Innovations of "great power diplomacy with chinese characteristics" by Xi Jinping "in the new era"

Khan' Xuemei Postgraduate, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, RUDN University 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, office 302 72malibu@mail.ru

Lyu Syuiyan Postgraduate, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, RUDN University 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, office 302 lxy516871@mail.ru

After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, diplomacy gained a significant role in China. This was expressed in the promotion of a number of innovative ideas, among which the central place is occupied by the concept of building a "Community of one destiny for humanity", which China understands as building a new type of international relations, creating a network of global partnership, observing the principles of justice in international relations and taking into account the interests of all states. Also, having put forward the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China expressed its readiness to lead the reform of the global governance system, establishing the basic framework of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics" while simultaneously advancing a mutually beneficial theory of cooperation. The course of President Xi Jinping has led to an increase in China's activity in the activities of regional and global governance institutions – the UN, BRICS, the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and others, which have assumed important functions for maintaining sustainable economic growth, improving and reforming the modern system of international relations, ensuring international security and creating a new world order. The defining moment of China's diplomatic relations with leading states and third world countries was both China's economic interest in the necessary resources for its rapidly developing economy, and the political component aimed at expanding the circle of foreign policy partners and strengthening influence in the world.

At the same time, the main topic for the development of Chinese diplomacy at the present stage is the implementation of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics", which will lead to a change in existing tools and the development of new practices. Traditionally, diplomacy with Chinese specifics was exclusively peaceful in nature, since it served to implement "peaceful development", "harmonious peace", "Community of a common destiny for humanity" and other foreign policy concepts aimed at creating a favorable background for strengthening China's structural power.

In the Russian scientific community, the peculiarities of Chinese diplomacy are actively studied by such Sinologists as A.V. Vinogradov ^[1], A.D. Voskresensky ^[2], E.N. Grachikov ^[3], A.V. Lomanov ^[4], A.Ch. Mokretsky ^[5], V.Ya. Portyakov ^[6], E.I. Safronova ^[7] and others. In the Russian scientific tradition, a deeper emphasis is placed on identifying and studying the main stages of the development of China's diplomatic practice in both bilateral and international formats. The analysis of the Russian scientific discourse makes it possible to clarify the impact of changes in the modern global security architecture and world politics on Chinese diplomacy.

In the Western scientific community, the thesis about the modification of Chinese diplomacy and the introduction of a more rigid and irreconcilable model of diplomatic behavior, which has been called "wolf warrior diplomacy", is increasingly being heard. This point of view is reflected in the works of such authors as P. Martin ^[8], C. Zhu ^[9], Z.A. Huang ^[10], D. Cheng ^[11], D. Wu ^[12], etc. In particular, P. Martin notes that "the diplomacy of the wolf warriors is based on long-standing traditions in Chinese diplomacy and is closely connected with the domestic political demands of the masses ^[13]. It is worth emphasizing that in Chinese political discourse, this term is considered as a "discursive trap" and a continuation of the "Chinese threat theory". At the same time, the reasons that led to the appearance of this term are called justified by increasing pressure on China's fundamental interests.

Due to the presence of prejudices in Western academic discourse, the purpose of this study seems relevant, which is to determine the features of "diplomacy of a great power with Chinese specifics in a new era." The objectives of this work are to examine the peculiarities of Xi Jinping-era diplomacy, to clarify the degree of their continuity with respect to previous diplomatic strategies of China, as well as to interpret the modern diplomatic strategy of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics" as a consequence of the growing power of China challenging the hegemony of the United States.      

The hypothesis of the study is that "the diplomacy of a great power with Chinese specifics in a new era" indicates that the PRC has abandoned Deng Xiaoping's diplomatic strategy of "hiding its capabilities", "keeping a low profile", "not claiming leadership". This turn in diplomatic strategy is caused by the complication of the strategic situation in the world and the increase in threats to Chinese indigenous interests.

