The attitude of the USSR to the policy of repatriation at the final stage of the WWII and in the first post-war years

Orlova Dar'ya Igorevna ORCID: 0009-0009-5770-2082 Postgraduate student, Department of Russian History, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6 oriol104@yandex.ru

In the context of the imbalance of the world order and the growing confrontation in the modern world, the problem of international cooperation, the protection of the rights of refugees and displaced persons, and the principles of diplomacy based on mutual respect among actors in international relations, is becoming particularly relevant.

         In the middle of the twentieth century.  The fate of refugees and displaced persons, as well as the problem of intercontinental migration as a result of World War II, has become the focus of international diplomacy. Even during the active hostilities, on November 9, 1943, it was decided to create an international organization, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). "In addition to the Council and the Central Committee of the UNRRA, two regional committees were established – for Europe and for the Far East, as well as committees for supply, financial control, industrial rehabilitation, maintenance of displaced persons, health, agricultural rehabilitation and public charity" [1. P. 209].

         The central task of the UNRRA was to provide assistance to the population liberated from occupation, namely: the provision of food, medicine, clothing, shelter, and the return of prisoners home. It is important to note that this urgent task was declared as an urgent measure. People needed immediate help to ensure their daily lives. Meanwhile, tasks such as the restoration of agriculture, industrial production, and the economy were not within the competence of the UNRRA.

         Concerns were expressed, in particular, by representatives of the United States, that material and financial assistance could cause the emergence of new destructive forces: civil war or armed conflicts. The American economist M. Strait noted in this regard: "American food has already been used as a political tool to support reactionary elements in North Africa, as well as in the Vichy government <...> to support monarchists and certain groups of fascists in the Franco cabinet" [2. P. 11].

The materials of the secret correspondence between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt indicate that "by the summer of 1944, the war had entered a new era, and Churchill, looking at the European continent, watched the retreating Germans with one eye, the other the advancing Russians" [3. P. 576]. The power of the USSR was growing, its offensive movement and the rapid liberation of the territory from Nazi occupation left no doubt that the victory of the Red Army was approaching, and it was only a matter of time. Thus, "the conference of the leaders of the three great powers took place at a time when the military successes of the Allies increasingly affected the issues of the post-war world order, stimulating centrifugal tendencies" [4. C. 203]. Nevertheless, the leaders sought to overcome these centrifugal forces, to develop principles of peaceful existence. The characteristic features of the activity of diplomats of all levels at that time in Crimea at the Yalta Conference were principled and resolute, but at the same time restraint and flexibility. Everyone was motivated by a common goal – the early establishment of peace, the restoration of economies and the stabilization of society.

In 1944, for the purpose of returning displaced persons to the USSR, their resettlement and employment, the Office of the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for Repatriation was established. This organization was formed from employees of the SMERSH military counterintelligence, which during the war provided state security in the Armed Forces of the USSR. The Department worked closely with the internal authorities of the USSR: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the NKVD, the command of the fronts, and also established contacts with international organizations and diplomatic representatives of other countries. Thus, thanks to international cooperation, by the end of 1944, responsible representatives for repatriation issues had access to almost all the camps located in Western European countries. [5. p.9].

The fate of displaced persons and prisoners of war also became the focus of attention of the leaders of the three allied Powers participating in the Yalta Conference of 1945 (February 4-11).  By the end of World War II, their number in Europe was about 9 million people, 7 million of whom were Soviet citizens [1. C. 207]. "In accordance with the Yalta Agreements, the Allied military command (USSR, USA, Great Britain) was among the first to deal with the problem of refugees, which began to implement a policy of repatriation, according to which Soviet subjects were to be transferred to the authorities of the USSR" [1. C. 207].

         On February 10, 1945, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin had a conversation with British Prime Minister W. Churchill, as well as British Foreign Minister E. Eden, at which the issue of prisoners of war was raised and discussed. Churchill noted that he was surprised by the number of Soviet prisoners of war in Western Europe and the derogatory attitude of the Germans towards them [6. C. 200]. The British government expressed a desire to return this category of persons to their homeland as soon as possible and at the same time provide information about British prisoners of war released by the Red Army, allow special British officers to be sent to care for them, as well as to transfer supplies from the Red Cross [6. C. 200].  Stalin replied affirmatively to all Churchill's requests, while noting that "among Soviet citizens there are people whom the Germans force to work, but there are also those who voluntarily took up arms against the Allies" [6. C. 200].  Both of these categories are Soviet citizens and are subject to return to their homeland.

