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Reference:
Bogdanova A.V.
The evolution of Belgrade's position on the Kosovo issue after 2008
// International relations.
2023. № 4.
P. 34-46.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2023.4.68907 EDN: EHIKKO URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=68907
The evolution of Belgrade's position on the Kosovo issue after 2008
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2023.4.68907EDN: EHIKKOReceived: 06-11-2023Published: 13-11-2023Abstract: This article examines the evolution of Belgrade's official position on the Kosovo issue. The author explores such aspects as the importance of Kosovo in the historical consciousness of the Serbian political elite, the stages of the current attitude towards Kosovo on the part of the Serbian leadership, as well as the significance of historical events on the Kosovo for modern Serbia. The object of the study is the Kosovo crisis, the subject is the vision of the presidents and senior officials of Serbia of the fate of Kosovo. Special attention is paid to the historical stage of the formation of national ideas among Serbs and Albanians, in which the battle on the Kosovo field played a key role. Studying the positions of the presidents and senior officials of Serbia on Kosovo allows to track the process of folding the current position, and also allows to see the trajectory of the formation of attitudes towards Kosovo. The main conclusion of the study is the idea that the struggle for Kosovo in Serbia is a central national idea that serves as a unifying principle and builds patriotism around itself. A special contribution of the author is the systematic tracking of the evolution of Belgrade's position on the Kosovo issue. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that the article consistently and constructively describes the approach of various Serbian presidents to the problem based on their speeches, statements and actions in the international arena. Keywords: Kosovo, Belgrade, Serbia, Kosovo field, NATO, Greater Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, Aleksandar Vučić, USA, RussiaThis article is automatically translated. After the annexation of Crimea to Russia, and especially after Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the discussion of the sovereignty of the territory is escalating. Thus, the topic of partially recognized states is reaching a new level, since the unwillingness of the world community to recognize the entry of Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions into the Russian Federation completely contradicts the opposite desire to rapidly recognize, for example, Kosovo, or interact with Taiwan as a sovereign entity (in the summer of 2023, the United States concluded several contracts with Taiwan on the supply of anti-tank remote mining systems and the transfer of reconnaissance drones of the MQ-9A type, which the PRC perceived as "playing with fire, doomed to failure" (The PRC called attempts to "play with fire" in the Taiwan issue doomed to failure. [Electronic resource] // Source https://iz.ru/1559191/2023-08-15/v-knr-nazvali-popytki-igrat-s-ognem-v-voprose-taivania-obrechennymi-na-proval Date of application: 06.11.2023)). One can judge that the Kosovo issue is reaching a new level by how actively the US and the EU are involved in the process of normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Until 2020, the process of solving the Kosovo problem proceeded sluggishly, the decade 2010-2020, when the United States actually transferred powers to the EU on the Kosovo project, can be considered a failure, since apart from becoming an official candidate for EU membership in 2012 [1], which, in fact, is an announcement of the intention to resolve the Kosovo issue, no other decisions were made important documents. In 2020, the USA announces its decision to return to the Balkans (Biden must reestablish US authority in the Balkans [Electronic resource] // Source: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/biden-must-reestablish-us-authority-balkans-195820 Date of application: 17.10.2023), i.e. about the beginning of the active phase of reconciliation. Earlier, in 2020, in Washington, with the mediation of Donald Trump, an agreement was signed between the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, and the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Hoti, on the normalization of economic relations and accession to the Mini-Schengen zone. After the introduction of 100% duties on Serbian goods by Kosovo earlier before the agreement, the signing of this document can be considered a stage of dispute settlement [2]. In 2021, the most important round is the meeting of the Serbian and Albanian leaders. Before the event, Alexander Vucic noted the importance of the negotiation process, since it is the key to peace, but in fact the dialogue was not established, since Albin Kurti "came to argue ..." (The meeting between Vucic and Kurti ended [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ruserbia.com/politika/vstrecha-vuchicha-i-kurti-zakonchilas-isterikoj-kosovskogo-lidera/ Date of application: 13.10.2023). On April 24, 2023, snap elections were held to the northern municipalities in Kosovo, which were ignored by the Serbs, which led to the appointment of Albanians to all positions. This fact led to the uprising of the Serbs and their clash with NATO forces. Alexander Vucic, in turn, put the army on alert (A failed attempt: the EU and the US could not reconcile Serbia and Kosovo [Electronic resource] // Source: https://iz.ru/1548836/kseniia-loginova/provalnaia-popytka-es-i-ssha-ne-smogli-primirit-serbiiu-i-kosovo Date of application: 01.11.2023) . The situation remains tense at the moment. Thus, all of the above events suggest that in modern conditions, when Russia solves the Ukrainian crisis by force, when Chinese aircraft again violate Taiwan's response zone in response to US attempts to isolate the island, flooding it with weapons (Taiwan declared a violation of the Chinese aircraft response zone [Electronic resource] // Source: https://lenta.ru/news/2023/08/25/024030449 / Date of appeal: 10/19/2023), when the Serbian army is put on alert, the escalation of conflicts regarding disputed territories is growing, and previously illusory stability can be disrupted extremely quickly. Studying the positions of the presidents and senior officials of Serbia on Kosovo will allow you to track the process of folding the current position, and may also be useful in subsequent studies for forecasting. The attitude of the population towards this region is demonstrated by the fact that the elected political elite is represented by supporters of the return of Kosovo to the de facto control of Belgrade. Candidates with a different opinion are not gaining popularity. In addition, the attitude "Kosovo is Serbia" is pedaled in every possible way in the media and the statements of politicians. Society becomes a hostage of the Kosovo myth, the central idea of which is the moral victory of the Serbs over the Muslim invaders. Prince Lazar and the defenders of the country gave their lives on earth to find Heavenly Serbia in the battle of the Kosovo field in 1389 [3]. Thus, the foundations of the superiority of the Serbian nation were laid, which influenced the basic idea that formed statehood in these territories, as well as the formation of the Serbian national historical memory. The date under discussion is sung in hymns and songs, therefore, the traditional perception of Kosovo as the center of Serbian civilization passed through the Ottoman conquest, which only strengthened it, through the communist system when Yugoslavia was united, and now prevails in the political elite [4]. Serbian national ideas are based on the idea that Serbia did not die in the Battle of Kosovo, but froze for a while [5, p. 110]. The maturation of Albanian nationalism has become a catalyst for the strengthening of national ideas among Serbs, and especially among Kosovo Serbs. Since the second half of the XIX century, for example, among Serbian creative figures there has been an increase in popularity of the theme of the sacred significance of Kosovo. A number of writers and poets turn to distant events, painting the image of the Serbs as victims, but victims morally superior to their rival and in no case bowing their heads before him [6]. In the second part of the century, there is a movement of youth in the city of Prizren, which is considered as a potential future capital. The newspaper "Kosovo" is published there in Serbian and Turkish. The letters of the Belgrade Literary Society prove the popularity of the idea of Prizren as the capital [7], because the youth of that time dreamed of the blessings of uniting all Serbs. In addition, the program of the People's Liberal Party of 1881 emphasizes that during the liberation movements of the Serbs against Ottoman rule, the holy Kosovo, Mishar and Takov flags could "develop again" [8]. This attitude shows the general perception of the edge as something integral and sublime. Kosovo is becoming an integral idea of a Great Serbia, the rejection of this region would mean the rejection of the idea of the Serbs as a people morally victorious enemy, superior to others and, more than others, deserving of a single state. Such motifs were especially praised already in times close to the present. After S. Milosevic became President of the Republic of Serbia in 1989, the idea of the full right of Serbs to Kosovo took root in society. Especially after the speech of the new leader in honor of the 600th anniversary of the battle of the Kosovo field, when he confirmed that in our time the boundary between historical reality and legend is being erased, and this is not a problem. The reason for the loss in 1389 s .Milosevic sees not only the failures of the army or the superiority of the Ottomans, but the discord in Kosovo, internal disagreements and injustices that have not bypassed the young