On the question of the dialectic of scientific knowledge in russian philosophy: the problem of reflection

Sverguzov Anver Tyafikovich ORCID: 0000-0002-1040-3044 PhD in Philosophy Associate professor, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Kazan National Research Technological University 68 K.marx str., Kazan, 420015, Russia, Republic of Tatarstan atsverguzov@mail.ru Other publications by this author

In the history of philosophy, there are different interpretations of the concept of "reflection". From Socrates to Hegel, Marx and beyond. The common content for them is characterized as "self-knowledge". The fundamental differences are expressed in Hegel's philosophy and dialectical materialism. Hegel limits thinking to the sphere of "pure" thinking, self-contained. In dialectical materialism, thinking is considered more broadly, since thinking is understood as practically oriented thinking. For Hegel, the source of the development of thinking is in thinking itself. Reflection is an element of the dialectical method, characterizes the relationship of concepts as a form of their reflection in each other. From the point of view of dialectical materialism, the source of the development of thinking is not only in thinking, but also in practice. Reflection is carried out not only on thinking, but also on its relation to reality. Therefore, it makes sense to talk about the difference in understanding reflection from the point of view of these approaches. In particular, the discussion that is the focus of this work lies in the plane of confrontation between dialectical methodologies expressed in Hegel's philosophy and dialectical materialism. It should be noted that in this study reflection is understood in a dialectical-materialistic sense.

A "panel discussion" on the problem of scientific reflection was held in the journal "Epistemology and Philosophy of Science" No. 4 for 2022. Two lines stood out here – the domestic traditional and the domestic pro-Western. Their source is Soviet and Western philosophy, respectively. If pro-Western researchers talk about the crisis of understanding reflection at the present time, then the "traditionalists" recommend paying attention to Soviet philosophy, which can actualize, give a new impetus to the study of the problem of reflection.

Indeed, in the Soviet period, research was progressive in nature and significant results were obtained on the problem [for example, 1-4]. This is indicated, for example, by V.A. Bazhanov as one of the main researchers of the problem of reflection in the Soviet period. "In the Russian philosophical literature, not only the origins of reflection have been identified, but also its various typologies, forms and types have been proposed: ontologism, epistemologism, methodologism. It has been shown that the reflexivity of scientific knowledge can be carried out at various levels: intra-theoretical, metatheoretical, interdisciplinary, general scientific and philosophical-methodological" ^{[5, p. 34]}. Currently, it makes sense to use the results on the problem that were obtained during the Soviet period. This, in particular, is what we propose in this paper.

Soviet studies, unlike Western ones, were generally complex and comprehensive in nature. However, V.A. Bazhanov characterizes the attitude towards them at the present time as indifferent. "So, in Soviet philosophy, during one period (in the 1970s), problems related to the dialectical laws of knowledge (the theory of reflection, the dialectic of absolute and relative truths, ascent from the abstract to the concrete and from the concrete to the abstract, the ratio of logical and historical, the relationship of induction and deduction, etc.) were intensively discussed, with the so-called general scientific concepts, and the tone of understanding here was set by some leading philosophers of the 1980s (V.S. Gott, A.D. Ursul, E.P. Semenyuk), methodological principles of science, how formal and dialectical logic correlate, etc. A systematic approach thundered. Nowadays, by and large, these problems are not actively analyzed, or are considered of little interest.." ^{[5, pp. 31-32]}. The attention of researchers turned out to be shifted to the problems proposed by Western philosophy. This was in line with the general trends in Russian philosophy of the post-Soviet period.

The problem of reflection was simultaneously studied both in the West and in the East (in the USSR), and "in the East the approach to this phenomenon was distinguished by depth and originality" ^{[5, p. 32]}. The difference between Soviet and Western studies is that they were conducted on a different methodological basis. Modern domestic research on the problem of reflection is in line with Western positivist methodologies. However, the dialectical approach is fundamental and, in our opinion, the general background is present in the modern agenda. From this point of view, it is all the more necessary "the importance of taking into account the results of studying the phenomenon of reflexivity of scientific knowledge, which were obtained in the Russian philosophical and methodological tradition" ^{[5, p. 31]}. For example, the idea of a possible synthesis of past and current results suggests itself. Moreover, we can talk about the continuation of dialectical research on the problem of reflection. A dialectical analysis of modern research on the problem can be indicative. In particular, it makes sense to consider the modern analysis of scientific reflection within the framework of dialectical opposites highlighted in Soviet philosophy. The main idea of this approach was formulated by us in one of the papers ^[6]. Here we offer it in a more detailed form.

