showed the transition in 1718 to the harvesting of ship's timber with the involvement of a foreign service population caused by the high cost of using hired labor for these works [21, p. 158]. I.V. Bogatyrev mentioned the recruitment of 280 carpenters for leaking work on the ship's timber, another recruitment in 1718 of 150 carpenters, 30 blacksmiths and 100 sawyers, who were trained by Admiralty craftsmen specially sent from St. Petersburg [12, p. 59]. The artisans recruited in this way, along with their families, were settled on the lands of the Kazan Zilant monastery and formed the initial population of the Admiralteyskaya Sloboda [24, p. 101].

I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov, who has studied the issue of staffing of Kazan shipbuilding in the most depth, believes that until 1718 its main method was the mobilization of the local population by conscription [25, p. 239]. After the establishment of the Admiralty, the formation of a permanent staff began by recruiting recruits within the Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod provinces. To fill the shortage of personnel during the period of intensification of work, they resorted to hiring, to forcibly attracting the population [25, p. 240], to transferring admiralty workers from other admiralties, most often from St. Petersburg. I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov noted the role of the first head of the Admiralty, N.A. Kudryavtsev, as well as foreign specialists in the organization of shipbuilding (ship's apprentice Johnston, master R. Gardley, etc.): "... in the initial period of Kazan shipbuilding, the organizing and training role of foreigners was noted, which was really great. They brought with them a wealth of experience in European shipbuilding" [1, p. 47].

An important factor in staffing was the training of qualified shipbuilders. This purpose was served by the Admiralty school, regarding the date of foundation of which in Kazan there is a solid range of opinions in historiography. A.I. Dubravin called 1720 [26, p. 66], Yu.V. Mansurov – February 28, 1714 [27, p. 15]. The final clarity on this issue was brought by I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov. He found out that there were two digital schools in Kazan: the first was founded in 1716 and soon merged with the garrison school [1, p. 83]; the second was the Admiralty school, opened on the initiative of N.A. Kudryavtsev in 1726 [1, p. 84] and existed until the end of the XVIII century.

The Admiralty form of organization of shipbuilding work also assumed the creation of appropriate production and auxiliary infrastructure. V.S. Gusev noted the construction of seven boathouses, warehouses, sheds, barracks, blacksmith, rigging, drawing, boat and other workshops on a plot of land allocated to the Admiralty on the banks of the Kazanka River [16, p. 56]. A water saw mill on 3 frames was added to the saw mill on two frames built back in 1717 for the shipyard in 1719 [1, p. 13]. In addition, a saw mill on the Pyana River in Nizhny Novgorod County, which had been operating since 1713, was transferred to the Kazan Admiralty. According to I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov, by 1720 the construction of the main production facilities was completed [1, p. 14]. Among the auxiliary industries should be attributed the state-owned pump (tannery) factory, which was engaged in the manufacture of leather goods for the manufacture of ship pumps. It was founded in 1719 [20, p. 116]. After visiting the factory by Peter I in 1722, it was decided to invite an English master, who set up the work of the enterprise, bringing the productivity to 300-400 tanned leathers per year [21, p. 157].

The intensification of shipbuilding and the expansion of their geography were caused by preparations for the Persian campaign of the Russian troops of 1722-1723. I.I. Golikov first noted the presence of a shipyard in Nizhny Novgorod, and also dwelled in detail on the nominal decree of Peter I, which prescribed the construction of ships suitable for navigation both by river and by sea, shipping to Nizhny Novgorod from St. Petersburg Admiralty masters of ship, mast, block, sailing, as well as "... masts, sails, anchors and other rigging should be made in Nizhny Novgorod, and in order to fix a shipyard with a helm, cranes and other things that are necessary" [28, p. 178].

F.F. Veselago, followed by I.A. Shubin, specified the course and volumes of shipbuilding, pointing to the construction in the winter of 1722 in the cities of Vyshny Volochyok, Tver, Uglich and Yaroslavl by the forces of the army regiments stationed there of 200 "Ostrovsky boats", 60 "new-fashioned romanovs" and flipper ships for transporting troops [13, p. 368; 7, p. 104]. In addition, 20 flipper ships were built in Nizhny Novgorod [7, p. 104], and a boatmaster was sent to Kazan to build a large boat, boats and trim the royal yacht [13, p. 368].

A number of details were clarified by I.V. Bogatyrev. In particular, the list of places for the construction of ships by troops has been expanded: in addition to the cities mentioned by F.F. Veselago and I.A. Shubin, Kashin and Romanov are also cities. It is noted that the prototypes of the "island boats" built at the same time were Finnish boats, and they were named Romanovki after the city of Romanov. The scope of work carried out in Kazan by the bot master V. Shipilov has been clarified: the construction of three shipboard and one large deck boat, 2-3 boats and the finishing of the royal yacht Esperance. Finally, I.V. Bogatyrev mentioned the activities of Admiralty quartermaster I. Potemkin and shipwright G.A. Menshikov in the construction of ships of a new type for the Volga in Kazan, Astrakhan and Nizhny Novgorod in 1721-1722, and since 1722 at the Nizhny Novgorod shipyard – galliots, nasads and Romanovs [12, p. 60].

A new impetus to shipbuilding was given by Peter I in October 1722 after his return from the Persian campaign. I.I. Golikov wrote about the emperor's order regarding the construction of hekbots in Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan [28, p. 284]. A.S. Shishkov specified the number of these vessels – 30 units, and also indicated the construction of several additional beads and galiots [17, p. 299]. F.F. Veselago detailed this information, noting that 15 boats were built in both cities [13, p. 376], and in Kazan there were 6 more large boats and about 60 longboats and boats. At the same time, anchors and rigging for ships were made in Nizhny Novgorod, and the mast and sails were made in Kazan [13, p. 382].

