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Conflict Studies / nota bene
Reference:
Tsimashchenia V.
Determinants of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: an analysis of socio-economic drivers
// Conflict Studies / nota bene.
2023. ¹ 4.
P. 62-82.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0617.2023.4.68701 EDN: PPOJTI URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=68701
Determinants of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: an analysis of socio-economic drivers
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0617.2023.4.68701EDN: PPOJTIReceived: 13-10-2023Published: 18-01-2024Abstract: The article analyzes the socio-economic factors that determine the development of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. The reasons for the development of this phenomenon in the region can be divided into poor governance, corruption, low level of human development, problems of inequality and social mobility, as well as the geostrategic position of the countries of the region. The article focuses on the comparison of the most and least vulnerable to organized crime countries in Latin America. The author concludes that the most common factors are weak state institutions, high levels of corruption and social inequality, and insufficient effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures. Venezuela, Mexico, Haiti and some other countries in the region are particularly vulnerable. To mitigate the risks, the author proposes a comprehensive approach that includes strengthening institutions, the rule of law, and combating corruption and inequality. The work makes a significant contribution to understanding the causes of the growth of organized crime in Latin America. Keywords: transnational organized crime, Latin America, corruption, public administration, money-laundering, inequality, the Caribbean, emerging security challenges, drug trafficking, economyThis article is automatically translated. Transnational organized crime poses a serious and growing threat not only to national but also to international security. According to the report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for 2021, organized crime continues to generate enormous revenues. In 2021, the total income of transnational criminal organizations was estimated at about 1.5-2 trillion US dollars. This amount is equivalent to about 2-5% of global GDP [1]. For comparison, in 2009 this figure was 870 billion dollars or 1.5% of world GDP [2, p. 7]. Thus, over the past decade, the income of transnational organized crime has increased by about 2 times both in absolute terms and as a percentage of global GDP. This indicates the continued high profitability of the criminal business and the growth of its scale. Criminal organizations are involved in the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, people, as well as money laundering. Their activities have serious implications for public safety, health, democratic governance and economic stability. The purpose of this study is to analyze the socio-economic factors influencing the development of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. The research methodology includes a theoretical analysis of scientific literature on the problem of transnational organized crime and its socio-economic determinants, collection and processing of statistical data from open sources – reports of international organizations, national statistical bureaus. Sources such as the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Human Development Index, the Rule of Law Index, the Global Corruption Barometer, and the Anti-Money Laundering Index were selected for the study, which evaluate key socio-economic and institutional factors influencing the development of organized crime. The practical significance of the article lies in the fact that its results can be used to develop an effective state policy to combat organized crime in the region, taking into account the identified socio-economic risk factors, developing recommendations by international organizations to reduce the risks of organized crime by solving socio-economic problems, increasing the effectiveness of cooperation between the countries of the region in the fight against organized crime.
The triad of organized crime: violence, corruption, money laundering Organized crime is an integral element. On the one hand, the core on which the successful functioning of the system is based is "mutual concealment, mutual responsibility" or "omert?", and on the other hand, the synthesis of violence, corruption and obstruction of justice. A study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, led by Jan Van Dijk, Mark Shaw and supported by Aurelie Merle, demonstrated that there is a close link between corruption, violence and organized crime. The authors analyzed 40 organized criminal groups and concluded that 30 groups use corruption as a means to achieve their goals, and 33 groups use violence as part of their activities [3, p. 17]. Criminal organizations use violence as a means of establishing control over their own members, over competitors and over illegal markets, regardless of what goods they sell: drugs, protection, trafficking in people or migrants, stolen cars, diamonds or emeralds, or money laundering. On the one hand, they use corruption to carry out their criminal activities, gaining access to markets through payments to officials responsible for overseeing them, winning contracts to perform public works or controlling commodity markets. On the other hand, they bribe judges, prosecutors or the police to obtain preliminary information about the actions of law enforcement agencies, or prison authorities to continue their criminal activities from prison or interpret the sentencing rules in their favor [4, p. 10]. Luis Guillermo Solis and Francisco Rojas Aravena, experts from the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO), proposed the following formula to demonstrate the relationship between the above phenomena: "OP + OD = > N + > K", where OP is Organized crime, OD is Money laundering, N is Violence, K is Corruption [5, p. 68]. The authors also note that organized crime necessarily generates illegal capital, and the more that criminal groups fight for, the more violence they use to control markets, territories or "finish off" their enemies [5, p. 69].