The theoretical and methodological basis of the research has a synthetic character and is based on the theory of structural realism ^[14]. The appeal to this scientific school makes it possible to explain the logic of China's behavior under the structural constraints of the system of international relations and analyze Chinese multilateral diplomacy as a non-forceful tool for implementing foreign policy, taking into account the challenges and threats that arise in connection with changes in the system of international relations. In characterizing the modern changes that are taking place in the system of international relations, the author relied on the interpretation of the theory of "transit of power" ^[15], according to which structural changes at the global level consist in the redistribution of structural power from the United States to China.

When studying this topic, the author used a whole range of methods. Thus, the historical-comparative method made it possible to identify common features and differences in the genesis of the Chinese approach to diplomacy in the period under study and, based on this, to identify the main trends in the implementation of the strategic course of the PRC at the present stage. Historical-typological and problem-chronological methods allowed us to identify the main periods of China's diplomatic strategies based on the identification of a number of characteristic features and draw a conclusion about the continuity and innovation of the diplomatic strategy of the Xi Jinping era.

Theoretical foundations of "Great Power diplomacy with Chinese specifics"

The PRC's diplomacy is divided into three periods: from 1949 to 1978, from 1979 to 2011 and from 2012 to the present. The 3rd plenum of the CPC Central Committee in December 1978 became an important historical milestone, at which Deng Xiaoping announced the beginning of a policy of reform and openness. This has led to drastic changes in China's domestic and foreign policy, including in the very paradigm of its diplomacy.

From the point of view of President Yuan Peng in 1949 – 1978, the basis of the "diplomatic mentality" of the Chinese leadership was the "philosophy of struggle". He points out that during 100 years of national humiliation, 50 years of revolution and 10 years of the "cultural revolution", the international environment, ideology and national feelings defined the struggle as the main component of Chinese diplomacy. The diplomacy of struggle continued to exist even after the Cold War. Yuan Peng calls Deng Xiaoping's diplomacy "the diplomacy of self-restraint" and "modest actions" ^[16].

At the turn of these periods, the concept of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics" began to emerge. It was closely connected with the development of the theoretical school of international relations, which began to take shape after the proclamation of the "reform and opening" policy. The first stage (1978-1990) of the formation of the theoretical school of international relations in China was marked by the influence of Marxism-Leninism and the development of the theory of the "three worlds" of Mao Zedong. During this period, Chinese scientists sought to develop their own concepts and theoretical foundations reflecting the specifics of Chinese diplomacy

Influenced by Marxism-Leninism, they investigated the socio-political structure of China and applied this theory to the analysis of international relations. Also, the theory of the "three worlds" had a significant influence on the formation of the theoretical school, which offered an alternative view of the global division of forces and alliances in the international arena ^[17].

However, by the end of this period, changes in approaches and the inclusion of Western scientific schools in the Chinese theory of international relations began to manifest themselves. Western concepts began to penetrate Chinese discourse as part of modernization and adaptation to the global environment.

Thus, the first stage of the formation of the theoretical school of international relations in China was characterized by an attempt to synthesize Marxist and Chinese concepts with Western scientific schools. This time was an important stage for Chinese diplomacy, as it sought to develop its own theoretical framework reflecting its peculiarities and national interests.

The modern model of diplomacy is organically combined with the course of development of Chinese foreign policy adopted at the XII Congress of the CPC in 1982, where it was decided to conduct an "independent and independent foreign policy". In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the course of "common development" and "joint peace" became the roadmap of Beijing's diplomacy. In 1999, a global strategy was proclaimed, which is being implemented to this day. It was called the strategy of "going abroad" ("zou chuqiu zhanliue" ) ^[18]. It has encountered serious opposition from major powers, because China has gently entered the already divided geopolitical space ^[19]. Accordingly, the involvement of diplomatic tools in the promotion and protection of Chinese national interests abroad was seen as an urgent need.

In the 21st century, the need for a strategic diplomatic approach at the present stage reflects the unity of the internal and external challenges facing the country. China steadily continues to implement the policy of global good neighborliness, according to which China demonstrates unconditional and active support for the international peace situation in the region and opposes aggression and external expansion. This scale allows us to say that the status of diplomacy in the process of implementing the strategic course of the PRC has increased significantly, and Chinese diplomatic theory is becoming global ^[20].

