Ontological, epistemological and anthropological dimensions of creativity in the context of classical European philosophy

Introduction

The historical and philosophical reflection of creativity as a cultural phenomenon is associated with the assertion of various aspects of the desired phenomenon. At different stages of the development of world philosophical thought, creativity is comprehended from ontological, epistemological, anthropological and other positions. Such a multidimensional nature of creativity requires a comprehensive understanding of its nature from the point of view of various sections of philosophical knowledge. Thus, the ontology of creativity explores the objective laws of the process of establishing a new being, and creativity itself is justified as an attribute of human, natural or divine existence. In this regard, V. Blok notes that "although humanity is not the subject of the creation of the world, the establishment and rooting in the world is not complete without human participation, since this world is performatively constituted in the act of invention, joint development, functioning and exploitation, in which a person living and acting in the world is involved" ^{[1, p. 16]}. 

Indeed, the creative subject creates a unique work, transforming the forms of existence of various levels of being, which, in particular, S.I. Fiut points out: "The work is a manifestation of the freedom of the artist, who in himself and in the world – in the orders of being that fall under numerous definitions – has found favorable conditions for his existence" ^{[2, p. 328]}. In turn, M.S. Neves-Pereira and M.A. Pinheiro reveal the ontological structure of the creative process, justifying the latter as a "social, semiotic, dialogical and relativistic phenomenon developing through processes permeated by the special dynamics of the human mental constitution itself" ^{[3, p. 11]}. Illustrating the ontological nature of musical creativity, L. Zheng and G. Mazzola distinguish three ontological dimensions of a musical work: the factual, reflecting the physical, psychological and mental forms of being of music, the semiotic, indicating the disclosure of the semantic content of music through signs and symbols, and the communicative, which "emphasizes the fact that music also exists as a joint being between the sender (usually a composer or musician), the message (usually a work) and the recipient (the public)" ^{[4, p. 7]}.

In turn, the epistemology of creativity is focused on the analysis of the cognitive processes of the subject as a kind of source of the creative act. Thus, M. Peshl and T. Fundneider point to the indissoluble unity of creativity and cognition, designating cognition as an act of generating new knowledge, oriented towards the future, because "what needs to appear is more important than the recombination of already existing knowledge structures" ^{[5, p. 17]}. The epistemological determinacy of creativity is emphasized by I. Licata and G. Minati, defining the latter as the potency of the subject to form original cognitive mechanisms: "Creativity begins with sensory relations with the outside world and continues with cognitive processes such as the production of theoretical modeling and representations" ^{[6, p. 10]}. At the same time, W. Ross recognizes a certain amount of ignorance in the implementation of a creative act as significant, since "ignorance ... is both a creative and necessary condition and, moreover, reveals the essence of the creative act" ^{[7, p. 10]}.

Finally, the anthropology of creativity is focused on the study of the essential characteristics and intrapersonal determinants of the subject, who in the act of creativity not only creates and transforms external reality, but also actualizes, manifests and bases his own essence. It is not for nothing that R. J. Sternberg defines creativity as "the ability of a person to show creativity beyond cultural boundaries both in space and in time" ^{[8, p. 363]}. D. Ambrose postulates the synthesis of intelligence, creativity and wisdom as anthropological determinants of creativity ^{[9, p. 363]}, and N. Myshkovsky, B. Barbeau and F. Zenasni claims "a set of key intellectual, personal, motivational and emotional aspects" as the subjective foundation of creativity, despite the fact that "the importance of these characteristics varies depending on the nature of creative work and the area of application of efforts" ^{[10, p. 33]}. Finally, J. Carroll emphasizes the inextricable relationship between creativity and flexibility in the process of creating a new subject, because "both flexibility and creativity determine the energy of innovation, which characterizes the behavior of modern people" ^{[11, p. 34]}.