Another measure taken by Peter I was the order he gave on November 4, 1722 on the construction of a shipyard in Astrakhan, closer to the theater of military operations [29, p. 108]. As A.P. Sokolov noted, the construction progressed slowly due to a shortage of workers and materials, and after the death of the emperor in 1725, it was stopped altogether. Instead, on June 6, 1726, the decree of the Admiralty Board on the construction of the admiralty in a new place followed, which from a hydrographic point of view turned out to be very unsuccessful [29, p. 109]. I.A. Shubin even claimed that in 1722 Peter intended to transfer the admiralty from Kazan to Astrakhan, but did not manage to implement it until the end of his life his intention [7, p. 386]. There is no single point of view among modern researchers on the creation of the Astrakhan Admiralty. Thus, V.V. Kistenev considered the date of its establishment to be 1722 [10, p. 16]. But M.A. Kirokosian believed that after the end of the Persian campaign, all ship repair and shipbuilding work continued at the long-existing Astrakhan Business Yard and only in 1727, in accordance with the order of the Admiralty Board, the Astrakhan Admiralty was built [30, p. 125].

The results of shipbuilding activity in Astrakhan were very modest. A.P. Sokolov wrote about one gukor, two galliots, four prams, three boats, two postal and 26 "island" boats built here in 1722-1723 [29, p. 112]. F.F. Veselago estimated the volume of construction in Astrakhan for 1722-1725 at one gukor and six deck boats [13, p. 505]. M.A. Kirokosian insisted that the construction of ships in Astrakhan continued after 1725 [30, p. 125], although he, like other researchers, has no specific data on this. But V.G. Chubinsky believed that after the establishment of the Admiralty in Astrakhan, only repairs were carried out on ships built mainly in Kazan [31, p. 78].

In the post-Petrine period, unlike the Baltic Sea, shipbuilding in the Volga region did not undergo significant reductions, despite the claims of some authors [12, p. 61]. Since the time of A.P. Sokolov, this has been explained by the need to meet the needs of the troops of the Grassroots Corps stationed along the western and southern coasts of the Caspian Sea [32, p. 466]. In order to maintain the ship's complement of the Caspian Flotilla, due to the short service life of the ships, in 1724 it was decided to build five hekbots annually. As a result, in 1725-1735, according to A.P. Sokolov, 51 hekbots, five gallots, eight gukors, one pram, 12 shmaks, three packet boats were built [32, p. 467]. The problem remained the quality of the vessels, which was solved by the proposal of the chief commander of the Astrakhan port, I.A. Senyavin, on the construction of hekbots from oak timber instead of pine [33, p. 175]. But M.A. Kirokosian found out that there was not enough oak for all shipbuilding programs, and already from December 1727, only fore- and afterstocks for Caspian ships began to be made from this material [4, p. 59].

Kazan remained the main place of ship construction. I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov drew attention to the organization of the production process at the shipyard, which provided, for example, in 1727, the presence of more than 10 main specialties among craftsmen, the number of which increased during the XVIII century [1, p. 57]. However, most of the work was done manually, which required a large number of workers and created a constant problem of replenishing the working staff [1, p. 58]. So, by 1727, the number of employees in the admiralty amounted to more than 1,000 people [3, p. 23]. A positive moment was the replacement of foreigners by domestic specialists as heads of shipbuilding works, the last of whom, shipwright R. Gardley, was dismissed from service at the very end of the 1720s [1, p. 46].

References to related enterprises of the Kazan Admiralty belong to this period. Among them, I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov named the rope factory in Nizhny Novgorod, transferred in 1727 to Kazan (rigging), the Olonets Petrovsky factories, and later the state-owned mining plants of the Urals (anchors and weapons), the Demidov mining plants (iron), the Moscow Sailing Factory (sailing cloths) [1, p. 26].

After the return of Persia under the treaties of 1732 and 1735. previously occupied by Russian troops lands along the western and southern coast of the Caspian Sea, shipbuilding activity in the Volga region is sharply reduced. A.P. Sokolov showed that a number of definitions of the Cabinet of 1735-1737. it was decided to keep three bots for postal messages and two hecbots "for detecting thieves" in the Caspian Sea, and the rest The vessels can be sold or donated to merchants [32, p. 468]. However, the activity of the Persian ruler Nadir Shah in the Caspian region in the early 1740s forced the activation of domestic shipbuilding. According to the testimony of the same A.P. Sokolov, the ships begun in 1735 were completed and by 1740 five hekbots and seven shmaks were concentrated in Astrakhan, and three more prams were laid in Kazan [32, p. 470].

A new round of tension was caused by the activities of the Englishman Elton in organizing the Persian fleet. I.V. Toropitsyn studied in detail the response measures of the Russian government. By the decision of the Senate of February 24, 1744, the construction of ten steamboats, 50 kayaks and 40 boats was allowed in Kazan [34, p. 334]. As the foreign policy situation changed, the course of implementation of this program was adjusted: in the summer of the same 1744. The Senate approved the construction of a third of the planned number of vessels, and in December - another third [34, pp. 335-336]. In addition, A.P. Sokolov pointed to the construction of three ships instead of the rotten ones in Kazan and the requisition of all commercial vessels in the Caspian Sea [32, p. 472]. In general, I.V. Tropitsyn estimated the results of the implementation of the shipbuilding program of 1744 in the built seven hekbots, 34 kayaks, 17 boats, seven yalbots and seven skerries [34, p. 337]. After the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 and the subsequent death of Elton, the activities of the Caspian Flotilla were again curtailed. By decree of June 26, 1750, only three shnyavs were supposed to be kept in the Astrakhan port [32, p. 473].