Features of Chinese diplomacy of the Xi Jinping era

With the coming to power of Xi Jinping, there was a surge in Beijing's diplomatic activity, which was marked by the introduction of the ideology of the "new era" and four new ideas into Chinese foreign policy: "a new type of great power relations", "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics", "the community of the common destiny of mankind" and "a new type of international relations". There has been a more creative approach (or, as they say in the Chinese scientific community, "creative offensive"), manifested in new initiatives around the world.

According to A.C. Mokretsky, a Sinologist from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, since 2012, "great power diplomacy" includes a number of areas. Among them, the establishment of a new type of relations between major powers is valuable; the creation of a peaceful and stable environment with neighboring countries; the establishment of relations with developing countries based on the concept of justice and interests; the continuation of the policy of reform and openness, as well as the protection of Chinese citizens and their legal rights abroad and the use of "soft power" in relations with other participants in international politics ^[21].

In addition, with the coming to power of a new generation of leaders, the diplomatic activities of high-ranking Chinese officials have intensified. The innovation of Chinese diplomacy also influences the conceptual framework of China's foreign policy. In particular, the fate of Deng Xiaoping's last words was hotly discussed: China was no longer ready to "coldly observe" and "remain silent", but began to act more actively ^[22].

According to Professor Zhao Lei of the Central Party School of the CPC, in the last two decades China has been demonstrating compliance with this requirement, it is developing advanced technologies and equipment on a global scale, is rapidly technologically re-equipped, and makes a great contribution to world scientific progress. In addition, humanitarian cooperation and cultural exchanges between China and other countries are continuously expanding.

The modern period of Chinese diplomacy (2012– present) is characterized by the rejection of the "behave modestly" strategy put forward by Deng Xiaoping and the gradual introduction into practice of the "strive for achievements" strategy, which means the transition from purely economic pragmatics to receiving political dividends in the form of support for their fundamental national interests and promoting their vision of the future model of the global world order.

The implementation of "great Power diplomacy with Chinese specifics" was characterized as a distinctive feature of national development. Chinese President Xi Jinping once again recalled this strategy at the XX Congress of the Communist Party of China. The key components of this model are the following aspects: China is a strong country; leadership, the systemic role of the Communist Party of China; continuity of leadership as the development strategy changes over generations.

A significant element in China's new diplomatic strategy is Russia as the only global strategic partner. The bilateral relations of the two countries are a true example of the creation of a new type of international relations, growing from the bilateral framework of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation to the global framework. This was emphasized in the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and China on International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development on February 4, 2022, and also confirmed by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin during their meeting in Moscow on March 20-22, 2023. The strategic partnership between China and Russia at the international level contributes to the formation of a multipolar world order, contributes to the fight against global challenges and threats, determines the directions of world development.

Thus, it is worth noting the close relationship between the development of the strategic course of Chinese diplomacy and the general process of China's integration into the international system. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, Chinese diplomacy has undergone significant changes, but there is still no consensus on the nature and scale of these changes. However, it is interesting to study the relationship between changes and continuity in China's foreign policy, which is a clear departure from Deng Xiaoping's strategy. This is manifested in a change in the way China acts in the international arena. Now the PRC participates not only in accommodation and adaptation to the institutional environment, but also in its active formation.

Challenges and threats of the emerging world order for China

Diplomacy is one of the instruments of the state's foreign policy, and its implementation is closely related to ensuring national security. In this regard, the forms of diplomatic activity are undergoing changes according to the modifications of the foreign policy and security situation. The current security situation is characterized by the transit of power from the United States to China. In the US National Security Strategy of 2022, China was designated as a "strategic competitor" that pursues a "revisionist foreign policy."

The growth of the PRC's economy as a result of market reforms and integration into the world economy is increasingly forcing Chinese authors, along with anti-Western rhetoric and the desire to find "their own way" and their "Chinese theory of international relations", to listen more and more to international experience and assessments of foreign analysts. The complication of the international situation predetermined the formation in the PRC in the late 1990s of a new concept of state security, which includes, in addition to classical components, such as the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and military threats, as well as phenomena such as terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking, pandemic, environmental crimes, illegal immigration, piracy, cyber and information threats, etc. This concept, outlined in the "White Paper on National Defense", provides for a "three-level strategy", including the goals of ensuring a peaceful environment, reunification of the country, countering hegemonism, the tasks of modernizing the economy and defense, military and political support for the prevention of local war and the ability to win "in low-intensity conflicts."