The relevance of the study of the ontological essence of creativity is determined by the trend of mechanization and algorithmization of the creative process in modern culture, which leads to the appearance of artificial products resulting from the eclectic combinatorics of heterogeneous fragments of material in order to realize pragmatic interests. In particular, R. J. Sternberg differentiates transformational creativity aimed at a significant and positive transformation of being, and pseudo–transformational creativity aimed at receiving rewards and "relying on the creator as making the world a better place, but in fact its goal is to improve the situation of a person who is a pseudo-transformational creator" ^{[12, p. 1]}. In turn, the study of the epistemological foundations of creativity is of particular importance in the context of the current trend of replacing the processes of cognition and self-knowledge of a creative subject with superficial and mechanistic cognitive acts, while the processes of idea formation are an integral attribute of creative thinking. Moreover, as R. Khalil, B. Godde and A. Karim emphasize, "having a creative mindset is one of the keys to achieving incredible success and noticeable progress in professional, personal and social life" ^{[13, p. 1]}. The relevance of studying creativity in the anthropological dimension is determined by the observed tendency of escalation of utilitarian intentions penetrating into the sphere of creativity, which condones the reduction of the creative potential of the subject to the level of conditional hedonistic reflexes. As a result, as E. Steiner writes, "although creativity may be inherent in every individual, innovation is often an end in itself" ^{[14, p. 145]}. In this regard, the study of the essence of creativity through the prism of the searches of representatives of classical philosophy seems relevant and necessary, since it allows us to identify the ultimate foundations and criteria of genuine creativity, especially since, as N.A. Shergeng notes, "the term classical philosophy in one way or another, it is connected with the exit of the human self beyond the boundaries of selfish interests of self–interest, and therefore with the problem of the existence of a system of supra-individual values" ^{[15, p. 714]}.

Undoubtedly, a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of creativity requires addressing other aspects of it, in particular, axiological, socio-cultural, aesthetic and praxiological. Thus, the axiological plane of creativity reveals its focus on the creation and preservation of spiritual and material values, despite the fact that "value in the creative process ... acts as a guideline for creative activity" ^{[16, p. 46]}. The socio-cultural facet of creativity reveals its focus on the continuity of cultural traditions and the transformation of social relations. Highlighting the aesthetic aspect of creativity allows us to study the specifics of the emergence of works of art and artistic creations. Finally, the praxiological aspect of the phenomenon reveals the essential characteristics of creativity as a process of transformation of natural and socio-cultural existence, despite the fact that "the most important goal of the praxiology of creativity is to study the process of transformation of ideas into creative products" ^{[17, p. 52]}. However, within the framework of this study, attention is mainly paid to the ontological, epistemological and anthropological facets of creativity, which are revealed and revealed meaningfully in the conceptual field of classical European philosophy, originating in antiquity and culminating in German classical philosophy.

Ancient philosophy: creativity as a transition from non-existence to being and contemplative imitation of the divine creation

In the semantic space of ancient philosophy, creativity is justified, first of all, as an ontological phenomenon. The creative nature of the cosmos itself is already evidenced by natural philosophical concepts, among which are the ideas of the eternal variability of being of Heraclitus, the cosmogonic concept of the four-stage development of the world of Empedocles, the doctrine of the self-movement of atoms of Democritus, the ideas of the homeomeries of Anaxagoras controlled by Nus. Within the framework of the Hellenistic-Roman stage, the creative essence of the cosmos is emphasized by Stoics, who believe that nature is "a creator fire, which strives towards creation in a certain way and which is a fiery and creative pneuma" ^{[18, p. 485]}. Cicero also asserts the creative principle of nature, which "will create, creates and has created countless worlds" ^{[19, p. 77]}. Therefore, the creativity of man as a finite being, from the point of view of ancient thinkers, is reduced to imitation of nature through its contemplative cognition, prevailing over the autonomous creativity of the subject.

