The Enlightenment Committee of Hamburg-Bremen and the Nazi Seizure of Power: the Case of "Self-Coordination"?

Nurislamov Ruslan Rifovich Independent researcher 107143, Russia, Moscow, highway Open, 33 ruslan.nurislamov89@mail.ru Other publications by this author

German national Socialism was not only an internal phenomenon that turned the country after the usurpation of power into a totalitarian, terrorist state in relation to various groups of its own population, but also an example of an aggressive foreign policy that was aimed at creating a "new order" based on racial principles and led to tragedy for many peoples of Europe and the whole world. The joint struggle of the anti-Hitler coalition with German expansion was able to ensure the overthrow of the Nazi regime in 1945. The outcome of the Nuremberg trial was indictments and punishments for Nazi criminals. However, despite the decades that have passed since then, the threats from dictatorial regimes have not only not been eliminated, but are also manifesting themselves with increasing force in the 21st century. This contributes to the fact that the study of the history of Germany during the period of National Socialism remains relevant up to the present time.

An important element of the establishment of the Nazi regime in the country after the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor on January 30, 1933, was the "unification" (German Gleichschaltung) of all aspects of public life, which in the second edition of the Dictionary of National Socialism compiled by Cornelia Schmitz-Berning is defined as "the elimination of political and organizational pluralism by subordinating existing structures and institutions to the national- the socialist Fuhrer principle" ^{[1, S. 277]}. In this regard, the following questions naturally arise. Has "unification" always been violent? If some structures themselves sought to become controlled by the regime, then what was the reason for this? How has the activity of these structures changed after joining the system of the state apparatus of Nazi Germany?

This article attempts to answer these questions using the example of the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information (sok. BEI, German. Aufklärungs-Ausschuss Hamburg-Bremen). This organization was established by the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce after the outbreak of the Ruhr crisis in 1923 to conduct export propaganda abroad ^{[2, p. 91]}. The main activities of the BEI in Weimar Germany and the mechanism of using "trusted persons" (German: Vertrauensleute) to promote pro-German articles in the foreign press were disclosed in the following publication ^[3]. However, the history of this propaganda structure after the Nazis came to power remains poorly understood up to the present time, although some aspects have been touched upon in works on various related topics. For example, in a recently published study by Claudia Kemper and Hannah Renchler on the responsibility of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce for crimes during the period of National Socialism, a 10-page paragraph is devoted to the BAE. Based on the analysis of documents from various Hamburg archives, it shows how this propaganda organization became "an important tool of the Nazi regime" ^{[4, S. 132]}. The text focuses on the issues of financing and the specifics of the BEI's activities in 1933-1945. At the same time, the process of including a propaganda organization based in Hamburg into the system of the Nazi state has not been fully worked out. There are also some important aspects of the functioning of the BEI during the period of A. Hitler's dictatorship that can be disclosed taking into account captured German documents stored in the Russian State Military Archive (abbreviated RGVA). In addition, this article uses some materials from the Federal Archive of Germany (German Bundesarchiv, in short. BArch), the Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry (German: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, in short. PA AA) and the National Archives of Great Britain (eng. The National Archives of the United Kingdom, abbreviated TNA), available in digitized form on the official websites of these document repositories.

The purpose of the study is to characterize the process of integrating the BEI into the system of the state apparatus of Nazi Germany.

Achieving this goal is impossible without addressing the impact that the world economic crisis of 1929-1933 had. IEC) on the German economy, the welfare of the business circles of Hamburg and Bremen and the activities of the BEI at the final stage of the functioning of the Weimar Republic.

The sudden collapse of quotations on the New York Stock Exchange on October 24, 1929 became a harbinger of the economic crisis, which first unfolded in the United States, and then spread to the whole world. From 1929 to 1932, the production of industrial products of capitalist countries decreased by 40% ^{[5, p. 116]}. The economic decline quickly manifested itself in Germany, whose economy was closely linked to the US economy and dependent on loans received from American banks. The economic indicators of Germany were set back decades to the level of the XIX century. Along with the decline in production, the ruin of enterprises, banks, peasant farms and mass unemployment also became characteristic features of the country's economy ^{[6, p. 83]}. The unfolding economic crisis dealt a significant blow to the psychological stability in society, evoked thoughts about the catastrophe of 1923 with its hyperinflation. This contributed to the radicalization of the population, distrust of moderate political forces and readiness for extraordinary measures. The results of the September 1930 parliamentary elections and the second place of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (German: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), in short. NSDAP) They raised concerns among foreign investors about the stability of the future political situation. There was an outflow of gold and foreign currency from the German financial system ^{[7, p. 613; 8, S. 220; 9, S. 126]}.

