Newspaper reports about the Polish uprising of 1863 in the perception of L.N. Tolstoy

Sun Jiaxuan PhD in Philology Postgraduate student, Department of History of Russian Literature, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119415, Russia, Moscow, Kravchenko str., 7, sq. DSK jiax.song@yandex.ru

The Polish uprising of 1863 led to a political crisis in the Russian Empire and to an increase in conservative sentiments in society and in pro-government circles. This was largely due to fears that the uprising would spread beyond the Kingdom of Poland, covering Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belarusian territories, which many in Russia considered to be native Russian [see 1]. The grounds for such fears were also given by the increasingly hostile attitude of Western European states towards Russia, which supported the Polish insurgents. L.N. Tolstoy, who served in the Russian army in the Caucasus a decade earlier and then took part in the Crimean War, did not ignore the events of 1863. In a letter to A.A. Fet dated May 1... 3, 1863, he expresses his intention to return to the army: "What do you think about Polish affairs? After all, it's a bad thing, won't you and Borisov and I have to take the sword off the rusted nail again?" ^{[2, vol. 61, p. 17]}. We learn about this from the diary of S.A. Tolstoy, who, of course, did not approve of this desire, dated September 22, 1863: "To the war. What's the strangeness? Flighty — no, not true, but just fickle <...> Put in such a position that you have to live and constantly think that if not today, then tomorrow you will stay with a child, and, perhaps, not with one, without a husband. Everything is a joke, a momentary fantasy. Today I got married, liked it, had children, tomorrow I wanted to go to war, I left. I must now wish for the death of the child, because I will not survive him. I do not believe in this love for the fatherland, in this enthousiasme at the age of 35. Aren't children the same fatherland, the same Russians? Leave them because it's fun to ride a horse, admire how beautiful the war is, and listen to bullets fly. I begin to respect him less for his inconstancy and cowardice" ^{[3, vol. 1, pp. 61-62]}.

The researchers raised the question of the reasons for this Tolstoy's intention, but did not give a clear answer to it, most often limiting themselves to comments of a psychological kind. In addition, only one of the episodes of 1863, either spring or autumn, usually came into their field of vision. So, N.N. Gusev did not comment on Tolstoy's May plan, but explained the September one by the severity of his family life, which makes one recall Prince Andrew's answer in "War and Peace" to the question why he goes to serve in the army: "I'm going because this life that I lead here, this life is not for me!" ^{[4, p. 615]}. B.M. Eichenbaum evaluates this episode in a similar way, considering it in connection with the formation of the idea of "War and Peace". Tolstoy's desire reflected, in his opinion, the "emotional and aesthetic side of the writer's military hobbies", i.e. there is a kind of "bravery" inherent in some of Tolstoy's heroes who go to war in search of strong and vivid impressions ^{[5, p. 211]}. According to the researcher, these military sentiments, coupled with the general interest of the writer's contemporaries in the Patriotic War, the 50th anniversary of which was celebrated in 1862, contributed to Tolstoy's work on the book that became "War and Peace".

More meaningful from a historical point of view is the version of S.S. Doroshenko, who in the book "Leo Tolstoy - a warrior and a patriot" argued that the reason for Tolstoy's desire to take part in the war was not so much the Polish uprising in itself as the threat of a declaration of war by the Western powers against Russia: "He was going to a "war" only if such a war really arose in Russia with Western countries, but Tolstoy clearly did not intend to pacify the Poles" ^{[6, p. 290]}. The researcher's intention to shift attention from Tolstoy's family circumstances to military and political ones is close to us, however, Doroshenko, embedding the Polish uprising in the context of the European foreign policy crisis of the early 1860s, does not clarify the details of this crisis, which motivated Tolstoy to recall his military youth. Quoting both Tolstoy's letter to Fet and S.A. Tolstoy's diary, the researcher does not analyze what exactly happened in May and September 1863 in the theater of military operations in Poland and in the diplomatic spheres of Europe.