First of all, it should be noted that the "Soviet" studies of reflection go beyond the time frame of the existence of the USSR. In particular, a direct continuation of dialectical research on the problem of reflection of the Soviet period was a dissertation study under the scientific supervision of V.A. Bazhanov [Sverguzov A.T. Reflection in the structure of mechanisms of scientific cognition: specialty 09.00.01 "Ontology and theory of cognition": abstract of the dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Philosophical Sciences. Samara: Samara State University, 1996. 23 p.]. To illustrate, we give the following excerpts from it. "... In this work, as a methodological requirement, we used A.P. Ogurtsov's thought about the need to overcome the traditional understanding of reflection, about the complementarity of the semantic and semantic-revealing works of consciousness. For this purpose, V.N. Dukhanin's idea of the existence of a function of scientific reflection is being developed, which consists in penetrating into the internal structure of scientific activity and identifying its target orientation" [Ibid., p. 3]. Reflection in science involves the reconstruction of "directly existing factual consciousness" (in the terminology of E.A. Alekseeva) or "constituted by the norms of scientific knowledge reason" (in the terminology of V.V. Ilyin) [Ibid., p. 4]. The scientific novelty of the work was to identify the dialectical structure of reflection in science.

The dialectic of scientific reflection, according to the dissertation research, is characterized by a two-level structure. There are two main interrelated sides of scientific reflection – external and internal. The external side is characterized by the dialectic of relations between scientific reflection and scientific rationality. The inner side is the dialectic of the relations of the semantic and semantic functions of scientific reflection. The dialectical nature of reflection means that the separation of these opposites from each other leads to a distorted understanding of the opposites themselves. For example, this may be expressed by attempts to ignore both the phenomenon of reflection and the phenomenon of rationality in scientific knowledge. It is noted that "from the point of view of the dialectic of reflexive and rational, one can consider neo-positivist and postpositivist concepts of science as emphasizing either the rational or the reflexive side of its development" [Ibid., p. 17].

Western studies of reflection as a whole, in our opinion, did not go beyond the semantic function of scientific reflection, that is, beyond the traditional understanding of reflection. For example, the meaning of reflection was understood abstractly, it was reduced to the fact that it should make knowledge genuine knowledge, a well-founded and true belief ^[7]. Ignoring the main, that is, the semantic function turns reflection, in our opinion, into a "bad infinity". The result of reflection should be some new knowledge of the second order in relation to the knowledge of the first order, which, in turn, should also be confirmed by reflection, and so on indefinitely ^[8].

The content of the discussion on the problem of reflection in science in modern Russian literature in the part that follows Western trends indicates, in our opinion, the dialectical nature of the problem in the dialectical-materialistic sense. In this article, we propose to consider the dialectical context of the analysis of the phenomenon of reflection proposed by O.E. Stolyarova. As we will see, this context is directly characterized by the framework of dialectically interrelated semantic and semantic functions of scientific reflection. Dialectics consists in the mutual complementarity of the semantic and semantic works of scientific consciousness, the main one of which is the semantic one.

Stolyarova considers reflection within the framework of the so-called "strong STS program" in the West. The program was formulated in David Bloor's work "Knowledge and Social Representation" ^[9], in which updated principles of the sociology of science were proposed. Among the main methodological guidelines of the program is the instruction to consider science as a social phenomenon. It should be noted that the results of the analysis of the phenomenon of reflection, even according to Western estimates, turned out to be unsatisfactory: "in the context of STS, the phenomenon has lost its radicalism and clear contours" ^{[10, p. 96]}. Nevertheless, at present, the study of the problem of reflection as a whole continues, although the focus has shifted from the fundamental level [for example, 11] to the applied one [for example, 12-15].

