Polish campaign A.V. Suvorov 1794: truth and myths

Bogdanov Andrey Petrovich Doctor of History Senior Research Associate, Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitriya Ulyanova ulitsa 19, Moscow 117036 Russia bogdanovap@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov (1730-1800) is a textbook figure. His detailed biographies began to be published during the generalissimo's lifetime ^[15] and have been diligently published to this day ^{[2] [19] [4] [71] [53] [39] [62] [8] [68] [3] [30] [38] [45] [18] [50] [6] [55] [57] [41] [73] [74]}. Major works are devoted to certain periods and aspects of the life and military activities of the commander ^{[71] [31] [17] [59] [50] [40] [46] [47] [58] [27] [43] [42] [37] [25] [69] [63] [35] [56]}. The deeds and military thought of Suvorov are considered in solid collections of articles ^{[67] [9] [11] [65]}. Countless anecdotes about Alexander Vasilyevich have been published, among which there are valuable notes by people who knew him well, such as Prince P.I. Bagration (in the transmission of his adjutant Starkov) ^{[21] [34] [70] [28] [61] [64] [14] [54] [11]}. The review of the extremely extensive, but mostly journalistic literature about Suvorov takes up entire books ^{[49] [12]}. The written legacy of the commander himself, describing in detail his life, thought and works, has been published since the 19th century. ^{[26] [51] [52]}. To date, it has been fully published in scientific publications ^{[24] [10] [66]}.

Despite the solidity of research and publications about Suvorov, we cannot state that the life, military thought and deeds of Russia's best commander are well known and understandable to us today. Even the basic facts of his biography, including his date of birth, were doubtful until recently. It was only at the end of the 20th century that it was finally established that the greatest Russian commander was born on November 13, 1730, and not 1729. But the main drawback of the literature about Suvorov was and remains not factual, but the refusal to explore his own thought in its beautifully expressed development by himself.

The situation is paradoxical: all the significant materials about his life and work have been diligently identified and perfectly published. The main editions of Suvorov's documents and letters adhere to the chronological principle of the arrangement of the material. They directly indicate that Suvorov's thought should be studied in its development. Nevertheless, there is no such attempt among the numerous books about the generalissimo. It seems that the greatest Russian commander did not think at all, but was simply born with a set of victorious ideas. But what kind of ideas?

We can truly understand any human thought only in its development, and in the formulations of the thinker himself. However, historians, depicting Alexander Vasilyevich as a bronze monument, did not limit themselves to a detailed description of his deeds. For two centuries, they have replaced Suvorov's life and thought with the myth of the initially invincible commander without any shadow of doubt. And, in my opinion, cynically, they changed his words in a way that seemed more beautiful to them.

A classic quote in literature: "Every soldier should know his maneuver." But Suvorov wrote differently: "Every soldier must understand his maneuver" ^{[10, vol. IV, No. 24]}. – Evaluate the difference between the concepts of "know" and "understand"!

Describing Suvorov's tactics, his credo is quoted: "eye, speed, onslaught." The true dictum of the commander reads:

                                 "Here's my tactic:

                                 bravery, courage,

                                 insight, foresight,

                                 order, moderation, charter,

                                 the eye, the speed, the onslaught,

                                 humanity, pacification, oblivion" ^{[66, p.386]}.

First, the military spirit, then a sophisticated mind and discipline, after them – an accurate, swift and strong attack, and finally, as the goal of defeating the enemy – a humane world.

In myth-making, colleagues were helped by a huge literature of pseudo-memories and anecdotes about Suvorov, published in the first half of the XIX century. Few, like D.A. Milyutin ^{[39] [40]}, I.I. Rostunov ^[57] and V.S. Lopatin ^[35], managed to get away from her, immersed in the original documents and letters of the commander, who thought about his every word with the greatest seriousness.

Suvorov considered the reliability of all data and figures, the accuracy of expressions and careful choice of words to be one of the cornerstones of military art. Suvorov's attitude to the word was enthusiastically studied by philologists. The commander left behind a large number of texts in several languages (mainly in Russian, French and German). He also wrote poetry. And good ones. Here is a friendly epigram on Prince Potemkin:

"He plays chess with one hand,

                       With his other hand he conquers the nations,

                       With one foot he strikes friend and foe,

                       With another he tramples the universes of the shore" ^{[66, pp. 468-469]}.

Suvorov was no stranger to social and literary life, so the research of philologists helps to understand his character. But first of all, he was a genius who made a revolution in the art of war on such a scale that at the end of his life he estimated himself simply: "He is not equal to anyone. Do I want to be equal? – he asked again, highlighting the importance of the conclusion, and repeated: "Judge – I am not equal to anyone" ^{[66, p. 395]}.

What does this "not equal" mean? We know that the commander admired his predecessors and sought to catch up with them: Prince Eugene of Savoy and Marshal Turenne, Hannibal and Caesar. He called General Fermor his second father, and General Weissmann his equal. He rejoiced when he bypassed military geniuses. "I am better than the late great king of Prussia," he remarked to Paul I, an admirer of Frederick the Great – I, by the grace of God, did not lose battles" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 593]}. And after the victorious Italian and Swiss campaigns, he proudly said: "Choose a hero, catch up with him, overtake him! My hero is Caesar. The Alps are behind us and God is in front of us! Russian eagles have flown over Roman eagles!" ^{[70, p. 140]} But at the end of his life, summing up its results, he really did not know any examples above himself. And therefore he ordered to write on his grave: "Suvorov lies here." – No rank, the highest in the army. No title of Count of the two empires. Not even initials.

He hoped that his descendants would understand him. Philologists, by the way, appreciated the power and reliability of the Suvorov word. And they, unlike historians, emphasized that Alexander Vasilyevich is not just a "General Forward!", but an extremely intelligent and prudent man who did not hope for military happiness and the indomitable steadfastness of his "Miracle Heroes". Commanding "Forward!", even at the peak of his military career, he carefully prepared everything for a reliable victory, not forgetting the ways of possible retreat.

Suvorov "was proud because he commanded the sword" ^{[10, vol. II, No. 272]}. He answered court slander with irony: "Today is happiness, tomorrow is happiness, God have mercy, one day one must have the ability"! ^{[10, vol. II. No. 209, 210]}. But how did he manage to defeat everyone, everywhere and always? What was the secret of Suvorov's military thought? This, oddly enough, is a question that I had to answer on my own when writing a book about the great commander ^[16].

Military historians did not respond to it for various reasons, including political ones. For example, who could write that the sacred commander very often did not command his troops? We have descriptions of battles in which Alexander Vasilyevich did not interfere at all, because he won the battle before it began. There are documents where the commander requires officers not to report to him, not to wait for orders, but to act according to the situation within the framework of the most general disposition. The initiative of those who fight should have won, and the whole army should act as a single organism. This organic theory was developed by Suvorov in great detail. But the bottom line is that all his ideas were organic to this unified theory, which the reader will be able to understand from my book. And no idea can be considered in isolation from it.

The mighty personality of Suvorov, who by his very appearance on the battlefield changed the psychology of Russian and even Austrian soldiers – and these miracles are recorded in the sources – obscured from historians the fact that it was not one small, dry general who won, who laughed at his own infirmity, but the mighty mental structure that he created for decades, and which was centuries ahead of his time. It has outstripped both in general and in some of its aspects, for example, logistics.