In our work, we will try to recreate this foreign policy context, thereby answering the question why Tolstoy's plan to go to war appears twice with some interval – in the spring and autumn of 1863. Based on newspaper reports about the Polish uprising in April-May and September 1863, we reconstruct the international and military-political situation of that time and thus explain Tolstoy's awakened interest in modern Polish events and the era of the Napoleonic Wars. We will rely mainly on publications in the Moskovsky Vedomosti edited by M.N. Katkov – firstly, because this print body was becoming especially popular in Russia at that time, broadcasting the point of view about the need to give the Poles a tough rebuff in order to avoid the collapse of Russia [see 7]. Secondly, Tolstoy in the early 1860s, refusing to cooperate with other publications, primarily Sovremennik, was published exclusively in Katkov's magazine Russian Bulletin, publishing here the novel "Cossacks", the story "Polikushka" and the first parts of the future "War and Peace", as well as several ads ^{[2, vol. 61, 77, 182, 205, 212-213]}. So there is every reason to believe that, first of all, the Moskovskie Vedomosti fell into his reading circle, especially since in his letters of the 1860s there are references to newspaper publications ^{[2, vol. 61, pp. 138, 157-158]}. The impact of the publications of the Moskovsky Vedomosti on Tolstoy's creative imagination during the creation of War and Peace is convincingly described by O.E. Mayorova [see 8]. However, he did not fully share Katkov's political views, which is confirmed by a letter from A.A. Tolstoy dated November 14, 1865: "Why do you say that I quarreled with Katkov? I didn't think so. Firstly, because there was no reason, and secondly, because there is as much in common between me and him as there is between you and your water carrier" ^{[2, vol. 61, p. 115]}. In this letter, he also shows indifference to public issues like Polish: "I don't I sympathize with the fact that Poles are forbidden to speak Polish, and I am not angry with them for this, and I do not blame the Muravyovs and Cherkasskys, but I do not care at all who strangled the Poles or took Schleswig-Holstein or made a speech in the assembly of zemsk[their] institutions" ^{[2, vol. 61, p. 115]}. However, his reaction to the Polish uprising of 1863 and the very enumeration of not random, but the most topical topics of the mid-1860s. in Tolstoy's letter confirms that he followed the news, and, apparently, the "Moscow Vedomosti", not too close to him ideologically, still satisfied his need to receive news, and the newspaper's assessments of events could have some effect on him. At that time, Tolstoy was very moderate in a political sense: by 1863 he was already at odds with democratic publications like Sovremennik and at the turn of 1863-1864 he was writing an anti-nihilistic comedy "The Infected Family". So, on the whole, he was not inclined at that time to problematize the foundations of Russian foreign and domestic policy with the determination that would be inherent in him in later years, when he would express deep sympathy for the Polish people. In a letter to M. Zdzekhovsky dated September 10, 1895, Tolstoy writes: "I, not being a Pole, will argue with every Pole in the degree of disgust and indignation at those wild and stupid measures of Russian government officials that are used against the faith and language of Poles" ^{[2, vol. 68, p. 168]}.

Let's turn to the historical side of the matter. On January 10 (22), 1863, an armed uprising broke out in the Kingdom of Poland, which, with the onset of spring, spread to the Western edge of the Russian Empire. In April, the rebel actions take on even more extensive dimensions: "Parties of 10 to 50 people roamed everywhere, who rampaged in places unoccupied by troops, hanged civilians there, even women suspected of loyalty to the government" ^[9]. Since the rebels were scattered everywhere, the hope of an early suppression of the uprising was not justified. At the end of April, a people's government was formed in Warsaw – the Jond [See 10, p. 167], which confirmed the large-scale goals of the uprising, the claim of the Poles to gain full independence and restore Poland within the borders of 1772. It was from this moment that the struggle of the Poles for freedom began to cause a particularly negative reaction in Russian society, which at first rather sympathized with the struggle of the Poles for freedom, but who did not want to be separated from the Russian Empire by its western regions. It is known that from that time on, the popularity of Herzen's "Bell", which sympathized with Poland, began to decline, and the importance of the Moscow Gazette, whose tenant editor since 1863 was Katkov, who protested against any concessions to the rebels, increased [see 7, pp. 26-27]

By this time, the Polish uprising had attracted the attention of European states and entailed their intervention in the conflict, which the Russian Empire considered its internal affair. On April 5 (17), the ambassadors of England, France and Austria presented notes to Vice-Chancellor Prince A.M. Gorchakov in St. Petersburg. England considered it legitimate to participate in Polish affairs as a participant in the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. Taking as a basis the Vienna Treaty, which defined the principles of the division of Poland between Russia, Austria and Prussia, England demanded that Russia comply with the treaty and cease hostilities. As the Moscow Gazette wrote on April 28, in fact, Britain's intervention was explained by the fact that it "hopes to do business in the East" ^[11] and wants to use the Polish uprising to gain freedom of action there. Russian Russian and French governments came closer together after the end of the Crimean War, and therefore sought to "negate the Franco-Russian rapprochement" ^{[12, p. 69]}. Due to the rapprochement with Russia, the French cabinet, in turn, was initially indifferent to the Polish uprising. However, when Prussia intervened, having concluded with Russia on January 27 (February 8) a convention on the possibility of an armed Russian detachment crossing the Prussian border to pursue Polish insurgents ^{[13, p. 152]}, France changed its initial neutral position and intervened in the Polish question, motivating it with a desire to restore order in Europe. However, in the issue of April 28, Moskovskie Vedomosti also noted France's own interest in changing the European map: to achieve this grandiose goal, "it would take Finland and Poland from us, and Galicia from Austria. The reward for all these donations can be cut out from Turkey, which serves as a reserve fund just in case. Having arranged this matter at will, it would not be difficult for the emperor of the French to expand France to the Rhine" ^[11].