The end of the 1740s – the end of the 1770s. Throughout the entire period from the middle of the XVIII century to the second half of the 1770s, the number of ships for the Caspian Sea was up to three ships or boats. According to I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov, only 5 seaworthy vessels were built during this time. In this regard, the author complains about the short-sighted policy of the government, which did not take into account the immediate and long-term prospects for the development of the fleet. "The government went from one extreme to the other: decisions were made to leave a minimum number of ships in the Caspian Sea, then the construction of ships was accelerated. The government's policy towards the navy was inconsistent, which led to uneven development, and even the decline of the fleet" [3, p. 23].

Despite the almost complete absence of shipbuilding activities in the Kazan and Astrakhan Admiralties, these enterprises continued to exist. Regarding the latter, A.P. Sokolov could only say that "the Admiralty, gradually and long ago built, stood in the same place..." [32, p. 474]. As for the Kazan Admiralty, the harvesting of ship's timber continued here and the pump plant continued to function. According to M.N. Pinegin, by 1774 its capacity had even increased to 500 tanned skins per year [21, p. 157]. In 1770, the Admiralty Board, due to the inconvenience of the plant's location near the cloth factory, ordered it to be moved to another location, but this project was implemented only in 1812 [20, p. 116]. The number of Admiralty craftsmen decreased in 1757 to 280, and in 1764 to 210 people [25, p. 241].

The end of the 1770s – the beginning of the 1820s. The resumption of active shipbuilding activity in the Volga region in the second half of the 1770s was due to factors of a foreign economic and geopolitical nature. This was shown, albeit somewhat veiled, already in the work of A.P. Sokolov. The author spoke about the difficulties of England's trade with India due to the uprising of the North American colonies and the strengthening of Russian-Indian trade through Central Asia, hinting at the role of G.A. Potemkin [35, p. 228]. The same motives about Russia's desire, taking advantage of the distraction of England's attention in the North American theater and the unstable domestic political situation in Persia, to establish direct trade and economic relations with India and spread its influence in the Caspian Sea are also heard in the works of modern researchers [3, p. 23; 4, p. 79]. G.A. Grebenshchikova, the author of this project calls G.A. Potemkina [36, p. 398].

The construction of new types of naval military vessels was resumed in Kazan in 1778. M.A. Kirokosian noted the requirements for these vessels: the possibility of their use as vehicles for leasing to merchants during periods of pacification of the situation in the region. The competition for the design of such a ship, held in 1777, was attended by shipwrights Yames, A.S. Katasanov and galley master Korchebnikov [4, p. 81]. Preference was given to Katasanov, who developed designs for a frigate and a bombardier vessel [36, p. 399]. The results of the construction that unfolded in 1778-1780 again differ in the works of researchers [32, p. 475; 4, p. 82]. The data of G.A. Grebenshchikova, who wrote about the concentration of a flotilla of three frigates, a bombardier ship and seven deck boats in the Astrakhan port by the end of the summer of 1780, seem the most likely [36, p. 399]. The activities of the Kazan Admiralty, which reached its highest development during this period, were aimed at maintaining the regular strength of the Caspian Flotilla, established in 1779 as part of three frigates, a bombardier ship and small vessels [3, p. 23].

I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov structured the composition of the Admiralty much more deeply than the researchers who preceded him did [21, p. 243]. In addition to the Admiralty proper in Kazan, he included about 40 ship piers and more than 120 places for harvesting ship timber in the Volga region [37, p. 5]. The main production facilities were concentrated on the central site in the city: seven boathouses, which allowed the simultaneous laying of 14 naval vessels, not counting small boats and boats for them; drawing, boat, forest, and lecture sheds; carpentry, cooperage, block, sailing, lantern, hose, plumbing, turning, carving, boiler room, painting and two rigging workshops, a blacksmith shop and shops. In addition, the Admiralty was responsible for: a rope spinning mill, instead of which a spinning mill was eventually organized on the territory of the Admiralty itself; a pump plant, which in 1812 was also transferred to the territory of the Admiralty [1, pp. 21-23].  

The undoubted merit of I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov is a thorough study of the most diverse aspects of the activities of the Kazan Admiralty. This author paid great attention to the issues of personnel support for shipbuilding, the financial situation of employees, and their working conditions. According to him, "... the craftsmen and workmen of the Kazan shipyard represented one of the important groups of government workers. Their economic and legal situation was common with the situation of employees of other admiralty and other state-owned enterprises in Russia, i.e. the development of the shipbuilding industry in Kazan was entirely connected with serf labor, serfdom methods of maintaining work discipline prevailed at the enterprise" [25, p. 244].

The importance of the Kazan Admiralty School for the training of qualified personnel is shown. Despite a number of characteristic disadvantages – low level of teacher training, poor funding - "the school was the initial stage in the training of specialists for the domestic shipbuilding industry of both low, medium, and higher qualifications" [1, p. 100].

