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DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2023.12.69095
EDN: VZRLGO
Received:
24-11-2023
Published:
06-12-2023
Abstract:
The article is devoted to the study of the nature of consciousness within the framework of the information concept. The paper proposes a definition of consciousness as an informational environment in which an extended model of reality is realized. The process of realization of this extended model is defined as thinking. The result of thinking is information objects that form a system in the form of information environment. Information objects are reflections of the real world properties, not directly, but by means of translation through a special object – a carrier of consciousness. In the case of human consciousness, such a carrier is a human being (represented in the form of his nervous system). As a result, consciousness can be qualified as a simulacrum of reality, i.e., a model of a model: an information model of the carrier of consciousness, which in turn is a means of physical modeling of the real "big" world. Possible mechanisms mediating thinking are considered. For this purpose, two new concepts are introduced: neural circuit and neurophysical pattern. An approach to the study of self-consciousness based on the localization of the consciousness carrier in the multidimensional space of states of initial real objects, as well as their reflections in the form of information objects is proposed. This localization is ensured by the presence of feedbacks. Summarizing the results of the study, the article states the following connection between consciousness, self-consciousness and subjectness: under certain conditions (when consciousness is localized in the state space of the carrier of consciousness), consciousness acquires the property of self-consciousness, a special case of which (when the initiator of changes determining localization is the carrier of consciousness) is self-consciousness endowed with subjectness.
Keywords:
consciousness, information medium, consciousness carrier, nervous system, neuron, circuit, pattern, localization, self-consciousness, subjectness
This article is automatically translated.
Introduction The question of the nature of consciousness has been one of the central issues for philosophy since the XVII-XVII centuries (the period of Modern philosophy). The most profound and fundamental philosophical research in the field of consciousness is associated with the names of Hegel and Kant. For Hegel, consciousness is identical with self—consciousness: "As a soul, the spirit has the form of abstract universality; as consciousness, the form of isolation; as an existing spirit for itself, the form of uniqueness ..." [1, p. 40] and subjectivity: "... the soul, through the denial of its corporeality, rises to pure ideal identity with itself, becomes consciousness, becomes "I"" [1, p. 41]. I. Kant does not give a direct definition of the concept of "consciousness", but operates with the concepts of reason, apperception and thinking. A possible systemic interpretation of the concept of consciousness, following from the analysis of the "Critique of Pure Reason", is the qualification of consciousness as a subject in which there is diversity in contemplation and thinking occurs [2, p. 127]. At the same time, thinking is a means of realizing apperception (self-awareness) [2, p. 85]. Thus, I. Kant, like Hegel, identifies consciousness with subjectivity. As part of the formation of the methodological base of cognitive science, including the creation of artificial intelligence systems, there was a need to consider consciousness independently of a person, i.e. in such a way that human consciousness was a special case of consciousness, and self-awareness and subjectivity were not assumed by default. To a significant extent, this was implemented within the framework of functionalism, but the resulting implementation turned out to be simplified, not providing the existing autonomy of consciousness from its physical carrier (natural or artificial neural network). One of the well—known modern definitions of consciousness is the following: "consciousness is one of the basic concepts of philosophy, sociology and psychology, denoting the ability to perfectly reproduce reality, as well as specific mechanisms and forms of such reproduction at its various levels" [3, pp. 43-48]. A significant step in understanding consciousness is, according to the authors, the information concept of consciousness, which is largely a development of the ideas of functionalism [4,5,6]. According to this concept, "cognitively, consciousness itself is reproductive: no new knowledge, ideas, sensations are produced by consciousness, i.e. consciousness in no way replaces and even more so does not replace the mental processes of thinking, perception, memory, etc." [7, p. 70]. The psyche is interpreted as an information process [8]. In this article, the authors will attempt to further develop the information concept of consciousness. The key tasks that need to be solved for this are: the formation of a system of concepts through which a comprehensive description of consciousness, as well as related key concepts, will be possible; the definition of mechanisms mediating consciousness; the identification of relations between consciousness, self-awareness and subjectivity. What is consciousness? The most general definition of consciousness, according to the authors, is its representation as an information environment in which an expanded model of reality is implemented. This understanding of consciousness is to some extent correlated with the definition of consciousness as a working memory [9], which states both the connection of consciousness with information and the description of consciousness as a memory storing information, i.e. some information environment. The process of