To achieve this goal, France began in early April, firstly, to seek military and moral support from Italy, Sweden, Spain and other states, and on the other hand, sought to encourage Austria and England to act in favor of Poland, setting them against Russia, as stated by the Moscow Gazette in issue 2 May [see 14]. Austria joined Britain and France, at the same time hoping, as Katkov explained, that Russia would find "some ways to stop unrest in the regions adjacent to Austria, threatening its own peace of mind" ^[15]. Thus, Austria had to play a difficult game: on the one hand, she would like to get closer to the Western powers in order to get their support in clashes with Italy and Prussia;, her reluctance to take the side of Russia was also due to the fact that this would incite her Polish subjects against Austria (especially in Galicia, where the Polish nobility played a significant role); on the other hand, Austria did not want the triumph of Poland, because it was afraid that the fire of the uprising in this case could spread to Galicia [see 10, p. 129].

It is easy to see that the messages we analyzed appeared in the Moscow Gazette in the very days when Tolstoy wrote his letter to Fet. Having recreated the international situation in the spring of 1863, it can be stated that the new pan–European war, which Doroshenko mentioned, seemed more inevitable than ever at the end of April - early May, which allows us to explain Tolstoy's concern about military affairs at that moment. Newspaper reports made him recall the Crimean War of 1853-1856, in which several European powers joined the coalition and caused serious damage to Russia. As a modern researcher notes, "the danger of being defeated in the event of a collision with former opponents in the Crimean War was real" ^{[16, vol. 15, p. 89]}. Tolstoy, apparently, also admitted that the anti-Russian coalition was using the Polish issue to weaken Russia.

The tense situation was defused by June. Appointed on May 1 by the new governor-General of Vilna, M.H. Muravyov used extremely harsh measures to suppress the uprising: from his reports it is clear that the actions of Russian troops at the end of May were aimed at the final cleansing of the region from "still wandering gangs" ^[17]. If we talk about the foreign policy situation, then despite the fact that rumors about preparations for an all-European war were spreading more and more in the world, the anti-Russian coalition did not take any measures anticipating a real declaration of war. Moskovskie Vedomosti stated that the financial preparations of the coalition for war are not underway [see 18], i.e. the Western powers are only intimidating Russia. Apparently, realizing the imaginary military danger, Tolstoy stopped thinking about whether he should personally go to Poland.     

After a temporary summer lull, a turn in Polish issues occurred at the end of September: a speech by the English diplomat Count Rossel, delivered on September 15 (27), 1863 in the city of Blairgowrie (Scotland), questioned Russia's right to own Poland and re-actualized the disputes of European powers over Polish affairs. Rossel stated that since Russia had not fulfilled the obligations imposed on it by the Vienna Treaty, its right to Poland "can hardly be preserved" ^[19]. This statement was tantamount to recognizing Poland as a full-fledged "belligerent party" ^[20], which, in turn, meant that the Polish issue was no longer given an internal Russian, but a European character. Rossel's position received the support of France, which, unwilling to close the road to the Rhine, made a similar statement. France would like "for the Poles to be recognized as a belligerent party" and for Russia to be given a six-point ultimatum "to put them into action immediately." However, cautious Austria did not want to support either England or France and stayed away, since recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent party would attract Galicia to the theater of war and would be a harbinger of an inevitable war with Russia ^{[21, p. 862]}.

Periods of lull and "increased enterprise" of the Polish detachments alternated depending on the diplomatic relations between the "patron powers of Poland" ^{[10, p. 299]}. At the moment of another "crisis in politics", the rebels seemed to strain all their forces to "warm up the cooling rebellion" ^{[10, p. 299]}. As Moskovskie Vedomosti noted in early September, "the current situation in Warsaw is extremely tense. The Poles are in an anxious, feverish state, waiting for some strict measures and are ready to implement them" ^[22]. In combination with the renewed diplomatic campaign against Russia, the international situation in the autumn of 1863 became even more tense than in the spring. As the Moscow Vedomosti recognized, "when diplomatic negotiations on the basis of the Vienna Treaty ceased, the policy adopted against us in Europe will act even more strongly than before, a policy aimed at inflaming passions, complicating and embarrassing our government" ^[19]. With the strengthening of ties between France, Austria and England, there was no hope for the resumption of the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia and Russia concluded in 1815, so that Russia turned out to be helpless and lonely in the international community. As pointed out by Severnaya Poshta, the official publication of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the English Times announced that for the three powers supporting Poland "there are only two possible ways out, either to submit meekly or declare war" ^[23]. According to the St. Petersburg Vedomosti, France was able to start a war even without the help of Austria and England: "She could have acted on her own in a militant and revolutionary spirit" ^[24].