The key elements of the national security concept with its enriching conceptual apparatus are presented in the "White Paper on National Defense" published annually since 1998, in which, along with the classic tasks of modernizing the armed forces to resist an external aggressor, protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as "conquests of the socialist system", new security challenges are increasingly mentioned and it is stated that financial, energy, environmental, religious, cultural and informational factors are becoming important security variables." It is quite difficult to get more in-depth information about the concept of national security of the People's Republic of China and its evolution, taking into account the reflex essence of foreign policy and the declarative nature of Beijing's statements: the assessment of the international security situation has not undergone significant changes until the last edition of the White Paper of 2019.

On April 15, 2014, at a meeting of the National Security Committee of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping officially outlined the basics of the "comprehensive concept of national security" for the first time. Noting that at present the internal content and scope of the concept of state security are becoming much richer, spatial and temporal aspects are broader than ever in the past, and external and internal factors are more complex than in previous historical periods," Xi Jinping listed the main components of this concept – the so-called "eleven types of security": 1) political security; 2) territorial security; 3) military security; 4) economic security; 5) cultural security; 6) public security; 7) scientific and technical security; 8) information security; 9) environmental security: 10) natural resource security; 11) nuclear security.

Speaking at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in September 2015 Xi Jinping, having formulated the main directions of work on building a "community of one destiny", highlighted the task of "creating a security model based on the principles of justice, joint construction and sharing, mutual trust, cooperation, protection of peace throughout the world and in the region." The promotion of this large-scale foreign policy project has become the main task of Chinese diplomacy within the framework of not only bilateral, but also a huge number of inter-party, public, regional, cultural and civilizational forums. Among these forums, the Group of Twenty Summit in Hangzhou in 2016, Xi Jinping's triumphant speech in Davos in January 2017, where he acted as virtually the only defender of globalization against protectionism, the BRICS summit in Xiamen in 2018, and the One Belt, One Road international cooperation forums 2017 and 2019 stand out. The Xiangshan Forum on Regional Security Issues (the Chinese alternative to Singapore's Shangri La Dialogue), etc. The ideas of "joint gain", "the Chinese plan for the whole world", "the Chinese dream as happiness for the peoples of all countries" voiced at these forums indicate that today China is actively promoting its own vision of its place in the architecture of international relations and is increasingly taking the initiative to promote a "fair and rational" global political and the economic agenda, offering their own solutions in the field of global governance ^[23]. At the same time, Beijing by no means positions itself as a "revolutionary and destroyer", insisting only on the uniqueness of the "Chinese way" of modernization and the unacceptability for China of copying all the elements and values of the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy.

The material embodiment of China's global claims to the formation of the world agenda was the initiative "The Silk Road Economic Belt" and "The Maritime Silk Road of the XXI Century" ("One Belt, One Road" – OPOP) put forward in the fall of 2013. Along with the creation of a New BRICS Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund, the OPOP, according to its basic characteristics – geography, goals and objectives, principles, directions and implementation mechanisms – is the fulfillment of the "dream of the great revival of the Chinese nation." As the authoritative Russian sinologist E.N. Grachikov and the leading researcher of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Xu Haiyan rightly emphasize, the new "innovative" international organizations of the PRC can be considered as "Beijing's desire to format a new non-Western system of international relations" ^[24].

