Topical issues of countering modern autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles and FPV drones

Nikolaev Nikolay Vladimirovich PhD in Economics Staff Member, The Academy of the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation 302015, Russia, Orel region, Orel, Priborostroitelnaya str., 35 nnv85Nikolas@list.ru Il'in Vladimir Viktorovich PhD in Technical Science Staff Member, The Academy of the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation 302015, Russia, Orel region, Orel, Priborostroitelnaya str., 35 w.ilin82@yandex.ru

Nekrasov Maksim Igorevich PhD in Technical Science Staff member, The Academy of the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation 302015, Russia, Orel region, Orel, Priborostroitelnaya str., 35 nekr-maks@yandex.ru

Introduction

Currently, considerable attention is being paid to the development of physical protection systems (FSS) of important facilities ^[1-3]. This is due, among other things, to the emergence of new means of implementing security threats – modern unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with explosive devices. Thus, autonomous UAVs flying according to a loaded program do not emit radio signals and, as a result, are not detected by specialized means of radio intelligence from the composition of the object SFZ. In turn, UAVs controlled by pilots using video from course cameras in the "first person" mode (hereinafter referred to as FPV drones) are characterized by small size, high speed and maneuverability, the presence of original parameters of control channels and data transmission. These aircraft are "inconvenient" targets with a high potential to overcome existing security systems. At the same time, autonomous UAVs and FPV drones have acceptable technical parameters (flight speed and duration, payload) for use for illegal purposes, for example, to commit terrorist and sabotage acts.

To neutralize these threats, research is currently underway aimed at finding effective methods of countering such means ^{[1, 4]}. The choice of a method of countering modern UAVs is a complex scientific and technical task, the solution of which requires taking into account many factors, for example, the location and configuration of the object, the peculiarities of the adjacent territory, the need to ensure electromagnetic compatibility of radioelectronic devices and others ^{[3, 4]}. This determines the relevance of the topic of this study.

Taking into account the above, the purpose of this article is to identify effective methods of countering modern autonomous UAVs and FPV drones in the interests of developing a scientific and methodological apparatus for substantiating SFZ objects.

In this regard, in order to achieve the purpose of the study, we will evaluate the capabilities of modern UAVs, study the practice of their application to identify key features. We will conduct a critical analysis of the main methods of countering UAVs and, based on it, present their brief characteristics, determine the advantages and disadvantages. In addition, based on the results of the study, we will propose directions for the development of means of countering modern autonomous UAVs and FPV drones.

1. Features of modern unmanned aerial vehicles

The results of the analysis of the capabilities and practice of using modern UAVs ^{[1, 4-12]} allowed us to identify their key features:

– modern UAVs provide the ability to fly in an autonomous mode, in which radio control and data transmission signals are not emitted, which makes such aircraft invisible to the main means of detection – means of radio intelligence;

– certain types of modern autonomous UAVs provide the ability to automatically identify and identify targets, as well as perform various actions against them in accordance with embedded algorithms (surveillance, tracking, attacks) by placing high-performance information processing tools on board for the functioning of artificial intelligence algorithms;

– modern UAVs have the ability to change the software version, as well as the introduction of additional signal amplification cascades on board the UAV or ground control station (NSO), which gives them a relatively greater resistance to electronic influences relative to their basic modification;

– highly maneuverable homemade FPV drones, assembled from ready-made components (available for free sale), which cannot always be identified by means of radio intelligence by the characteristic parameters of radio control and data transmission signals due to the possibility of using atypical circuit solutions and receiving and transmitting devices operating in unique frequency ranges, have become widespread;

– certain types of modern UAVs that use cellular network resources to organize control channels and data transmission cannot be identified among many other subscribers by available means of radio intelligence.