Weak public administration An integral element in the equation of violence is impunity caused by the problem of poor governance. The rule of law is the key to ensuring security, justice, human rights, democracy and sustainable development [6, p. 93]. At the global level, the relevance of strengthening the rule of law is recognized in Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which aims to ensure peace, justice and strong institutions as an integral element of sustainable development. In particular, Goal 16.3 of the 2030 Agenda is aimed at promoting the rule of law and ensuring access to justice for all [7]. Despite the importance of the rule of law for sustainable development, in recent years there have been significant failures in ensuring fundamental rights, checks and balances of State power and the fight against corruption on a global scale, according to the Rule of Law Index 2022 compiled within the framework of the World Justice Project (WJP) [8]. The rule of law is a multidimensional concept, and eight factors are used to measure it in the Rule of Law Index: 1) limitations of State power, 2) absence of corruption, 3) open government, 4) fundamental rights, 5) compliance and security, 6) compliance with regulatory requirements, 7) civil justice and 8) criminal justice. These factors are further divided into 44 sub-factors, which allow for a more detailed analysis of the situation with the rule of law in each country [9]. The Rule of Law Index 2022 presents data for 140 countries, which were calculated on the basis of more than 130,000 surveys of the general population and more than 4,000 questionnaires from specialists in the field of criminal, civil and labor justice, as well as health care around the world. On a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the highest commitment to the rule of law, the countries with the highest scores are Denmark (0.90), Norway (0.89) and Finland (0.87), and the countries at the bottom of the ranking are Venezuela (0.26), Cambodia (0.31) and Afghanistan (0.33). In Latin America, no country has a perfect result, although there are significant differences between the best and worst indicators of the 2022 Index. The countries with the best indicators are Uruguay (0.71, position 10 out of 140 countries), Costa Rica (0.68, position 29/140) and Chile (0.66, position 33/140), while Nicaragua (0.36, position 133/140), Haiti (0.35, position 136/140) and Venezuela (0.26, last place in the world) present the greatest problems. Six Caribbean countries scored more than 0.60 points: Barbados, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia and the Bahamas, ranking 4th to 9th among the 32 Latin American countries included in the 2022 Index. On the other hand, Brazil (0.49) and Mexico (0.42), which are the most populous in Latin America, occupy positions 18/32 and 27/32, respectively (Table 1).
Table 1 – Latin American and Caribbean States in the Rule of Law Index, 2022
Source: compiled by the author based on data from the Rule of Law Index 2022 (World Justice Project) [8]. Note: The World Justice Project is an independent, international, multidisciplinary organization whose mission is to measure and strengthen the rule of law in the world. Given the importance of reliable and comparable data on the rule of law, WJP has been conducting surveys in more than 135 countries for more than a decade to understand people's perceptions and experiences regarding corruption, security, discrimination and access to justice.
Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) noted that in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region there are serious problems of violence, insecurity, high rates of murder of women, corruption, impunity, among other problems that are obstacles to sustainable development [10]. According to the creators of the index, all eight factors included in the Rule of Law Index positively correlate with each other in a statistically significant way [8]. Thus, countries that perform better in one of the dimensions tend to receive a positive assessment in all other factors, reflecting the systemic and structural nature of the rule of law. Although correlation analysis does not imply a causal relationship, it points to the fact that strengthening the rule of law requires multidimensional solutions. Thus, the countries with the best and worst indicators for each dimension tend to coincide. For example, Venezuela is among the top three in all factors of the Index, while Bolivia and Honduras are among the four factors. On the other hand, Uruguay is among the top three in six factors, while Costa Rica occupies the top positions in four indicators (Table 2).
Table 2 – Indicators of the Rule of Law Index 2022 for Latin America and the Caribbean by factors
Source: compiled by the author based on data from the Rule of Law Index 2022 (World Justice Project) [8]. Note: 0 points is the lowest rule of law. 1 – the highest rule of law. PGV – Limits of state power, OK – Absence of corruption, OV – Openness of power, OP – Fundamental rights, PB –Order and security, RP – Regulatory law enforcement, GS – Civil proceedings, US – Criminal proceedings.