The functions of reflection in the works of O.E. Stolyarova have different designations. Attention should be paid to this, since the titles generally characterize the author's understanding of reflection. To begin with, the semantic and semantic functions can be designated respectively as the "external position of the explainer" and the "internal position of the explainer". This follows from the statement, which refers to reflexive work, which assumes an "external position of the explainer" in relation to the explained ^{[16, p. 21]}.

In another statement, it seems to assume the relationship of the meaning-setting and meaning-revealing functions of reflection. Accordingly, they can already be designated as "reflexed and unreflexed beliefs."  "Philosophical reflection acts as a source of unreflected beliefs, which become the object of subsequent reflection. At the same time, it is not so much an epistemological justification as a genetic explanation of knowledge and reveals the involvement of the cognizing subject in the real world" ^{[17, p. 81]}. It may seem that what follows is a statement about the necessary relationship, the complementarity of these functions. However, O.E. Stolyarova reduces reflection to the semantic function. "Accordingly, reflection is a secondary effort aimed at an already accomplished (primary) effort of thought. If an already accomplished effort of thought is characterized as knowledge (representation, information, idea, etc.), then reflection is characterized as knowledge about knowledge (representation of representation, etc.). In philosophical reflection, two aspects can be distinguished: the actual conversion of thinking, or knowledge to oneself and the tradition of understanding this phenomenon" ^{[17, p. 81]}. Here, the meaning-setting function closes on itself. The semantic and semantic functions can be designated respectively as "secondary and primary efforts of thought."

In general, in our opinion, the understanding of O.E. Stolyarova's reflection is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, she seems to criticize the traditional approach, talking about "the involvement of the cognizing subject in the real world." And, on the other hand, she cannot abstract from this approach, since she limits reflection to a sense-setting function.

Recall that from a dialectical point of view, the separation of reflection functions from each other leads to a distorted understanding of them. A vivid example of the absolutization of the semantic function is aptly described by O.E. Stolyarova herself. Such absolutization leads, in her opinion, to a negative result. "In epistemology, reflection plays not so much a positive as a negative role. Even if its intermediate result is positive knowledge, then its absolute result is skepticism. It shows that there is no valid (true) knowledge. The more consistently the reflecting individual carries out reflexive acts, building them one above the other, the more likely he will come to absolute skepticism, because he will be convinced that every new foundation he finds requires his own justification and so on" ^{[17, p. 82]}. An illustrative example of the absolutization of the semantic function of reflection is the methodological setting of the "strong program", which assumes the dependence of the content of scientific knowledge on the attitudes of the consciousness of the subject of cognition. "The strong program was designed to show that the observation of physical processes takes place in the context and under the influence of pre-formed ideas that are the product of communication of physical subjects" ^{[17, p. 23]}.

The reduction of reflection to a meaningful function can lead to a distorted understanding of reflection as a whole. For example, to ignore the principle of reflection in scientific knowledge. This possibility is also described by O.E. Stolyarova. "Moreover, some determined sociologists were ready to delete it from the list of basic principles of a strong program altogether. The situation has not changed much in the future. The principle of reflexivity, by and large, has remained idle and does not encourage researchers of science to empirically explore their own premises" ^{[16, p. 26]}. She characterizes this situation as an "epistemological impasse."

O.E. Stolyarova, it would seem, sees a way out of this impasse in a dialectical solution. "Is it possible to find a way out of this epistemological impasse? We will try to do this by recognizing that reflection has not only a critical function, but also a dogmatic one. In other words, we will attribute philosophical reflection not only to epistemology, but also to ontology. To do this, we will consider philosophical reflection from the point of view of the genetic explanation of a particular knowledge that has taken place, i.e., as a search and determination of the sources (conditions of possibility) of knowledge" ^{[17, p. 82]}. Here, as we can see, two more variants of the designation of the semantic and semantic functions of reflection can be distinguished: "epistemological and ontological", as well as "critical and dogmatic".