The mimetic nature of the subject's creativity is revealed most clearly in Plato's teaching. Comprehending creativity as "the transition from non-existence to being, the creation of any works of art and craft" ^{[20, p. 115]}, Plato postulates the One as an ontological source of global creation as an identical substance, which is the initial creative impulse of the unfolding of existence. As V.A. Yakovlev notes, Plato's creativity "has a universal character, manifesting itself whenever any something finds its being," in connection with which the meaning of human creativity "lies in the constant improvement of the entire universe" ^{[21, pp. 146-147]}. Indeed, according to Plato, natural processes and phenomena are conditioned by divine art, as a result of which a thing and its accompanying image are formed, while the creativity of the subject, imitating the demiurgic act of creation, establishes the object and its image.

In this respect, divine creation is ontologically superior to human creativity, which, despite its mimetic nature, is not mechanical imitation and thoughtless copying, since it is founded by Eros as a kind of human obsession with the desire to contemplate the beautiful in nature. In addition, the creativity of the subject in his Platonic understanding is inseparable from the free enthusiast principle, manifested in the creator's following of the Daimon – the inner voice of genius and the patronizing spirit. At the same time, the most important determinant of human creativity, according to Plato's views, is creative frenzy, which Ch. Lombroso describes it as something that "evokes in a simple and immaculate human soul the ability to express the exploits of heroes in a beautiful poetic form" ^{[22, p. 18]}.

Thus, the genuine creativity of the subject is justified by Plato as possessing an enthusiastic-daimonic nature and inspired frenzy, since "the creations of the sane will be eclipsed by the creations of the frantic" ^{[20, p. 154]}. By distinguishing between the true and imaginary creative intentions of a person from aesthetic positions, the thinker differentiates creative art, which calls to life previously non-existent, and the art of acquisition, subordinating to its influence the existing and emerging. Describing the subject of the art of acquisition, the thinker notes that "by creating ... all kinds of imitations and objects of the same name with existing things, he will be able to deceive unreasonable young people by showing them what he painted from afar and suggesting that he is quite capable of actually doing whatever they wish" ^{[23, p. 298]}. In other words, if the genuine (imitative in essence) creativity of the subject is conceptualized by Plato as the art of creating images (in accordance with the specified characteristics of the sample), then the imitation of genuine mimetic creativity is the art of creating ghostly similarities, which proceeds from the subject's misunderstanding of the beautiful and proportionate and represents a hypocritical imitation of the works of other creators.

In contrast to Plato's predominantly ontological understanding of creativity, creativity in Aristotle's teaching is interpreted from anthropological and epistemological perspectives. Thus, the thinker gives the creative subject greater autonomy, arguing that "the creative principle is in the creator, whether it is the mind, art or some ability" ^{[24, p. 180]}. In this regard, the key anthropological determinant of creativity is the ability of the subject to generate changes in external objects or in himself, because, according to Aristotle, what a person is in possibility, such is his creation in reality. The epistemological nature of creativity is revealed in the assertion of practical sciences as a source of creativity, however, creativity is also present in theoretical thinking as one of the structural components: "In the knowledge of creativity, the subject is the essence taken without matter, and the essence of being, in speculative knowledge – definition and thinking" ^{[24, p. 316]}.

The epistemological line can also be traced in the thinker's differentiation of the true and imaginary creative intentions of the subject. In particular, Aristotle distinguishes between artfulness and non-artfulness, understanding the first as "a warehouse [of the soul] involved in a true judgment, suggesting creativity", and describing the second as "a warehouse [of the soul], suggesting creativity, but involved in a false judgment" ^{[25, p. 176]}. In addition, Aristotle puts forward a thesis about the possible unsuccessful result of human creativity in the form of dissonant works of art, which he calls a mistake of nature. An important aspect in distinguishing between genuine and imaginary creative intentions within the framework of peripatetic philosophy is the juxtaposition of creativity and action. If creativity, conditioned by a relative goal, is interpreted by a philosopher as a choice of another, then an act characterized by an unrelated goal is defined as a person's choice of himself.