One of the manifestations of the stagnation of the world economy was the reduction of foreign trade and the intensification of the struggle of various powers for sales markets by raising customs barriers. The particularly disastrous consequences of the crisis on the German economy took place due to its dependence on the export of goods ^{[7, p. 623; 8, S. 270]}, while the government hardly managed to maintain the country's export competitiveness. The volume of German foreign trade fell by 40% from 1928 to 1932 ^{[10, S. 238]}.

The influence of the IEC in the north of Germany, in Hamburg and Bremen should be considered taking into account the key role played by trade and transportation in the economy of both cities. Approximately half of all German naval vessels entered the port of Hamburg, and the port of Bremen was the second largest in the country ^{[11, S. 72]}.

Due to the fact that Hamburg's economy was mainly focused on trade with foreign countries, the IEC had an influence there, according to historian Ursula Buettner, "deeper and longer than in other regions of Germany" ^{[12, S. 44]}. If we turn to the quantitative indicators of Hamburg's trade activity at the height of the crisis, they looked like this: the import of goods through the port of Hamburg dropped by 35%, exports by 31%, and the volume of total maritime turnover by 33% ^{[10, S. 238]}. In 1932, every second worker and every third employee in the city were left without work ^{[13, S. 346]}.

Many prominent trading, shipping and shipbuilding companies in Hamburg experienced serious difficulties, which in some cases led to their ruin. So, in June 1931, the company "Schlubach, Thiemer und Co" (German: Schlubach, Thiemer und Co), which had been trading in various parts of the world since 1867 and had extensive plantations and representative offices in Central America and Africa, went bankrupt. A similar fate awaited many previously successful Hamburg trading firms, and only the support of the government could save some of them from liquidation ^{[10, S. 239]}.

A sharp decrease of 30% was observed in the field of maritime passenger transportation. This led to the fact that the shares of Hamburg's largest shipping company GAPAG (German Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (abbreviated HAPAG), also Hamburg-Amerika Linie) depreciated to 10% of their nominal value. She was saved from bankruptcy by the merger with the Bremen-based North German Lloyd (German: Norddeutscher Lloyd) and assistance from the state for further obtaining bank loans ^{[10, S. 239-240]}.

By 1932, the average employment in the port of Hamburg had fallen by about 2 times compared to 1928. The largest shipbuilding company in Hamburg, Blohm und Voss (German: Blohm & Voss), reduced its staff from 10700 (in 1929) to 2449 (1932) ^{[10, S. 240]}. Historian Andreas Meyhoff wrote in this regard that the production of ships there was not completely stopped only thanks to the government-supported order from GAPAG for two new ships ^{[14, S. 53]}.

Similar processes took place in Bremen. Trade through the port of Bremen fell by 15.9% in 1931, and by another 12.4% in 1932, while the reduction was more affected by the export of goods (24%) ^{[15, S. 543]}. The intensity of shipping and the orders of shipbuilding companies also decreased. The well-known shipyard "Weser" (German Aktien-Gesellschaft "Weser"), having no large projects, was forced to repair and dismantle old ships ^{[15, S. 522]}. Bankruptcy of the largest wool spinning company Nordwolle (German: Norddeutsche Wollkämmerei & Kammgarnspinnerei, in short. Nordwolle), whose products were exported from the port of Bremen all over the world, led to the banking crisis in Germany. In particular, in 1931, the Schroeder Bank (German: J.F. Schröder Bank), which financed shipping and shipbuilding companies in Bremen, was forced to close. Attempts to support crisis enterprises led to a breakdown of finances and the looming threat of bankruptcy already over Bremen and Hamburg as a whole.

All of the above confirms the destructive influence of the IEC on the economic circles of both German cities. This could not but affect the financing of various projects, in particular BEI. It should be noted that the Chambers of Commerce of Hamburg and Bremen have strengthened cooperation to minimize the consequences of the crisis. In particular, Bremen entrepreneurs officially joined the management of the BEI in 1931 ^{[4, S. 128]}. Therefore, the name of the organization soon changed from the "Bureau of Economic Information of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce" to the "Bureau of Economic Information Hamburg-Bremen". However, such a measure was not enough. The most important part of the BEI's propaganda activity was the covert promotion of pro-German articles for publication in the foreign press ^[3]. At the height of the IEC, the number of materials sent out was reduced by a third, the staff was cut in half, and due to lack of funds, there was a threat of curtailing some areas of activity (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 127-129). The organization's budget consisted of private business revenues and non-permanent subsidies from government agencies. In its message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 23, 1931, the leadership of the BEI complained that "the poor economic situation led to the fact that many firms, convinced of the need for the functioning of the propaganda structure, stopped paying contributions, since they no longer had the opportunity to do so" (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 126). In 1931, the BEI received only a quarter of the funds from private business from the amount that was previously available. The reserves accumulated over the years were also used up, and funds intended for the next 1932 were used to continue the work (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 130).

