The Rhine-Ruhr Service — an instrument of German propaganda during the Ruhr crisis of 1923

Nurislamov Ruslan Rifovich Independent researcher 107143, Russia, Moscow, highway Open, 33 ruslan.nurislamov89@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The Ruhr crisis, which broke out after the entry of French and Belgian troops into Germany in early 1923, became an important milestone in the history of the Weimar Republic and the development of international relations in Europe. Limited in its actions due to the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty regarding its armed forces, Germany, which was on the verge of disaster, managed to achieve a resolution of the conflict in a favorable way for itself. This makes it relevant to study the means that the Germans used to achieve their goal.

Among the works specifically devoted to the Ruhr crisis of 1923, the works of B. Muller ^[1], K. Fischer ^[2], G. Kruger ^[3] should be highlighted, as well as two collections containing articles by various, mainly German scientists, "The Ruhr crisis of 1923: a turning point in international relations after the First World War" ^[4] and "The Shadow of the First World War: the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923" ^[5]. In the above-mentioned studies, as a response to the seizure of the Ruhr by Franco-Belgian troops, "passive resistance" was considered in detail, expressed primarily in the holding of general strikes and the refusal of the German population to obey orders from the occupation authorities.

At the same time, a much more modest place in the research literature is given to another important tool that the German government relied on during the Ruhr crisis — external propaganda. A special study by G.Y. Muller is devoted to the analysis of the activities undertaken by the Germans in this field in the period 1923-1925^[6]. His work shows how, along with direct government activity, after the beginning of the Ruhr crisis in Germany, there was a surge in private initiatives to conduct propaganda abroad ^{[6, S. 124-132]}. Some of the newly formed non-governmental organizations continued to function after 1923, for example, the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information (German: Aufklärungs-Ausschuss Hamburg-Bremen) ^[7-8]. Others, however, quickly curtailed their activity. The purpose of this article is to analyze the activities of the Rhein—Ruhr service (German Rhein-Ruhr Freie Arbeitsgemeinschaft wirtschaftlicher Verbände; Stelle Rhein-Ruhr) created during the Ruhr crisis of 1923 and determine why this propaganda structure ceased to exist by the end of the year. The sources for writing were documents related to its foundation, functioning and liquidation from the Federal Archive of Germany (German Bundesarchiv, in short. BArch).

Georg Klingenberg and Karl Kremer were at the origins of the Rhine-Ruhr service ^{[6, S. 125]}.G. Klingenberg was a certified engineer and was known for his activities in the field of power plant construction. According to his projects, over 70 similar structures were erected, some of them abroad (Mielert M. Klingenberg, Georg // Neue Deutsche Biographie. Band 12. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980. S. 79-80. [electronic resource]. URL: https://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/0001/bsb00016329/images/index.html?seite=93 (date of address: 06/07/2023)). G. Klingenberg possessed organizational skills and extensive scientific connections: since 1922, he served as chairman of the Association of German Engineers (German: Verein Deutscher Ingenieure), and was also involved in leadership positions in other scientific, technical and professional associations. K. Kremer, in turn turn, a professional lawyer, has successfully realized himself in the political sphere. Since 1920, he was regularly elected to the Reichstag as a member of the German People's Party. In Parliament, K. Kremer was an exponent of the interests of the economic circles of heavy industry in Westphalia. This region was experiencing significant difficulties due to the fact that the occupation authorities prohibited the export of coal outside the Ruhr ^{[9, p. 80]}, therefore, local industrialists were interested in using all possible means to resolve the crisis in favor of Germany and the early withdrawal of Franco-Belgian troops. K. Kremer was also associated with a nationalist politician, a media magnate Alfred Hugenberg, who in 1920 appointed him director of the Telegraphen-Union news agencies and the Deutscher Überseedienst. Along with the activities relevant to the news agency, the German Overseas Service also engaged in propaganda in foreign countries ^{[10, S. 287]}.