Medieval Philosophy: Creativity as the creation and maintenance of Being by God

The ontological hypostasis of creativity in the concept of St. Augustine is traced in the recognition of the uncreated and unchangeable God as the creator and provident of all things, generated by the will of the Father through the power of the Son in the gift of the Holy Spirit. The act of divine creation is interpreted by the philosopher as the establishment of visible and invisible existence through the design of formless matter. Moreover, the creativity of God is theistically justified by Aurelius as well as maintaining the existence of the world: "The creative force embraces everything with its might, which does not tire or cease its activity, and allows everything that exists from and through it to continue to exist" ^{[26, p. 385]}. The epistemological and anthropological determinants of creativity are revealed in the affirmation of the subject's creativity as a contemplative comprehension of God's creations, leading to eternal truth. In this regard, a creative work, as G.G. Mayorov writes, is interpreted by Augustine "as an imitation of an ideal carried out through the medium of the artist's personality" ^{[27, p. 304]}. The distinction between genuine and imaginary creative intentions can be traced in the philosopher in the distinction between divine and human creativity, the latter of which can turn into fussy and reckless activities focused on obtaining purely sensual pleasures: "People who are carried away by their external creation leave in their hearts the One who created them, destroy what He created in them" ^{[28, pp. 649-649]}. Therefore, true creativity is defined by Augustine the Blessed as being driven by a person's conversion to God, who is the source of the creative abilities of the subject.

The ontological essence of creativity through the prism of the teachings of Thomas Aquinas is also found in the recognition of God as the original and ultimate goal of all things created through creative intentions of power, wisdom and goodness. The direct act of divine creation is understood by Aquinas both as the creation of a thing out of nothing and as the maintenance of the existence of a created thing, because "all creatures, before they began to be, had the opportunity to be ... only thanks to divine potency-power: insofar as God could bring them [i.e. creations] into being" ^{[29, p. 91]}. The gradation of genuine and imaginary intentions of creativity can be traced in the thinker in the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable creation: "If a reasonable creation has freedom of action, achieves the goal according to reason and will and comprehends the essence of God, then an unreasonable creation depends entirely on the providence of God, realizes purely natural aspirations and does not have the ability to know God" ^{[30, p. 66]}. In this regard, genuine creativity is justified by the philosopher as the understanding of the subject about the ways of creating man-made things. It is not for nothing that G.G. Mayorov points out that the purpose of the creator, from the point of view of medieval thinkers, is "to convey to contemporaries and posterity the image of truth as it is given in the prototype, without bringing anything from himself and excluding his subjectivity from the creative process as much as possible" ^{[27, p. 7]}.

New European philosophy: creativity as a combination of existing elements of existence and practical invention

The rapid development of science, technology and production within the framework of the New European stage of the deployment of philosophical thought led to the interpretation of creativity, first of all, as a synonym for invention, serving scientific, technical and social progress. In this regard, creativity loses its ontological status, transforming from the act of evoking being from non-existence into the process of combining already existing elements of existence in order to create scientifically and technically useful objects. At the same time, creativity acquires an epistemological orientation. Thus, F. Bacon actually identifies the processes of cognition and creativity, since the source of human creativity is postulated by contemplation of the fruits of divine creation, which gives knowledge about the divine potentials of power and wisdom, which act as models and measures of his creativity for the subject. For the full development of creative abilities, a person, according to Bacon, must also contemplate the creative nature of nature, which allows the subject to realize the source of the diversity of existing things.

In addition to the contemplation of divine and natural creations, the development of human creativity is also facilitated by the study of the works of sciences and arts of their predecessors. By imitating these creations (and especially those of them that are most similar to the creations of nature), the subject in his work is able to reach the real heights of skill and skill. Anyway, the main driver of the subject's creativity is his cognitive activity. Bacon also mentions the importance of the creative nature of knowledge in relation to the development of education, the main disadvantage of which the philosopher considers the gap "between exercises requiring memorization and exercises designed to develop the creative abilities of the student" ^{[31, p. 152]}, which leads to stagnation of the creative mind of the subject.