In this regard, the management of the BEI was forced to seek financial assistance from the state. The emphasis in the appeals was on the need to strengthen political propaganda to counter the activities of foreign states seeking to expose Germany in a bad light, in particular, unable to fulfill the agreements concluded due to economic collapse and political instability. The reduction of the BEI's activities due to insufficient financing was exposed as an urgent threat to the country's export activity. In addition, it was about the risk of losing the connections formed over the years of propaganda work in various countries of the world. As stated in the above-mentioned message from the BAE leadership to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "If now our texts cease to be produced and distributed in due volume, foreign newspapers will use an increasing stream of French, English, North American, and other propaganda material in their publications" (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 129).

As a result, the government provided the BEI with additional funds, and the ministries provided materials for publications in the foreign press (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 117, 122, 142). The available sources do not give a clear picture of how the BEI leaders assessed the amount of this assistance, however, it is obvious that under the influence of the IEC, "the Hamburg-based organization increasingly began to fall under the influence of the state" ^[3]. The Nazis' rise to power was supposed to further strengthen this process, given the ties that had developed between the NSDAP and the economic circles of Hamburg and Bremen.

The growing dissatisfaction with the measures taken by the Breuning government to overcome the crisis (the policy of "deflation") led to the fact that part of the economic elite of Hamburg and Bremen turned their attention to those political forces that could offer an alternative to the existing course. At the same time, the attitude towards the NSDAP was initially extremely cautious. This is explained, on the one hand, by the desire proclaimed by Nazi ideologists to achieve economic autarky, and on the other hand, by a tendency to radicalism in methods of achieving political goals, manifested, in particular, in street violence. Hamburg and Bremen entrepreneurs, many of whom had been increasing their wealth for generations through interaction with foreign countries and therefore inevitably advocated the principle of "free trade", at first glance, there was little that could bring them closer to the Nazi movement. However, gradually the picture began to change and individual, primarily young representatives of influential commercial families began to interact more intensively with the NSDAP ^{[10, S. 266]}.

The successes of the Nazi Party in the elections to the Reichstag and local parliaments played an important role in this. In particular, in Hamburg, the NSDAP, according to historian Martin Kruger, "gradually and steadily secured access to political life in the 1920s" ^{[16, S. 124]}. As a result, in the elections to the Hamburg parliament on April 24, 1932, the Nazis took first place with a result of 31.2%.

The rise in popularity opened up the possibility for the leaders of the NSDAP to come to power legally. To do this, it was important to give the party greater prestige and representativeness, as well as to provide additional injections into the party treasury to participate in costly election campaigns ^{[17, pp. 33-34]}. This could be achieved, first of all, by deepening ties with the economic circles of the country. One of the tools that was used for this in the north of Germany was the Hamburg National Club (German: Hamburger Nationalklub), at whose meetings A. Hitler spoke on December 1, 1930, and in March 1931 Joseph Goebbels took part as a speaker. A supporter of the Nazi Party, industrialist Wilhelm Keppler, also sought to consolidate various regional economic circles to support A. Hitler. In March 1932, on the instructions of the "Fuhrer", he visited Hamburg to probe the ground for deepening the joint work of the NSDAP with the leading entrepreneurs of the city. In November 1932, a letter was drafted and sent to President Paul Hindenburg in the Keppler Circle, in which the idea of appointing A. Hitler as chancellor was promoted. Among the 16 signatories, 5 were representatives of the Hamburg business community: Emil Gelferich, Franz Witthofft, Kurt Wehrmann, Karl Krogman, Erwin Merck ^[18]. Nazi plans for a ruthless struggle against the "Versailles dictatorship" and the parliamentary system of Weimar Germany, under the influence of the crisis, eventually managed to reconcile the Hamburg and Bremen business circles with the NSDAP's desire to achieve economic autarky.