The analysis of the capabilities of modern UAVs and the practice of their use during a special military operation in Ukraine, as well as the results of a study of existing means of detecting and countering them, allowed us to conclude that the most difficult targets with high potential to overcome existing SFZ are autonomous UAVs and FPV drones with explosive devices. In this regard, an urgent task is to find effective methods of countering such means.

To this end, we will conduct a critical analysis of the main methods of countering modern UAVs in the context of assessing the possibility of their use to combat autonomous UAVs and FPV drones.

2. Critical analysis of the main methods of countering unmanned aerial vehicles

The analysis of publications ^[4-15] showed the absence of a single generally accepted classification of methods of countering UAVs. At the same time, the following methods of influence are considered in works on this topic ^{[5, 13-15]}:

– radio-electronic equipment;

– information technology;

– electromagnetic;

– laser;

– acoustic;

– mechanical.

Radio–electronic interference (radio-electronic suppression of control channels, data transmission and navigation) is a method of countering UAVs, in which interference signals are generated and emitted to impede (block, disrupt) the functioning of UAV and NSO systems ^[13]. Technical products implementing this method, as a rule, use a barrier noise interference at the typical frequencies of the UAV control, data transmission and navigation channels, which provides an unacceptable signal-to-noise ratio in the bandwidth of the UAV or NSO radio receiving path.

The following types of the method of radioelectronic exposure are distinguished ^{[5, 13]}:

– suppression of UAV control and data transmission channels;

– suppression of satellite radio navigation equipment (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou, etc.);

– combining varieties of the method of radioelectronic exposure.

The method of radioelectronic exposure of UAVs has the following main advantages ^{[4, 5]}:

– only a renewable resource is consumed – electricity, not weapons of destruction;

– selective impact is carried out both on certain types of UAVs with specified parameters, and on their individual on-board systems;

– the impact is provided on several UAVs at once.

However, the use of this method is associated with a number of disadvantages ^{[4, 5, 7, 13]}:

– the possibility of influencing the control and navigation channels of UAVs only if electromagnetic accessibility is observed, since the effectiveness of their suppression decreases in proportion to the square of the distance to the target;

– the inability to counteract UAVs flying in autonomous mode (in the "radio silence" mode) according to a preloaded program using inertial or noise-proof navigation systems;

– electronic jamming means do not provide effective counteraction to UAVs using unique information exchange protocols and frequency ranges to organize control channels and data transmission;

– electronic suppression devices have limitations on their use due to the need to meet the requirements for electromagnetic compatibility with other electronic means;

– relatively low efficiency of countering UAVs using broadband signals to organize control and data transmission channels;

– electromagnetic radiation from electronic suppression devices has a negative impact on operators and other technical means;

– There are legal restrictions on the use of satellite radio navigation suppression devices.

It is important to note that currently the method of radioelectronic exposure (suppression) is the main method of countering UAVs. However, the development of modern UAVs in the direction of increasing their noise immunity for successful operation in a complex electronic environment, as well as the widespread use of homemade FPV drones operating in unique frequency ranges, significantly reduces the effectiveness of this type of impact.

Information technology impact (control interception, spoofing, ddos attacks) is a method of countering UAVs, in which the impact is carried out by intercepting control, imposing incorrect modes of operation on on-board systems and special software on UAVs and/ or NSOs. To implement this method, technical means of counteraction must obtain information about the control protocols used and access to control and telemetry channels in order to generate and subsequently transmit substitution commands or data.

The following types of information technology impact method are distinguished ^{[5, 14]}:

– violation of radio communication between UAVs and NSOs;

– violation of information exchange between UAVs and NSOs;

– changing special software for UAVs and/or NSOs;

– substitution of satellite radio navigation signals (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou, etc.).

Violation of radio exchange between UAVs and NSOs provides ^{[5, 14]}:

– disruption of synchronization and/or communication procedures;

– the imposition of incorrect modes of operation in the channel or network protocols of the radio network;

– overflow of the input buffer by DOS or DDOS attacks;

– malfunction of the software of the microcontroller for controlling radio transmission facilities.

