Cultural and historical context in the analysis of the concept of "antiterrorism"

Volodin Sergei Filippovich PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, L. N. Tolstoy Tula State Pedagogical University Ryazanskaya ulitsa 32/3, Tula, Tulskaya oblast' 300012 Russia volodin93@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The problem of countering terror is placed in the center of attention of modern society by life itself. Meanwhile, research interest often shifts towards studying the phenomenon of terrorism itself, and thus the whole complexity of the fight against terrorism remains undiscovered. In this regard, it is of interest how Western analysts, who have published a considerable array of monographic studies on counter-terrorism issues, consider the actual content of the concept of "counter-terrorism". Therefore, the purpose of the proposed article is to critically comprehend the concept of "counterterrorism" in the context of the so–called models (strategies) of counterterrorism (hereinafter - CT), which are actively being developed in modern Western historiography.  In line with the critical methodology, the author of the article focuses here, first of all, on the formation of a national model of counterterrorism in modern counterterrorism discourse and on its theoretical justification.

We should immediately note that some analysts distinguish between anti–terrorism – preventive and defensive measures to combat terrorism, such as strengthening targets and increased patrols - and the broader concept of combating terrorism (counterterrorism), which includes active and offensive (both proactive and retaliatory) efforts to prevent, deter and the fight against the terrorist threat. The subjects of the fight against terrorism use a wide range of response measures, such as law enforcement, political, psychological, social, economic and (para) military measures ^{[1, p. 817]}.

Of course, as a social evil, terrorism has serious socio-economic, historical and cultural prerequisites, which, in the context of counter-terrorism policy, actualize the strategy of preventing the terrorist threat. The root causes of terrorism usually include such fundamental phenomena as acute social and economic inequality, unbearable foreign oppression, general rejection of an illegitimate political regime, and practices of using violence for political purposes rooted in national culture.  At the same time, as a universal means of stopping the root causes of terrorism, Western historiography, as a rule, proposes economic and political reforms.  At the same time, some authors rightly point out the ambiguous consequences of their real embodiment ^{[2, p. 369; 3, p. 50, 63]}. We are talking about a non-accidental surge of anti-Western, anti-capitalist and religious fundamentalist movements. Let's add that the very discourse of promoting "democratic" reforms may well fit into the strategy of promoting the global interests of "advanced" nations, for example, under the slogan of fighting "autocracies". In this case, the strategy of a united front in the fight against global terrorism inevitably collapses. And today we are just observing that all this work is actually being dismantled and it is unlikely that a general consensus on combating the global terrorist threat will be possible in the near future.

First of all, experts focus on the prevention of extremism as an ideological prerequisite for potential terrorist activity and identify three stages in this process. The early preventive level is mainly aimed at young people through the development of their social skills and criticality towards various forms of radicalism. As terrorism researcher Alex Schmid rightly pointed out, a terrorist act is more than an act of violence, since it is primarily an act of communication caused by violence. Therefore, crucial attention in this context is given to the propaganda dimension of CT, i.e. psychological operations. The counter-terrorism strategy includes, for example, efforts to strengthen the psychological resilience of its own civilian population through an education campaign in schools. The essence of this work is to promote desired perceptions, images, opinions or attitudes among members of a society under attack and, conversely, to prevent the dissemination of undesirable content ^{[4, p. 229-230]}.

The secondary, "proactive" level of prevention includes initiatives aimed at individuals who are already showing signs of radicalization. Efforts to provide affordable and high-quality education to young people, and to organize interesting and diverse leisure activities are relevant here. Finally, the tertiary level is directed against individuals who are part of an extremist environment and have already committed crimes or are at risk of committing them ^{[5, p. 20-21]}.

The anti-terrorist protection of potential targets of terrorist attacks includes a whole system of measures that together are designed to seriously prevent possible terrorist attacks. Thus, the authors of the "Guide to Counterterrorism Tactics, Procedures and Methods" note such key aspects of this work as targeted analysis of potential targets for terrorist attacks, planning the defense of critical infrastructure facilities, the formation of crisis teams, their regular training, etc. ^{[6, p. 49-69]}. In this regard, it makes practical sense to differentiate the vulnerability of potential targets for terrorist attacks into "hard" and "soft" targets. If the former are clearly defined and well protected, for example, nuclear facilities, then the latter are not. The latter include, in particular, transport systems, places of religious worship, schools, hospitals, dormitories, markets, theaters, cinemas, and other facilities where civilians can be destroyed in significant numbers. And we can agree with Alex Schmid that intelligence efforts, analytical work, interagency communication, flexibility and readiness of special services to act in extreme conditions will be of key importance here ^{[1, p. 825-829]}.