The appointment of A. Hitler as Chancellor on January 30, 1933 was the beginning of the dismantling of the state system of the Weimar Republic. As historian Oleg Yuryevich Plenkov rightly pointed out in his work: "Despite the legal nature of coming to power, the changes in the German system of state power undertaken by the Nazis were revolutionary in nature..." ^{[19, p. 475]}. During the first half of 1933, a number of laws were drafted designed to establish the control of the Nazi Party over social and political processes in the country. In particular, on March 31, 1933, the "Preliminary Law on the Unification of Lands" (German: "Vorläufiges Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich") was adopted, according to which the composition of local legislative bodies should be formed based on the results of the elections to the Reichstag on March 5, 1933. In addition, regional governments could now issue laws without coordination with local parliaments. The logical continuation of this act was the "Law on the Unification of Lands" adopted on April 7, 1933 (German: "Zweites Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich"). According to it, the position of staffgalters (German: Reichsstatthalter) was introduced, who became government governors in various German lands and acquired a number of important rights: to appoint and dismiss chairmen of governments, as well as officials and judges of lands; to dissolve local legislative bodies; to approve and publish local laws ^{[20, pp. 74-75]}. The adoption of both resolutions was aimed at eliminating the independence of the administrative-territorial entities of Germany and their subordination to a centralized vertical of power based on Nazi ideology.

In accordance with the two above-mentioned, as well as other legislative acts, the "unification" of Hamburg and Bremen was carried out.

The newly formed Hamburg Senate and Parliament were now dominated by the Nazis. However, the leaders of the NSDAP did not immediately decide to nominate an old member of the party to the post of mayor, but preferred a compromise figure to create the impression that "they adhere to the old Hamburg tradition of assigning responsibility for the city and its inhabitants to knowledgeable, worthy and respected people without regard to party affiliation" ^{[12, S. 74]}. The new mayor was the banker and industrialist K. Krogman, one of the signatories of the letter to P. Hindenburg in support of A. Hitler. In his speech on May 10, 1933, K. Krogman tried to identify the continuity of the established dictatorial regime in history, stating that "the Fuhrer principle now operating in Germany had previously dominated Hamburg for many centuries" and "only with the Reformation began the city's slide towards such an alien phenomenon as parliamentarism" ^[18]. At the same time, the real power was not in the hands of the mayor, but in the hands of the leader of the Hamburg Nazis, Karl Kaufmann, who was appointed stadtholder on May 16, 1933. Parties and trade unions were dissolved in the city, and newspapers came under the control of the NSDAP ^{[21, S. 540]}. Jews began to be consistently ousted from public life ^{[16, S. 127]}. In particular, all members of Jewish origin, including the famous banker Max Warburg, were excluded from the plenum of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce. Four commissioners were sent to the presidium of the organization to monitor the implementation of "unification" ^[18]. Elections to the plenum were canceled, and its members and the president were now appointed by the Senate. Hermann Hubbe, a young (32 years old at the time of appointment) representative of a well-known Hamburg commercial family, became the new president of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce.

Thus, given the possibility of countermeasures in a city where both liberal and communist forces were historically strong and Jews played a large role in the economy, the NSDAP in Hamburg acted gradually, trying at the first stage after coming to power to rely on local traditions and support pro-Nazi influential figures, usually of a younger generation.

The "unification" of Bremen and its Chamber of Commerce was carried out in a similar way. Bremen, like Hamburg, lost the status and privileges of free cities during the Nazi era.

All state, economic and public organizations in Hamburg and Bremen and the whole country were soon "unified". Brutal methods, state terror against dissenters forced some of them to proactively move towards the Hitler regime for their own safety. Others, not under fear or coercion, but purely for utilitarian reasons, recognized the Nazi dictatorship as an opportunity for their own prosperity. The latter case was typical for the BEI, whose leadership saw prospects for further activities in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Education and Propaganda (sokr. MNPP).