Disruption of information exchange between UAVs and NSOs includes ^{[5, 14]}:

– interception of UAV control by replacing the operator's console;

– substitution of control commands in order to transfer the UAV to an incorrect flight mode, turn off the engines, power supply of on-board equipment and payload;

– substitution of telemetry data for the NSO.

Changing special software on UAVs and/or NSOs involves unauthorized implementation ^{[5, 14]}:

– computer viruses in special UAV software;

– software bookmarks in the UAV that ensure the reception and execution of commands from third-party sources.

Substitution of satellite radio navigation signals (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou, etc.) implies the creation of a false radio navigation field (GPS-spoofing) ^[14].

The method of information technology impact on UAVs has the following advantages ^{[7, 9, 14]}:

– it is not the means of destruction that are consumed, but only a renewable resource – electricity;

– the information obtained on the format and structure of the control and data exchange protocols used allows you to determine the type of UAV, its coordinates (based on data from on-board navigation equipment) and the coordinates of the NSO, the status (state) of the aircraft systems, the sequence of control commands, software parameters and settings, etc.

– information technology impact is characterized by secrecy, which makes it significantly difficult for the operator to take timely and adequate counteraction measures;

– substitution of the radio navigation field can significantly reduce the effectiveness of some types of autonomous UAVs.

The following disadvantages of this method are highlighted ^{[4, 5, 7]}:

– intercepting the control of a UAV seems to be a very non-trivial scientific and technical task, requiring specialists to create and constantly replenish a database of signal, format, streaming and network parameters of radio control channels;

– low efficiency of substitution of individual low-level control commands and telemetry data, since each subsequent command from the NSO and telemetry data from the UAV make all previous ones irrelevant;

– effective information and technical impact on UAVs requires the integration of radio and radio intelligence, network computer intelligence, etc. into a single complex;

– the use of cryptographic information protection equipment, as well as broadband signals in the communication channel between the UAV and the NSO, significantly complicates the information technology impact on the UAV;

– there are legal restrictions on the use of means of substituting satellite radio navigation signals.

It should be noted that the method of information technology impact on UAVs is actively developing. Currently, technical solutions providing substitution of satellite radio navigation signals have become the most widespread.

Electromagnetic interference (functional damage by microwave radiation) is a method of countering UAVs based on remote disabling of on–board electronics by high-power electromagnetic radiation ^[4]. Technical products (microwave emitters, microwave guns) use narrowly directed radiation that can change the electrophysical parameters of semiconductor elements of radioelectronic systems by overheating or breakdown in order to disrupt the operation of on-board UAV systems. The effectiveness of functional damage by electromagnetic weapons depends on factors such as the intensity of the electric field at the target location, its design, as well as the frequency of radiation.

The advantages of the electromagnetic impact method are the following ^{[7, 8]}:

– it is not the means of destruction that are consumed, but only a renewable resource – electromagnetic energy;

– electromagnetic means have an "area effect", which provides the possibility of hitting single and group targets;

– the ability to affect almost all types of UAVs, including autonomous and FPV drones;

– electromagnetic means do not require precise targeting and information about the operating modes of the UAV;

– weather conditions (smoke, rain, fog) do not significantly affect the range of damage.

The disadvantages of the method include ^{[4, 7, 8]}:

– electromagnetic means do not provide selectivity in relation to the targets being hit in the area of action;

– has restrictions on the use in cases where various electronic systems are located in the affected area (for example, in urban areas, in the presence of infrastructure facilities, etc.);

– requires high energy costs;

– to significantly reduce the effectiveness of electromagnetic interference, it is enough to apply simple circuit solutions aimed at reducing the strength of induced currents, as well as shield the electronic components of the UAV (for example, using a "Faraday cage");

– the radiation of electromagnetic means has a negative impact on operators and other persons in their area of operation.