Thus, there is every reason to believe that even at this moment Tolstoy's concern about the Polish question did not arise spontaneously and not only under the influence of domestic circumstances, but also under the influence of newspapers: in September he had every reason to look at the situation pessimistically. As we can see, exactly on the very day when a message was published in the Moscow Gazette about the French demand to recognize Poland as a "belligerent party", Tolstoy announced to his wife his intention to go to war.

However, this time the worst fears were not confirmed. Since the motive for the intervention of the Western powers in Polish affairs was the realization of their foreign policy goals, and not helping the Poles to liberate them from Russia, none of the powers decided to take the risk and get involved in a full-fledged war for Poland. Therefore, the recognition of the rights of the "belligerent side" by the insurgents without their real armed support could be perceived by the Russian Empire as an empty threat. In addition, faced with a very possible clash with Western powers, Russia was able to find the United States as an ally. The arrival of the Russian squadron in the United States on September 13 (25) had a huge impact on the relations of the Russian Empire with England and France, giving the former "great independence and freedom in its European unions" ^[25]. In addition, in the Kingdom of Poland itself, military operations were subsiding, there was no more news about large "gangs". The diplomatic struggle over the Polish issue, which lasted for about seven months, was coming to an end, Russia got rid of the threat of an external war, and Tolstoy's desire to "take the sword off a rusty nail" disappeared.

Thus, during the Polish uprising, Tolstoy was not only absorbed in family life and household, but also followed the political news. Although he refused to participate in the war (and, quite likely, he was not seriously going to move from words to deeds, expressing in the above conversations with his loved ones his concern about the situation as a whole rather than his willingness to actually go to war), the thought of it did not go unnoticed and left an imprint on his work of that time. In a letter to aunt A.A. Tolstoy dated October 17, he reports on the work on the novel "from the time of the 1810s and 20s, which has been occupying me completely since autumn" ^{[2, vol. 61, p. 23]}. Tolstoy's literary pursuits are strongly associated with the era of the Patriotic War, and the reference to this topic during the Polish uprising was not accidental. It is known that during the war of 1812, the Poles, pinning their hopes for national liberation on Napoleon, fought with France against Russia. Russia's rejection of Poland in 1863 would mean, according to the Moscow Gazette, a willingness to "neglect the only tangible result of the glorious struggle that Russia endured in 1812 against all the hordes of Napoleon" ^[26], since after the victory over France, most of the Duchy of Warsaw (So-called. Napoleonic Poland, created by Napoleon I in 1807 and including ethnically Polish lands transferred to France by Prussia under the terms of the Tilsit Peace Treaty) ended up in the hands of Russia. Moskovskie Vedomosti compared 1812 and 1863 in terms of the mood of public opinion, which, according to Katkov, was more unanimous during the Polish uprising. Russian russians, through whose efforts a considerable part of Russian society supported the government's actions in 1863, even argued that if "in 1812 many could still doubt whether it would not be better to act in a spirit of compliance and keep peace with Napoleon," then "in 1863, except for a few pathetic renegades of the Russian land, the whole of Russia he is aware of the need for war if our enemies do not abandon their plans, which, by their own admission, tend to the ultimate destruction of Russia" ^[27]. "Society woke up," wrote Moskovskie Vedomosti in May 1863, "raised its head and loudly, with thousands of voices, proclaimed that it would stand up and defend itself strongly when they came to rob his house and slaughter his children" ^[28]. As O.E. Mayorova showed in the book "From the Shadow of Empire...", conservative publicists of the 1860s, using the memory of 1812, tried to awaken patriotism and the desire to actively resist the Poles in Russian society, and Katkov was one of the main initiators of this movement [see 8]. Historical analogies between the Polish uprising and the Patriotic War also contributed to Tolstoy's interest in the era of 1812, but the writer retained independence in the perception of these events [see 8]. By showing, for example, the murder of Vereshchagin by a crowd on the orders of Rastopchin, he makes it clear that people can be subject to a kind of hypnosis, forcing them, under the influence of momentary irritation or collective moods, to plot or commit acts based on violence; however, the influence of propaganda or public opinion on a person cannot be prolonged, and a person quickly realizes that violence is an extreme, most often involving pangs of conscience. So Tolstoy himself, twice during 1863, at moments of the greatest pan-European tension, considering the possibility of personal participation in Polish affairs, gradually, obviously, moved from a direct emotional reaction to newspaper publications to their critical reception, which is why he was able to offer the reader of "War and Peace" a balanced and generally peaceful view of relations between nations.