Consequently, it was K. Kremer, due to his practical experience in the information sphere and propaganda, who was a decisive figure in the service of the Rhine-Ruhr. G. Klingenberg at the same time assumed representative functions and carried out communication with official state bodies. After the entry of Franco-Belgian troops into the Ruhr region, he addressed the government with a number of messages in which he defended the need to strengthen propaganda. In an address to Chancellor Wilhelm Kuno on February 21, 1923, G. Klingenberg noted that the already established network of propaganda structures had undertaken tangible activity within the country, while pointing out the need for serious improvements in conducting propaganda abroad (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 136). He proposed a number of different concrete measures to strengthen influence on the population of foreign countries (deepening contacts with foreign correspondents; mediation in interviews with leading figures of the German economy and their publications in foreign newspapers; propaganda in foreign ones intended for the average reader, as well as specialized technical and scientific journals, etc.) (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 136), the implementation of which could be handled by the Rhine-Ruhr service under his control, and referred to the need to provide material support from the State (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 136v). V. Kuno enthusiastically accepted the ideas presented to him. He believed that the Rhine-Ruhr service could make an important contribution to influencing the public opinion of foreign countries (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 13). As follows from his correspondence with the head of the government's press department, Friedrich Heilbron, the chancellor realized that propaganda in this situation could be crucial for Germany (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 6), and the official and private initiative should combine their efforts to achieve common goals (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 7). It was supposed to allocate all the necessary material resources for carrying out urgent activities, while, from V. Kuno's point of view, unnecessary expenses related to uncoordinated or even selfish interests of individual structures should be avoided (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 8).

Most likely, V. Kuno's final position on the role of the Rhine-Ruhr service in the German propaganda system was influenced by the opinion of State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery Eduard Hamm, which he formed after a personal conversation with G. Klingenberg. E. Hamm reacted with apprehension to the actively unfolding, but at the same time uncoordinated with the government activities of the Rhine-Ruhr service (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 139). He also questioned the competence of G. Klingenberg in matters of propaganda. The State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery correctly established that the determining persons in the service of the Rhine-Ruhr are K. Kremer and A. Gutenberg standing behind him, who, from his point of view, could use the organization to spread their own political line. E. Hamm came to the conclusion that the organization's activities should be limited to the production of films and illustrative material for German and foreign magazines, as well as building interaction between German and foreign entrepreneurs for propaganda purposes (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 139v). As follows from V. Kuno's letter to G. Klingenberg dated March 13, 1923, the Chancellor agreed with the position of the State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery and ordered the Rhine-Ruhr service to limit itself to the directions stated by E. Hamm. She had to coordinate her activities with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the press department of the government, which would allocate funds only for strictly prescribed tasks (BArch. R 43-I/227. Bl. 140).

An idea of the activities undertaken by the Rhine-Ruhr service since then is given by the reports that G. Klingenberg sent to V. Kuno and F. To Heilbron (BArch. R 43-I/228. Bl. 47–50, 111–114, 117–120). According to them, the newly formed organization has developed wide activity both inside and outside the country, while interacting with other structures, in particular with the economic and political society (German Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft), the German Defense Union (German Deutscher Schutzbund), the League for the Protection of German culture (German Liga zum Schutze der deutschen Kultur), the press service of the Ruhr-Rhein in Bielefeld (German Pressestelle Ruhr-Rhein in Bielefeld), the Union of German newspaper publishers (German Verein Deutscher Zeitungsverleger), the committee of German universities (German Ausschuss deutscher Hochschulen), the committee of German students of the Ruhr (German Ruhrauschuss der deutschen Studentenschaft), the export consulting bureau and import (German: Export und Import Beratungsstelle), by the Evangelical Press Association (German: Evangelische Presseverband).

At the same time, the actions taken by the Rhine-Ruhr service went beyond the directions indicated by the Government. The organization was engaged in the production of film products, propaganda posters, brochures, leaflets, photographic materials, which were shown during various events (for example, at the Frankfurt Exhibition), distributed among the Franco-Belgian troops, German and foreign population, and promoted articles for publication in the foreign press, distributed leading German newspapers in the Ruhr region and abroad, she organized exhibitions, prepared propaganda reports. Visits by Germans to foreign countries and foreigners to German territory, establishing contacts abroad and distributing propaganda materials there were organized by the Rhein-Ruhr service not only at the level of economic circles, but also within the framework of universities, students and the Christian Church.