Everyone has heard about the incredible Suvorov campaigns, when his soldiers, as if on wings, flew huge distances at an impossible speed. Suvorov made no secret of his method. Starting with the transfer of the Suzdal infantry regiment, which rushed to Smolensk from Staraya Ladoga in 30 days, having overcome 927 km. due to bad roads in November-December 1768, Rumyantsev's army, which will advance next year from Ryabaya Grave to Larga and Kagul, will lose a third of its composition at three times less distance. Suvorov's result is different: one soldier died, Rodin fled and three were left on the way in hospitals, but mostly "people and horses are healthy" and ready for new campaigns. There is no secret: the regiment, according to Suvorov, overcame the transition "on wheels". He simply put soldiers on carts, and the whole problem was to repair "very bad" crossings and the proactive work of quartermasters ^{[66, No. 4]}.

There is only one way to understand the true greatness of a commander who left nothing to chance. This is a thorough study of documents, an understanding of Suvorov's thoughts and an assessment of his decisions as a whole, with all the previous considerations prompted by decades of difficult practice. You will say that this is the natural way of scientific analysis. Right. Moreover, it is necessary to follow this path in studying the thoughts and deeds of a commander who did not want anything for himself and gave his whole life to the glory of Russia.

*          *          *

The salvation of Warsaw and the liberation of Poland from the rebels in 1794 is a great and undeservedly overlooked feat of Suvorov by historians. There are a lot of lies and shameful omissions piled up around him. This is strange. Suvorov himself, who put humanity at the forefront and revered "virtue", without which "there is neither glory nor honor," was proud of his second Polish campaign. The army, which he formed and trained during the campaign, brilliantly fulfilled the main task of the armed forces: she swiftly eliminated the war.

It was the war that was Suvorov's main enemy. She demanded the blood of soldiers and countless victims from the civilian population. The soldier's task was to protect civilians, and all of them, not just Russian citizens. And to protect not just in the process of war, but by "overcoming" the disasters inevitably entailed by the continuation of the war. The second main value after the life and well-being of peaceful people was for Suvorov the life and health of his soldiers. The third, almost equally important– was the life of the enemies who fought against the Russians with weapons in their hands. Only the rapid defeat of their main forces allowed Suvorov to make do with minimal casualties among opponents, whether Turks, Poles or the French.

The tasks of the army, which Suvorov formulated by the end of the first Polish campaign of 1769-1772 and persistently developed in the future, were to stop the war and save people's lives – in the specified sequence – by rapidly defeating the main forces of the enemy, depriving him of the ability to resist and appeasing with mercy.

In the Polish campaign of 1794, the main tasks of the army were carried out perfectly. Suvorov reduced the duration of military operations to a shocking minimum. The civilian population was minimally affected by the war, which at first seemed long and bloody to everyone. The losses of the Russian troops were small even for Alexander Vasilyevich. The losses of Polish soldiers and militia did not exceed 15%. Most Poles laid down their arms and gained freedom "with the oblivion of everything that happened."

Only the ambitions of a part of the nobility suffered. But they have suffered regularly in recent centuries. And they could not help but suffer, because they did not correspond to historical realities in the slightest. Unable to fight against Suvorov with weapons, the rebel leaders released by the victor, as well as their foreign allies, spread ridiculous rumors throughout Europe about Alexander Vasilyevich's bloodthirstiness, especially when he liberated Warsaw. They do not correspond to Suvorov's character and beliefs, his behavior in all other campaigns, as well as reliable facts about the losses of the Russian and Polish sides during the storming of the fortified suburb of Warsaw – Prague.

Accusations against the commander from those whom he defeated and released – on horseback, with personal weapons (many for the second and some for the third time, in order to meet them in Italy in 1799, defeat them and release them again on "my word of honor", which meant an empty phrase for the nobility) – a wonderful an example of historical irony. Russian Russian newspapers were especially active in exaggerating this absurdity, invariably pouring mud on Russians at times when British politicians did not save their country with Russian blood.

After Russia rendered a service to England by defeating Napoleon, the Times broke out an article on Suvorov on 01/26/1818: "Although the ferocity of his orders is well known from the terrible sacrifices of Ochakov, Izmail and Prague (where 60,000 Poles were sacrificed to his vindictiveness), sometimes he demonstrated a much more extravagant fervor of cruelty. With regard to the French, in particular, he felt a kind of fierce disgust," etc. – The version is funny, given that in the Italian campaign of 1799 Suvorov spared the French and released their officers, and Ushakov quarreled with Nelson because of the bloodthirstiness of the British, who killed prisoners...

In general, Suvorov's accusations of bloodlust have become a litmus test of impotence and a guilty conscience. Napoleon Bonaparte, who treacherously abandoned his troops in Egypt to carry out a military coup in Paris, justified himself by saying that Suvorov, this "barbarian, drenched in the blood of Poles, brazenly threatened the French people." "The terrible Russian field Marshal Suvorov, this half–man and half–demon in one person," Napoleon defended himself, "was going to cross Saint-Gotthard ... The situation was not just bad – it was very bad. No one could hold back the Russian Field Marshal Suvorov, who defeated any army sent against him."

Ridiculous accusations against Suvorov may be of interest in analyzing the nature and intentions of the persons who put them forward. They are related to Alexander Vasilyevich only in the sense that they are still used by unscrupulous historians and publicists who aim to "refresh" their meaningless judgments about the commander with lies, whose actions and motives they do not know how and do not try to understand.

Studies of the 1794 campaign, both in general works and in special works ^{[75] [62, ch. 2] [29] [44] [23]} they do not give a clear picture of what was happening, first of all, from the point of view of Suvorov's thought. Meanwhile, he revealed in detail the meaning of a complex set of measures to save Poland from the rebels in his letters and documents ^{[10, vol. III. ¹ 354–428] [66, ¹ 465–503]}. It is to them that we will turn.

*          *          *

The catastrophe that happened in Poland in 1794 could have been prevented. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was already in full swing in the summer of 1792. On June 21, Suvorov, while in Finland, petitioned the Empress to transfer to Poland so that the unrest there "would come to an end soon." "Polish affairs do not require Count Suvorov! The Empress wrote back. – The Poles are already asking for a truce" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 130]}. And so it happened. Russian and Prussian troops entered Poland and established the authority of King Stanislaw Poniatowski. On January 23, 1793, the neighbors agreed on the second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, according to which Catherine the Great received the Belarusian and Ukrainian regions. About 280 thousand km2 and 3 million Orthodox, with the consent of the Polish Sejm, were freed from the power of the Catholic gentry state and reunited with the lands of Ancient Russia.

The beginning of the Polish Uprising in 1794 under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciuszko ^{[1] [7] [5] [22] [76]} Suvorov met in the South of Russia, where he was sent from Finland in connection with the threat of Turkish war by the rescript of Catherine II dated November 10, 1792 ^{[10, vol. III, No. 175]}. Having led the troops of the Yekaterinoslav province, Taurida and the newly annexed lands between the Bug and the Dniester, Alexander Vasilyevich vigorously engaged in improving the health of soldiers and their training, establishing supplies, building fortresses and long–range reconnaissance - up to the composition of the French squadron moving to the Dardanelles. The rumor of this appointment quickly reached the Turkish government – the High Porte – and, according to the Russian resident in Istanbul, A.S. Khvostov, pretty much removed the possibility of war, which the revolutionary French pushed the Turks to.