The expansion of China's foreign policy activity has led to a backlash from the United States, which supports military formats in the East Asian region in order to contain China. In 2017 Tokyo, with Washington's approval, initiated the revival of the Quadrilateral Defense Format (QUAD), which consists of the United States, Japan, Australia and India. This marked the beginning of more regular military contacts at various levels. At the moment, the importance of the Format is to maintain regular political coordination (twice a year), as well as to expand the problem field of the organization. It is symptomatic that from Washington's point of view, the importance of QUAD is not limited solely to coordination in a quadrilateral format. Rather, it appears to be a framework concept, and cooperation with Japan, Australia and India is built within a complex network of bilateral and trilateral dialogues. In 2021, AUKUS was created, which is a project to expand military-industrial cooperation between the United States, Great Britain and Australia, providing for the transfer of nuclear submarines to the latter, as well as the necessary technologies for their production. This project is a manifestation of the US military-political tactics of "leading from behind", which is based on the goal of maintaining leadership with greater reliance on regional forces ^[25]. Thus, by increasing the offensive capabilities of its ally, the United States intends to limit the military and economic activities of the PRC in East Asia. The communique of the leaders of the three countries also briefly emphasizes that cooperation can also cover, among other things, "cybernetic capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional underwater capabilities." Despite the military-technical nature of the AUKUS project, the possibility of its development into a military-political instrument is not excluded.

The "Ukrainization" of the Taiwan problem also poses a significant threat to China's national security. The similarity of the crisis that occurred in Ukraine raises China's concerns about the possible stimulation of the armed manifestation of separatist sentiments of the population of Taiwan, followed by separation from mainland China. China regards Taiwan as an indivisible part of its territory and does not recognize its independence. A potential internal conflict or political division in Taiwan may serve as an impetus for the intervention of external forces and the creation of a precedent that will undermine the territorial integrity of China.

Thus, the strategic task that the Chinese leadership faces both in the domestic and foreign policy field requires an effective fight against emerging threats. However, the stability of the world political environment is threatened by the transit of power from the United States to China, which threatens to change the balance of power in a region that is strategically important for China. D. Trump's proclamation of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region" strategy from 2017, based on the quadrilateral QUAD Defense format, which includes the United States, India, Japan and Australia, and the creation of the AUKUS block (USA, Great Britain, Australia) with the prospect of strengthening unfriendly countries along the perimeter of the PRC's borders with nuclear technologies, causes in China of particular concern. The situation in the East China and South China Seas continues to be ambiguous. Finally, starting with the administration of D. Trump, the United States has taken a tougher course with regard to China's trade and economic policy, on human rights, territorial claims and freedom of navigation, calling China the main strategic rival, more dangerous than even Russia and Iran. Relations between China and the United States entered a new round of confrontation after the outbreak of COVID-19, which led to a modification in China's diplomatic rhetoric.

Changing the style of "great Power diplomacy with Chinese specifics"

The significant complication of the foreign policy environment could not but affect diplomacy as a significant tool for the implementation of the country's foreign policy. The unspoken beginning of the change in the style of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics" was laid after the statement of the official representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Zhao Lijian on the social network Twitter in March 2020. Responding to the characterization given by the US President D. According to Trump, that COVID-19 is a "Chinese coronavirus" and "Wuhan flu", Zhao Lijian called for evidence and suggested that the US army brought the virus to China.

However, the new model of Chinese diplomacy acquired stable features after the transfer of Chinese Foreign Ministry diplomat Zhao Lijian from the post of adviser-envoy of the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad to the post of Deputy director of the Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. It was Zhao Lijian's position that caused a serious global reaction, as the media around the world discussed it.

Following Zhao Lijian's statement on the social network Twitter, Chinese representatives in France, Sweden and Venezuela published statements that also contained firmer rhetoric. In February 2021, senior diplomat Yang Jiechi demonstrated China's uncompromising approach by outlining a list of policy changes that he demanded the administration of J. Biden to improve US-China relations. In his speech, Yang Jiechi identified the possibility of "constructive relations" between the United States and China if the former refuse to compete with China; stop efforts to destabilize the economic and technological activities of Chinese companies in the American market, and also respect the position of the Chinese government in relation to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang. In an interview published in June 2021, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shei, touching on the topic of Chinese diplomacy, noted that "now we do everything differently" and "we need to start getting used to it." The ambassador explains the "fundamental reasons for changes in China's diplomatic style" as "changes in the international situation and changes in China's power."