The forceful approach to countering terrorism is viewed through the prism of operational police and military methods.  In the first case, terrorism is identified as criminal activity and thus implies the inclusion of well-known crime prevention tools. Thus, within the framework of the situational crime model, Ronald Clark and Greg Newman propose using tactics to prevent opportunities for terrorist attacks, which includes targets, weapons, tools and facilitating conditions ^{[7, p. 86]} Targets that terrorists consider vulnerable, as a rule, have a number of understandable characteristics. They are open, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, filled with people, close and easy. As for weapons, the most attractive for terrorists will be multi-purpose, undetectable, removable, destructive, "pleasant" for terrorists, reliable, affordable, uncomplicated and safe (7, p. 97-98). According to the authors, facilitating conditions for terrorists can be grouped into five categories – those that make crime easy, safe, excusable, tempting and rewarding (7, p. 99) In turn, reducing opportunities for terrorism is achieved by (1) increasing efforts, (2) increasing risks, (3) reducing rewards, (4) reduction of provocations and (5) elimination of excuses (7, p. 103). R. Krelinsten rightly notes that terrorists need food, housing, training, weapons, explosives, safe houses, means of communication, travel documents and money. And the complication of these tasks reduces the risk of terrorist attacks ^{[8, p. 174]}. It is obvious that the routine of police activity in the most general form is aimed at collecting and analyzing data, constant contacts with informants; at protecting, regularly inspecting (patrolling) vulnerable objects; at detaining or eliminating (with armed resistance) terrorists; at ensuring their punishment regime. Moreover, today the arsenal of operational capabilities has been seriously expanded due to video surveillance and listening systems, which make it possible to successfully identify potential and relevant terrorists. However, serious abuses can manifest themselves here, which was discussed not only by J. Assange and E. Snowden, but also some analysts ^{[9, p. 7]}.

In the fight against large-scale manifestations of terrorist activity (including riots), it is impossible to do without the involvement of armed units. For these purposes, as a rule, special armed units are used. It should be noted that in Western historiography, the military model of combating terrorism has different interpretations. Firstly, there is a solid experience in understanding the practice of military suppression of riots, rebellions, and insurgent movements. These can be both asymmetric low-intensity combat encounters and "wild war" battles ^{[10, p. 114]}. The rebels seek to inflict permanent losses on superior enemy forces through pinpoint attacks and thereby, over time, demoralize the occupying forces and undermine political support for the occupying forces. Quite often, as noted above, both sides use the tactics of "wild war". So, during the Vietnam War, American servicemen killed more than five hundred Vietnamese civilians from the village of Songmi on March 16, 1968, because it was assumed that armed guerrillas were allegedly in this settlement. On the other hand, during the "battle of Mogadishu" in 1993, murdered American soldiers were demonstratively dragged by cars through the streets of the Somali capital while broadcasting this horror with television cameras. It was this incident that led to the conclusion in Washington that the operation had failed and American troops should be withdrawn from the country.

After the "Battle of Mogadishu", the preferred tactic of Western forces was the use of air forces in conducting ground operations. Therefore, the idea is popular today that a country's armed forces can observe, listen, record and track anyone and strike at will with guided, unmanned attack aircraft or space weapons designed to fight a scattered enemy, rather than a traditional hostile state or terrorist group. Here, great importance is attached to remote sensing, satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile technologies, smart bombs, as well as facial recognition and other biometric data ^{[9, p. 4-5]}.

Today, in the West, a special concept of the war against the rebels is used, or in English-language sources COIN (English counterinsurgency). The essence of COIN is the military-political neutralization of the rebels through both the struggle "for the hearts and minds" of the population, and the conduct of maneuverable military-police operations to search for and destroy the rebels. The theory of maneuver warfare suggests that destroying the enemy's moral and physical cohesion is more effective than achieving his destruction. Consequently, the strategy in this context focuses on people and ideas, rather than on military efforts, which are of a supporting nature. Therefore, in line with this strategy, it is important to respect group identity and take appropriate socio-economic measures to stop existing resentments ^{[10, p. 109, 122]}.  That is, priority is given here to a soft line as opposed to a hard approach, i.e. the "military model" of CT.