In Novorossiya, Suvorov was engaged not only in military affairs. He literally left his mark everywhere in the form of cities, fortresses, ports, public buildings and temples ^{[10, vol. II, ¹ 175-353] [66, ¹ 423-503]}. But his main brainchild, of course, was the army. Arriving in the South, Suvorov was not satisfied with reports on the state of the troops. He conducted a thorough audit of them, dismissing soldiers unable to serve, ensuring the fate of the disabled and drawing up a "table of troops" indicating the number of healthy, sick and seconded soldiers and officers, with the calculation of the required "in addition" to the regular strength of each unit. Shops and warehouses were subjected to no less thorough revision ^{[10, vol. III, No. 196, appendix. 1–2]}. Alexander Vasilyevich made extraordinary efforts to restore the number and supply of troops, primarily by increasing the level of sanitation, improving the work of doctors and hospitals, treating patients and "returning to the units of the wrongly seconded." His concerns concerned every barrel of artillery, every military doctor and student of the military surgical school, every paramedic and wagon wheel, every driver of the army mobile store. Based on a thorough analysis of the causes of high mortality, which Suvorov found in the south, he approved the "Rules for medical ranks" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 257, appendix. 1]} on the protection of the health and life of soldiers during peace and in battle.

The war did not happen, but in order to assess further events, it is important to understand that its absence was a salvation for the Turks. Before reviewing the existing concept of Suvorov's campaign in Poland in the literature, it should be taken into account that before that, in the South of Russia, Suvorov carefully prepared everything for war, received detailed information about the enemy and drew up an accurate military-political plan for the defeat of the Ottoman Empire ^{[10, vol. III, No. 281-282]}. The Turks' preservation of Istanbul, which Suvorov's army and F.F. Ushakov's fleet were supposed to take, turned into the salvation of Poland, in which the affairs of Austria, Prussia and Russia were going terribly badly.

Unlike the last Polish uprising, which Suvorov successfully fought in 1769-1772, now the Poles did not act anarchically. The uprising led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko involved well-trained Polish troops led by experienced generals. On Easter night, April 7, 1774, the 12 thousandth Russian garrison in Warsaw, unarmed on the occasion of a solemn divine service, was suddenly attacked, suffered heavy losses and barely escaped from the city. Polish graduates of the best European universities, who led the uprising, clearly organized the massacre of the civilian population: Russians and all those who did not sympathize with the rebellion. Up to 4 thousand people were killed ^{[66, No. 470]}. Having completely taken command of the army, the rebels repelled the Russian and Prussian offensive on Warsaw by August, drove the Austrians out of the Lublin voivodeship and pushed Field Marshal N.V. Repnin's corps in Lithuania.

Of course, the forces of the parties were unequal. There was discord in Poland itself. By moving serious armies there, the three great European powers had every chance to suppress the uprising and literally burn out the Polish land. Suvorov, who realized in his first campaign in Poland that his enemy was precisely the war, which for many of its participants was like a "mother of his own", was sure that the Poles could only hope for a miracle. And it appeared in the person of Suvorov.

Initially, Alexander Vasilyevich, busy preparing for the "real war", was skeptical about the news of the next unrest in Poland and the decree of Catherine II on the disbandment of Polish troops dated April 23, 1794 ^{[10, vol. III, No. 308, 313]}. The decree announcing Prince Repnin's command of military operations in Poland and the separation of part of the troops of I.P. Saltykov's corps from him required Suvorov to stretch his right wing to the Bratslav and Izyaslav provinces. Naturally, Suvorov did not want to do this, which he notified Saltykov on May 6 ^{[10, vol. III, No. 313]}; on the contrary, he himself expected Saltykov to send troops "to the newly acquired regions" along the Dniester ^{[10, vol. III, No. 314]}. Nevertheless, assuming the inevitability of a new rescript of the "Mother Empress", on May 7 he ordered the preparation of troops for relocation ^{[10, vol. III, No. 315]}. On May 8, he already began to act ^{[10, vol. III, No. 316]}. And on the 10th he entered under the command of Field Marshal P.A. Rumyantsev, who led the troops in the South of Russia ^{[10, vol. III, No. 317, 321]}.

This appointment could have tied Suvorov's hands in the Turkish war, but it turned out to be saving for Poland. Transferring responsibility for the security of the South of Russia to Rumyantsev, Alexander Vasilyevich in May became increasingly interested in the peaceful disarmament of Poles in the Bratslav province ^{[10, vol. III, No. 319, 327]}. At the same time, he was instructed to complete the strengthening of the Turkish border ^{[10, vol. III, No. 322]}. But there was a war in Poland, and the Turks, according to Suvorov, were not going to fight yet. It is not surprising that on May 25, 1774, Suvorov reported to Rumyantsev that he had marched to the Bratslav province himself ^{[10, vol. III, No. 329]}, and on June 13 asked him for permission to march to Poland in order to avoid "languid idleness", with an ironic promise to pacify the riot and "keep up with the construction of fortresses" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 331]}. From Suvorov's letter to his old combat comrade I.M. de Ribas, we know that the decision to personally "end the matter in Poland" was made by the commander on June 4 ^{[66, No. 466]}.

Suvorov outlined his motives in a letter to de Ribas dated June 14. He knew that the elder brother of the Empress's favorite, Major General Nikolai Zubov, being a charge d'affaires in Warsaw and fleeing from there, increased the panic at court; that Valerian Zubov, who went to Repnin's troops in Poland, it was advantageous for Achilles to gain fame "not to rush to the end of the case" – as it was in the last Polish the campaign that Suvorov was not allowed to finish with all his might ^{[16, pp. 119-185]}. He could not afford to profit from the war, from the blood of soldiers and the suffering of the population, although he was nobody in the Polish scenario.

Prince N.V. Repnin, who was much and deservedly disliked by Suvorov, was appointed commander-in-chief in Poland. He was 4 years younger than Suvorov, he was ahead of him in his career, although he shone more in the diplomatic service than in the military. Repnin's victory at Machin in 1791 was decisive and quite "Suvorov", with few losses. However, it was stolen, because it was Repnin who convinced Potemkin, when he left for St. Petersburg, to transfer command to him, and not to Suvorov, who would "lead the army to Constantinople or ruin it" ^{[36, p. 23]}. Most of all, Suvorov was afraid that Repnin would lead the same policy in Poland as before, when he was ambassador in Warsaw and actually led the long-term ruin, if not, as they said, to the Lordly Confederates (1764-1769). "Prince Repnin is the commander–in-chief of the troops in Poland and Lithuania," Suvorov complained, and "I am condemned to be an engineering conductor" ^{[66, No. 468]}.

Alas, the situation was even worse. Appointed commander-in-chief on April 30, Repnin received neither the authority nor the right to leave Riga for the troops, not only in the Warsaw area, but even in Brest. The president of the Military College, General-in-Chief N.I. Saltykov, was completely zero in military affairs (the last time he sniffed gunpowder in 1769), was jealous not only of Suvorov, to whom he spoiled the blood both in Finland and Novorossiya, but also of Repnin. Suvorov could not be controlled accurately, but Saltykov doubted that Repnin could be kept on a short leash if he were in the theater of operations. Saltykov took over the entire management of military operations. Repnin only received permission to leave Riga on June 29, but only to Nesvizh. The result of the guidance of directives from St. Petersburg was disastrous. A month later, Russian troops cleared Poland and Lithuania. On August 1, Repnin took Vilna, but he himself found himself surrounded by partisans. Bound hand and foot, and at the same time responsible in the eyes of society for everything, Repnin resigned. On September 1, Catherine refused him. The Russian troops were ready to take up winter quarters, the war had clearly become protracted.