state, Yugoslavia, in modern times. Milosevic says that the Serbs have always compromised because of the peculiarities of their mentality to settle conflicts peacefully and make concessions. The President warns that from now on the Serbs will not bow down, that from now on the nation will find its proud and true position in the multinational and equal society of Yugoslavia. Milosevic inspired the Serbs to unity, explaining its importance by the fact that today people cannot afford wars, since only peaceful coexistence and coordination of actions will lead the state to prosperity. Back in 1389, events have already demonstrated all the dramatic consequences of fragmentation, which is why the Serbs must defend their historical homeland, Kosovo, no matter how difficult it was during this period [9]. The speech ensured the rise of national ideas among the Serbs and the strengthening of internal national confidence. Unity among the Serbs raised the factor of conflict, as the nation, inspired by the leader's speech, was no longer ready to compromise and accept the Albanians' claims to independence and special status. Milosevic's speech can be considered a reference point when the Serbs realized their strength and right to defend Kosovo. Unwillingness to compromise also played a role in the severity of the conflict. The declaration of Kosovo's independence in February 2008 was the apogee of the Albanians' struggle for independence, from that moment the rhetoric that Serbia cannot exist without Kosovo became even stronger among the Serbian political elite. Boris Tadic, under whom the actual secession of Kosovo took place, even before the precedent said that this step would not accelerate Kosovo's accession to the EU. At a press conference in RIA Novosti back in 2004, long before the Ahtisaari plan was discussed, the leader spoke about the impossibility of creating a new state in the Balkans (Tadic: the creation of an independent Kosovo is unacceptable for Serbia [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20041116/734721.html Accessed 08.10.2023). The West's obvious support for the separatist movement, as well as NATO's open participation in the war, made it obvious that the creation of an independent Kosovo, which could potentially become a springboard for the NATO contingent, would radically change the situation of forces in the region. In addition, the mechanism of using humanitarian interventions would change, as this would create a precedent for success [10]. Such a step would create a sharply hostile formation on the borders of Serbia. Judging by the current situation, the forecast of the former president of Serbia turned out to be true. Belgrade, surrounded by states gravitating towards the Western bloc, was forced to balance between the Western Path (which would actually mean recognition of Kosovo) and ties with Russia (which implied reduced energy prices). After the start of the special operation in Ukraine, the leadership of Belgrade is "forced" to join the anti-Russian rhetoric. At the same time, it is important to note the fact that Serbian leaders are less radical in their statements. An example of this is the recent participation of the Serbian Prime Minister in the Crimean Platform. Ana Barbic did not comment on Russian actions, but only spoke about support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, readiness to provide humanitarian aid in the form of medicines (Serbia's participation in the "Crimean Platform" hits not Russia, but the Serbs in the region [Electronic resource] // Source: https://dzen.ru/a/ZOe-m-piblV8xXTf Accessed 06.11.2023) . Although the need to "choose a path for Serbia" has always existed, it became especially acute even before 2014, when, after another wave of expansion and the admission of economically weak members, questions were born about the fate of the EU, and, accordingly, about the foresight of the decision to join this organization. Even then, in contrast to the "weakening" EU, Russia had to provide its own alternative [11]. The next step in the evolution of official Belgrade's position on Kosovo can be considered the statements of President Boris Tadic that Kosovo as part of Serbia will be much more likely to enter the EU than acting independently (Tadic: Serbia's accession to the EU is not related to the solution of the Kosovo problem [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20070726/69744825.html Date of application: 10/15/2023) . In 2007, the country's leadership saw the declaration of independence as a dangerous precedent and hoped to convince the United States to abandon the strategy of bringing Kosovo to independence. In addition, it was noted that the EU does not impose any condition on Serbia regarding Kosovo for joining the organization. Returning to the current situation, we are witnessing a complete change in the attitude of EU representatives to this issue. Olaf Scholz demanded recognition of Kosovo's independence from Alexander Vucic and joining anti-Russian sanctions at a