And here we come to the key opposition in the ideological strategies of CT, as they are presented in Western historiography and, more broadly, in Western ideological discourse. The opposite pole in relation to the military approach is the criminal justice model, in which all legal procedures are followed with respect for human rights. And although this strategy is given priority attention, analysts are aware that the real fight against terrorism involves the use of funds beyond any one approach. For example, the United States has created extra-judicial territories to circumvent obstacles and restrictions created by the legal systems of democracies to protect human rights at Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, and Abu Ghraib prison (Iraq). It is clear that such stories cannot be perceived positively, therefore, in a wide range of counter-terrorism approaches, it is proposed, for example, to apply an expanded (hybrid) criminal justice model. In this case, special legislation and administrative regulations should be involved in the fight against terrorism. In addition to the police, secret services and special forces are legally involved in the counter-terrorism fight ^{[11, p. 6]}. It seems that A. Pedakhzur and M. Ranstorp do not casually appeal to national experience in this case, because the national model of counterterrorism activities, as a rule, includes components of different approaches, and their "weight" ratio depends both on fundamental factors, including cultural and historical prerequisites, and on the current circumstances of the time.

The appeal to national CT models does not just serve academic interest, but is the subject of contested ideological discourse. This is clearly seen in the example of the extremely negative assessment of the Russian Federation's experience in combating the terrorist threat, which is often heard in the West, which is clearly demonstrated to us, for example, by a researcher from the University of Kansas (USA) M.Y. Omelicheva. The very table of contents of the section in the collection "The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy" (2017) defines the guiding thread that the author follows – "Anti-terrorist policy of Russia: variations of the imperial theme". The argumentation of the section follows an ideologically predetermined pattern of centuries-old Russian irregularity: The country covers a large territory and in it "the predominantly Slavic political elite rules over many disenfranchised ethnic groups and peoples" ^{[12, p. 524]}. And if so, then in counter-terrorism practice, the Russian Federation, according to M.Y. Omelicheva, cannot but give preference to the policy of repression and force, that is, the military model. Yes, the Russian government made significant investments in the North Caucasus after the end of hostilities, but they, she categorically asserts, "fail" ^{[12, p. 521]}. Why? Yes, because, – the American researcher follows the constructivist approach, – imperial beliefs and ideas lie in the very content of this policy.  M.Y. Omelicheva clearly does not like the found intra-Chechen reconciliation with Russia, and she is not ready to assign him the newfangled status of the COIN model. This, she joins the opinion of adherents of the ancient ideology, is a continuation of the same imperial policy with such features as the split of local elites, the co-optation of those who are ready to work with the central authorities, the necessary concessions to new local rulers and their integration into the Russian state ^{[12, p. 528]}. In general, the position of the American author seems to have a fundamental flaw. Uncritical adherence to the ideologies of the Western mainstream, including in relation to Russia and its policies, leads to false conclusions. Realizing this, another American researcher Joshua Sinai, in his article on the counterterrorism experience of modern Russia, nevertheless talks about progress in preventing terrorist threats from Russian special services, in particular in ensuring the security of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. "Like other governments ...," he notes, the Russian authorities use a rich set of technical and security, military and police means to  CT ^{[13, p. 100]}.

Thus, foreign experts rightly point out that the fight against terrorism should be based on powerful systems of ideological, political and law enforcement structures. A key place here is given to long-term strategic goals related to the root causes of terrorism. At the same time, the fight against terror is not confined to itself, it has to do with national interests and those factors and forces that prevent their implementation. These goals and threats, and therefore the directions of action, should be defined and presented in regularly updated doctrinal documents. Significant, from the point of view of foreign researchers, is the level of mastery of the tactical arsenal of hard and soft approaches, instrumental and/or political-symbolic logic of actions. There are standard methods for ensuring security regimes, operational police work, and propaganda efforts for different audiences. When considering a specific CT system at the national level, it is important to take into account both cultural and historical prerequisites and fundamental factors that generate nodal contradictions in society, as well as current situational variables related to the increase in terrorist threats. Theoretical analysis in this context helps to determine the long-term logic of CT actions when making necessary management decisions, taking into account international and national experience.