The further course of development of the Ruhr crisis influenced the functioning of the German propaganda system and predetermined the fate of the Rhine-Ruhr service. The internal situation of the country was deteriorating, and there was a constant increase in inflation. After the general strike in August 1923, V. Kuno resigned. The government was headed by Gustav Stresemann, under whose leadership an active fight against inflation began, the policy of "passive resistance" began to be curtailed, and reparations payments in favor of France were resumed. Diplomatic activity and propaganda abroad had already had some effect by that time, so the new chancellor hoped, through the assistance of foreign states (especially the United States and Great Britain), for a solution favorable to Germany of the reparation issue, which became the direct reason for the entry of Franco-Belgian troops into the Ruhr region. In September 1923, the German government made a proposal to hold a conference on reparations, which the French government, under pressure from the Anglo-Saxon powers, was forced to accept ^{[11, p. 114]}, and on November 23, 1923, an agreement was signed between the Germans and representatives of the Franco-Belgian control commission, which provided for the withdrawal of occupation troops from the territory of the Ruhr ^{[11, p. 112]}.

As archival documents show, in October 1923, G. Stresemann noted, with some change in semantic orientation (emphasis on the unity of the country, the fight against political division and separatism), the need to continue propaganda activity both inside and outside Germany and ordered the formation of a special fund for this, monthly payments from which were also relied on for the service of the Rhine-Ruhr (BArch. R 43-I/228. Bl. 289-290). It is obvious that the restriction or curtailment of the activities of organizations could lead to the loss of established contacts abroad, which, if propaganda work resumed, could lead to even greater costs. Nevertheless, the changed domestic political conditions had an impact on the Chancellor's plans. The German Finance Ministry, pointing to the country's dire economic situation, has significantly reduced the size of the planned propaganda fund. On November 1, 1923, K. Kremer, in a message to the new State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery, Adolf Kempkes, wrote about the impossibility of continuing his previous activities abroad due to insufficient material support. For this reason, the management of the Rhine-Ruhr service decided to liquidate it (BArch. R 43-I/228. Bl. 302). At the end of November 1923, G. Stresemann thanked K. Kremer and G. Klingenberg in writing for the work done, expressing the hope that in the future it would be possible to recreate the organization (BArch. R 43-I/228. Bl. 311-312). However, the Rhine-Ruhr service ceased operations forever.

Considering the process of functioning of the Rhine-Ruhr service from foundation to liquidation, we can come to the following conclusions.

The state's lack of material resources due to the deterioration of the economic situation caused by the costs of supporting the population of the occupied regions and the resumption of reparations payments to France was the most important reason for the termination of the organization's activities at the end of 1923. However, this could not be the only reason, given that not all private structures (for example, the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information) curtailed their activities. activity after the resolution of the Ruhr crisis of 1923

The critical situation after the entry of Franco-Belgian troops into the Ruhr region in early 1923 forced the German government to resist in any possible way, to support any initiative directed against the occupiers. Private propaganda organizations could be considered by the government as competitors, but the seriousness of the situation forced them not only to allow, but also to financially support their activities.

As the foreign policy crisis began to resolve, the German government's approach to propaganda began to change. This was also influenced by the strengthening of regional separatism and political radicalism in Germany. Propaganda within the country became more urgent than outside it. Only the most effective structures could continue their activities in cooperation with the state. The Rhine-Ruhr service could not be classified as such due to the following circumstances. Firstly, the organization was unable to find its unique niche in propaganda. Its activities were characterized by a wide scope, which implied interaction with other structures. Secondly, despite some of Kremer's propaganda experience, the Rhein-Ruhr service could not have such extensive and stable connections in various foreign countries, unlike, in particular, the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information ^{[7, pp. 91-92]}. In addition, as shown earlier, there were initial suspicions in the government that the Rhine-Ruhr service might get out of control and promote its own line of propaganda. In the context of increased confrontation in society, this could be extremely dangerous.

All of the above explains why the Rhine-Ruhr service could not withstand competition and ceased to exist by the end of 1923.