Propaganda occupied a crucial place in the activities of the Nazis and provided significant assistance for their coming to power. The ideological works of the leaders of the NSDAP of the 1920s were filled with passages about the need for thoughtful promotion of their own worldview. The Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, according to historian Peter Longerich, was basically a propaganda movement ^{[22, S. 291]}. Hence, it is not surprising that after the appointment of A. Hitler as chancellor and the victory of the NSDAP in the parliamentary elections on March 5, 1933, on March 13, 1933, a new ministry of Public Education and Propaganda was created, headed by the leading Nazi propagandist J. Goebbels. All the propaganda activity of the various ministries now had to be consolidated into a single department. One of the tasks of the newly formed structure was officially designated "informing the foreign public about the essence and tasks of the Nazi state" ^{[23, S. 29]}. Over the previous years, Goebbels and his party comrades gained significant experience in how to introduce Nazi ideology into the minds of the German population. Getting their hands on public funds could make it possible to increase the scale of this impact. However, propaganda abroad could become a vulnerable point of the newly formed ministry, due to the fact that it previously occupied a subordinate position in the NSDAP in comparison with propaganda work inside the country. This manifested itself already in the spring of 1933, when the foreign media were filled with hostile messages criticizing the persecution of Jews and political opponents of the Nazis in Germany ^{[24, S. 109-110]}. J. Goebbels, busy building an internal structure and coordinating the powers of his department, which lasted until the autumn of 1933 ^{[25, S. 81]}, failed his the first challenge in the field of foreign policy propaganda. As the historian Helmut Michels wrote: "The initial phase of the Ministry of Propaganda abroad left behind a pile of fragments, which was caused by the actions of its head" ^{[24, S. 130]}. Sluggish propaganda work in foreign countries influenced foreign policy and led to Germany's isolation on the world stage. The Foreign Ministry had to correct the situation at that moment. On the part of his staff, harsh criticism was directed at J. Goebbels' department: complaints related to the lack of support and lack of propaganda material that could convincingly explain A. Hitler's repressive policy for the population of foreign countries ^{[24, S. 128-129]}. The cool relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were characteristic of the entire period of the Nazi dictatorship ^{[26, S. 103]}.

J. Goebbels' department independently and as soon as possible needed to resolve the issue of improving foreign policy propaganda, therefore, ministry officials had to show significant interest in those structures that had previously achieved some success in this area.

The BEI certainly deserved their attention, given also that since the spring of 1933 it had independently taken a number of measures that justified the policy pursued by A. Hitler. The response of foreign countries to the persecution of Jews was the boycott of German goods, which dealt another significant blow to the well-being of the commercial circles of Hamburg and Bremen. Therefore, in order to influence the foreign public, leaflets were compiled and distributed abroad in the depths of the organization, criticizing the prevailing public opinion and denying terror and racial discrimination in Germany ^{[27, S. 262]}. In addition, from March to July 1933, the BEI conducted its first propaganda campaign in the foreign press. Based on the list of publications published in the foreign press at that time (PA AA. RZ 214/98433. Bl. 79-104), three main topics can be distinguished, to which the texts of the Hamburg-based organization were devoted: the falsity of anti-German propaganda abroad; the "real" state of the Jewish question in Germany; the positive aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the government of A. Hitler.

Even before coming to power, the Nazis established contact with the BEI through the head of its Berlin representative office, Wilhelm Grosse, who since 1929 informed about the activities of the Hamburg-based structure of future significant figures in the propaganda of Nazi Germany: Otto Dietrich and Walter Funk ^{[27, S. 46-47]}. Therefore, it is not surprising that after the appointment of A. Hitler as chancellor and the creation of the MNPP, the leadership of the BEI intensified the search for opportunities to deepen interaction with the state. One of the first steps for this was the signing on April 15, 1933, of an agreement on the joint work of the BEI with the press department of the German government ^{[28, S. 56]}. However, establishing direct contacts with the newly formed MNPP could be more promising. On April 20, 1933, V. Grosse compiled a "Memorandum on the hidden influence on public opinion of foreign countries as currently the most important and financially acceptable method of systematic German foreign policy and counter-propaganda" (German: "Denkschrift vom 20. April 1933 über die getarnte Beeinflussung der öffentlichen Meinung des Auslandes als z. Zt. wichtigste und finanziell tragbarste Methode einer systematischen deutschen Auslands- und Abwehrpropafanda"), which during the spring and summer of 1933, along with other materials on the activities of the BEI, was sent to various government departments. Thanks to the mediation of the State Secretary of the Imperial Chancellery, G. Lammers, a memorandum was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1933 (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. l. 145-146). To understand how this document could be of interest to Y. Goebbels and the staff of his department should elaborate on its contents in more detail.

This memo was essentially an expanded and systematized version of the previous messages that the heads of the BEI addressed, in particular, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the height of the IEC. It pointed out the weaknesses of the existing German propaganda system and put forward specific proposals for its improvement. From the point of view of the organizational structure, V. Grosse defended the position that with the existence of various departments performing narrow tasks, all direct German propaganda in foreign countries should be subordinated to a single center, namely the MNPP (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d.18. L. 11-12). At the same time, the memo recommended the creation of a special commissariat and the introduction of the post of commissioner, whose tasks would include coordinating the activities of various German organizations engaged in covert foreign policy propaganda. Such a partial departure from the principle of centralization was necessary to achieve greater secrecy (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. l. 24-25).

