Russian-Belarusian relations of the late 1990s – early 2000s: the view of French researchers

Trifonova Elizaveta Dmitrievna ORCID: 0000-0002-0636-8426 Senior Lecturer, Department of Foreign Languages, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University) 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10 k.2, room 502 elizkin3@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Babintseva Ekaterina Alekseevna ORCID: 0000-0002-1197-0892 PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of Foreign Languages, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, RUDN University 117198, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, office 502 babintseva-ea@rudn.ru

The analysis of the views of modern French researchers on the relations between Russia and the post-Soviet republics allows us to identify and assess the interest that modern Western, in particular, French researchers show in Russia's foreign policy both in general and in its relations with the former Soviet republics. The Republic of Belarus is Russia's closest neighbor, so relations with this state have been one of the priorities of Russia's foreign policy since the collapse of the USSR.

The signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991, which took place without consultations with the rest of the Soviet republics, led to the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a regional international organization that united most of the former Soviet republics on the one hand, but also marked their separation on the other ^{[1, p. 12-13]}, since, as some French researchers believe, this step did not take into account the interests of the majority of the former Soviet republics, pushing some of them towards rapprochement with Western countries ^{[1, p. 12; 2, p. 30]}. Despite the geographical proximity to Russia, most of the countries of the so-called near abroad did not seek relations with Russia similar to those they had with the RSFSR, perceiving Russia as a hegemon. Russia itself, having lost the status of an imperial power, could not provide either support or influence on these countries ^{[1, 3]}. It should be noted that after the collapse of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin's main goal was to preserve the solidarity of the three Slavic states that were part of the USSR, including Belarus, which, as he believed, were inseparable ^{[1, p. 12]}. But despite the fact that a new regional organization was formed, which was intended to replace the USSR to one degree or another, in the 1990s the main vector of Russian foreign policy was still aimed at the West, and not at the so-called near abroad ^{[1, p. 14]}. The French authors explain this by the fact that, firstly, Russia, perceiving itself as the "heiress of the colonial past of the empire", sought to achieve recognition as a "great European state" ^{[1, p. 15; 4, p. 53]}, and, secondly, relations with the former Soviet republics as a whole were quite complex and contradictory, since Russia viewed itself as a key player not only in the entire post-Soviet space, but also in the CIS itself, from which, since the collapse of the USSR, it has been trying to create a controlled space where it wanted and could dominate ^{[5, p. 22; 6, p. 111]}.

However, it should be noted that at the end of the 1990s, Russia itself is a rather politically weak state that faces other priorities and is forced to engage in domestic rather than foreign policy ^{[5, p. 53; 7 p. 158-159; 8, p. 75]}. Only after Russia manages to strengthen its position in the international arena in the early 2000s, the issue of relations with the countries of the post-Soviet space gradually returns to the political agenda and even becomes a priority [5 p. 53; 7, p. 158; 8, p. 75]. French researchers associate the increase in Russia's interest in the region after the collapse of the USSR with the end of the era of "Mr. Yes" - M. Kozyrev, who insisted on pursuing a pro-Western course, and the appointment of Foreign Minister Ye. Primakov, who switched to a multi-vector foreign policy, and after V. Putin came to power, who from the first presidential term not only declared that he would pay the closest attention to the CIS member countries, but also secured the status of a priority area for the post-Soviet space in the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the region becomes one of the priorities of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation ^{[1; 2; 9; 10; 11]}. On the other hand, not all French researchers adhere to this point of view, considering the policy pursued by V. Putin towards the CIS less productive compared to the policy pursued by E. Primakov, and noting that it was under E. Primakov that Russia tried to consolidate its influence in the CIS by signing a number of bilateral agreements, for example, the agreement on reintegration by Belarus ^[12], and with the arrival of V. Putin, Russia in its policy towards the post-Soviet space has to increasingly resort to levers of pressure, such as, for example, energy ^{[12, p. 108; 13, p. 49]}.