meeting in Belgrade in June 2022 (Vucic responded to Scholz's words about the need to recognize Kosovo's independence in order to join the EU [Electronic resource] // Source: https://topwar.ru/197599-vuchich-otvetil-sholcu-na-slova-o-neobhodimosti-priznat-nezavisimost-kosovo-dlja-vstuplenija-v-es.html Date of application: 17.09.2023). It is important to note that before this, the German leader held a meeting with Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti, where they also discussed the prospect for Kosovo to receive official candidate status on a par with Serbia. Despite the fact that Olaf Scholz is not an expression of the opinion of the entire EU (after all, there are members in the organization whose positions on Kosovo are categorical – Spain and Greece), there is a gradual exhaustion of hope for a relatively painless inclination of Belgrade to accept Kosovo's independence. If this was not discussed in 2007, then at the current stage it becomes obvious that the EU is not able to influence Serbian categoricality by other means than open blackmail. Boris Tadic tried to find a solution to preserve Kosovo as part of Serbia, giving the province the widest autonomy, as evidenced by the eight-hour debate of the Serbian Assembly (Kosovo proposed autonomy instead of independence [Electronic resource] // Source: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/789777 Date of application: 17.09.2023). Thus, the president declares his readiness to cooperate, and at the same time take steps towards European integration. After the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, Boris Tadic expresses calm while waiting for the decision of the International Court of Justice (Boris Tadic is grateful to Russia for its support on the issue of the status of Kosovo [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20091020/189801534.html Date of application: 13.10.2023) . Then he takes another step towards rapprochement with the Kosovo Albanians – congratulations on the New Year in Albanian when visiting the region (Boris Tadic in Kosovo [Electronic resource] // Source:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UVKkDcznzSk Accessed 07.11.2023). It was under this president that Serbia became an official candidate for the EU, which also indicates another step towards the West. Boris Tadic's presidency is distinguished by its focus on European integration, the real successes of Serbian diplomacy on the way to the EU indicate the country's readiness to make concessions during this period. On the one hand, these steps make us think about how deep the president would be willing to go in matters of European integration, and what red lines he would be willing to cross in pursuit of EU membership. The willingness to cooperate with the Kosovars can be regarded as an attempt to keep control of the situation in their hands without igniting a large-scale conflict in the Balkans, as well as as the beginning of a smooth process of transferring independence to the province. On the other hand, the President has repeatedly firmly stated that it is impossible to accept the independence of Kosovo (Serbia will never recognize the independence of Kosovo, Tadic said [Electronic resource] // Source https://ria.ru/20070202/60122140.html Date of application: 10.10.2023), relying on the support of Russia in this matter. At the same time, for example, in terms of energy, close cooperation between Russia and Serbia began back in 2008 with the signing of an intergovernmental agreement, according to which the Russian company Gazprom Neft acquired 51% of the shares of the Serbian company Naftna industrija Srbije ("Oil Industry of Serbia"; NIS) [12]. Since the presidency of Boris Tadic, the prospect of joining the EU is categorically not directly dependent on the fact of recognition of Kosovo. The President has repeatedly emphasized that it is impossible to create connections between these aspects. The next president, Tomislav Nikolic, whose victory turned out to be a big surprise, agreed with the importance of continuing the political course towards European integration, but clearly indicated that Kosovo would not be exchanged for EU membership (A former radical became President of Serbia [Electronic resource] // Source: https://smotrim.ru/article/1979162 Date of application: 17.09.2023). Based on the statements of the new president, it can be assumed that Brussels was not as confident in him as, for example, in Boris Tadic, since Tomislav Nikolic has repeatedly stated the importance of maintaining and expanding ties mainly with Russia (Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic: I do not hide that after Serbia I love Russia the most [Electronic resource] // Source: https://oko-planet.su/politik/politiklist/167420-prezident-serbii-tomislav-nikolich-ya-ne-skryvayu-chto-posle-serbii-bolshe-vsego-lyublyu-rossiyu.html Date of application: 12.10.2023). It could have been expected that he would turn the country completely to the east, especially after the