Analyzing the activities of the Kazan Admiralty at the final stage of its existence, I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov noted that its main task was to harvest and send ship timber to the St. Petersburg Admiralty, and since the beginning of the XIX century – to Arkhangelsk. "At the same time, the construction of our own ships receded into the background. Even during the years of the absence of a shipwright in Kazan for the construction of ships, such a master must have been present at the harvesting of ship's timber" [2, p. 102]. According to the author, from 1709 to 1856, about 2 million of the highest quality oak trees were cut down in the Volga forests [1, p. 136]. In addition, the production of building materials for shipbuilding was also established in Kazan [38, p. 123]. According to I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov, "in order to reduce the volume of transportation, many parts of the ship's hull were manufactured according to patterns (templates) at the sites of workpieces and brought them to the shipyard almost ready-made. This significantly reduced transportation costs and accelerated drying" [1, p. 134]. S.P. Sanachin noticed an important feature of the production activity at the Admiralty. According to him, the most important ship product manufactured in Kazan for the capital's admiralty was nagels – large oak nails for fastening ship parts. The technology of their manufacture included soaking in salt water and drying, for which the Admiralty was equipped with a Salt Channel [8, p. 183].

The problem of harvesting ship's timber was closely related to the problem of Lashmans. According to I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov, "... after numerous attempts to attract hired workers for the harvesting and removal of ship's forests, which were unsuccessful, the state followed a proven path more than once – the path of coercion" [1, p. 126]. By the above-mentioned nominal royal decree of January 31, 1718, the non-Russian military population of the Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Voronezh provinces and Simbirsk district was assigned to the Admiralty for harvesting ship timber [37, p. 4]. The number of Lashmans according to the VI revision of 1811 reached 943,139 male souls [37, p. 7]. In general, despite serious shortcomings in the management system, numerous violations on the ground, frequent changes in the composition, number, and administrative-territorial affiliation of loggers, the Lashman Institute played an extremely important role in providing raw materials and materials for Baltic shipbuilding [23, p. 373].

The Kazan Admiralty's focus on logging affected its shipbuilding activities. The authors note problems with the quality of ships manufactured at his shipyard almost throughout the entire period of existence. A.P. Sokolov mentioned this regarding the ships that participated in the expedition of Count M.I. Voinovich in 1781-1782, which "... after one year of their service and four years after construction turned out to be rotten" [35, p. 235] I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov named among the most important reasons for this situation: inexperience and lack of specialists at the initial stage [1, p. 40]; the use of raw timber, haste and large amounts of work, violations of the technology of fastening parts of hulls [1, p. 41]; the use of residual materials in shipbuilding, since the best were transported to St. PetersburgSt. Petersburg [1, p. 42]. The author does not name one more circumstance among the reasons, although he mentions it in a different context. We are talking about the uneven development of shipbuilding in Kazan, its high dependence on Russia's foreign policy activity in the Caspian region [3, p. 24]. Not to mention the almost complete curtailment of work in 1747-1778, long breaks occurred in the future, for example, from 1785 to 1794 or from 1798 to 1805 [39, pp. 644-687]. The abrupt nature of the course of shipbuilding work could not but lead to a decrease in the qualifications of shipbuilders of all levels, and this affected the quality.

In general, "the capabilities of the Kazan Admiralty made it possible to build a much larger number of ships. However, the increase in orders was prevented by the ambivalent and inconsistent policy of the government, which considered it reasonable to reduce the cost of building and maintaining naval forces, and only military threats that arose from time to time forced to increase the cost of the fleet" [3, p. 25].

The Astrakhan Admiralty remained in the shadow of Kazan for a long time and practically did not take part in shipbuilding. A.P. Sokolov noted the poor condition of port buildings in Astrakhan as a whole, including elements of shipbuilding infrastructure, which had developed by the early 1790s [40, p. 5]. In 1793, the design of the construction of a new port began with The Admiralty, however, due to lack of funds, the prepared project was rejected the following year [4, p. 97]. The question of the restoration of the Astrakhan Admiralty was returned to at the beginning of the XIX century. Only in 1806, a little more than 34 thousand rubles were allocated for the repair of existing structures [40, p. 5]. Despite this, according to M.A. Kirokosian, the shipyard in Astrakhan was still restored. In 1793, a team of shipbuilders was sent from St. Petersburg to Astrakhan, and in 1794 the construction of military packet ships "Letuchy" and "Sokol" began here [4, p. 98; 18, p. 429]. And yet, "... in the first third of the XIX century, ships for the Caspian Flotilla continued to be built in Kazan, completion, rigging and scheduled repairs, including keeling, heeling and timbering, took place in Astrakhan" [30, p. 128].

Russian Russian-Persian war caused the intensification of shipbuilding, especially after the appointment of Prince P.D. Tsitsianov as commander-in-chief of Russian troops in the Caucasus. At his request, the composition of the Caspian Flotilla was increased and the construction of new vessels began, including a bombardier ship in Astrakhan [40, p. 7]. In total, 16 vessels were built for the Caspian Flotilla from 1805-1806: two bombardment ships and corvettes, four brigs, transports and luggers [39, pp. 644-687].   