Anticipating such a development, Suvorov bombarded the field marshal with requests to let him go to Poland. Rumyantsev did not notice Suvorov's petitions, although he accepted him on June 24 and spoke very kindly ^{[66, No. 471]}. On June 30, Alexander Vasilyevich tried to appeal to the favorite of the Empress Platon Zubov, transparently hinting that with his sword he could "extinguish the "fire" of the uprising "in an instant" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 333]}. Without receiving answers, Suvorov informed Rumyantsev about the continuation of the movement of troops to Lithuania ^{[10, vol. III, No. 336, 339, 340]}, not forgetting to perform command duties in the South of Russia. On June 24, he begged the field marshal to release him from his duties as an "engineer" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 346]}, and asked the Empress to let him volunteer for the allied forces (Austria against the French), since the Russian army does not have "military practice" corresponding to his rank ^{[10, vol. III, No. 347]}. Suvorov was really immersed in the war of the British and Austrians against revolutionary France, foreseeing "devastation unheard of since the 12th century" and wanting to help avoid them ^{[66, No. 474]}. On August 2, the Empress replied with an affectionate but firm refusal ^{[10, vol. III, No. 351]}.

Nevertheless, Suvorov's demarches were successful. On August 7, when things in Poland and Lithuania were already worse than ever, Rumyantsev released him for action in Poland and Lithuania, expressing the hope that the commander would defeat everyone with his glorious name; the troops trained by Suvorov were to remain in Southern Russia. However, in the Helm and Lublin voivodeships, Alexander Vasilyevich could subdue two corps, in total 6 infantry battalions, 10 cavalry squadrons, 500 Cossacks and 8 field guns ^{[10, vol. III, No. 354]}. But Suvorov was able to march from Nemirov to Lithuania on August 14 with only 2 regiments and 2 battalions ^{[10, vol. III, No. 355]}. Along the way, he joined scattered detachments. Rumyantsev was right: at the very sound of Suvorov's name, the rebels left Vilna. But at the same time, the Poles drove the Prussians away from Warsaw, and the total number of their soldiers has already exceeded 100 thousand.

Subsequently, Catherine the Great declared: "I sent two armies to Poland–one active, the other -Suvorov." She understood perfectly well that Alexander Vasilyevich did not have an army. He assembled and trained troops in his own way literally on the move. As part of the order of his assistant, Lieutenant General P.S. Potemkin, an invaluable document has been preserved: Suvorov's order on combat training to defeat the rebels ^{[10, vol. III, No. 359]}.

"In any case, to fight with cold steel. The general-in-chief ordered. To give a volley in 60-80 steps, i.e. from 43-57 m. with a statutory step of a yard. But if the advancing line is in motion, immediately attack with bayonets, without firing. During the campaign, the infantry trained to attack in all the ways tested by Suvorov: in line, columns and squares, with strict observance of the formation. The commander made the choice of the formation and direction of the attack, without waiting for orders from above and without wasting time on the report. All he needed was a victory report. The platoon leaders repeat the commander's order, of which the main one in the cavalry is "ruby!", and in the infantry and Cossacks – "koli!", to a decisive attack with a shout of "hurrah!". Suvorov ordered the commanders, who were unable to give clear orders, to be immediately removed.

 In the lines, Suvorov recommended the old three ranks, instead of the statutory two, to strengthen the bayonet strike. Initially, the lines were intended for volley, "battle" fire. The general-in-chief recognized him on the condition that the shooting was not carried out in volleys that only shook the air, but aimed, which the soldiers should have been taught. In the lines, the first one cannot be put on one knee ? all barrels must shoot over the right shoulder of the first rank. Under no circumstances can you take a single step back: "A step back is death. All shooting ends with bayonets."

A volley is possible in a line when it stands, but not in a square, because "a square never stands still." This is an offensive formation. Only snipers and rangers shoot in it. When attacking cavalry, the line can be rolled into a square to protect its cavalry, but at the same time it should continue the offensive. The column is even more designed to move than the line and square. To advance to the attack in a column, you can build a platoon, a battalion, and a cavalry squadron. In the column, the infantry immediately takes up arms "like an officer", not for shooting, but for a bayonet strike.

In a battle with a trained enemy, the column can be deployed in a line (so Suvorov will beat the columns of the French in Italy and Switzerland in a few years). When faced with less organized forces like the Turks, Suvorov recommended deploying columns in a square, staggered. He proposed attacking field fortifications in a square, and taking stronger fortresses "in columns with bayonets."

Each commander must attack the enemy's weak side. But – in order to destroy the main forces. The Poles had the strongest cavalry. Therefore, "the main rule is: the enemy's cavalry is shot down, his infantry is gone." The Poles, in a completely Roman style, put cavalry on the flanks. If there was a strong cavalry, the Russians should create one strong flank from it, and if the cavalry was weak, hide it in a square.

Suvorov began his service at the head of the cavalry detachment of the Berg mobile corps, and all his life he paid special attention to the training of horsemen. In Poland, his demands for a cavalry charge seem to have reached the limits of the impossible. His cavalrymen had to strike in a single line, in a tight formation and at the highest speed, in a rapid quarry. Having "refuted" the Polish cavalry, it was necessary to "chop down" the infantry standing behind it without stopping, even if the infantry has a reserve line. Similarly, "piercing the enemy's infantry line", it was necessary to immediately attack the cavalry galloping behind it. Having discovered the Polish cavalry behind the enemy infantry line, attacked by Russian infantry, our horsemen had to gallop through their infantry, cut down "even a dense crowd of enemies", form a line and attack the cavalry with a quarry.

The penetrating power of the cavalry described by Suvorov in the order proved impossible even in the Napoleonic wars, however, only when the Russians and the French collided. But the commander had a very good idea of the enemy, whom he had swept away more than once with cavalry in the last war, and even with small forces, as at Landskrona. Suvorov's squadrons had to "pierce" everything, and at the same time take field fortifications that were not closed from the rear and "relentlessly" pursue the defeated enemy, not allowing them to "catch their breath and build up again." To do this, they had to tirelessly train to stab and chop on both sides at full gallop, fly through the formation of their cavalry with cold weapons and the formation of scorching infantry, "so that the horses would be accustomed to fire and smoke, as well as to the shine of cold weapons, and the rider to the stirrup and reins."

Attacking the enemy's dense formation in the quarry was the most difficult, but Suvorov set easier tasks, including for the Cossacks, whom he had not considered a striking force for decades. By a swift attack to the rear, any, and heavy, light cavalry had to confuse the enemy, capture "any defile fenced with guns": bridges, dams, close exits from the forest or ravines. Without maneuver, such strong places and settlements should not have been attacked at all: it was easier to bypass them, avoiding losses, if it was not possible to attack unexpectedly, with a "surprise". And it was not worth being distracted by the enemy in your rear: to deal with him, you should use a second line or reserve.

During the drill, Suvorov's order obliged not only to save charges and keep a bullet in the barrel in attack, but to learn to shoot well at a target, and "it is better for cavalry to shoot at a gallop." – An amazing order at a time when horsemen fired volleys at a step. Contrary to popular belief, Suvorov demanded to teach soldiers not only to chop and stab well, but to aim and hit.

Passing this order to the troops, Potemkin, who served with Suvorov back under Izmail, demanded that the commander's rules be "confirmed" to all officers and "indoctrinate" the lower ranks: "so that everyone knows what is prescribed to him firmly." It was necessary to understand and execute the order immediately: "Easy to learn – hard to hike, hard to learn – easy to hike." Potemkin himself clarified the order with one important point, about the treatment of the enemy and the population.

Suvorov's own order read: "Give mercy to those who surrender. In all villages in general, where the enemy will defend himself, naturally he must end up in houses and buildings. Be extremely careful of the slightest robbery, which is the most harmless in operations! Storming the fortress is another matter. There, after taking possession, with permission, for some time, legitimate prey, similar to that before the enemy camp, after taking possession of it."