Moreover, F. Bacon exposes the imaginary intentions of the creativity of such subjects, as a result of whose activities "imperfect creations accidentally appear ..., impressive in appearance, but weak and unreliable in use; however, deceivers flaunt it, invent all sorts of tall tales about it and feel triumphant" ^{[32, p. 268]}. At the same time, such "pseudo-creators" and "pseudo-inventors", from the philosopher's point of view, are focused on achieving their goals at any cost, regardless of the prejudices that arise along the way. In other words, imaginary creative intentions are characterized by leveling the epistemological nature of creativity and are revealed by F. Bacon in the aspect of the creative subject's commitment to various idols and dogmas of knowledge.

Affirming God as the infinite creator of all things and world movements, R. Descartes ontologically exalts divine creativity over human creativity, because, unlike the creative potencies of God, the creative mind is limited in its cognitive potentials. In this regard, the creativity of the subject is reduced to the ability to modify the world movements set by God, while in divine creativity acts of volition, cognition and creation are organically combined, carried out simultaneously. To preserve a thing in time, almost the same force is needed as for its creation, and therefore the concepts of creation and preservation in Cartesian philosophy differ only in quantitative terms. The distinction between genuine and imaginary creative intentions in Descartes is carried out according to the criterion of independence of the subject from external influences, since creative activity, which has as its source an order to create for a reward, is "accidental and remote causes, because it is possible that, without receiving an order, the master would not do anything" ^{[33, p. 474]}. It is also important to note that, according to Descartes, a person can be considered the creator of an invention only if he previously has in his mind the idea of perfection of the creation of art, given to him by God.

In his philosophical quest, J. Locke continues the New European tradition of the actual identification of human abilities for creativity and cognition, given to him by God, who, however, limits the subject in his cognitive potentials exactly to the extent necessary to comprehend the essence of divine creations and for the creative fulfillment of practical tasks. At the same time, the cognitive process itself, according to Locke, is restless, because it is the will of a person that forces him to act and by the power of his mind to set other things in creative motion. In this regard, the thinker gives the subject greater creative independence, since he believes that a person has received his being in order to freely realize his creative intentions of cognition. Nevertheless, the ways of developing a subject's creativity are determined by his ability to contemplate divine creations, and therefore the specific ideas of human creations represent limited ideas of God.

Locke's implicit differentiation of genuine and imaginary intentions of the subject's creativity can be traced in the thinker's separation of creativity as an institution of a fundamentally new being from birth and manufacture as a combinatorial transformation of the elements of existence, respectively, for internal and external reasons. At the same time, a person can consider himself a full-fledged creator of a thing that has already been presented before him in existence if he creates through his thoughts, believing them to be new. In this regard, the philosopher distinguishes between the logic of a reasonable person and the logic of trickery, the first of which contributes to the struggle of the subject for the truth, and the second proceeds from borrowing other people's thoughts and ideas. Thus, the philosopher emphasizes that "the definition of whether or not a particular thing is an invention is not to find out who made it first, but to find out whether or not ... thoughts were borrowed from someone else" ^{[34, p. 344]}.

German Classical Philosophy: creativity as a synthesis of theoretical and practical reason and the unity of conscious and unconscious activity

The epistemological justification of human creativity continues in German classical philosophy and, in particular, in the Kantian concept, according to which the subject in the process of carrying out cognitive activity actually creates the object of his knowledge. At the same time, the source of the subject's activity is the synthesis of theoretical and practical reason, while the cognitive process, carried out on the basis of the unity of sensuality and reason, is impossible without productive imagination, which synthesizes these cognitive abilities and is a condition of cognition itself. As I. Kant notes, "imagination acts creatively at the same time and sets in motion the ability of intellectual ideas (reason), namely, it makes us think about this representation ... more than could be comprehended and understood in it" ^{[35, p. 188]}.