After the end of the Russian-Persian war, the issue of the construction of the Astrakhan Admiralty was raised again, and again they limited themselves to half measures. As A.P. Sokolov wrote, in view of the needs for the repair of flotilla vessels, "since Kazan did not have enough hands or material resources for the constantly required new buildings," it was decided to build a boathouse in Astrakhan on the Tsarev River for repairs, which was equipped by 1815 [40, p. 15]. AndA. Bykhovsky claimed that engineer A.A. Popov had built a shipyard on the Tsarev River, where two covered boathouses were equipped: one for repairing old ones, the other for building new small vessels. At the new shipyard, Popov immediately laid down the Belka bomber ship according to his own design [41, p. 76]. However, due to the change in the military and political situation in the Caspian Theater in 1817, it was decided to continue building only brigs and tenders for the flotilla [40, p. 16]. In this regard, the construction of the Belka was not completed. Instead, in 1819-1820, at the Tsarevskaya shipyard, five seaworthy sewers were built for the Astrakhan Provisions Committee [30, p. 129], as well as an 8-gun packet boat [40, p. 16; 4, p. 135]. Due to the shallowing of the Tsarev River, the boathouses on its shore worked only until 1824, and then they were moved to the Volga [30, p. 129].

And yet, by the beginning of the 1820s, the inconvenience of locating the main shipyard in Kazan and the need to move it closer to the sea, i.e. to Astrakhan, became increasingly obvious. A.P. Sokolov called the initiator of this Major General P.G. Orlovsky, appointed in 1821 as the main commander in Astrakhan, and the main reasons "... a large waste, used for wiring ships under construction for the Caspian Sea in Kazan, the slowness of wiring – we lost a whole year of service, the inconvenience of over-eye construction and the inability of funds to quickly increase the flotilla when needed..." [40, p. 18]. E.I. Ahrens believed that the main reasons for the faulty condition of the Caspian Flotilla were the construction of ships in Kazan is significantly remote from the sea and the shallowing of the Astrakhan port [42, p. 53]. The same position was held by researchers of a later time [16, p. 56; 3, p. 24].

However, the resolution of the issue was delayed. A.P. Sokolov saw the reason in the inertia of the leadership of the Kazan Admiralty [40, p. 18]. E.I. Arens also complained, "... that the sympathy of the Minister of the Navy for this case could not save him from the endless red tape that dragged on throughout the reign of Emperor Alexander" [42, p. 53]. It was only in 1824 that funds were allocated "to improve the Astrakhan Admiralty and adapt it to the needs of shipbuilding" [42, p. 53], and the last ships were built in Kazan in 1821-1823 [4, p. 135]. By 1823, A.P. Sokolov attributed the beginning of the deployment of active shipbuilding in Astrakhan, when the Yaik and Volga transports were built. They were followed in 1824 by the brig Peter and the yacht Marfa, and in 1825 by several transports for the Caucasian Corps [40, p. 18].

Modern researchers I.Z., Fayzrakhmanov and K.Z. Nasyrov see an important role in the final solution of the admiralty transfer problem in the work of the expert liquidation commission headed by Vice Admiral P.M. Rozhnov, who worked in Astrakhan in 1826 [19, p. 216]. The Commission clearly showed that despite the lower cost of building ships in Kazan, even taking into account the costs of wiring and finishing, there were also important disadvantages: the location of the shipyard, the launching of ships from which was possible only in the spring; the irregularity of ship construction, which led to irrational expenses for the maintenance of admiralty during periods of downtime; all ships They left Kazan unfinished [1, pp. 36-37]. The important advantages of Astrakhan from the point of view of shipbuilding were the more favorable hydrographic conditions of the Volga River in the city area, a milder climate and the ability to build ships and launch them almost throughout the year [19, p. 219].

The new war with Persia that began in 1826, according to A.P. Sokolov and S.F. Ogorodnikov, accelerated the resolution of the issue [40, p. 18; 43, p. 108]. The draft closure of the Kazan Admiralty, drawn up based on the results of the work of the commission of Vice Admiral P.M. Rozhnov, was approved by Emperor Nicholas I in December 1827. Its implementation lasted for three years due to the need to decide the fate of the pump plant [19, p. 220]. Meanwhile, all the equipment of the Kazan shipyard and workshops was transferred to Astrakhan. M.A. Kirokosian also notes the dispatch of a part of the craftsmen to Astrakhan [30, p. 131]. However, a significant part of the workers of the Kazan Admiralty, which was abolished in 1830, continued to harvest timber for the capital's shipyards until the 1860s [3, p. 24]. The pump plant also continued its work [38, p. 150].

The beginning of the 1820s – the beginning of the twentieth century. The last period of the history of the Volga-Caspian shipbuilding that we have highlighted is very poorly covered in Russian historiography.

According to I.A. Shubin, the construction of all the buildings of the Astrakhan Admiralty was completed by 1830, but even after that the boathouses were repeatedly moved from one place to another due to a decrease in the water level at the mouth of the Volga [7, p. 826]. The main commander of the Astrakhan port, Major General P.G. Orlovsky, and S.A. Burachek, who arrived with him in 1821 to the post of manager of the Admiralty, played an important role in the establishment of shipbuilding works. Researchers note the merits of the latter in organizing construction work at the Admiralty, equipping workshops with new equipment, and making important changes to the technology of ship construction [4, p. 137]. During S.A. Burachek's stay in Astrakhan, shipbuilding activity peaked, caused primarily by the wars between Russia and Persia and Turkey that took place in 1826-1829. Under his leadership, eight brigs, several transport vessels and the first steamships in the Caspian Sea were built for the Caspian Flotilla until 1831 [44, p. 13]. After S.A. Burachek's transfer from Astrakhan, his work was continued by his students Bibikov and Neverov [45, p. 249]. In total, in 1823-1842, when the Astrakhan Admiralty remained the only shipbuilding base of the Caspian Flotilla, 35 combat and transport vessels were built here, including four steamships [30, p. 132]. As follows from the work of F.F. Veselago, after 1842, Astrakhan shipbuilding ceased to engage in shipbuilding. And only in 1857-1859 four steam transports were built here [39, pp. 666-667].