Potemkin added the correct explanation: "I strongly recommend that all gentlemen regimental and battalion chiefs inspire and interpret the lower ranks and privates so that they do not do the slightest ruin anywhere when crossing towns, villages and cramps. Food for the troops will be taken by institution. And if it is said above in order to vindictively punish military Poles and armed philistines, on the contrary, to spare those who remain calmly and not offend in the least, so as not to harden the hearts of the people and moreover not to deserve the vicious name of robbers."

The order does not mention the possibility of killing a layman. In Russia, unlike the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the murder of even a serf by a landowner was severely punished (this is evidenced not only by laws, but also by criminal cases). There has been no death penalty in the Russian Empire since the time of Elizabeth Petrovna (1741). And in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, even in the time of Suvorov, public and qualified (especially cruel) types of capital punishment were used. There was a serious historical cultural difference.

Suvorov, in his declining years, rightly told a foreign artist unfamiliar with the Russian order that "in my whole life I have not made anyone unhappy; I have not signed a single death sentence." Where did the stories come from in Polish, and now in Belarusian literature, that in 1794 Suvorov's troops carried out mass executions of the population, and along their path "there were countless gallows"? There is no such lie in contemporary sources and even in later memories. Obviously, publicists attributed to Suvorov the alien mores of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which the gentry liked to "decorate" their campaigns (to Ukraine and Belarus, to Spain) with mass executions to intimidate the population.

*          *          *

On August 24, Suvorov, while in Varkovets, subordinated the corps of Major Generals F.F. Buksgevden and I.I. Morkov allocated to him ^{[10, vol. III, No. 361]}. On the 26th he was already in Lutsk, on the 30th in Kovel ^{[10, vol. III, No. 364, 365]}. On the night of September 2, he gave the famous order to his quartermaster, Lieutenant F.M. Matushinsky: "Get ready at one o'clock, leave at two, at seven-eight on the spot. The camp is a strong place. Keep your eyes open. The Sarmatians are close!" ^{[66, No. 483]}.

By the time of the battle with the 16th corps of General Serakovsky on September 6, 1794 in the Brest region, Suvorov already had up to 13 thousand soldiers, including baggage carriers and cooks. He appreciated the combat qualities of the enemy very highly: "This rebel corps consisted of their best troops, a noble part of the old Crown Guards and other regiments, properly trained," with 28 guns ^{[10, vol. III, No. 369, 370]}. Serakovsky built troops in front of the stone Krupchitsky monastery so that Russian guns, if they dared to shoot, would fall into the shrine (the Poles then demanded reparations from Suvorov for decades for damage to the monastery). Forested hills covered his flanks, and there was a swamp in front of the front.

Suvorov led troops on a buckshot from five enemy batteries, right through the swamp, which he forced under fire for an hour. It was not possible to overturn the Poles immediately: the old crown Guard fought to the death. The Russian cavalry bypassed Serakovsky's flanks, but after a 10-hour battle, he was still able to withdraw part of the troops from the battlefield. Suvorov fought this difficult battle head-on because he immediately and certainly needed a clean, glorious victory in the Polish spirit over the best parts of the rebels. Two days later, he caught up with Serakovsky's corps, which had hidden in the gullies in the Brest region, and completely destroyed it without any sentiment ^{[10, vol. III, No. 372, 378]}.

Serekowski, Poniatowski, 4 of their officers and up to 70 soldiers fled to declare for the whole of Poland: Suvorov is back! The Russians took 28 cannons and a pile of banners. Immediately after the battle, the general-in-chief ordered: "To help the wounded Poles." And he spent two more days with huntsmen and Cossacks catching in the woods all those who did not surrender. Why they did it requires an explanation. After all, Suvorov let everyone who promised not to raise weapons anymore go home. From the experience of the last Polish campaign, he knew perfectly well that the nobility easily violated this kind of "word of honor". But the commander was convinced, and more than once announced in the orders for the troops that God would not grant victory to the unrighteous, even if it was a Russian officer. The Pole who broke his word was obviously defeated by the detachment he joined. Such logic may be incomprehensible to a modern person, but Suvorov proved its correctness with his victories.

"Veni, vidi, vence" – Suvorov wrote to de Ribas ^{[66, No. 485]}. He turned the situation around in Lithuania, but he was in no hurry to go to Poland. The legend of the rapid march from the South of Russia to Warsaw is broken by a simple fact: Suvorov stood in Brest for 29 days, collecting and training troops, arranging supplies and ensuring interaction with Russian troops in Lithuania and Poland, securing his rear ^{[10, vol. III, No. 374, 381]} and trying to negotiate with the allies. The Prussians turned out to be hopeless, and the "Austrians are weak" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 402, 403]}. However, Suvorov himself had already formed an army of 25 thousand from scattered detachments, trained it and was ready to march on Warsaw.

Suvorov decided to strike a concentrated blow, but with what forces?! This issue was difficult for the general-in–chief himself, and in historiography it has not yet been resolved. Repnin had to give orders to the troops, so Suvorov's attempts, using his seniority in rank, to unite with the corps of Lieutenant Generals I.E. Ferzen and V.H. Derfelden failed ^{[10, vol. III, ¹ 379, 380, 382. 383, 390]} It was especially difficult to subdue old Derfelden ^{[10, vol. III, No. 391, 392]}, in the future ? one of the best generals of Suvorov in the Italian and Alpine campaigns. Of course, Suvorov's cavalry did not stand still. On October 3, the Cossacks of Major General Denisov captured General Serakovsky, and at the same time General Kaminsky and Kosciusko himself in the sich at the Maceevichi ^{[10, vol. III, ¹ 388] [66, ¹ 488, 489]}.

On October 6, Suvorov's military council decided to advance from Brest to Warsaw, without waiting not only for the Prussians, but also for Derfelden ^{[10, vol. III, No. 393]}; on October 11, a report on the campaign was sent to Rumyantsev ^{[10, vol. III, No. 396]}. On October 15, the commander was already near Warsaw, having defeated 5020 rebels in the village of Kobylka. The rebels received help from Warsaw, a heavy battle in the forest lasted 5 hours, but the Russian victory was complete: "the enemy was all killed or captured." The Russians got a banner, 9 cannons and 850 prisoners, including 50 officers ^{[10, vol. III, ¹ 400, 404] [66, ¹ 491]}.

Suvorov had to repeat the feat of storming Izmail in Poland. The powerfully fortified suburb of the capital Prague was defended by 26 thousand army, "almost all regular" ^[44]. With armed inhabitants, the number of rebels reached 30 thousand ^{[10, vol. III, No. 408, 408a, 423]}. Prague had three lines of fortifications, on which stood 104 cannons, including large ones. Suvorov's army of 5 corps (Potemkin and 4 attached) with 86 guns numbered, according to historians, from 28 to 30 thousand soldiers, including 12 thousand cavalry. The balance of forces was slightly better than during the storming of Izmail, where Suvorov's 31 thousand army was opposed by 35 thousand fanatically minded Turks with 265 guns. The decision to attack Prague with such a balance of forces meant that Suvorov was ready for great human sacrifices. By analogy: 26 thousand Turks died in Izmail, Suvorov lost up to 2 thousand killed and 2.5 thousand wounded ^{[10, vol. II, No. 631, 637]}.