implementing (building and functionally using) an extended information model of reality is thinking and has one of its main tasks knowledge of the real world. At the same time, when we talk about thinking, we are not necessarily describing human consciousness. The development of information technologies, including those related to the creation of artificial intelligence, makes it necessary to correct the interpretation of existing concepts. Consciousness, thinking, as well as other concepts that we will talk about in the future (in particular, self-awareness), should be considered independently, in general, without tying them to a person. In this case, human consciousness receives the status of a special case of consciousness, human thinking – a special case of thinking, human self–awareness - a special case of self-awareness. When defining consciousness, we pointed to the implementation of an expanded model of reality in it, as in an information environment. It should be noted that this extended model of reality correlates with the real world, but is not a reflection of it. Along with the distortions of reality caused by the inevitable divergence of knowledge about being and being itself, the reality model is "expanded" by objects that do not exist in the real world. Close in meaning to such an understanding of consciousness, but at the same time narrower, is the existing idea of subjective reality. According to our proposed interpretation, subjective reality is a special case of an expanded model of reality, which takes place in the case of human or other consciousness endowed with subjectivity. What is subjectivity and how it is related to the properties of consciousness, we will talk a little later. An information environment is a system formed from information objects that represent reflections (fixed or updated) of the properties of real objects. Information objects themselves cannot be the source of processes in the information environment. This requires changing the properties of real objects, which are reflected in the form of information objects. The specified reflection can be direct, or through other information objects, both belonging to the same information environment (consciousness) and other information environments. For example, the reflection of biological, social or economic objects in the information environment is not a full reflection of real objects, since they have an essential information component. This information component is added to information objects in consciousness through other channels, in particular, it is modeled in a carrier of consciousness, which we have yet to consider. The most important feature of consciousness is that the main part of the information objects forming it are not reflections of the properties of objects from the real "big" world, which is the main object of cognition and construction of a model of reality, but reflections of some special object that is the carrier of the model of reality. We will call such an object a carrier of consciousness. An example of a carrier of consciousness is a person – a real object, changes in the properties of which (electrical or biochemical activity of the central nervous system (brain and spinal cord), impulses in the peripheral nervous system, etc.) are reflected in the form of information objects in consciousness. Consciousness, the main honor of information objects of which is a reflection not of the real world, but of a much less complex physical object – the carrier of consciousness, is successfully implemented in practice. Whether consciousness is possible that is not connected as the main source of information objects with the carrier of consciousness is a question that requires a separate in–depth study. As far as we know, there are no examples of such consciousness in the world around us.
On the other hand, it can be assumed with a high degree of confidence that consciousness operates not only with information objects reflecting the carrier of consciousness (in particular, changes in the "big" world reflected in the carrier of consciousness as a model of reality), but also with information objects obtained from the "big" world, bypassing fixation in the carrier of consciousness. In the process of its functioning, human consciousness relies not only on the brain, but also on the sense organs, through which changes in the properties of the "big" world are displayed in consciousness. At the same time, however, data on these changes are still transmitted through the carrier of consciousness (in the case of a person, sensory perception data is transmitted to consciousness through the nervous system). Based on the presented description of consciousness, it can be qualified as a simulacrum of reality (in the Platonic sense), i.e. as a model of a model: an information model for a carrier of consciousness, whose properties, in turn, serve as a physical means of modeling reality. In the context of such an interpretation of consciousness, it is not surprising that information objects can be formed in it that do not have a prototype (in the form of an object, process, or property) in the real "big" world. Consciousness is certainly connected with reality, limited by its forms and laws, but is not its mirror image and therefore is able to imagine (generate in the form of information objects) what does not exist in the real world. Where is the expansion of the reality model taking place: at the level of the carrier of consciousness or at the level of its information model? For a carrier of consciousness, this question makes sense. Indeed, some of the information physically recorded in the carrier of consciousness has no prototype in the real "big" world. This means that at the level of the carrier of consciousness, the expansion of the model takes place. As for information objects in consciousness, they are a reflection of the properties of the