The gradual transition, first to steam and then to iron shipbuilding, had a significant impact on the very configuration of the Volga shipbuilding industry. This was reflected, on the one hand, in the emergence of new enterprises here, which built ships not only for the Caspian Flotilla, but also for other maritime theaters, and on the other hand, in expanding the sources of replenishment of the ship's complement of the Caspian Flotilla itself.

As already noted, the first two wheeled steamships were built according to the design of S.A. Burachek at the Astrakhan Admiralty in 1828. Then, until 1853, the flotilla received ten more steamships for port needs and for navigation on the Caspian Sea. Of these, four wooden steamships were also built in Astrakhan, two iron ones at the Votkinsk plant and four more iron ones at the shipyards of England and Holland. P. Mordvinov pointed out that two of these steamships were armed with cannons [46, p. 51].

The Votkinsk state-owned mining plant, according to I.I. Yakovlev, began building iron vessels for the Caspian Flotilla in 1847 [14, p. 152]. However, F.F. Veselago also claimed that the first iron steamship was built by this enterprise in 1845 [39, p. 650].

Sormovsky Shipyard is becoming another new shipbuilding center. The Nizhny Novgorod Machine Factory Company, established in 1849, built a factory and shipyard near Nizhny Novgorod, and launched its first steamship in 1850 [47, p. 293]. According to V.M. Mikhalev, since 1852 the plant began to fulfill orders from the Maritime Department for wheeled steamships, and also built three screw schooners of the Persianin type [48, p. 57]. This is at odds with the data of F.F. Veselago, according to which the first steamships with iron hulls for the Caspian flotilla were built in 1855-1856 [39, p. 650], and schooners of the Persianin type were handed over to the fleet in 1858 in the amount of four units [39, p. 658].

The events of the Crimean War accelerated the process of equipping the Caspian Flotilla with steam vessels. However, the available research does not allow us to form a complete picture of this process and contains very contradictory information about the number of ships built, their types, and their construction sites. 

P. Mordovin noted in the Caspian Flotilla by 1856 five sailing schooners (according to F.F. Veselago they were built in 1843-1849 at the shipyard in the Finnish city of Abo [39, p. 658]), a sailing brig, two screw schooners and 12 paddle steamers [49, p. 106]. However, according to F.F. Veselago, the construction of screw schooners was not carried out during this period, and the number of steamships could not exceed seven, unless P. Mordovin referred to ships of other types as steamships.

N.I. Barbashev claimed that the construction of steam ships according to the shipbuilding program of 1857 was carried out in Astrakhan, and steam engines for these ships were produced by the Nizhny Novgorod Mechanical Factory. At the same time, a major role belonged to the senior shipbuilder of the Astrakhan port, M.M. Okunev [45, p. 253]. M.A. Kirokosian names among the Astrakhan enterprises the shipyard of G.V. Tetyushinov, where a steam screw schooner was launched in 1857, and in 1858 the 8-gun transport Kalmyk [4, p. 194]. And again, this picture does not correspond to the information of F.F. Veselago, according to which, firstly, in 1857-1858 ships were built in Sormovo - a steamship and four screw schooners, secondly, two screw schooners were built at the Shepelev factory (meaning, apparently, the Vyksa plant, which seems unlikely, since the company has never engaged in shipbuilding), thirdly, in Astrakhan in 1858-1859, not one transport was launched, but at least four [39, pp. 658, 666]. The authors of the book about the history of the Krasnoe Sormovo plant confirmed the active participation of the enterprise in fulfilling the government order for steam screw vessels. But they mentioned two schooners, the Persian and the Khivinets, and five wheeled transports. In addition, supplies of machine tools and stationary steam engines for the Astrakhan port were noted [50, p. 17].

The most definite picture of the composition of the Caspian Flotilla by 1861, which is considered the initial date of construction of the Russian armored fleet, is provided by the works of F.F. Veselago [39, pp. 650-666] and S.P. Moiseev [51, pp. 47-48]. According to them, the flotilla consisted of seven steamships, four sailing and six screw schooners, two sailing and four steam transports. Of the 23 vessels, 9 were built at the Sormovsky plant, 3 at the Votkinsk plants, 4 at the shipyard in Abo, 6 at the enterprises of Astrakhan. The place of construction of the Astrabad sailing transport is not specified.

The construction of an armored fleet in Russia in relation to the Caspian Flotilla was reflected in equipping it with seaworthy gunboats. The history of the creation of the first ships of this type was described by I.I. Chernikov. In 1865, the construction of gunboats with metal hulls began instead of the wooden boats "Sekira" and "Pischal" that had fallen into disrepair. In the summer of 1866, two hulls were lowered at the Votkinsk plant and delivered to Astrakhan. However, due to a reduction in the estimates of the maritime department, completion was postponed until 1870, while machines from old wooden boats were installed on the ships [52, p. 55]. It was only in 1871-1872 that new machines were made for boats at the Sormovo plant, and in 1875 and 1877 the ships were converted to fuel oil by the forces of the Baku port. I.I. Chernikov emphasized the fact that "... the "Axe" and "Pischal" became the first domestic iron ships to descend from the stocks outside the traditional shipbuilding the centers of Russia. Their construction revealed considerable technological and organizational capabilities of the Votkinsk Mining Department plants, which later specialized in large orders from the Maritime Ministry" [52, p. 57].