However, is this true, and how reliable is the figure of 28-30 thousand? Throughout the Polish campaign, Alexander Vasilyevich acted extremely prudently. On October 18, he conducted a reconnaissance, losing one of his retinue killed and two wounded, and made sure that Prague was fortified excellently ^{[10, vol. III, No. 402, 403]}. Suvorov established that the Varshavians helped the rebels only with food ^{[10, vol. III, No. 401]}. However, a rebellion was raging in the country. The slightest failure of the assault ? and the whole of Poland will fall on the Russians. Doubting that the commander had put his entire army on the map, we counted his troops anew. The fact is that Suvorov, without specifying the total number of the army, accurately named the composition of all 8 columns during the storming of Prague, including the reserve.

These are 37 battalions and 2 infantry regiments (4 more battalions). In total, 41 battalions with an average strength of 850 people, and full?time (which rarely happened) - 1000, not counting those employed on the farm. It turns out that Suvorov had one infantry from 34,850 to 41,000. However, the army also had a strong cavalry: 70 regular squadrons of 120-150 blades and exactly 2,680 Cossacks, totaling 8,400-1,0500 people. Consequently, Suvorov's army numbered from 45930 to 48030 fighters, who were joined by an unknown number of volunteers, but significant according to the memoirs of contemporaries. Neither Suvorov nor other participants in the Polish campaign mention the noticeable incompleteness of the units. So, we have no reason to reduce the number of Russian troops near Warsaw from 46-48 thousand to 28-30 thousand.

To storm Prague, Suvorov used the bulk of this army, according to our calculations ? 35-41 thousand. Trying to further increase the preponderance of his troops, he hurried 13 squadrons of Kinburnian and Smolensk dragoons (3,300 men) and joined them 9 squadrons of Pereyaslavsky and Elisavetgrad mounted chasseurs, who were supposed to enter Prague when the infantry opened the gates to them, but in fact broke in even earlier, right through the ditches and ramparts.

So, Suvorov provided the overall superiority by more than a third of the troops; Russians were 16-18 thousand more; superiority over regular Polish units exceeded 20 thousand. In the assault itself, the Russians were even 5-8 thousand more in disposition, but in reality, when the cavalry rushed into Prague directly through the ditches and ramparts, it was almost a third more. And this despite the fact that the Russians held their formation better and attacked in concert, achieving a decisive advantage at each point.

According to Suvorov's calculation, a long delay of 29 days ^{[10, vol. III, No. 425]} in Brest-Litovsk to gather all forces turned out to be justified. He was convinced that "Poland demanded a massive strike" ^{[66, No. 684]}. And the commander fully provided for him. Near Warsaw, he, having a serious numerical superiority, increased the qualitative superiority of his troops.

Suvorov's troops spent a week learning how to storm fortifications and brought these new ones to automatism on specially built models of fortifications. Officers and soldiers were required to be able to quickly cover wolf pits with wattles, throw fascines over the moat, attach and run up wide, "like under Ishmael," assault ladders: two at a time is unlikely. At the same time, the huntsmen practiced rapid shooting "over the heads" of a hidden enemy. The training covered all troops, including the Ferzen corps ^{[10, vol. III, No. 398]}.

Suvorov, based on the experience of storming Izmail, compiled two dispositions of the storming of Prague, the main and additional ^{[10, vol. III, No. 405, 406]}. Both were suggested to each soldier three times to avoid the slightest doubt about what to do and how to do it. The "hunters" were the first to go into battle: volunteers from regiments and volunteers, who were in abundance in the army. Their task was to call fire on themselves, covering the columns of workers following with fascines, fences, ladders and trench tools. Each of their columns was accompanied, on the one hand, by sappers, on the other by snipers. Near Izmail, the sappers had to pick up the guns of the dead to support the advancing columns. In Prague, everyone was armed, even "the workers had guns over their shoulders on a shoulder strap." Passing by the storming columns, everyone had to shoot, suppressing the enemy's defenses. Besides, Suvorov understood: on the spot, having done their job, they would not resist, and they would also go on the assault.

Before the "Hurrah!" command, everyone had to walk in silence, without firing a shot. "We came to the moat," Suvorov's order read, "do not hesitate for a second, throw a fascist into it, go down into it and put the stairs to the shaft! Hunters, shoot the enemy on the heads! Very soon, pair by pair, climb! Is the staircase short? – Bayonet into the shaft, climb on it, another, a third. Comrade, defend your comrade! Standing on the rampart, overturn the enemy with a bayonet – and instantly form up behind the rampart."

The commander had no doubt of victory. However, his task was not just to take Prague quickly and with minimal losses. It was equally important to save the capital of Poland, Warsaw, which stood on the other side of the Vistula from destruction. Even in Prague, packed with rebels, the civilian population, if possible, should not have suffered, as happened in Izmail. Suvorov strictly ordered, descending from the ramparts and bastions into the streets of Prague, "not to engage in shooting; not to shoot unnecessarily; to beat and drive the enemy with a bayonet; to work quickly, soon, bravely, in Russian! Do not run into houses; spare the enemy, asking for mercy; do not kill the unarmed; do not fight with women; do not touch youngsters"! The soldiers had to memorize and shout to the fighting Poles: "zgoda", "cut off the reservation" (surrender, drop your weapon). "Those who put down their weapons should be separated: liberty, passports! Which are not – ... to beat, to cum at one o'clock! ... I strictly remind you: to conduct the operation quickly, to strike with cold steel, to catch up, to beat ... to force surrender. Until now, do not rest until all the rebels are taken."

While the training was going on, Suvorov's advanced detachments on November 22 pushed back the Polish pickets to Prague. The commander and the generals studied the enemy's fortifications up close. The intelligence data was confirmed. The Polish ramparts and bastions were built according to the latest military engineering ideas. All three lines of defense were covered by crossfire, the approaches to them were reinforced by ditches and wolf pits. From the point of view of military science, an assault was impossible, and a siege would be extremely difficult.

Suvorov hoped that the Polish military leaders, with the usual contempt for Western Europe, passed by his experience of storming Izmail: the exploits of Russians there were almost always belittled or even ignored. The exception was, perhaps, Frederick the Great, who really appreciated Rumyantsev's victories over the Turks, but the vast majority of foreign generals were no match for this military genius. All that Suvorov had to do to cover up the noisy and prominent preparations for the assault ? This is to create the appearance of a siege according to the classical scheme.

To do this, on the night of November 23, three siege batteries of 16, 22 and 48 guns were erected near Prague. According to Suvorov, these "batteries were built only to distract the enemy from waiting for an attack." The Russian guns opened fire at dawn. Their caliber did not allow them to inflict serious damage to the fortifications. Any reasonable military commander would have realized that their firing was pointless. But the ardent Poles, firstly, quickly joined the firefight, and secondly, they made sure that everything was going according to plan: the siege began as it should, and the Russians, as Western generals usually expect, are acting ineffectively because they are not familiar with modern military science.

Under the cover of this noisy pyrotechnic action, Suvorov's troops left the camps at 3 p.m. on October 24, on the 6th day after the start of training. The signal for the assault was. Like in Izmail, a flare. She took off at 5 a.m. But this was not a signal for all columns. The first of them came out, through the forest and a swampy channel, earlier to attack Prague along the Vistula, from its lower course. The other columns attacked by rocket, except for two, which were supposed to go on the offensive as soon as the rebels gathered reserves to the breakout sites.

A well-thought-out and well-executed attack wiped Western European fortification science into dust. Polish fortifications and strong but undirected fire did not even slow down the Russians. All the lines of ditches and ramparts were overcome, the batteries were captured, the bastions fell. The Poles fought beautifully, dying on the spot under the blows of bayonets. The Polish cavalry in Prague was ready for counterattacks. But they proved useless: the Russians advancing in dense ranks swept away the cavalry with bayonets, without even slowing down. The assault even accelerated in comparison with the disposition. Suvorov's cavalry stood in reserve, waiting for the builders and sappers to fill up the ditches. But, seeing the counterattack of the gentry cavalry, two squadrons of the Kiev cavalry regiment immediately jumped over the moat and cut down the rebels. According to the plan, the dragoons attacked dismounted. However, the main part of the Russian cavalry flew into the quarry filled up ditches and destroyed ramparts, breaking into the streets of Prague. Behind her, artillery entered the city along the open road.