It should be noted that electromagnetic interference is an effective method of countering UAVs, which is currently actively developing in the direction of ensuring selective impact on targets.

Laser exposure (functional damage by laser radiation) is a method of countering UAVs, in which the impact on an object is carried out by narrowly directed high–energy electromagnetic radiation in the optical wavelength range.

Depending on the density of the laser radiation flux, the following main types of the method are distinguished ^{[4, 7]}:

– thermomechanical effect on UAV elements (destruction, melting, evaporation);

– defeat of optoelectronic devices of UAVs (arrays of receivers of optoelectronic systems);

– optical effect on optoelectronic devices of UAVs (blinding).

The advantages of the laser exposure method are the following [6-8, 10, 15]:

– it is not the means of destruction that are consumed, but only a renewable resource – electricity;

– the thermomechanical effect (destruction, melting) of laser devices is characterized by secrecy, which makes it significantly difficult for the operator to take timely and adequate countermeasures;

– laser tools have high selectivity, since they require high accuracy of aiming the laser beam at the target;

– laser tools can be used on autonomous UAVs flying in "radio silence" mode and FPV drones;

– the absence of mechanical inertia, which determines the ability of the laser beam to hit highly maneuverable targets;

– the ability to adjust the degree of impact on the object by changing the power of the laser beam (from "blinding" the optoelectronic systems of the UAV to its physical destruction).

At the same time, there are a number of disadvantages of the laser exposure method ^{[4, 6-8, 15]}:

– high requirements for the quality of target designation for laser weapons;

– high requirements for laser guidance systems due to the necessary accuracy and duration of continuous exposure (0.5-15 s) to UAVs to melt their elements in conditions of active maneuvering;

– existing laser installations have a significant interval between a series of "shots", which can reach tens of seconds, which negatively affects the possibility of repelling a group attack by a UAV;

– the effectiveness of laser exposure is significantly influenced by weather conditions (smoke, rain, fog, etc.), since the attenuation of the laser beam occurs in atmospheric gases;

– high serviceability and high energy consumption;

– laser products (chemical type) have significant weight and size characteristics and high heat dissipation;

– to reduce the effectiveness of laser exposure, it is enough to apply a special coating on the UAV that promotes the scattering (reflection) of laser radiation, as well as equip the aircraft with a smoke screen type aerosol sprayer;

– high cost of laser systems.

It should be noted that laser exposure is a promising method of countering UAVs. This method is actively developing in the direction of finding new constructive solutions that ensure the elimination of its main disadvantages.

Acoustic impact (acoustic suppression of an autonomous navigation system) is a method of countering UAVs, in which the UAV gyroscope is affected by acoustic vibrations. Frequency-matched acoustic effects negatively affect the operation of gyroscopic sensors due to the resonance effect. This can lead to destabilization of the aircraft in space and a subsequent accident ^[4].

This method is characterized by the following advantages ^{[4, 5]}:

– only a renewable resource is consumed – electricity, not weapons of destruction;

– relatively low cost of technical implementation of the method;

– acoustic means can affect the gyroscopes of autonomous UAVs flying in the "radio silence" mode.

The main disadvantages of the acoustic impact method ^{[4, 5, 7, 8]}:

– short range of existing technical means (up to 40 m) and intense sound effects with a power of about 140 dB;

– the difficulty of selecting the resonant frequency of different models of UAV gyroscopes to create an emergency situation;

– low efficiency of the UAV counteraction method due to the design of gyroscopes (in some of them, resonance affects only the orientation channel along the horizontal axis) and the presence of magnetometers duplicating the orientation of the UAV in the horizontal plane;

– an easy way to reduce the effectiveness of this effect is acoustic protection of the gyroscope with foam material;

– it is necessary to study the issues of ensuring the environmental safety of such means, since an acoustic oscillation at the level of 120-140 dB corresponds to the pain threshold and can lead to concussion of the operator.