B.A. Sutyrin also showed the contribution of Votkinsk plants to equipping the fleet.  He noted the construction of iron floating lighthouses here for the equipment of naval bases in Astrabaza (1864) and Krasnovodsk (1872) [53, p. 53], sea barges, longboats and iron steamships for the Caspian Flotilla (1863-1868), as well as steamships, iron barges and boats (1870) for The Aral Flotilla [53, p. 54].

The Sormovsky Shipyard also remained an important center of military shipbuilding. Moreover, this enterprise took part in equipping not only the Caspian Flotilla, but also the fleet forces at other naval theaters. I.I. Yakovlev in this regard mentioned the manufacture by the enterprise in 1901-1907 of two machines with a capacity of 19,500 hp and auxiliary mechanisms for the Ochakov cruiser under construction in Sevastopol [14, p. 149] And I.I. Chernikov investigated the history of the construction by the plant in 1905-1910 of ten gunboats of the Buryat and Vogul types for the Amur Flotilla [54; 55].

In general, during the period from 1861 to 1917, four gunboats, three transports, two schooners, seven steamships and a port ship, as well as several longboats, sea barges and bots were built for the Caspian Flotilla [51, pp. 342-348]. Of these vessels, 7 were built at the Votkinsk Plants, 2 at the New Admiralty in St. Petersburg (the gunboats Kars and Ardagan), 2 at the Sormovsky Plant, and at the shipyard of the company V. Creighton and Co." in Abo – 1, at the shipyards of Great Britain – 2. The construction sites of three more vessels are not specified.

It is noteworthy that during the period of the armored fleet, shipbuilding was not carried out directly in the Volga-Caspian region. The reason for this is obvious: the high cost of creating an industrial base for armored shipbuilding could not pay off the insignificant needs of the Caspian Flotilla, which stemmed from the current military and political situation in the region and which could easily be satisfied at the expense of existing capacities in the main naval theaters.

These circumstances, as well as the difficulties of building ships in the conditions of the decreasing water level in the Volga, led to a gradual curtailment of production activities in the Astrakhan Admiralty. However, due to financial problems, this issue was resolved slowly. Meanwhile, the maintenance needs of existing vessels, primarily steam and screw vessels, required the construction of a mechanical plant in 1857-1858. It was only in 1867 that the Admiralty was moved to Baku, and all the production facilities of the Astrakhan port in the form of a mechanical plant and 13 workshops were transferred to the use of the Caucasus and Mercury Steamship Company [7, p. 827].

Even before the final decision on the transfer of the main port to Baku in April 1855, work began here on the construction of a "mechanical institution" designed by Lieutenant Colonel M.M. Okunev. The Nizhny Novgorod Machine Factory took an active part in equipping the new ship repair enterprise. The construction of the plant was completed at the end of 1862, and the complete equipment was completed in 1866 [56, p. 295]. Since 1872, the company began manufacturing steam boilers [57, p. 300]. And by 1871, through the joint efforts of the Caucasus and Mercury Steamship Company and the Maritime Ministry, a Morton boathouse was built in the Baku port, which also served military vessels [57, p. 301].

The results of shipbuilding (XVIII – early XX century) We will try to summarize more than two hundred years of shipbuilding in the Volga region in the interests of the Russian Navy.

A number of researchers have tried to evaluate the results of the work of the Kazan Admiralty, which undoubtedly made the most significant contribution to military shipbuilding in this region. Let's leave out the very pretentious statement of I.V. Bogatyrev that only during the Petrovsky period about 2,000 ships of 30 types were built in the Volga region [12, p. 61]. M.N. Pinegin was one of the first to put into circulation the figure of 400 ships built at the Kazan shipyard since 1722 [21, p. 160I.A. Shubin extended this number to all ships built during the existence of the Kazan Admiralty from 1718 to 1830 [7, p. 385]. This position was also followed by subsequent researchers [16, p. 56; 38, p. 122; 3, p. 24].

A lot of work on systematization of knowledge about the results of Kazan shipbuilding was carried out by I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov. According to his calculations, from the beginning of the XVIII century to the 1820s in Kazan, "... more than 400 naval vessels of various sizes were built ..., the same number of auxiliary vessels to them and several hundred river vessels, mainly for the transportation of ship timber" [1, p. 168]. In the list given by the author in the same monograph, 468 vessels of 25 types are represented (schmaks, yachts, flutes, scampways, shnyavs, schooners, tugboats, brigantines, bots, gukors, evers, hecbots, galliots, prams, English vessels, kayaks, horse-water vessels, small frigates, bombardier ships, transports, brigs, corvettes, lugers, tenders, seaworthy hulls), as well as 613 small vessels of 6 types (buoys, boats, boats (dinghies), schooners, harnesses, iols). Of all this number, 123 vessels were intended for the Baltic Fleet [1, pp. 174-179].

The works of F.F. Veselago and A.A. Chernyshev contain generalized information about military sailing ships built at all shipyards of the Volga region from 1701 to 1852. The first of them includes 323 vessels of 23 types (cutters, schmucks, privateers, yachts, brigantines, schooners, skins, scampways, deck boats, hookers, damshouts, evers, bots, heckboats, schooners, bombardment vessels, transports, frigates, brigs, corvettes, luggers, tenders, schooners) [39, pp. 644-687], in the second – 509 vessels of 26 types (shmaks, flutes, yachts, buoys, brigantines, shnyavs, skins, scampways, bots, gukors, gokbots, kayaks, shnyavs, kicks, frigates, bombardier vessels, transports, packet boats, galliots, guardcoats, brigs, corvettes, lugers, tenders, iols and schooners) [18; 58]. The number of ships built during the period of steam and ironclad shipbuilding according to the works of F.F. Veselago and S.P. Moiseev was: until 1861 – 11 steamships, six schooners and four transports, and for the period from 1861 to 1917 – 12 gunboats, three transports, two schooners, five steamships and a port ship [39, pp. 650-666; 51, pp. 47-48, 342-348, 418].