The need to reform propaganda abroad was justified, as before, by threats from Germany's opponent states on the world stage (in particular, France and Poland), which, from the point of view of the author of the memo, were able to achieve significant success in their propaganda work, actively using indirect methods of influence (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op 2. d. 18. l. 9, 12, 20, 25). V. Grosse proposed to turn to the experience of these countries and, in the new conditions, strengthen covert foreign policy propaganda. The masking of the ideas promoted in the materials and the source of origin, characteristic of covert propaganda, in his opinion, could avoid the rejection among foreigners that often arose before intrusive and undisguised agitation (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 15-16).

Naturally, in the updated propaganda system of Germany, V. Grosse assigned the most important place to the BEI, which over the decade of its existence, according to him, turned into the largest German organization in the field of covert propaganda abroad (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 14) and had significant advantages in comparison with other state-owned departments (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War, representative offices of chambers of Commerce abroad) and private structures (primarily cultural, scientific and economic orientation) (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 12-13). Describing the main activity of the BEI, covert penetration into the foreign press, the author of the memo confirmed its effectiveness with the following figures: per month, the organization's employees created about 80 articles of political, cultural and economic content, which were published through the mediation of about 400 "trusted persons" in about 800 major newspapers of the world, published in 16 foreign languages, with with an audience of about 18 million readers (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 14-15, 17). The work of the BEI, according to the memorandum, was carried out at the expense of a budget of 150 thousand marks (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 18).

The key to the effectiveness of BEI V. Grosse saw that his work took into account the difference between internal and external, direct and hidden propaganda. Therefore, the organization's propaganda materials were compiled taking into account the mentality of the population of the country to which they were directed. In addition, he drew attention to the fact that the success of the previous work of the BEI was based on the synthesis of relations between the trading circles of Hamburg and Bremen and the experience of government departments (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 19). This interaction was significantly deepened due to the activities of the BEI in the 1920s.

The memo also offered a number of specific proposals to improve foreign policy propaganda. The main ones were: firstly, the establishment of a unified propaganda structure mentioned earlier; secondly, the expansion of the BEI's activities. As for the latter, due to additional financial injections (an increase in the budget by 200-300 thousand marks), V. Grosse proposed to strengthen the promotion of old and recruitment of new "trusted persons" who had connections in the foreign press; accelerate the transfer of propaganda materials through the use of air communication and telegraph; expand the staff of authors, translators, artists; develop interaction BEI with other departments; to establish a scientific study of the foreign press and propaganda, etc. (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 20-28)

It follows from this that the memo did not imply any revolutionary changes in the work of the BEI. V. Grosse proposed using the already existing potential of the organization, providing it with stable funding and making it the core of the hidden foreign policy propaganda of the new Germany. From his point of view, such a logic of action would be financially beneficial to the state: in the current conditions, the creation of a new operating structure dealing with covert propaganda "from scratch" would cost several million marks and take many years to establish those connections in many countries of the world that have already been established by the BEI (RGVA. F. 1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 19).

The new President of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, G. Hubbe, also joined the promotion of the idea of the need to intensify foreign policy propaganda and state support for the activities of the BEI. In his message to J. Goebbels on June 30, 1933, he outlined the advantages of a propaganda organization in terms similar to the memo, among other things, emphasizing the possible expansion of a secret information service from abroad, which would ensure that reports on the situation of foreign states were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a regular basis ^{[28, S. 57]}. This aspect was certainly important for J. Goebbels, given that strained relations with the Foreign Ministry, which had priority for such activities, could make it difficult for him to quickly and comprehensively access this information.

Taking into account the materials received by him, J. Goebbels should have understood that under his control, in the person of an organization based in Hamburg, there could be a full-fledged, well-functioning mechanism, while not directly associated with National Socialism ^{[27, S. 260]}. As a result, on July 20, 1933, an official agreement was concluded between the MNPP and the BEI ^{[4, S. 130]}, according to which the privately founded organization became directly subordinate to the department of J. Goebbels, subsequently working in close relationship with its departments IV b (foreign press) and VII (abroad).