It should be noted that the conducted research and experiments have revealed the low efficiency of this method due to the limited range and the required high power of acoustic exposure. In this regard, its use to counter UAVs is considered inappropriate.

Mechanical impact is a method of countering UAVs, in which an object is hit by fire (kinetic impact) or its physical interception (physical impact) ^[4]. Fire damage is aimed at destroying (damaging) the UAV by transferring the kinetic energy of the striking element to it. Physical interception involves the impact on the UAV, leading to a forced stop and/ or restriction of the mobility of its structural elements.

In publications ^{[4, 5, 7-12]}, the following main varieties of the method of mechanical action are highlighted:

– fire damage to UAVs by means of artillery weapons (anti-aircraft artillery installations (ZAU), anti-aircraft machine gun installations (ZPU), anti-aircraft missile and cannon complexes (ZRPC)), guided missile weapons (anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS)), small arms (machine guns, submachine guns etc.) and kamikaze UAVs with explosive devices;

– kinetic impact of ram-type interceptor UAVs;

– the use of interceptor UAVs with installed means of fire destruction;

– the use of systems for throwing volumetric nets, threads or tapes made of high-strength materials, adhesive (viscous) and flammable aerosols, which can be placed both on the "ground" in the form of hand-held (portable), mobile and stationary installations, and on UAV interceptors;

– the use of specially trained birds to intercept UAVs.

The main advantages of the method of mechanical action include the following ^[7-11]:

– capturing small-sized UAVs with a network is the easiest to implement and quite effective method;

– provides the ability to defeat all types of UAVs;

– relatively low cost of weapons of destruction (except guided missile weapons) and physical interception;

– weather conditions (smoke, rain, fog, etc.) do not have a significant effect on the means of fire damage to UAVs.

The main disadvantages of the mechanical action method are ^{[7, 9, 10, 12]}:

– the effective use of fire (kinetic) weapons requires the use of high-precision targeting systems, high-performance ballistic data calculators and pre-emption angles, as well as automatic guidance systems;

– when the UAV is hit by fire with artillery weapons (ZAU, ZPU, ZRPC) and small arms, a large consumption of ammunition occurs;

– the use of means of fire (kinetic) impact is associated with the possibility of causing collateral damage to human life and health, infrastructure elements and other material values;

– the use of ram-type interceptor UAVs or kamikaze UAVs often leads to their irretrievable loss;

– the use of interceptor UAVs is not an effective method of counteraction in case of repelling a group attack by small-sized maneuverable UAVs;

– the use of sticky (viscous) and combustible aerosols is associated with the following problematic issues: strong dependence on weather conditions; restrictions on use in urban conditions; complexity of the aerosol cloud formation process with the required concentration level of the active substance in a given location; a short "life span" of the aerosol cloud; low efficiency against actively maneuvering UAVs, etc.;

– the use of ground-based systems for throwing volumetric nets is limited to a range of no more than 200-300 m;

– the use of birds of prey is associated with long periods of their training, the influence of external stimuli and psycho-physiological characteristics of animals on the effectiveness of intercepting UAVs.

It should be noted that mechanical action is a relatively easy-to-implement method of countering UAVs with certain limitations on the use of technical means and complexes. At the same time, the means of fire damage or physical interception in combination with detection, targeting and automatic guidance systems have sufficient potential to counter modern UAVs.

3. Comparative analysis of methods of countering autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles and FPV drones

The physical foundations of various methods of countering UAVs characterize the theoretical possibility of influencing modern UAVs or their individual systems. At the same time, the achieved high level of development of unmanned aviation, as well as the current level of development of science and technology in the field of countering UAVs, together impose significant restrictions on the possibility of applying the considered methods in practice. In this regard, we present the results of a comparative analysis of counteraction methods, taking into account the theoretical and practical possibility of influencing autonomous UAVs and FPV drones at the current stage of their development (Table 1).