Despite the differences in the scores of the Rule of Law Index, there are areas for improvement in all LAC countries. For example, Uruguay, with an average score of 0.71, ranks first in the region and has scores above 0.75 in half of the sub-factors included in the Index. However, the State also has low scores on some indicators, such as factor 8, which evaluates the effectiveness of the criminal justice system (0.56). The Index data show that the countries of the LAC region have at least two common features. First, each country has relative strengths and weaknesses in the field of the rule of law. Even in countries with the best indicators of the rule of law, there are unresolved problems. In this sense, the Rule of Law Index is a useful tool for identifying progress, failures and policy priorities in each country. Secondly, the Index data show that there are common problems in the field of criminal justice and corruption in LAC countries. In particular, the sub-factors with the lowest averages for LAC are 2.4, which measures the absence of corruption in legislative bodies, 8.1, which measures the effectiveness of investigations, and 8.3, which measures the quality of each country's prison system. All eight factors of the Index positively and statistically significantly correlate with each other, reflecting the systemic and structural nature of the rule of law. This means that strengthening the rule of law requires multidimensional solutions, and also shows that a strong rule of law – with institutions that inspire public confidence – is the key to ensuring security, justice, human rights, democracy and sustainable development. The Rule of Law Index is the most comprehensive indicator of the rule of law in the world and serves as a tool for comparing between countries and assessing changes over time. However, it also has some limitations. First, the Index does not distinguish between the experiences of vulnerable groups such as women, children, migrants or people living in poverty, among others, who face additional barriers to access to justice. The second limitation is that the Rule of Law Index describes the situation in a country during a certain period, but does not investigate the causal mechanisms that explain these results. Third, because of the sample design and methodology, it is impossible to disaggregate data at the subnational level, so it is impossible to investigate the complexities within each country. In fact, so far, the Rule of Law Index has produced only one index at the state level – in Mexico – which contains comparable information for all 32 Mexican states [11]. In the region, for example, in Brazil, there are institutional vacuums, due to which approaches to combating organized crime are accompanied by failures and inconsistencies [12, p. 16]. Organized crime groups in Latin America thrive in the context of weak and fragile institutions in the region, not to mention the geographical proximity to drug markets. In the case of Latin America, the democratization process that took place in the 1980s and 1990s led to the rise to power of democratically elected officials, but these officials increasingly turned out to be corrupt and incompetent in the fight against organized crime. The regimes in most Latin American countries do not correspond to the prototype of free democracy, as they are hampered by the problem of overcoming the dictatorial features of the past. In the old days, liberal democracies were weak states with stable governments, but in the modern world, most of them have turned into weak states with even more fragile governments. However, the exceptions are Chile and Puerto Rico, while all the others have certain disadvantages that lead to a suboptimal level of management. Such Governments cannot prevent the spread of criminal organizations that resort to violence in an attempt to establish absolute control over competitors, their members, as well as over the illegal market that sells drugs, protection, money laundering and people smuggling for sale. Organized crime thrives best in weak States with low levels of governance.
Corruption Corruption is considered another powerful factor contributing to the development of transnational organized crime, when organized criminal groups are involved in bribing certain government officials, such as members of the security forces, as well as the judicial system. Organized crime shows great interest in participating in the political life of many Latin American countries [13, p. 49]. As the annual corruption rankings compiled by Transparency International show, corruption is the biggest driving force behind such crimes in the region. Transparency International, a non-governmental organization, has been compiling a ranking of countries by the level of corruption since 1995. Despite the fact that the number of countries studied, as well as the methods used, change over time, Latin American countries are considered the most corrupt, especially because of their involvement in transnational organized crime. According to the latest Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, in 2022 the most corrupt countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were Venezuela, Haiti, and Nicaragua [14]. In such countries with high levels of corruption, the level of transnational organized crime is significantly higher. On the other hand, countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Barbados and the Bahamas are considered the least corrupt, so they have few cases of organized crime (Table 3).
Table 3 – Corruption Perception Index by LAC countries, 2022
Source: compiled by the author based on data from the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) [14]. Note: Transparency International is a non–governmental international anti-corruption and anti-corruption research organization around the world. According to the Global Go To Think Tank 2020 report, the organization was ranked 20th out of 154 in the "Best Think Tanks in the World (not in the USA)" category and 53rd out of 174 in the "Best Think Tanks in the World (in the USA and outside the USA)" category.