The personnel "unification" of the BEI unfolded even before the official entry into the MNPP and took place in parallel with the "unification" of the Chambers of Commerce of Hamburg and Bremen. The new chairman of the board of the propaganda organization in March 1933 ^{[27, S. 261]} was E. Gelferich, a merchant, K. Krogman's adviser, one of the signatories of the letter to P. Hindenburg in support of A. Hitler. The director responsible for all the practical work of the BEI, G. Johannsen, and the head of the Berlin branch, V. Grosse, retained their positions. E. Gelferich and G. Johannsen became members of the NSDAP in the spring and summer of 1933, V. Grosse joined the party even earlier — in 1932 ^{[27, S. 260]}. Already on April 24, 1933, the latter wrote that the personnel "unification" of the BEI was mainly carried out ^{[27, S. 260]}. Representatives of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, other ministries, economic associations, as well as various structures of the Nazi Party were soon introduced into the governing bodies of the BEI ^{[28, S. 58-59]}.

How has the activity of the BEI changed after joining the structure of the MNPP?

First of all, it should be noted that the Chambers of Commerce of Hamburg and Bremen lost direct control over the organization, which, in accordance with the agreement signed with the office of J. Goebbels, henceforth had no right to disclose the details of its work to third-party departments. However, such strict regulations concerned mainly political and cultural propaganda. At the same time, the BEI continued to engage in export propaganda, which could be part of the disguise of its main activity ^{[27, S. 264]}. In the field of promoting German goods abroad, it continued to actively interact with various German economic structures, which allocated special funds for these purposes (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 4). At the same time, the MNPP controlled any additional finances received by the BEI, and for its part ensured a stable the main budget for its functioning (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 4). Already in the summer of 1933, the flow of material resources and tasks from the department of J. Goebbels increased to the organization ^{[4, S. 129]}. At the end of the year, BEI representative offices were established in Brussels, London, Milan, Paris, Prague and Rome ^{[4, S. 133]}. Subsequently, in 1935, G. Johannsen in one of his messages mentioned the amount of 280 thousand marks provided by the MNPP ^{[4, S. 130]}. It should be added that the previously named heads of the BEI (E. Gelferich, G. Johannsen, V. Grosse) remained such throughout the 1930s. Excluding "trusted persons", the staff consisted of approximately 86 people (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 5).

Since the incorporation of the Hamburg-based organization into the structure of the MNPP, it has operated completely in line with Nazi ideology. The propaganda treatment of the population of foreign countries served as preparation and support for Nazi foreign policy actions. In the early years, the BEI materials were aimed at ensuring confidence in the Hitler regime abroad, creating an image of a stable Germany, reliable and open to political and economic cooperation with foreign countries ^{[4, S. 132]}. The promoted ideas were still presented mainly in a hidden form, and propaganda materials were characterized by a restrained tone and reliance on facts ^{[28, S. 63]}. The name of the BEI, which was also characteristic of activities in Weimar Germany, did not appear anywhere, a number of specially created structures (press services, publishing houses, etc.) were used for cover purposes. Increased tensions in Europe and the world since the mid-1930s became the basis for even more dynamic work of the organization. After the outbreak of World War II, the BEI actively interacted with the Wehrmacht High Command ^{[4, S. 137]}.

Given in the "Overview of the structure and activities of the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information and related independent departments as of August 1939" (German: "Übersicht über Organization und Tätigkeit des Aufklärungs-Ausschusses Hamburg-Bremen und der ihm angeschlossenen selbständigen Unternehmen nach dem Stande vom August 1939"), which was transferred Under the leadership of the BEI, along with other materials deposited in the Imperial Archive in Potsdam, data for 1938 show that the organization's propaganda activity abroad was significantly intensified. During this year, 2,100 articles were sent out for publication in the foreign press (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 5), which was more than twice the figures indicated by V. Gross in a memo at the beginning of 1933. At the same time, the number of foreign languages into which texts created by German authors were translated increased from 16 to 27 (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 5). According to historian Peter Longerich, BEI was the leading organization in Germany in the field of dissemination of propaganda materials in the foreign press ^{[29, S. 303]}. Articles were published in both provincial and major metropolitan periodicals of foreign countries. Those newspapers and magazines that had nothing to do with National Socialism and were initially negatively disposed towards Germany were considered especially valuable for the leadership of the BEI ^{[27, S. 264]}. Interaction with the foreign press was still carried out through "trusted persons", the number of which, according to the "Review", decreased from 400 to 350 (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 5). Given the fact that the number of materials created in Germany has increased, this may indicate that that the organization has rationalized its activities, abandoning ineffective agents.