Table 1 – Results of the assessment of the main impact methods for combating autonomous UAVs and FPV drones

The results of a comparative analysis of methods of countering autonomous UAVs and FPV drones allowed us to conclude that the most effective of them are:

– electromagnetic effects;

– laser exposure;

– some methods of mechanical action.

Let's consider the required parameters for the effective application of these methods of countering autonomous UAVs and FPV drones.

The results of a study on the evaluation of the effectiveness of electromagnetic effects on UAVs show that when using microwave pulses with a duration of 200-270 ps with a spectrum width of 2-3 GHz, various kinds of aircraft failures occur ^[16]. Thus, when the electric field strength is formed on the surface of the UAV ^[7]:

– 0.05-0.07 kV/m reversible effects occur: failures during maneuvering of the UAV, in the power supply of electric motors and on-board payload, malfunctions of receiving and transmitting devices, etc.;

– 1.4 kV/m irreversible malfunction of the UAV is observed – loss of control due to failure of individual systems;

– from 3 kV/m and above, the element base of the on-board UAV systems is being disabled.

To destroy microwave diodes and integrated circuits, it is required to provide a microwave signal power at the input of UAV radioelectronic elements from 0.006 to 0.4 W, switching diodes and low-power transistors – 0.06-9.5 W, microwave diodes and microcircuits – from 6.125 to 125 W, switching diodes and low–power transistors - from 62 W ^[7].

It should be noted that the existing disadvantages of electromagnetic means, due to the lack of selectivity of the affected electronic systems in their area of operation, impose restrictions on the scope of application of such means to repel attacks by autonomous UAVs and FPV drones.

The results of the study on the evaluation of the effectiveness of laser exposure to UAVs show ^{[6, 7]}:

1. For thermomechanical effects on UAV elements by destroying them (melting, evaporation), it is required to hold a 2 kW laser beam on the structural elements of the aircraft for 10-15 seconds, and a 20-50 kW beam for 0.5–5 seconds. At the same time, at a distance of 2 km, the angular accuracy of the laser beam guidance should be at least 0.00145 °.

2. To defeat optoelectronic devices of UAVs, it is necessary to create an energy density of laser radiation:

– 0.005–0.01 J/cm2 (pulse duration 0.3 s) on the outer surface of the camera lens filter (responsible for improving light, reducing reflection and protecting the lens) to exceed the melting point of its surface layer;

– 0.01 J/cm2 at the entrance pupil of an optoelectronic device for rapid heating of the radiation receiver to a high temperature with subsequent failure.

3. For optical effects on optoelectronic UAV devices (blinding), a laser radiation energy density of less than 0.005 J/cm2 is required.

Radiation levels for thermomechanical effects on UAV elements and damage to their optoelectronic devices can be created by a laser source with a pulse energy of 200-300 J at a range of 5 km ^[7].

It should be noted that since autonomous UAVs and FPV drones are in motion and maneuvering, the actual orientation accuracy of the laser beam to obtain the effect of hitting UAVs at a distance of 2 km should be on the order of 0.001-0.002 °. This condition characterizes the high requirements for the guidance system of the laser damage complex, which significantly increases its cost and manufacturability.

A more promising and relatively inexpensive version of the method of countering autonomous UAVs using a course camera for geo-positioning or object detection and identification, as well as FPV drones, is the optical effect on optoelectronic UAV devices. The conducted research ^{[6, 7]} shows that for optical (blinding) effects, a relatively low density of the laser radiation flux and a short duration of exposure are sufficient. These factors make it possible, even with a relatively low power of the laser radiation source, to increase the diameter of the optical beam, thereby significantly reducing the requirements for the accuracy of its guidance. In this regard, this type of method has great potential for development.