carrier of consciousness, which are only a record (in physical form) of information about the world, but are not properties of the real "big" world. Information objects in consciousness probably do not have a strictly defined source in the form of separate properties of the carrier of consciousness. Information objects in consciousness are formed from many different interrelated properties, the division of which into separate information objects is not possible. Therefore, there is no clear answer to the question of extending the model at the information model level. We cannot fully formulate what in this case should be understood as an extension of the model. Special cases of consciousness are human consciousness, information objects are images in human consciousness, processes in the information environment are human thinking. Similar special cases also occur in relation to society as a whole and its individual components (for example, the economy). As we have already pointed out, ideas about the information environment, information objects and processes in the information environment can be expanded beyond the limits of human consciousness and related fields of activity. In particular, the formation of consciousness based on the information execution environment (computing environment), including the environment in which artificial intelligence is implemented, has great prospects. Components of consciousness Consciousness, regardless of the chosen concept of its representation, consists of several components. In the interpretation of the information concept of consciousness, we are talking about several areas that are in different relationships with each other: some areas are partially suppressed, the second are part of others, etc. Each of these areas provides certain thinking abilities. These areas of consciousness include the mind, the area of consciousness that determines the ability to think, including creative thinking. Approximately the same area of consciousness as the mind corresponds to the mind, which includes only formalized information objects from the total volume, serving to solve intellectual tasks, including creative ones. The thinking abilities associated with the functioning of the mind are defined by the concept of creative intelligence, which has two related meanings. The first meaning of the concept of "creative intelligence" is the ability to solve formalized tasks, including creative ones. In other words, creative intelligence is the possession of the mind. The second meaning of the concept of "creative intelligence" is an information system with the ability to solve formalized tasks, including creative ones. In other words, creative intelligence is an information system that has a mind. Creative, obviously, is human intelligence. The development of artificial intelligence systems currently observed suggests that creative artificial intelligence will be created in the near future [10]. An important component of the mind is the mind, a part of consciousness that determines the ability to systematize and use existing knowledge. The thinking abilities associated with the mind are defined by the concept of intelligence. To distinguish it from creative intelligence, let's call it trivial intelligence (from Latin. trivialis is common). Like creative intelligence, trivial intelligence has two meanings. According to the first, trivial intelligence is the ability to systematize and use existing knowledge, i.e., the possession of reason. According to the second, trivial intelligence is an information system with the ability to systematize and use existing knowledge, i.e., possessing reason. Along with the mind and reason in the composition of consciousness, it is necessary to distinguish such an area as contemplation, which includes the emerging and disappearing information objects in the information environment (images in consciousness). They correspond to changes in the real "big" world, transmitted through a carrier of consciousness, reflected, but not fixed in the information environment. An important part of consciousness is also the accumulated knowledge that exists in the information environment as permanent or updated information objects – reflections of the properties of objects of the real "big" world and the carrier of consciousness. Collectively, these information objects form an area of accumulated knowledge or, in terms of computing systems, permanent memory. Mechanisms mediating thinking Previously, we defined thinking as the process of implementing (building and functionally using) an extended information model of reality. The processes in the information environment corresponding to thinking are obviously a reflection of the real processes taking place in the carrier of consciousness. In the case of human thinking, as we have already defined, the carrier of consciousness is a person (mainly his central nervous system (brain and spinal cord) and peripheral nervous system). The real processes occurring during thinking in the carrier of consciousness are the activity of neurons – electrically excitable nodes of the neural network that process, store and transmit information using electrical and chemical signals. In living organisms, a neuron is a nerve cell, i.e. a highly specialized cell, a structural and functional unit of the nervous system. For the nervous system to work, glial cells are also needed – auxiliary cells that provide conditions for the generation and transmission of nerve impulses, as well as those involved in the metabolic processes of neurons. An artificial neuron is a structural unit of an artificial neural network. The functioning of an artificial neural network, like the nervous system of a living organism, also requires the participation of "enveloping" elements (analogous to glial cells) that provide power connection and transmission of electrical signals between artificial neurons.