After breaking into the city, Suvorov set the number one task to capture the bridge over the Vistula. A bridge standing in the same place today connects its eastern and western shores. This bridge led to the very center of Warsaw. If the rebels had been able to retreat along it, the battle would have spread to the capital. This worried Suvorov extremely. He demanded the destruction of the bridge, doubting that the Russian detachment that had broken through to it through Prague would be able to hold back the countless crowds of rebels. Any troops were stuck in the stormed city, if not because of resistance, then unable to resist the temptation of looting. But the commander's fears were in vain. His soldiers breached the fortifications, marched through the city, burned the bridge and disarmed most of the rebels in just three hours from the start of the assault. For comparison: in the Battle of Izmail, it took 2.5 hours only to storm the fortifications, and the battle in the streets lasted another 8 hours.

Suvorov won an incredible, brilliant victory with minimal losses and reliably saved Warsaw from the horrors of war. What could Russia's detractors oppose to this? ? That's right, only the purest lies and slander. And, according to the old tradition, the falsification of history must certainly be supported by publicists from Russia.

Speaking about the horrors of the storming of Prague, the story of I.I. Klugen is usually quoted, allegedly listened to around 1810 and transmitted in the 1850s by Faddeus Venediktovich (born Jan Tadeusz) Bulgarin. This son of a Polish nationalist exiled to Siberia for the murder of a Russian and named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko, strengthened his hatred of Russia when, with the rank of lieutenant, he was dismissed from its army due to inconsistency. Joining the Polish Legion, he participated in punitive actions in Spain and the 1812 campaign against Moscow. In 1814, Bulgarin was captured, pardoned and promoted in Polish journalism. In 1819, he moved to St. Petersburg, where he suddenly found himself a "Russian patriot", expressing in journalism the positions of the III Branch of the E.I.V. Chancellery. Shameless as a rarity, Bulgarin attributed the Polish-French view to Klugen, hiding at the same time behind the Russian "hurrah-patriotism" for which he was paid. Here is this story:

"They shot at us from the windows of houses and from roofs, and our soldiers, breaking into houses, killed everyone they came across... The bitterness and thirst for revenge reached the highest degree ... The officers were no longer able to stop the bloodshed ... The inhabitants of Prague, old men, women, and children, ran in droves in front of us to the bridge, where the defenders of the fortifications who had escaped from our bayonets also sought – and suddenly there were terrible screams in the fleeing crowds, then smoke rose and flames appeared... One of our detachments, sent along the banks of the Vistula, broke into the trenches, lit the bridge on the Vistula, and repelled the fleeing retreat... At the same moment, there was a terrible crash, the ground shook, and the daylight was dimmed by smoke and dust... The powder magazine blew up ... Prague was set on fire from four ends, and the flames quickly spread through the wooden buildings. There were corpses, blood and fire all around us... There was another massacre at the bridge. Our soldiers fired into the crowds without making out anyone, and the shrill screams of women and the screams of children terrified the soul. It is rightly said that spilled human blood excites a kind of intoxication. Our fierce soldiers saw in every living being the destroyer of ours during the uprising in Warsaw. "There is no pardon for anyone!" our soldiers shouted and killed everyone, not distinguishing between age or gender... Several hundred Poles managed to escape across the bridge. Two thousand drowned, rushing into the Vistula to swim across. Up to one and a half thousand people were captured, among whom there were many officers, several generals and colonels. It took a lot of work for the Russian officers to save these unfortunate people from the vengeance of our soldiers. At five o'clock in the morning we stormed, and at nine o'clock there was no Polish army defending Prague, nor Prague itself, nor its inhabitants... At four o'clock in the morning, a terrible revenge was taken for the massacre of our people in Warsaw!" ^{[20, ch. 3]}.

Bulgarin "remembered" how he wanted and changed the story of Major General Ivan Ivanovich von Klugen, a Baltic German who received the Cross of St. George IV degree and the rank of prime major in 1792 (he became a major general under Paul I, and in the 1810s lived out his life as commandant of Kronstadt and chief of the garrison regiment). According to this story, Klugen commanded a battalion in the storming of Prague. But in the lists of those who distinguished themselves, compiled by Suvorov in great detail, he is not present, and with the disposition of the battle, announced three times to each private, he is so unfamiliar that he did not understand the meaning of burning the bridge over the Vistula. Perhaps Bulgarin attributed to Klugen the story of another German, Zeime, who served as a tutor for children and secretary to the plenipotentiary minister in Warsaw Igelstrom, who sat with him in Polish captivity and passed on rumors that circulated among Poles. It is equally likely that Bulgarin simply invented this story, as most Western "testimonies" about the storming of Prague are invented, without correlating at all with real circumstances.

I deliberately brought this "testimony" to show what Suvorov's accusations of "bloodthirstiness" are worth. The soldiers had no motive for "revenge" for the Russians who died in the Polish uprising – they simply did not know about them, and this topic was never raised in the orders of Suvorov and his generals. They were ordered to kill everyone holding a weapon, and women and children were forbidden – the Poles "added" them by their example, because they killed all Russians and their supporters in Warsaw in 1792, regardless of gender and age. The majority of the civilian population left Prague in advance and went to Warsaw. The residents who remained in their homes and did not shoot at the Russians were not subjected to any violence.

Even a considerable part of the 30 thousand rebels who settled in Prague were saved. The dead, whom Suvorov always demanded to count accurately, turned out to be up to 12 thousand, 10.5 thousand were captured. About 2 thousand more cavalry galloped off in all directions (it made no sense to detain them), the rest fled to their homes. Estimate – more than 10 thousand prisoners, whom no one thought to kill, like the Turks or Poles, the French or the British! The number of 12 thousand killed included all "not our" corpses to be buried. Their exact count does not even cover the number of Prague's defenders who have disappeared into obscurity – and certainly does not accommodate civilians. Some of the rebels could have drowned in the Vistula, some could have burned down in warehouses and warehouses set on fire by the defenders. But Prague itself was not burned, and its inhabitants soon returned home. Otherwise, Suvorov would not have been able to billet some of his troops in Prague.

The triumph of Russian military thought, organization and spirit was complete. Suvorov lost up to 300 dead and 500 wounded in Prague: 6 times less than in Izmail. It is equally important that the commander managed to save the locals, and Warsaw did not suffer at all.

By October 27, Suvorov had sorted out the prisoners. He sent 3 captured generals to Rumyantsev in Kiev, up to 500 staff and chief officers and 4 thousand ordinary regular regiments, as well as 101 guns. The general-in-chief pointedly did not notice Repnin. 6 thousand rebels from the militia were released with passports. The Russians let the officers go with weapons, as was the case during the last Polish campaign. At the same time, Suvorov sent home 313 Prussians and 63 Austrians who were languishing in Polish captivity ^{[10, vol. III, No. 408a, 414]}.

Especially cynically, from the point of view of Polish patriots, Suvorov acted with Warsaw. Instead of demanding surrender and reparations, he proposed to the Warsaw Magistrate to amicably negotiate "peace. The citizens of the city were guaranteed the inviolability of their person and property. In turn, the magistrate asked Suvorov to bring Russian troops into the city as soon as possible ^{[10, vol. III, ¹ 409, 411, 412, 425]}. The Varshavians can be understood: having fled to the city, the rebels, scattered by Russian weapons, could cause terrible riots. Suvorov did just that.