In her other work, one can also assume the need for a dialectical solution, highlighting different sides of the phenomenon of reflection. "What are the reasons for the failure of the principle of reflexivity? In the context of STS, this natural question for any science about the causes of the observed state of things acquires a dual meaning. On the one hand, it is impossible not to ask it while maintaining claims to be scientific (we remember that any true and false, successful and unsuccessful ideas have empirically cognizable social reasons). On the other hand, having explained and thus legitimized this failure, we will have to simultaneously fulfill the requirement of scientific universalism and admit that STS does not satisfy this (own) requirement" ^{[16, p. 26]}.

What solution does O.E. Stolyarova propose to make the principle of reflection work? In our opinion, overcoming the "epistemological impasse" turned out to be dialectically incomplete. On the one hand, O.E. Stolyarova seems to suggest the relationship between the semantic and semantic functions of reflection: "... philosophical reflection, even self-directed, cannot fail to take into account the results of empirical sciences" ^{[18, p. 50]}. But, as we have already said, she does not manage to break out of the traditional understanding of reflection. O.E. Stolyarova, in the end, still continues to reduce reflection to a meaningful function. Moreover, in our opinion, for her, the interrelation of the semantic and semantic functions of reflection means unacceptable "duplication", the absolutization of the semantic function. "... The key requirement of reflexivity is distancing oneself from the object of one's interest, being out of position in relation to it. Reflexivity does not duplicate the original, "naive" position to which it is directed and is not located inside it. She objectifies her subject, takes it, so to speak, in a ready-made form in order to "turn the stuffing back." An external position is a necessary prerequisite for a reflexive act, a source of explanatory power over a "naive" position" ^{[16, p. 27]}. Here, as we see, O.E. Stolyarova designates the semantic function of reflection by another term characterizing her approach, "naive position".

We emphasize that the dialectic of the semantic and semantic functions of reflection lies not only in the fact that they cannot be separated from each other, but also in the fact that the semantic function is the main one for scientific reflection. And for O.E. Stolyarova, the main and, in fact, the only one is the semantic function. Although she sometimes tries to smooth out this position when she claims, for example, that "all respected commentators, being philosophers, somehow expressed the general idea that philosophical reflection, even self-directed, should take into account the practices and results of empirical sciences" ^{[18, p. 54]}.

If we talk about the general assessment of O.E. Stolyarova's interpretation of scientific reflection by other philosophers, it also implies the need to take into account the dialectical nature of the phenomenon of reflection. V.A. Bazhanov, for example, draws attention to the fact that O.E. Stolyarova does not take into account the "dialectical results of research of Soviet philosophy that are ahead of the West. In the East, it was clearly realized that "science is a self-referential (self-reflective) system" ^{[5, pp. 32-33]}. The principle of self-reflexivity of science, in our opinion, directly means that the semantic function of reflection is the main one for scientific knowledge.

V.N. Porus also notes that the analysis of the principle of reflexivity in O.E. Stolyarova's version ignores its understanding as the principle of self-reflexivity. "The analysis of STS programs leads O.E. Stolyarova to the conclusion that the principle of reflexivity (in D. Bloor's version) is not fulfilled in them, although this contradicts the installation of these programs on self-reflection of scientific grounds" ^{[19, 2022, p. 44]}.

In our opinion, S.V. Pirozhkova speaks about the one-sided interpretation of the principle of reflexivity by O.E. Stolyarova. "...The justification of the functions of philosophy within the framework of STS, proposed by O.E. Stolyarova, remain within the boundaries of philosophical self–justification - and complacency. In the context of interaction with other disciplines, in the context of communication organization, this is not enough" ^{[20, p. 39]}.

Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that the resumption of dialectical research in the philosophy of science as a whole is productive. Consideration of the modern discussion on the problem of scientific reflection in Russian philosophy, conducted within the framework of the Western tradition, indicates the dialectical nature of this phenomenon. In the previous period, within the framework of Soviet research, results were obtained that reveal the dialectical essence of scientific reflection and its fundamental importance in the mechanism of functioning of scientific knowledge. In particular, it was shown that the dialectics of the semantic and semantic functions of scientific reflection reflects the relationship and dynamics of the revolutionary and paradigmatic (in T. Kuhn's terminology) periods of the development of scientific knowledge. It makes sense to continue this research and analyze the modern understanding of science in order to show the dialectical context constituted by the framework of the relationship between scientific reflection and scientific rationality.