The current level of knowledge in the field of physiology of higher nervous activity is not enough to reliably determine the specifics of various mental processes [11]. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some assumptions about the implementation of the thinking process based on existing knowledge. According to the authors, there is no qualitative difference between different thought processes, whether it is creative thinking, solving trivial intellectual problems or contemplation, at the level of implementation mechanisms. The mechanisms of the thought process do not change, the methods of information processing used (in particular, methods of solving intellectual problems) undergo changes. These methods of information processing correspond to certain neurophysiological mechanisms, which can be represented in the form of circuits, the elements of which are neurons connected by channels (signal transmission routes) as part of a neural network. Neurons have significantly different sizes, structures, and other properties (sensitivity to electrical or chemical stimuli, ability to neurocrete, learning ability, and many others). These differences are due to the difference in the areas of their use (bipolar – in sensory organs, multipolar – in the central nervous system, etc.), functional purpose (reception, transmission and integration of signals) and other factors. An analogue of neural circuits are electrical circuits that implement certain signal conversion algorithms (for example, calculations). For the practical implementation of such an electrical circuit, it is necessary to have circuit elements with specified properties, as well as means of combining them into a single whole. Something similar is required for the formation of a neural circuit that unites neurons that are part of a neural network to implement a certain function. In consciousness, this function is displayed as an information object. The necessary conditions for the practical implementation of complex neural circuits corresponding to complex information objects (for example, corresponding to structural forms, laws or generalized concepts) is the presence of a sufficient number of complex neurons (in particular, performing an integrative function) and "enveloping" their auxiliary elements (glial elements). These conditions set limits on the mental activity of animals that do not have a sufficient number and functionality of neurons and glial cells. The basis of complex thought processes associated with any creative task, "for the solution of which there are still no generally accepted rules and regulations in science that determine the exact program for its solution" [12, pp. 39-40], lies, according to the authors, the use of analogies, the principle of similarity and other manifestations of isomorphism of the world, allowing define laws and forms in some subject areas based on forms and laws from other subject areas. Formalized patterns of forms and laws form collections of patterns [13]. These patterns (patterns of forms and laws) correspond in a certain way to neural circuits. One of the proposed ways to implement such a correlation is based on the formation of neurophysical patterns (as we will call them) – a set of neural circuits and modes of their functioning. Patterns similar in principle of operation are formed during hardware programming of the signal processing algorithm, implemented based on the choice of a typical electronic circuit and its operating mode (supplying voltages to specified inputs and determining the switching of contacts inside the circuit). In a more complex form, the same principle is implemented in programmable logic integrated circuits (FPGAs) [14]. Computing modules can also be built on the basis of passive elements, including on the basis of multilevel memristor logic [15]. In the process of human existence in the world (multisystem integration of a person into the physical world, biological and ecological systems, society, the intellectual world), neurophysiological patterns corresponding to typical tasks are inevitably formed in his nervous system (probably in the central nervous system). Neurophysiological patterns are a special case of neurophysical patterns for the case when a person (or another living being with a complex nervous system) acts as a carrier of consciousness. In the future, the formed neurophysiological patterns can be used to solve other problems from other subject areas. The isomorphism of forms and laws in the universe makes the use of patterns formed on the basis of tasks from other subject areas productive. The term "neurophysiological patterns" has been used more and more widely in recent years. Neurophysiological patterns are usually considered in the context of psychology [16], psycholinguistics [17] and psychiatry [18]. Self-awareness and subjectivity One of the main philosophical problems related to consciousness is the mechanism of the birth of self-awareness. Within the framework of some definitions of consciousness, it is identified with self–consciousness [19], which is certainly a misconception - self-consciousness is not a necessary property of consciousness, but arises in it under certain conditions. Externally, the phenomenon of self-awareness is formed as the interconnection of information objects in the information environment: changes in some information objects entail changes in other information objects. In other words, self-awareness is realized as a unity of information objects that form consciousness. The ontological content of self-awareness is associated with the influence of real objects on each other, the reflection of the properties of which are information objects. The central attribute of self-awareness is the definition of the boundaries of consciousness in the form of localization of the carrier of consciousness (for example, a person) in the multidimensional space of states of the original real objects (including spatial localization, time, values of essential parameters, etc.), as well as their reflections in the form of information objects. This localization is ensured by the presence of feedbacks. Through them, consciousness "defines" the boundaries between the carrier of consciousness and the surrounding world. This is how a person is aware of himself: he looks around, fixes his position relative to surrounding objects, feels them and himself, etc. Moving, experiencing visual, auditory, tactile and other (not necessarily physical) sensations, a person monitors feedback and through them realizes himself. The set of parameters that form the space of states of the original real objects does not necessarily have to cover all the signs of the carrier of consciousness. It can be limited to a small set of parameters that are considered essential for this particular task. For example, a technical automatic car control system has some self-awareness (extremely limited in scale and set of parameters). Such a system is "aware" of the dimensions and speed of the car and its position relative to the terrain, other cars and pedestrians (if there is a pedestrian detection subsystem). Another typical example of a possible realization of self-awareness is the information environment for performing computational operations (for example, for managing a technical system in real time), implemented according to the actor model [20]. The objects of this information environment (actors) are autonomous, exchange data, forming an interconnected system with many feedbacks. The given examples of information environments are certainly very far from human consciousness or even artificial intelligence in terms of complexity, but they have the necessary qualities to qualify as examples of the realization of self-awareness. So, we can state the possibility of self-awareness in a system that forms an information environment and has the property of its localization in the space of states, regardless of the complexity of this system.