         As a result of the conversation on February 11, 1945, representatives of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA V.M. Molotov, A.L. Gryzlov, E. Eden and D. R. Dean signed bilateral agreements: Anglo-Soviet and American-Soviet, respectively. They laid down the basic principles of repatriation. The agreements stipulated that "all Soviet citizens... they will be contained... in camps or assembly points until their transfer to the Soviet authorities" [7. Electronic resource]. "Molotov and Eden signed several more agreements, including an additional document on the status of Russians in camps in England" [8. C. 348]. According to this document, it was necessary to separate Soviet citizens from German prisoners of war, and to allocate the first separate part in the camp, where authorized representatives of the USSR for repatriation would have free access [8. C. 348].

         "In total, the Allies created about 1,500 displaced persons camps, with an estimated capacity of 4.5 million people. From 3 to 10 thousand or more of their inhabitants lived in each camp" [9. C. 61].

         This type of citizen received the status of displaced persons – Displaced persons of United Nations (abbreviated DP or DP). It included: "citizens of the opposing countries, citizens of the USSR, England and the USA, former civilian prisoners, as well as citizens whose nationality has not been clarified due to territorial changes; persons politically or religiously persecuted; citizens of neutral states; non-German collaborators" [1. C. 208].

         However, most of the displaced persons were Soviet citizens who were forcibly abducted by the Nazis to Germany and other countries for forced labor.

         There was a very difficult situation in the camps intended for children. Each of the countries that had influence on the world stage at that time sought to achieve their interests. It is important to note the influence of anti-Soviet propaganda, which gained momentum in connection with the beginning of the implementation of the means of waging the Cold war. The USSR suffered huge human losses, therefore. It was important for him to return as many Soviet citizens to his country as possible in order to stabilize the demographic situation and rebuild the country. While the Anglo-Saxons, interested in cheap labor and brain drain, were actively working against repatriation.

            Based on the above, it should be concluded that the scale of the refugee problem was great. In this regard, the task of the world community was to achieve the rational use of the resources of the UNRRA. The Soviet Union signed an agreement on the establishment of this organization, immediately becoming a member of it. At one of the sessions of the UNRRA, the Soviet delegation expressed its readiness to provide assistance to other countries within the framework of the organization, but did not name specific sizes due to the fact that a significant part of the Soviet territory was in enemy hands, and it was difficult to calculate the full scale of the destruction caused by the German invasion at that time. [2. P. 17]. The fair distribution of material resources among the affected countries has been one of the controversial issues throughout the entire activity of the UNRRA. Nevertheless, it was decided that the participating countries contribute one percent of national income to the UNRRA budget, which was later increased to two [1. p. 209].

         The peculiarity of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the UNRRA was that the USSR did not directly seek help from this organization, despite the fact that "on the basis of resolution No. 67, the UNRRA was obliged to provide assistance to displaced persons in cases when the government turned to the UNRRA for assistance" [9. L. 119]. The Soviet delegation confirmed its position in the directives at the IV session of the UNRRA Council. In particular, it was noted that "assistance to displaced persons should be provided only with the consent of the Government of the country they are from." [9. L. 120]. The Government of the Soviet Union has fully assumed the implementation of all the activities of the UNRRA on its territory. International cooperation with the countries where the Soviet displaced persons were located was carried out on the basis of bilateral agreements, which made it possible to implement more effective control over the repatriation process, in order to maximize the protection of the country from the introduction of collaborators, Quislings and other undesirable and politically dangerous displaced persons.

         On December 15, 1946, the International Organization for Refugees and Displaced Persons (International Refugee Organization) – IRO (hereinafter IRO) was established by the UN General Assembly instead of the UNRRA. In order to create an IRO and resolve the issue of refugees and displaced persons as soon as possible, a Special Committee was established in 1946, within which three more subcommittees were created. "The first of them was engaged in the interpretation of the concepts of "refugee" and "displaced person", the task of the second was to "establish facts and collect information"; the third subcommittee was engaged in drafting the charter of the future international organization for refugees and displaced persons" [11. L. 366]. Delegates from the USSR were members of each of these subcommittees. In addition to the subcommittees, a special committee was established to study various applications of private organizations on the issues of public health [11. L. 367].

             The report of the delegations of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR on the results of the work of the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons clearly captures the position of representatives of England, the United States and other countries, whose speeches were extremely confusing and unreasonably verbose, aimed at deliberately delaying the discussion of the problem, and, accordingly, complicate the process of solving it [11. L. 367].

             Due to the constant confrontation, the USSR could not carry out many tactically important proposals at the meetings of the Committee and subcommittees. They concerned the provision of information on the countries of origin of refugees and displaced persons and the political situation in them; clarification of the status of displaced persons falling under the jurisdiction of the IRO [11. L. 390]. Also, the proposals of the USSR delegation on the dissolution of military formations, on the prohibition of propaganda, on the composition and citizenship of the service personnel of the camps of the Dipians; on sending a commission to the camps to establish the facts of the presence of war criminals, Quislingians and traitors were not accepted" [11. L. 391]. The proposals of the USSR on the form of organization of the IRO, the principles of functioning, and the specifics of financing also remained without legal consolidation in the documents of those years. Nevertheless, thanks to the work of the Special Committee, definitions of the concepts of "refugee/displaced person" were fixed, it was decided to create an IRO as a specialized international organization, which was supposed to speed up the resolution of issues related to refugees and displaced persons.