The anthropological nature of creativity is revealed in Kant's mental constructions in substantiating the genius of artistic creativity as a subject capable of creating works of art bypassing the rules and, moreover, setting these rules to art. The key quality of genius, according to the thinker's views, is taste as the ability to judge the beautiful. Taste cuts the wings of genius and indicates the boundaries of its creative development, the absence of which turns creativity into a vain occupation that does not go beyond reciting good intentions and drawing up a plan of action. From the point of view of I. Kant, such "creators", trying on the role of a creative genius, demand "what they themselves cannot do", condemn "what they cannot fix" and offer "what they themselves do not know where to find" ^{[36, p. 77]}. As a result of such pseudo-creative intentions, according to the philosopher, unnatural, bizarre and caricatured works are established, which are created by the subject on the basis of images that do not correlate with real experience.

In turn, F.W.J. Schelling substantiates creativity mainly from ontological positions, since being itself in the thinker's concept is revealed as an artistic work of the Creator: "The universe, as it resides in God, is an absolute work of art in which infinite premeditation and infinite necessity are interpenetrated" ^{[37, p. 221]}. Presenting himself as the highest stage of the dialectical development of nature, man adopts creative potencies from nature itself and carries out a creative act not through mechanical copying of reality, but through the manifestation of the spirit of nature in him. Schelling also emphasizes the contradictory nature of human creativity, the source of which is both an irresistible natural attraction and the boundless free will of the creative subject. This kind of contradiction between the unconscious and the conscious in a creative act is removed only in a completed work of art, which the thinker defines as imprinting infinity in the finite, or as beauty. It is also important to note that, according to Schelling, a genuine creative subject with sufficient artistic skill is opposed by "people with sufficient skill and dexterity, but devoid of genuine creative power" ^{[38, p. 528]}. The product of the activity of such subjects is not organic and integral, like that of the creators, but far-fetched and imperfect, moreover, this imperfection is not taken seriously by "pseudo-creators".

Conclusion

Summing up the consideration of ways to conceptualize the phenomenon of creativity in the content space of classical European philosophy through the prism of ontological, epistemological and anthropological aspects, it is necessary to summarize the central conclusions of the work in the following provisions:

1. In the semantic field of ancient philosophy, the essence of creativity is revealed in ontological, epistemological and anthropological perspectives. The ontological rootedness of creativity can be traced in the understanding of being as a process of constant changes, the source of which are both material first principles and ideal substances, as well as in the understanding of creativity as a transition from non-existence into being and causing changes in an external object or in the creator himself. The epistemological determinant of creativity is revealed in the recognition of the sources of creativity of the subject of the contemplative cognition of the eidos of nature and the involvement of the soul in true judgments. The anthropological meaning of creativity consists not so much in the establishment of an original being by the subject, as in imitation of the demiurgic creation and the natural world of things, which is facilitated by the daimonic and obsessive principles of the subject, generating inspired creative frenzy.

2. The distinction between genuine and imaginary intentions of creativity in the context of the views of ancient thinkers is manifested in the separation of creative art and the art of acquisition, the art of creating images and the art of creating ghostly likenesses, artfulness and non-art, as well as creativity and action. In other words, ancient Greek philosophers urge to distinguish inspired and violent creativity as imitation of natural creations from mechanistic and hypocritical imitation of the works of other creators, proceeding from the subject's misunderstanding of the nature of beauty and the involvement of the soul in false judgments, which leads to the appearance of dissonant works. 

3. Within the framework of medieval philosophy, creativity is grounded in ontological, epistemological and anthropological dimensions. The existential nature of creativity can be traced in the postulation of God as the eternal creator, provident and guardian of all things, generated and supported by the divine potencies of wisdom and power. The epistemological hypostasis of creativity is revealed in the affirmation of human creativity as a contemplative cognition of divine truths and imitation of an ideal prototype. Creativity in the anthropological plane is justified as the aspiration of the subject to God as the source of his creative potencies. 