Who or what is the initiator of changes in the states of real objects that allow self-awareness to be realized? The answer to this question is fundamentally important, since the presence or absence of subjectivity in the carrier of consciousness depends on it. In the context of the problems of our research, the most adequate definition is the subjectivity of the carrier of consciousness as his ability to be an actor of his own changes and changes in the surrounding world. If the changes demonstrating the connectivity of information objects within consciousness are initiated by factors external to the carrier of consciousness, then he will have self-awareness, but subjectivity will not be formed. If the initiator (actor) of the same changes is the carrier of consciousness himself, then this means that he has subjectivity. Self-awareness in the presence of subjectivity is assumed by default, since subjectivity is impossible without self-awareness. Based on the above arguments, the following connection of consciousness, self-consciousness and subjectivity can be stated: under certain conditions (when consciousness is localized in the space of states of the carrier of consciousness), consciousness acquires the property of self-consciousness, a special case of which (in the case when the initiator of changes determining localization is the carrier of consciousness) is self-consciousness endowed with subjectivity. Conclusions Summarizing the reflections collected in this article, the following key conclusions can be formulated: 1. The question of the nature of consciousness is one of the central issues for philosophy throughout its existence. A promising approach to understanding consciousness is the information concept of consciousness. 2. According to the definitions proposed by the authors, consciousness is an information environment in which an expanded model of reality is implemented, and thinking is the process of implementing (building and functional use) this model. 3. The information environment, according to the definition proposed in the article, is a system formed from information objects that represent reflections of the properties of real objects. At the same time, the main part of information objects are not reflections of the properties of objects from the real "big" world, but reflections of the properties of the carrier of consciousness, for example, a person (represented by his central and peripheral nervous system). 4. Consciousness can be qualified as a simulacrum of reality (in the Platonic sense), i.e. as a model of a model: an information model of a carrier of consciousness, which, in turn, is a physical means of modeling reality. 5. The main components of consciousness (areas of the information environment) include reason, reason, contemplation and accumulated knowledge. 6. The authors propose to base the description of the mechanisms mediating thinking on the concepts of a neural circuit and neurophysical patterns. A neural circuit combines neurons that are part of a neural network to implement a specific function. In consciousness, this function is displayed as an information object. A neurophysical pattern is a set of neural circuits and their mode of functioning, usually corresponding to some pattern (patterns of forms or relationships) common in the real world. 7. The central attribute of self-awareness is the definition of the boundaries of consciousness in the form of localization of the carrier of consciousness in the multidimensional space of states of the original real objects, as well as their reflections in the form of information objects. This localization is ensured by the presence of feedbacks. 8. If changes demonstrating the connectivity of information objects within consciousness are initiated by factors external to the carrier of consciousness, then he will have self-awareness, but subjectivity will not be formed. If the initiator of the same changes is the carrier of consciousness himself, then this means that he has subjectivity.