Western media have proposed the term "wolf warrior diplomacy" in response to Beijing's changing style of diplomatic activity during the COVID-19 pandemic, however, this definition has been met with a tough rebuff from Chinese officials. China's position is that the term "wolf warrior diplomacy" is a new round of the "Chinese threat theory" and a discursive trap created specifically for China.

Scientists who analyzed the practice of Chinese diplomacy during the COVID-19 crisis considered the change in the style of Chinese diplomacy a sign that the Xi Jinping administration abandoned Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy emphasis on restraint and patience ^[26], but Beijing officials argued that "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics" corresponds to another aspect of Deng's diplomatic doctrine: "We will never seek hegemony over them or serve as their leader. However, [...] we have to contribute" ^[27]. In other words, behind the restraint, patience and emphatically humane rhetoric of the Chinese leadership since Deng Xiaoping, another goal has been hidden: "to promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order." Thus, the "diplomacy of a great power with Chinese specifics" under the leadership of Xi Jinping is the legacy and development of China's diplomatic practices aimed at "breaking with the main models of international discourse, where the West is strong and we [China] are weak." Their invariable feature remains pragmatism and orientation towards solving national tasks, which at the present stage are united under the auspices of the national mission for the "great revival of the Chinese nation". For example, Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, linked "the diplomacy of a great power with Chinese specifics" with the maintenance of justice, stressing that "kneeling for the people" is not a "tradition."

It is also worth noting that in addition to emphasizing the "spirit of struggle" in the field of diplomacy, Xi Jinping, speaking at the Politburo, stimulated the activation of public diplomacy through two appeals: "effectively exercise international leadership of public opinion", as well as "pay more attention to strategies and methods of combating public opinion." This concept inherited Mao Zedong's thoughts about a "protracted war" ^[28]. Considering the war not only as an armed confrontation, Mao believed that in order for the subjects to win, it was necessary to mobilize the mass public through a number of strategic communication measures. The goal is to adhere to the values of the target audience, to orient and coordinate public opinion in order to "unite with all the forces that can be attracted." Thus, the strategy of a protracted war emphasizes two main tactics: "offensive through defense and exit to the outer lines from the inside" ^[29].

Commenting on the speech of the President of the People's Republic of China in the Politburo, Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies at Fudan University Zhang Weiwei, noted that from now on any negative international reaction to the presentation of China's position is "mainly a problem from the West," and not the fault of Chinese diplomats.

Conclusion

Summing up all of the above, it is worth noting that Chinese diplomacy in the "Xi Jinping era" is enriched both theoretically and practically. The leitmotif of all the innovations of China's diplomatic strategies is the aspiration for more active and deep participation in the reform of the global governance system, the promotion of new concepts, initiatives and projects that reflect the Chinese vision of the system of international relations. At the same time, Xi Jinping returns to the traditional understanding of the concept of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics", in the Chinese style and manner. Chinese diplomacy is still based on the principle of supporting the social system and the country's development path, the principle of supporting an independent peaceful foreign policy, the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" and non-interference in the internal politics of other countries. Thus, when changing tactics, which became more offensive and proactive, the strategy remained unchanged.

In general, the strategic course of Chinese diplomacy at this stage of its development is to comprehensively promote "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics." According to the idea of the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping, voiced by him at the XX National Congress, "diplomacy of a great power with Chinese specifics" should contribute to the construction of a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, honesty, justice, as well as the creation of a "Community of a common destiny for humanity." This succinctly reflects the common goal of Chinese diplomacy "in a new era", and also shows China's international partners the general direction in which they hope to work together.

Due to the aggravation of systemic instability, Chinese diplomacy has acquired a more accentuated and firmer rhetoric, which emphasizes irreconcilability with baseless attacks by Western countries and manipulations with the vulnerability of indigenous Chinese interests. It is worth emphasizing that the question remains whether the new style of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics" is the culmination of the transitional period of Chinese diplomacy or a situational form of defending interests. Since China is facing growing external criticism on an increasingly wide range of issues, it is quite possible that the Chinese leadership will use this model only on the most fundamental aspects of national security as a tool of strategic communication in order to change the balance of forces in the so-called "international struggle for public opinion."