4. The distinction between genuine and imaginary creative intentions in the semantic field of medieval philosophy is manifested in the differentiation of divine and human creativity, as well as reasonable and unreasonable creations. Therefore, medieval thinkers distinguish free and purposeful divine creation from human creativity, which often denies the divine primordial image and acquires hedonistic orientations, which leads to the oblivion of God and the extinction of the creative potencies granted to the subject by him.

5. In the context of the New European philosophical tradition, the essence of creativity is also manifested in the triad of the above aspects. The ontological nature of creativity is revealed in the recognition of God as the eternal creator of material things and their movements and in the understanding of creation as well as God's constant maintenance of the existential status of things. The postulation of the source and condition of human creativity by the contemplation of divine, natural and human creations by the subject reflects the epistemological hypostasis of creativity, since outside of comprehension of these samples of creativity, a person is not able to create his own works of science and art, and through creativity – to realize his cognitive intentions. The anthropological aspect of creativity is revealed in the understanding of the latter as the setting in motion of things by the subject with the help of the will and the rational principle of the soul. By combining various elements of an already existing existence, the subject contributes to the emergence of scientifically and socially useful inventions.

6. The differentiation of true and imaginary creative intentions within the framework of Modern philosophy manifests itself in the separation of creativity as a process of combining the available elements of existence, leading to the emergence of useful inventions, from the process of accidental generation of a formally practical, but in practice useless product, displayed in order to receive remuneration. At the same time, if creativity proceeds from the idea of a perfect creation independently formulated by the creator and does not depend on outside influences, then the bearer of imaginary creative intentions relies on borrowed ideas or his own misconceptions and idols of knowledge, which he is in no hurry to part with.

7. In the content space of German classical philosophy, the nature of creativity is also revealed in ontological, epistemological and anthropological perspectives. The ontological nature of creativity is manifested in the affirmation of being as an artistic work of God, as well as in the understanding of creativity as giving reality to a work in the process of its formation. The epistemological dimension of creativity is found in the understanding of cognition as a creative act of the subject, de facto creating the world from a priori principles, as well as in the assertion of productive imagination as a condition of cognition, based on the synthesis of sensuality and reason. The anthropological nature of creativity manifests itself in the assertion of genius as a subject who sets the rules for art and disposes of taste, limiting its aesthetic expediency. Being a synthesis of conscious and unconscious activity, human creativity comes from the depths of his spirit and certainly has the freedom that allows the subject to define himself and imprint infinity in the finite.

8. The distinction between genuine and imaginary intentions of creativity in the context of German classical philosophy is revealed in the separation of creativity as a free and spiritual process of generating an original, organic and masterfully executed work from vain, arbitrary and demonstrative activities, as a result of which unnatural, far-fetched and mannered works are established, while being presented as original and even ingenious creations.

9. Based on the ways of understanding creativity revealed in the semantic field of classical European philosophy, revealed in the ontological, epistemological and anthropological dimensions of the desired cultural phenomenon, as well as taking into account the articulated aspirations of ancient, New European and German thinkers to distinguish between genuine and imaginary creative intentions, it is necessary to present working definitions of genuine and imaginary creativity determined by the classical model of philosophizing. In this regard, it is advisable to justify creativity as an inspired, independent of external influences, process of creating an original, organic and masterfully executed work (ontological aspect) based on the contemplative knowledge of divine and natural creations (epistemological aspect) by a subject who independently establishes the rules of activity, obsessed with the pursuit of beauty and possessing taste (anthropological aspect). In turn, imaginary creativity must be presented as a mechanistic and dependent on outside influences process of the emergence of an unnatural mannered product (ontological aspect) based on borrowed thoughts or their own false judgments (epistemological aspect) of a subject with weak aesthetic taste and proceeding from hypocritical, vain, demonstrative and pragmatic intentions in their activities. In this regard, the prospects for further research on the true foundations of creativity may be associated with clarifying the aspects of creativity identified in this work, the unity of which can serve as a criterion basis for creativity as a multidimensional cultural phenomenon.