However, most French researchers and analysts have no doubt that with V. Putin's coming to power, Russia not only intends, but also manages to strengthen its position in the post-Soviet space, where the CIS really becomes not just one of, but the first regional priority of foreign policy ^{[1, 5, 8, 14]}. It is then that Russia manages to become the center of attraction for some CIS member states, it aims to create new forms of cooperation and integration within this organization, and Belarus, along with Ukraine, is included in the sphere of "privileged" interests of Russian foreign policy. The most successful example of integration is the Union State of Russia and Belarus, within which cooperation goes on in all areas, despite the tensions that arise from time to time in relations between the countries. In the same vein, we can talk about such structures within the CIS as the CSTO and the EurAsEC, which, according to D. Tertry, together form a massive, relatively orderly and thoughtful geopolitical ensemble and which are present in all CIS regions ^{[5, p.128; 15]}. It should be noted that both Belarus and Russia are not just members of all these structures, but the main and active participants ^{[1, 5, 8, 15]}.

Since the collapse of the USSR, relations between Russia and Belarus have been different from relations with other former Soviet republics, since Belarus has always remained one of the key players in the integration processes taking place in the territory of the post-Soviet space. Among the reasons for such a desire for rapprochement between Russia and Belarus, most researchers single out, on the one hand, economic difficulties caused by Belarus' strong dependence on Russia for the supply of raw materials and exports of goods, as well as cultural proximity with the "elder Russian brother", and the election of the "pro-Russian" Alexander Lukashenko to the post of president of Belarus, on the other hand ^{[5; 16]}. But despite this, it should be noted that immediately after the collapse of the USSR, Belarus under the leadership of S. Shushkevich, like most of the former republics of the USSR, sought to get closer to Europe and tried to sign an Agreement on partnership and cooperation with the European Union, but it was never signed. However, as noted above, when A. Lukashenko came to power after the elections in 1994, Belarus, like Russia after E. Primakov came to the Foreign Ministry, chooses the eastern vector of foreign policy. It should be noted that it is under the leadership of A. Lukashenko that the country really begins to move towards "merging" with Russia: in a fairly short period, an Agreement on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus (1995), an Agreement on the creation of a community of Belarus and Russia (1996), an Agreement on the Union of Russia and Belarus (1997), the Treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on Equal Rights of Citizens (1998), and, finally, the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State (1999), which became a concrete step towards real integration between the two post-Soviet states and in which, in particular, the free movement of citizens of Russia and A free trade zone is being established across the territory of the two countries, issues of military cooperation are being considered, etc., and the formation of the Customs Union in 2010 marks an unprecedented strengthening of ties uniting the two countries ^{[1, 5, 8, 15]}.

It should be noted that the main attention in their works devoted to the foreign policy of Russia and the Republic of Belarus and the relations between these two countries, French researchers and analysts pay specifically to partnership in the economic and military spheres, unfortunately, not stopping at cooperation in other areas, such as, for example, culture and education.

In 1995, Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus founded the Customs Union, which Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined in 1996 and 1998, respectively, and which was transformed into the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in 2000. The purpose of this organization was the formation of a common market, as well as coordination of actions in the economic sphere. According to most researchers, the Customs Union and the EurAsEC, although they are among the main priorities of Russian diplomacy aimed at implementing integration projects ^{[4, 11]}, are ineffective, since Russia uses these economic associations primarily for political purposes to maintain its influence, as well as to confront China and the EU ^{[2, p. 41-42; 5, p. 69]}.