migration crisis hit Europe, and the Serbian leader began to ask questions about the benefits of joining the EU (Tomislav Nikolic: Serbia wants to maintain fraternal ties with Russia [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20160310/1387422248.html Accessed 22.10.2023). For the first time since 2008, he held a meeting in Brussels with the President of Kosovo, Atifeta Yahyaga, which was considered by Western media as Serbia's last step towards recognition of Kosovo, and in fact, was an attempt to extinguish the noise around the problem (The Presidents of Serbia and Kosovo held the first-ever negotiations [Electronic resource] // Source: https://lenta.ru/news/2013/02/07/first / Date of application: 10/30/2023). Although Brussels initially feared a turn of the country towards Russia, Tomislav Nikolic remained faithful not only in words to his promises to strive for the EU, but also in practice. In 2013, an important step was taken in the rapprochement of Belgrade and Pristina – the signing in Brussels of the principles of normalization of relations [13]. An assessment of this document, on the one hand, may lead to conclusions about a change in Belgrade's position on Kosovo, on the other hand, may make it clear about its strong intention and faith to solve the problem. The point that all Serbian structures should be integrated into the bodies operating on the territory of Kosovo, and the order should be controlled by the Kosovo police (represented by EU forces) can be regarded as an actual rejection of the northern regions of the province. Such a step is theoretically an aid in the formation of Kosovo statehood, so it turns out that Belgrade recognizes that sooner or later secession will happen [14, p. 119]. From this we can conclude that this document contains a radical change in Belgrade's attitude towards Kosovo, which has now acquired a certain humility with the fact that secession has already taken place, and the issue of recognition is only a matter of time, depending on the strength of Western pressure. In addition, Hashim Thaci stated that the Serbs recognized Kosovo de jure by this agreement. The countries confirmed the mutual opening of the European perspective, which means for both Kosovo and Serbia the possibility of joining the EU. Considering that such states as the USA, Germany, Great Britain and a number of others that recognize the independence of the republic have congratulated the countries on this step, we can conclude that this document is, if not a complete, then still a partial surrender of Kosovo. On the other hand, fateful and radical statements regarding the fate of the region have not been made. Official Belgrade has remained true to its position. His desire remained fundamental that the leading positions in northern Kosovo should still be occupied by Serbs, and Albanian paramilitary units should not enter this region, but the latter was fixed only by an oral agreement. The actual exchange of northern Kosovo for an illusory date for the start of EU accession negotiations is unequal. In any case, the fact that the document turned out to be so ambiguous only indicates a change of approach to the solution of the Kosovo issue on the part of both Albanians and Serbs, because previously categorical positions did not allow negotiations to progress at all. During the presidency of Tomislav Nikolic, there was an unprecedented imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation in 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea. This situation has stirred up discussions about Kosovo again, and during this period, for the first time, there is a direct link between the solution of the Kosovo problem and accession to the EU, built by the European Commissioner, Johannes Hahn (Nikolic: The EU expects Serbia to recognize Kosovo and sanctions against Russia [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20141203/1036269746.html Date of application: 17.10.2023). The current President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, is the successor of the main ideas of protecting Serbian interests in Kosovo and Metohija. He has repeatedly repeated about the ongoing struggle for a united great Serbia, which he will always support and lead himself. The rhetoric of the president's speeches has changed recently in connection with the current geopolitical transformations of the world picture, but the same idea can be traced about the historical belonging of the region to Serbia. To a greater or lesser extent, this idea is pedaled in various speeches and in various negotiations. Depending on the negotiating partner or the audience, Aleksandar Vucic resorts either to the desire to normalize relations with Kosovo, or to the protection of the Serbian population in the enclaves and throughout the territory, or to calls to fight for the territorial integrity of the country, but the main line of policy is always unchanged – Kosovo must remain Serbian. The President adheres to the prospect of joining the EU, but