"Warszava zbawcy swemy" ("Warsaw to its deliverer") was written on a diamond-lined snuffbox, which was presented to Suvorov on behalf of the townspeople ^{[10, vol. III, No. 436]}. The inscription in Polish without a name was all the more fortunate because the commemorative gift was clearly made in advance and was intended for someone who would establish his power over the city, whether he was Russian, Polish, Austrian or Prussian. The sincere Suvorov was moved and showed a purely Russian naivety. With the Poles, he wrote to Rumyantsev, "everything is forgotten. We communicate in conversations as friends and brothers. They don't like Germans. We are adored" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 437]}. Russian troops solemnly entered Warsaw as its saviors, enthusiastically welcomed by the population. In the city, they freed up to 1,400 Russian military and officials from captivity.

Suvorov's resounding victory and mercy convinced many rebels to lay down their arms. The Poles surrendered in companies, squadrons, battalions and brigades. Suvorov was especially pleased that the war ended bloodlessly and very quickly. He was convinced that any continuation of the war was evil. And the Polish campaign lasted only 44 days from the moment of its departure from Brest ^{[10, vol. III, No. 425]}. "Vivat, great Catherine! Suvorov reported to Rumyantsev on November 8 , 1794. It's over, Most illustrious Count! Poland is disarmed" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 427]}. In the "Final Journal" of the Polish campaign of November 13, the general-in-chief assured the field marshal that "the huge militia of the Polish troops and the entire people of the revolted forces have been deposed to the end. This daring army, which has been fighting all summer with the noise of importance, now victorious by her Imperial Majesty's troops entrusted to me, is destroyed, disarmed, turned into nothing. The brilliant capture of Prague and the extermination here during the assault and in the battles of the most noble rebels of the army shook all their forces to the ground. The conquest of Warsaw led them to a state of inability to resist the victors. The tireless pursuit of the troops sent after them completed their final destruction!"

The magazine clearly presented the dynamics of events. On October 24, there were 30 thousand rebels in Poland, on November 4 ? 20 thousand, on November 13, no force opposed the Russians in the country. The soldiers and officers were immediately released to their homes. The leaders of the uprising, having given their word not to fight against Russia, received passports for living at home or traveling abroad. By November 20, passports had been issued to 24,972 rebels, not counting two generals ^{[10, vol. III, No. 441]}. This work continued afterwards. Of the almost 100 thousand rebels, less than 6 thousand were sent to Russia and held captive for some time, the rest were rehabilitated immediately after handing over their weapons.

"So the campaign is over! Suvorov reported. – Everywhere is calm, the Polish troops no longer exist, only 600 infantry and 400 cavalry guards have been left to His Majesty the king. Moreover, there are 300 police soldiers in Warsaw" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 431]}. The commander ruled peaceful Poland from January to October 1795 ^{[10, vol. III, No. 429-513]}, treating the Poles "very kindly and friendly" ^{[10, vol. III, No. 419]}. The royal court was angered by Suvorov's meekness and unselfishness, including the fact that he "releases all Poles general, not excluding the main rebels ... freely into their homes, giving open sheets" ^{[66, No. 500, approx. 4]}, but I have to hide the poisonous stings at least for a while.

*          *          *

"Hurrah! Field Marshal Suvorov! – the Empress congratulated Alexander Vasilyevich. – You know that I do not rank without a queue. I cannot offend the elder; but you have made yourself a field marshal!"

Suvorov was happy, having surpassed many rivals in the ranks. Orders of various states flew to his chest. The glory of the commander was undeniable throughout Europe. But the field marshal was not deluded by the strength of his position. Showered with favors after the storming of Izmail, he was already sent out of sight to Finland. He knew that the poisonous arrows were already flying at his back. Suvorov "always used to say that he had seven wounds: two received in the war, and five at court, or political. And these five, according to him, were much more painful than the first ones" ^{[70, p. 51]}.

At the end of the Polish campaign, the commander perfectly understood what plans of St. Petersburg for the long war he had violated and how many influential people he had crossed the road. "The peace–loving field marshals spent all their time preparing stores at the beginning of the Polish campaign," he said. – Their plan was to fight for three years with an outraged people. What a bloodshed! I came and won. With one blow, I gained peace and put an end to the bloodshed" ^{[71, pp. 44-45]}.

Suvorov sincerely loved Poland, as he confessed in letters to various people many times. However, even after his previous Polish campaign, the country was divided, and now, on October 24, 1795, a new division took place: a week after the recall of Suvorov, who was sharply against it. He was deeply convinced that the goal of any war can only be a just and lasting peace. But an unfair world that deprives one of the parties of something extremely important for it, in principle, could not be durable.

Poland was divided by Austria and Prussia, Lithuania ? Prussia and Russia, which also ceded Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. It turned out to be quite difficult for Polish historians and publicists to objectively assess this act, even though many of them had lived in the Kingdom of Poland, as part of the Russian Empire, since 1815, and others in the Polish People's Republic, an ally of the USSR. It was much easier to blame Suvorov for the partition of Poland and Lithuania, attributing to him at the same time fictional atrocities. It began during the life of the commander and caused him perplexity. He himself respected the enemies, and he never considered them all enemies, in particular the Poles. Suvorov had only one true enemy ? the war, which he sought to end in order to reduce the number of victims. It was precisely in excessive mercy to the vanquished that he was accused at the court of Catherine II, complaining that he "releases all Poles general, not excluding the main rebels ... freely into their homes, giving open sheets" ^{[66, No. 500, note 4]}.

Suvorov, in the second Polish campaign, as well as in the first, was firm in the conviction that he inspired the soldiers in the "Science of winning": that even an armed enemy "is a sin to kill in vain, they are the same people," and those who lay down their weapons deserve freedom with "oblivion of everything that happened." This philanthropy of the commander was then and subsequently questioned by St. Petersburg society and completely rejected by Western journalism, which sought to present Suvorov as a bloodthirsty monster. It would seem that history itself questioned the beneficence of his humanism. General Jan Dombrowski, released by the commander with a passport, i.e. forgiven by him, formed two Polish legions in Italy under Bonaparte (1797), which Suvorov had to defeat in 1799 at Trebbia and Novi. Alexander Vasilyevich did not remind the legionnaires that many of them had broken their word not to fight against the Russians, and again released the captured Poles. If he had sent the legionnaires captive to Russia, they would not have died almost in full force on the island of San Domingo. Perhaps, if the commander had committed the atrocities on Polish soil that were unreasonably attributed to him, 100 thousand Poles would not have fallen under the banners of Napoleon, fighting against Russia in 1812.

It is clear that such a game of alternative history is unrealistic. If Suvorov had not been humane and merciful, he would not have been Suvorov. His Orthodox worldview was based on the postulate of free will, rejecting ideas about the predestination of destinies and events. By releasing the defeated Poles, the commander repeatedly gave each of them the opportunity to stand on the side of peace and goodness, or at least make sure that the truth is on the side of Russian weapons. Convinced that the enemy was the same person as himself, Alexander Vasilyevich believed that the Poles he defeated on the battlefield would eventually understand that "God is not in power, but in truth." This saying of the patron saint revered by Suvorov, Alexander Nevsky, who also released prisoners and repeatedly offered the opponents a good peace, served the great Russian commander as a guide to action all his life. For Suvorov, good intentions towards the Poles and Poland were the key to victory and dictated humanity towards the vanquished.