As for the partnership between Russia and Belarus in the economic sphere, French researchers emphasize that, due to the fact that Belarus is a member of all economic integration structures within the CIS, it is more profitable for Belarus – obtaining energy resources at preferential prices, the possibility of duty-free export of its goods to the Russian market, etc. immediately after the collapse of the USSR, thanks to the integration processes taking place between Russia and Belarus, the latter manages not only to preserve, but also to develop its industry, including oil refining (despite the fact that Belarus has no oil reserves, it has had two fairly modern oil refineries since the Soviet era at the beginning of the 1990s the plant), which, thanks to Russia, is becoming the leading export industry of Belarus, which most post-Soviet states failed to do ^{[5, p. 77]}. However, the apparent benefit for the Belarusian side turns out to be even more dependent on Russia for it, in connection with which certain problems arise from time to time in relations between the countries, such as attempts to revise trade rules and existing pricing systems in the field of energy, refusal to privatize Belarusian enterprises in Russian interests, but despite this, the integration of the two states does not stop, and the free trade zone, based on political and economic compromises between the two states, actually becomes the greatest success of the Union state from an economic point of view ^{[5, p. 76]}.  

In their works, French researchers pay special attention to military cooperation between Russia and Belarus within the framework of various integration associations of the post-Soviet space, emphasizing the unprecedented strengthening of ties that unite the two countries in this area.

Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has sought to make its ally in the person of Belarus an important asset in its strategy towards NATO, which, according to most French researchers, it has successfully succeeded. The principles of military cooperation were formulated and enshrined in the military doctrine of the Allied Russian-Belarusian State in 2001, and the continued strengthening of military cooperation between Russia and Belarus, observed over the past decades, leaves no doubt about the decisive strategic role that Russia assigns to its Belarusian ally in a possible crisis with the West. It was within the framework of the Russian-Belarusian Union State that several dozen bilateral agreements were signed during the entire post-Soviet period, which provide for "coordination of the policy of armaments, armed forces and air defense, military intelligence, training of personnel, as well as joint use of military infrastructure and political coordination in matters of regional security" [15 p. 156; 20, p. 162;]. Being Russia's only ally on the western flank of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - a regional international organization founded in 2002 on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty, which was signed in 1992 by Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and to which Belarus joined in 1993 ^[17] - it is Belarus, thanks to its special geostrategic position, that allows Russia, which, faced with the so-called "open door policy" of NATO and continuing to develop the "besieged fortress syndrome", to protect their security interests in the event of possible Western aggression ^{[15, p. 161; 20]}. In this case, according to most researchers, Belarus will be able to become a so-called buffer zone for Russia: a territory capable of receiving Russian troops; an ally that allows combining military capabilities and acting as a springboard for advancing to the West as part of an offensive against NATO forces ^[18]. D. Tertry also notes the intermediary role that Belarus plays Within the framework of the CSTO, Russia participates in resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet space, emphasizing that Russian leaders have already "been able to assess its usefulness" ^{[15, p. 159]}.

Summing up, I would like to note that most researchers note that relations between Russia and Belarus are among the strongest and steadily developing, and in comparison with other interstate associations within the CIS, the Union State is not just the most ambitious in its goals, but also the strongest integration association between the two former Soviet republics, regulating relations between the two countries in various fields of cooperation. It is interesting to note the interpretation of the choice of the name of this organization given by D. Tertry, who points, firstly, to a symbolic reference to the word "union", which is extremely important for former Soviet citizens, and, secondly, that the union presupposes "strict legal equality of the two sides", which implies the existence of the same status for both states ^{[5, p.74; 19]}. However, most researchers believe that this is far from reality, since Russia, as noted above, acts as an "older brother", providing economic and military support, which both sides, and especially the Belarusian side, value for its weight in gold ^{[8, 19, 20]}, but, as some researchers note, which It is not accompanied by equivalent compensation from Belarus ^{[5, p. 80]}. The goal of Russia, according to the majority, is to preserve Belarus in its zone of influence, as well as "support integration processes on the territory of the near abroad by any possible means, but within a narrower framework" ^{[3, p. 64]}, and Belarus' political and military dependence on Russia makes it an extremely convenient and malleable partner, on which Russia can rely on it.