this becomes an illusory goal, which is also evident in the disputes between members over the 2018 strategy "A reliable prospect of EU enlargement and its enhanced interaction with the Western Balkans" [15]. For example, the speech of the Serbian president in Kosovo Mitrovica in 2018 is filled with calls for the protection of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija [16]. The President emphasizes that the pogroms and protests in Metohija at that time serve as proof of the importance of the process of defending the region and protecting the Serbs. Here, a reference is made to the battle on the Kosovo field, but the context here is different from the widespread myth of the moral victory of the Serbs. Vucic mentions the importance of listening to others, not just your own personal interests. This is the main omission of the former leaders who gathered the army, who did not listen to other people's interests. Vucic sees a similar mistake in the good intentions of S. Milosevic, in his opinion, with the consequences of which Serbia puts up to this day. Alexander Vucic openly declares that he sees the solution to the problem in establishing relations with Albanians and establishing everyday life and daily life on the same territory. Despite the fact that a full agreement is far away, the prospect exists. In this aspect, the president was wrong in predicting the date of normalization of relations with Kosovo, since in 2020, with the mediation of the United States, an agreement on normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina was signed in Washington. On September 4, 2020, Kosovo's Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President Vucic signed a document called "Economic normalization", referred to as the "Washington Agreement". The Trump administration praised the Washington Agreement as a historic commitment and a "major breakthrough" in relations between Kosovo and Serbia[2]. Vucic's statements looked the most confident during conversations or meetings with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Russia has repeatedly expressed its full support for Belgrade's position on Kosovo and Metohija. Despite the fact that, since May 2022, no interactions have been carried out (Vucic said that he had not spoken with Putin for more than a year because of the attitude of the West [Electronic resource] // Source: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/01/06/2023/647864aa9a7947d126e5afc5 Date of appeal 08.11.2023), since ties with Russia can be used as an accusation against Serbia, until From that moment on, the cooperation was distinguished by unanimity of opinion. For example, at one of the last meetings of colleagues, the parties agreed on reduced energy prices, and also discussed the importance of normalizing the situation in Kosovo under the control of Belgrade (Without NATO, but with gas [Electronic resource] // Source: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2021/11/25_a_14244955.shtml?updated Accessed: 08.11.2023). In the current situation, representatives of the EU countries are no longer trying to disguise the ultimatum about the need for Belgrade to recognize Kosovo in order to obtain membership. During Olaf Scholz's visit to Serbia, the German Chancellor openly declared a direct relationship between the two events. Alexander Vucic in response to this drew a parallel with Ukraine ("As you love the territorial integrity of Ukraine, we also love the territorial integrity of Serbia" (Vucic answered Scholz's words about the need to recognize Kosovo for EU membership [Electronic resource] // Source: https://topwar.ru/197599-vuchich-otvetil-sholcu-na-slova-o-neobhodimosti-priznat-nezavisimost-kosovo-dlja-vstuplenija-v-es.html Accessed 04.11.2023)). The issue of territorial integrity has been raised by Vucic more than once, one of the last, most important decisions regarding Kosovo is the permission of the Council of Europe to begin the process of joining the structure. Firstly, it violates the Washington agreements of 2020 banning Kosovo from joining international organizations. Secondly, Alexander Vucic rightly raises the question of why the territorial integrity of Ukraine is so zealously defended by the West, when the territorial integrity of Serbia is an empty phrase (Serbia is forced to react to the decisions of the Security Council [Electronic resource] // Source: https://iz.ru/1504500/andrei-kuzmak/zla-uzhe-ne-khvataet-serbiia-vynuzhdena-reagirovat-na-reshenie-soveta-evropy Date of application: 29.10.2023). The position of the country's leader is clear and unchangeable, regardless of the surrounding reality and the level of pressure. The details of the rhetoric may change, but Aleksandar Vucic clearly limits Belgrade's policy on this issue. Let the West repeatedly "blackmailed" and predicted the withdrawal of investments, the closure of the visa-free regime with the EU and the termination of European integration for Serbia (The right-wing parties of Serbia called the West's plan