The results of the study on the evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanical action show that ^{[4, 7, 8]}:

1. The use of small arms for effective destruction of maneuvering small-sized targets requires the use of automated guidance and fire control systems. However, even with conditionally ideal aiming, the probability of defeat depends on the accuracy of the weapon's combat (for example, for a 7.62 mm Kalashnikov machine gun, the normal accuracy of combat is characterized by four bullets hitting a circle with a diameter of 15 cm at a distance of 100 m), the distance to the target and other factors. In this regard, the guaranteed defeat of such targets requires the production of several series of shots, and the effective firing range does not exceed 200 m.

2. Artillery weapons (SAU, ZPU, ZRPC, etc.) have a high rate of fire. Guaranteed defeat of maneuvering small-sized targets by these means requires significant ammunition consumption, even with the use of automated guidance and fire control systems. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of this type of method in terms of countering autonomous UAVs and FPV drones. To eliminate this shortcoming, work is currently underway to create projectiles with a programmable detonation time. Their use will ensure the creation of a cloud of striking elements at a given point in space, which will reduce the requirements for precision targeting and significantly reduce the time of hitting targets and ammunition consumption.

3. Guided missile weapons (SAMs, MANPADS) in terms of defeating the UAVs considered in the article are characterized by excessive combat power and a significantly higher cost of weapons relative to the cost of targets. In this regard, their mass use against autonomous UAVs and FPV drones is considered impractical from an economic point of view. It should be noted that work is currently underway to create inexpensive small-sized short-range guided missiles (up to 2 km) to defeat UAVs. Common standard ammunition is used as their warhead, for example, shots with a fragmentation grenade, hand grenades, etc.

4. The use of UAV interceptors (kamikaze) of all types with manual or automated control does not ensure effective destruction of maneuvering small-sized targets due to insufficient operator reaction speed. Meanwhile, the development of systems for automatic targeting of these weapons at the target, as well as unmanned platforms with the required flight characteristics, is underway. The most promising direction in this subject area is the introduction of algorithms for processing video data from the course camera of an interceptor UAV (kamikaze) for automatic recognition, capture and targeting. At the same time, the execution of these algorithms should be carried out on the computing resources of the NSO.

It should be noted that the existing disadvantages of means of mechanical action due to the short effective range of small arms, the significant consumption of ammunition for artillery weapons, the high cost of guided missile weapons, as well as the difficulty of aiming such means at small maneuvering targets significantly limit the possibility of their use to counter autonomous UAVs and FPV drones. In addition, the use of mechanical means is associated with the possibility of causing collateral damage to human life and health, damage to infrastructure elements and other material assets.

Thus, the results of the analysis of the required parameters for the effective use of electromagnetic, laser and mechanical impact methods to defeat autonomous UAVs and FPV drones allow us to conclude that optical (blinding) effects on optoelectronic UAV devices seem to be the most promising direction for the development of methods to combat such targets. This approach makes it possible to use relatively cheap, compact laser installations with a wide beam of radiation that does not require its precise guidance and long-term retention on the target.

Conclusion

The development of robotic technologies has predetermined the emergence of new means of implementing security threats to important facilities – autonomous UAVs and FPV drones with explosive devices. In order to counter such threats, it is necessary to continuously improve the SFZ of facilities in the direction of countering modern UAVs.

The article highlights the main features of modern UAVs, and concludes that the most difficult targets with high potential to overcome existing security systems are modern autonomous UAVs and FPV drones. The characteristics of the main methods of countering modern UAVs are given, their advantages and disadvantages are highlighted. The results of a comparative analysis of these methods are presented, reflecting the susceptibility of autonomous UAVs and FPV drones to various kinds of effects.

In addition, the paper presents the required parameters for the effective application of electromagnetic, laser and mechanical impact methods to defeat autonomous UAVs and FPV drones, which allow us to conclude that the most promising is the optical effect on optoelectronic devices of these aircraft.

The results obtained can be used as the basis for research aimed at developing technical solutions and their application as part of the SFZ, ensuring the protection of important objects from attacks by modern UAVs.