References
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The authors of the reviewed article turn to the consideration of the "classical" problem of the essence and nature of the functioning of consciousness for philosophy, and such "determination" in choosing a topic already deserves support. However, pointing to the "rootedness" of the topic of consciousness in the tradition of thought, the authors exaggerate somewhat, saying that "the question of the nature of consciousness remains one of the central ones for philosophy throughout its existence," in fact, the prerequisites for considering the problem of consciousness are formed only in New European philosophy (Descartes and his followers), and The "rights of citizenship" in philosophy received this concept only at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. However, this inaccuracy is insignificant, it is much more important to pay attention to those shortcomings of the article that prevent it from being recommended for publication in a scientific journal. Firstly, for some reason the authors distance themselves from the historical and philosophical aspect of the problem. No matter how one evaluates the achievements of classical philosophy in this matter, but an article on consciousness and self-awareness that does not mention Kant and Hegel looks just strange. Of course, a publication that is not historical and philosophical in its orientation is not obliged to dwell on these concepts, but it is unacceptable to talk about consciousness as if nothing had been said about this subject in previous eras. Secondly, when talking about consciousness, the authors also move away from the well-known position that consciousness has a socio-historical origin, it is impossible to talk about consciousness outside of history and culture, which, in fact, "prepare the content", which is then absorbed by consciousness, creating prerequisites for the illusion that it itself is its own produces. Thirdly, the problem of consciousness (mainly in a "psychological" context) is widely discussed in that segment of modern philosophy, which is usually called the "philosophy of consciousness", and it is also not discussed in the article. Maybe the authors deliberately distanced themselves from all these discussions, and their plans did not include a return to a broad and principled discussion of the topic of consciousness, but then why give the article such a title? Further, let's say about some particular provisions of the article, which also raise questions and perplexity. Thus, the authors proceed from the definition of consciousness, in which it appears as an "information environment", and only then the specific characteristics of this "environment" are discussed. Do the authors really believe that on the basis of understanding consciousness as an environment, it is possible to reveal the secret of the birth of "self-consciousness" and "subjectivity"? It is not surprising that with such an approach to the topic of consciousness (outside of sociality, history, etc.), formulations that cause outright bewilderment appear here and there, for example: "self-awareness is not a necessary property of consciousness, but arises in it under certain conditions." It seems that the authors should either abandon the intention to talk about "consciousness" and "self-awareness" as such, limiting their approach (both in the title and in the introduction) to some precise conditions, or constructively take into account the comments made. I recommend sending the article for revision.
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The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.
The subject of the research of the article "Definition of consciousness, self-awareness and subjectivity within the framework of the information concept", as the name implies, is consciousness. The authors turn to the classical problem, known since the beginning of philosophy, and propose their own interpretation of consciousness as a system for processing information flows. The authors of the article associate their approach to the interpretation of consciousness with the so-called "information concept of consciousness", in which human consciousness is considered as a special case of consciousness in general. In the "information concept", consciousness is defined as "an information environment in which an expanded model of reality is implemented." The authors see the task of the article as the further development of this approach to consciousness and the definition of mechanisms mediating consciousness, identifying the relationship between consciousness, self-awareness and subjectivity. The research methodology chosen by the authors for their article consists, firstly, in the reduction of human consciousness to a set of its functions, and secondly, in the analogy between the processes occurring in human consciousness and the processes available to modern information systems, for example, the autopilot of a car. Such consideration proceeds from the hypothesis that human consciousness can be considered as a special case of consciousness in general, "human thinking is a special case of thinking, human self–consciousness is a special case of self–consciousness." However, the authors make an initial logical mistake in their reflections – they embed reflection based on the named hypothesis, relying on it as an axiom known to all and recognized by all, and instead of confirming the possibility of considering human consciousness "as a special case", they draw conclusions from this hypothetical premise, without confirming either the conclusions or the premise itself either logically, neither empirically. The relevance of the study is associated by the authors with the need to develop artificial intelligence and promote it to a state of full consciousness, for which it is necessary to rethink the interpretation of consciousness. The scientific novelty lies in the development of a categorical apparatus for describing consciousness from the point of view of its interpretation as a system for processing information flows coming from both the world and the carrier of consciousness. The style of the article is not very close to scientific, since the authors do not appeal to other studies of consciousness, do not fit their vision into existing concepts of consciousness, they offer the reader their own vision of the problem, which is built purely speculatively. The article gives in detail a "new" categorical apparatus for describing consciousness, which is quite contradictory, however, the authors practically do not correlate it with the "old" categorical apparatus in any way, simply asserting the possibility of a different view of consciousness. The structure and content fully correspond to the stated problem. The authors really propose in the article an "information concept of consciousness", a system of concepts suitable for describing consciousness from these positions, consideration of the mechanisms mediating consciousness, reveal the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness and subjectivity, coming to the conclusion that "under certain conditions (when consciousness is localized in the space of states of the carrier of consciousness) consciousness acquires a property of self-consciousness, a special case of which (in the case when the initiator of the changes that determine localization is a carrier of consciousness) is self-consciousness endowed with subjectivity." The bibliography of the article includes 20 titles of works by both domestic and foreign authors devoted to the problem under consideration. However, these works are mentioned by the authors rather to give the article a scientific form, since they are not used to develop the ideas set out in the article. There is no appeal to the opponents. The article makes an ambivalent impression. On the one hand, most of the authors' assumptions are unsupported and raise serious objections. The form of presentation of ideas and their content do not correspond to the existing scientific convention. On the other hand, the authors' ideas can serve as a reason for scientific discussion and a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness. They deserve the attention and familiarity of specialists and interested readers.
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