for Kosovo a capitulation [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20230128/kosovo-1848111515.html Date of appeal 17.10.2023), the position of the central government and the largest Serbian Progressive Party in parliament has been determined. The opposition view, recognition of Kosovo's independence, is also represented in the Serbian political elite. For example, the Liberal Democratic Party of Serbia is an openly pro-Western structure, whose charter stipulates the recognition of Kosovo and the goal of the country's early accession to the EU [17]. This party is part of the People's Assembly in a coalition with the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, which is also in opposition, occupying only 9 seats out of 250 (Serbian parliament left without clear opposition as the ruling party wins partially boycotted elections [Electronic resource] // Source: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/06/22/serbian-parliament-left-without-clear-opposition-as-the-ruling-party-wins-partially-boycotted-elections/ Accessed 20.10.2023) In recent months, Alexander Vucic has been able to find a balance between a position on Ukraine and not breaking ties with Russia. The statements and results of the summit on the Balkans, held at the end of August 2023, serve as proof of this (Media: Vucic was surprised by the presence of the leader of Kosovo at the summit on the Balkans [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20230822/vuchich-1891411334.html Accessed 03.11.2023). Vladimir Zelensky appealed to the Serbian president with a request for a personal meeting. Thus, Alexander Vucic demonstrated that he is not looking for negotiations with the Ukrainian side, remaining committed to the previously stated views that all NATO fighting with Russia will still not be able to prevail (Vucic said that the West cannot defeat Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20230818/ukraina-1890778597.html Accessed 03.11.2023). At the same time, he had a chance to discuss positions with Ukraine confirming that the countries adhere to the ideas of territorial integrity and the need to comply with international norms (Vucic discussed with Zelensky the situation in Ukraine and Kosovo [Electronic resource] // Source: https://ria.ru/20230822/vuchich-1891457579.html Accessed 03.11.2023). This position will not harm Serbian-Russian relations, as it is completely logical: if Serbia supports the annexation of Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia, then the right to defend Kosovo will be lost. The reverse situation also applies to the Ukrainian side. Despite the fact that mutual positions bring the parties closer together, Alexander Vucici remains principled on the issue of imposing sanctions against Russia. He insisted that calls for sanctions be removed from the text of the declarations of the "Athens Summit". It can be concluded that Serbia has found a certain balance between the two blocs, taking advantage of the weaknesses of each. The complexity of this position lies in the fact that it does not bring the country any closer to achieving its goal of joining the EU. In addition, at the end of the XX century, the United States, Great Britain, France and other NATO members demonstrated that international norms no longer restrain the actions of states by bombing Belgrade and later recognizing the independence of Kosovo contrary to the UN Declaration 1244 [18]. And the hysteria itself around anti–Russian sanctions reflects the fact that in almost identical situations – the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions - the international community acts diametrically opposite. The leading forces of globalism, having declared the idea of a nation-state obsolete, actively insist on building a state for Albanians who played the role of victims of the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, so that the United States could demonstrate that it is not an enemy of Islam [19, p. 55]. The Serbian view of Kosovo is that the territory has neither state status (statehood) nor state solvency (stateness) [20, p. 248]; which is radically different from the vision of the Western world, which fills both aspects with meaning. Thus, the dominant view in the Serbian political elite is obvious. Most parties support the central idea of belonging to Kosovo, since Serbian statehood and independence itself are based on it. It seems that if Belgrade submits to the West in this matter, it will lose the very meaning of its existence. In recent years, the country has been developing as if "against and in spite of" in order to prove its worth and be ready one day to take control of Kosovo, which is completely lost, because the ongoing skirmishes around Serbian enclaves take place, and cannot be prevented by Belgrade in any way. The idea of fighting for Kosovo is the central national idea, which serves as a unifying principle and builds patriotism around itself. References
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