         As a result, the USSR did not become a member of this international organization. This was due to the fact that the Soviet leadership considered the IRO as an Anglo-American mechanism for managing the fate of the Dipians, a supplier of cheap and disenfranchised labor for capitalist countries [1. C. 216].

         But the problem of refugees and displaced persons throughout the post-war period was on the agenda of the United Nations, of which the USSR was a member. It is important to consider the proposals submitted to the UN from the USSR, the BSSR, the Ukrainian SSR, in particular, draft resolutions, after the publication of the Report of the delegations of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR on the results of the work of the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons ^[12.]. The main requirement of the Soviet representatives of the delegation was that all refugees and displaced persons The persons were returned to their countries of origin as soon as possible.

         In the draft resolution of October 20, 1947 "On international cooperation in preventing immigration that could disrupt friendly relations between nations" on the part of the USSR, the USSR also demanded that the world community react to the facts of propaganda and recruitment of Soviet citizens recorded in camps for displaced persons in Germany and Austria not in favor of returning to their country [12. C. 146]. Representatives of the USSR in this document ask to take measures, namely: "remove agitators from administrative posts ..., appoint those who deserve trust", "ensure free access to the camps of interested representatives of states", "stop recruiting" [12. C. 164].

         In the draft resolution of August 12, 1948 "On the issue of repatriation, resettlement and immigration of refugees and displaced persons", in addition to the above-mentioned requirements of the USSR, articles on the prohibition of persecution of displaced persons wishing to return to their homeland were included. The Soviet Union also called for the removal of war criminals from the leadership of the camps of persons who collaborated with the Nazis [12. P. 165]. One of the provisions mentioned children who found themselves without parents as a result of the war, who also had to be returned to their homeland immediately [12. C. 165]. For the first time in this document, the deadline for completing repatriation was set in 1949 [12. C. 165].

         This was followed by draft resolutions in 1949 on the report of the International Organization for Refugees (IRO), the contents of which generally repeated the previous requirements.

         These resolutions were followed by draft documents from the BSSR in 1949 and 1950, which stated the need to complete repatriation by 1950, to provide complete information about persons located on the territory of UN member states and in refugee and displaced persons camps [12. C. 168]. Also, representatives of the BSSR in these documents noted the failure of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries to comply with the UN General Assembly resolution on encouraging the early return of displaced persons to their countries of origin on February 12, 1946. Therefore, a demand was made for the need to take measures to implement this resolution [12. C. 169].

         The main repatriation process was completed in the first half of 1946. The total number of repatriates in the specified period was "5.1 million Soviet citizens, while in the occupation zones of the Western powers there were still more than 0.5 million displaced persons who sought to avoid repatriation and became non-returnees" [1. P. 211].

         It would be incorrect to assume that many Soviet citizens were returned to their territory against their will. According to sources, more than 80% of refugees and displaced persons wanted to return to their homeland, did so voluntarily, received assistance and necessary support from their native country.

         Nevertheless, almost all repatriates were checked and filtered in specially created institutions of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs [13. C. 6]. Elderly people and children, who did not arouse much suspicion, went to their places of residence. Those who could have been involved in illegal activities against the USSR were subjected to a thorough check and were subject to trial. Such a contradictory repatriation policy could not remain without the attention of the West and began to be used as one of the mechanisms of the political and ideological struggle against the USSR, which complicated the Soviet repatriation policy.

         Thus, on the one hand, we see the interest of the USSR in returning its citizens to their homeland, the desire of the Soviet people to rebuild the country destroyed by the brutal fascist aggression, and deep hostility to the enemy. On the other hand, we are dealing with the rights and freedoms of displaced persons, the right to refuse forced repatriation. It is necessary to emphasize once again the interest of Anglo-American representatives in refugees and displaced persons. In the post-war world order, the United States and Great Britain, as well as other countries under their influence, pursued their economic and political goals, namely: cheap labor, highly qualified specialists in scientific fields, recruitment for ideological propaganda against the Soviet regime. The former allies saw in the terrified and exhausted by the exhausting hardships of the war and post-war period, the Dipians were the most suitable category of people for the realization of these goals.

         Based on the above, it can be concluded that the Soviet State sought to pursue an international policy of returning its citizens to their homeland on the basis of humane principles fixed in international documents. In addition, the USSR, concerned about the fate of its compatriots, took a constant active part in the work of international organizations (UNRRA, UN), where it initiated a number of resolutions aimed at returning Soviet citizens to their homeland and punishing collaborators and traitors.