During 1933-1939, the BEI deepened ties with foreign publishing houses, which contributed to the publication of a number of pro-German books and pamphlets abroad, in particular, in Great Britain and Sweden. The most solid of them should probably be recognized as the book "Germany Speaks" (Brit. Edition: Germany speaks. London: Butterworth, 1938. 407 p.; Swedish. Edition: Tyskland talar. Stockholm: Medén. 1939. 266 s.), which was a detailed presentation of the Nazi state built by that time. The introduction to it was written by I. Ribbentrop, and the chapters on various spheres of state and public life in Germany were written by the relevant ministers and other responsible officials. It is noteworthy that among the authors, the director of the BEI, G. Johannsen, was also noted, who probably made the greatest organizational contribution to the publication of this book. However, in the text of the chapter "The essence of propaganda in Germany" designated by his authorship, he generally focused not on the external, in which, given his vast experience since the 1920s, he was an expert, but on the internal side of propaganda activities.

The author of several smaller editions published in English was the British journalist Bertram de Colonna (Colonna B. Czecho-Slovakia Within. London: Butterworth, 1938. 126 S.; Colonna B. Poland from the Inside. London: Cranton, 1939. 167 S.), BEY's "trusted representative" in the UK. Even after the outbreak of World War II, while in Copenhagen, he attempted to publish pro-German articles in the British press, but was exposed by the British as a German propagandist working for the MNPP, which is reflected in the documents of the MI5 counterintelligence service (English Military Intelligence, abbreviated MI5) (TNA. KV 2/3403).

After the BEI joined the structure of the MNPP, the publication of the Spanish-language magazine Revista Alemana (Spanish: Revista Alemana, trans. "German Magazine"), distributed in Spain and South America. Starting in 1932 and until 1936, it was published in double issues of 80-100 pages, and then in separate issues, but with fewer pages. From the beginning of 1935, the magazine began to be published under its classic, conceptual cover, depicting the caravel of Christopher Columbus heading from Europe to America and a modern German airship hovering over it in the same direction. The magazine was published until 1944, and 38 out of 44 issues were published during the Nazi period. The Revista Aleman published news of current political events in Europe, presented from a German point of view. Texts about the peculiarities of the internal and external life of Germany were often written by leading figures of the Nazi regime, such as J. Goebbels, O. Dietrich, V. Funk, A. Rosenberg, etc. A significant block of articles was devoted to various details of Germany's economic relations with Spain and Latin American countries, the functioning of the Hamburg and Bremen ports, the products of German export companies, etc. Also in the magazine, a considerable place was occupied by materials about cultural events that connected Germany with Spanish-speaking countries. The authors of articles in this field were often diplomats, well-known journalists, writers and scientists from Spain and Latin America.

In 1934-1938, the BEI also published a similar magazine in Portuguese, A Nova Alemanya (portug. "A Nova Alemanha", trans. "New Germany"), intended for Portugal and Brazil.

Within the framework of the BEI, after the Nazis came to power, a secret information service from abroad functioned intensively: 120-140 messages were received annually in Germany (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 4) containing information about the peculiarities of domestic and foreign policy of various countries. For example, at least 55 such materials were received from England in 1938, and 44 in 1939. The messages of the "trusted persons" were not intended for general publication; after processing in Germany, they could only be used by officials of the concerned departments approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thus, due to stable state support, the BEI, after joining the structure of the MNPP, was not only able to maintain at the same level, but also expand its activity.

Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of the article, it should be recognized that in the case of BEI, one cannot talk about forced "unification". In this case, we are talking rather about "self-unification", which was due to a number of reasons: the negative influence of the IEC and, against this background, increased interaction with the state even before the Nazis came to power; the rapprochement of part of the Hamburg and Bremen economic circles with the NSDAP at the end of the Weimar Republic due to the success of the party in local and national elections; the fleeting process the "unification" of Hamburg and Bremen and the Chambers of commerce of both cities after the Nazis came to power; dissatisfaction with the existing system of foreign policy propaganda, hopes for its strengthening under National Socialism. In view of all the above, the leadership of the BEI itself sought to make the organization under the control of the Hitler regime, therefore, even before officially joining the structure of the MNPP, it conducted personnel "unification" and began to produce materials in a pro-Nazi manner. In Nazi Germany, the BEI was provided with stable funding and other government support. The previous areas of activity (covert penetration into the foreign press, distribution of printed materials, secret information service) were preserved and strengthened. The BEI interacted with various departments and had the opportunity to involve leading figures of Nazi Germany as authors of its propaganda materials. Firmly embedded in the foreign policy propaganda system of the Nazi regime, the organization in question ceased to exist with its fall in 1945.