Conclusion. Created during the period of active search for the most optimal ways to build a navy based on the capabilities of various regions of the country, the Volga shipbuilding industry has acquired unique features - a combination of the production capacities of shipbuilding itself with extensive activities in the field of logging and manufacture of shipbuilding materials for the shipyards of the Baltic Fleet.

Taking into account the generally closed nature of the region where the shipbuilding industry facilities were located, the history of its origin and development in the Volga region most prominently demonstrates the influence of foreign policy factors on the content of Russia's military-industrial policy in the field of shipbuilding.

Despite the criticism of a number of researchers against the Russian government for its inconsistent policy regarding the development of naval forces in the Caspian Sea, it should be noted that the shipbuilding base formed in the Volga region was adequate to the level of threats to national security that took place in this region throughout the period under study. And taking into account the contribution that the Kazan Admiralty made to providing the shipyards of the Baltic Fleet with shipbuilding materials, it should be recognized that the shipbuilding industry of the Volga region coped quite successfully with the tasks assigned to it.

The conducted research makes it possible to identify a number of problems and issues that are poorly or not reflected at all in historiography. These include: the history of military shipbuilding in the Volga region during the period of the steam and armored fleet; the development in the region of enterprises of industries serving military shipbuilding; industrial relations of shipbuilding enterprises in the Volga region with related enterprises in other regions of Russia; the history of the Nizhny Novgorod shipyard, covered today in extremely fragmentary terms, despite the fact that according to I.Z. Fayzrakhmanov, it continued to exist until 1830 [1, p. 3]. Finally, the creation of a comprehensive work on the history of military shipbuilding in the Volga region throughout the entire period of its entry into Russia remains relevant.

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The thousand-year history of Russia is full of heroic victories and unprecedented feats, among which an important role belongs to the development of scientific and technological progress, for example, nuclear energy, the space program, etc. Military shipbuilding, which dates back to Peter the Great's reforms, has traditionally been of particular interest, taking into account the maritime borders of Russia. At the same time, the debate around the origins of Russian military shipbuilding continues today. These circumstances determine the relevance of the article submitted for review, the subject of which is the historiography of military shipbuilding in the Volga region. The author sets out to analyze the work of Russian historians on this issue, as well as to identify "a number of problems and issues that are poorly or not reflected at all in historiography." The work is based on the principles of analysis and synthesis, reliability, objectivity, the methodological basis of the research is a systematic approach, which is based on the consideration of the object as an integral complex of interrelated elements. The comparative method is also used in the work. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the very formulation of the topic: the author seeks to characterize military shipbuilding in the Volga region (XVIII-early XX centuries) in Russian historiography. Considering the bibliographic list of the article, its scale and versatility should be noted as a positive point: the total list of references includes up to 60 different sources and studies, which in itself indicates the serious preparatory work that the author has done within the framework of the study. Among the works attracted by the author, we note the works of I.I. Yakovlev, A.I. Nogmanov, I.Z.Fayzrakhmanov, A.A. Voronova, which focus on various aspects of the history of military shipbuilding in the Volga region. Note that the bibliography is important both from a scientific and educational point of view: after reading the text of the article, readers can turn to other materials on its topic. In general, in our opinion, the integrated use of various sources and research contributed to the solution of the tasks facing the author. The style of writing the article can be attributed to scientific, at the same time understandable not only to specialists, but also to a wide readership, to anyone interested in both the history of military shipbuilding in Russia, in general, and military shipbuilding in the Volga region, in particular. The appeal to the opponents is presented at the level of the collected information received by the author during the work on the topic of the article. The structure of the work is characterized by a certain logic and consistency, it can be distinguished by an introduction, the main part, and conclusion. At the beginning, the author defines the relevance of the topic, shows his periodization of military shipbuilding in the Volga region: " the end of the XVII century – 1718; 1718 – the end of the 1740s; the end of the 1740s – the end of the 1770s; the end of the 1770s – the beginning of the 1820s; the beginning of the 1820s - the beginning of the The author draws attention to the fact that "most domestic researchers tend to talk about organized state military shipbuilding in the Volga region only since the era of Peter the Great." Among the issues poorly studied in Russian historiography, the author identifies such as "the history of military shipbuilding in the Volga region during the period of the steam and armored fleet; the development of industrial enterprises serving military shipbuilding in the region; industrial relations of Volga shipbuilding enterprises with related enterprises in other regions of Russia; the history of the Nizhny Novgorod shipyard." The main conclusion of the article is that "despite the criticism of a number of researchers against the Russian government for an inconsistent policy regarding the development of naval forces in the Caspian Sea, it should be stated that the shipbuilding base formed in the Volga region was adequate to the level of threats to national security that took place in this region throughout the period under study". The article submitted for review is devoted to an urgent topic, will arouse readers' interest, and its materials can be used both in lecture courses on the history of Russia and in various special courses. In general, in our opinion, the article can be recommended for publication in the journal "Historical Journal: Scientific research".