However, it should be noted that if you rank countries by the strength of organized crime depending on corruption, you will get a separate list. There is a difference in situations where officials ask for bribes for issuing permits, securing government contracts, and also contribute to the disappearance of speeding fines, and in a situation where all police in a municipality are in the custody of a drug cartel, as in Mexico. According to the tenth Global Barometer "People and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean" prepared by Transparency International in 2019, more than half of the citizens of the LAC countries who participated in the organization's survey claim that their government is unable to fight corruption (53%) and every third person who has used public services in recent years For 12 months, he noted that he had to pay a bribe (29%). Based on the estimated population of these countries, about 90 million people paid bribes. Seven out of ten citizens are ready and willing to participate in the fight against corruption (70%), however, despite this, only a few bribe takers said that they actually reported it to the authorities (9%), and of those who did, almost a third noted that as a result they were persecuted by law enforcement organs (28%) [15]. This report demonstrates that citizens' demands for accountability and transparency are not being met by their leaders, which increases the tendency of citizens to distrust authorities and increases impunity for offenders. The level of corruption in most Latin American countries is pernicious, for example, when drug traffickers give money to officials: massive financing of political campaigns by illegal gold miners, as is the case in Peru, as well as the most severe case when Pablo Escobar in Colombia bribed and intimidated the entire Constituent Assembly to prohibit extradition [16, p. 27]. Organized criminal groups try to bribe government officials to cover up their illegal activities or participate in facilitating them. Organized criminal groups usually target the police, who are supposed to investigate any illegal activity, with the primary goal of drug traffickers in the region being the fight against drugs. Drug trafficking activities are also directed at officials (including the police) responsible for controlling ports and airports that are potential transit or departure points for drugs. The investigation of organized crime is in the hands of either police officers or the Prosecutor General's Office, who are often victims of intimidation and bribery. According to the above-mentioned survey of citizens of LAC countries, the most corrupt institutions in society are the police (47%), elected government representatives (47%), local government (45%), as well as the Prime Minister/President of the state (43%) (Figure 1).
Figure 1 – Corruption of public institutions in LAC States according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, 2019 Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data from the report of the Global Corruption Barometer in the LACB, prepared by Transparency International in 2019 [15]. Note: The respondents were asked the question "How many of the representatives of public institutions listed below, in your opinion, are involved in corruption, or have you not heard enough about them to say?". Response base: all respondents – 20,000 people from 18 LAC countries (Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Colombia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bahamas, Mexico, Guyana, Barbados), excluding missing responses. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered that either "Most" or "All" of them are corrupt. The answers "No", "Some" and "Don't know" are not shown for ease of comparison.
If the activities of organized criminal groups cannot be prevented from investigating their cases and they end up in prison, they try to conduct their illegal business from prison by bribing prison officials and guards. After sentencing, criminals buy themselves a presidential pardon, as was the case in Peru [17, p. 84]. As Latin American researchers Aravena F. R. and Solis L. G. explain, organized crime flourishes and thrives as a result of the corruption of society and the state, as well as the fact that the problem of corruption was not considered as a state agenda [5, p. 72]. In addition, the fight against corruption in Peru is still not a priority, since this social problem was not mentioned during the presidency of Alan Garcia [18]. In addition, there was a close connection between members of organized criminal groups and the Government, for example, Fujimorism, as members of Parliament from Alberto Fujimori support the activities of the government. Many organized crime syndicates relied on full protection from high-ranking political figures, with the most famous cases of this kind taking place in Colombia. In 1994, the Cali cartel paid $6 million for Ernesto Samper, who has been Secretary General of UNASUR since 2014, to win the presidency of Colombia [19]. In the ranking of Latin American countries, based on the potential of organized crime for state corruption, as well as the perception by the public sector of the level of corruption in the group, Mexico is the most corrupt country.
The level of socio-economic development The low level of human development in a number of Latin American and Caribbean States is another dominant factor contributing to the activities of transnational organized crime in this region. The Human Development Index (HDI), created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is an indicator that analyzes the level of development of countries. According to the UNDP, the HDI contains three main parts of human development: 1) The ability to lead a long and healthy life, which is measured by life expectancy at birth, which refers to the expected number of years that a person will live in a given country and is calculated based on the average age of people who died in one year. 2) The ability to acquire knowledge (education), which is analyzed by average years of study and expected years of study. 3) The ability to achieve a decent standard of living, which is quantified by gross national income (GNI) and per capita income at purchasing power parity (PPP) in US dollars [20]. In the 2022 report (estimates for 2021), the countries were divided into four groups. The first group consisted of 59 countries with very high HDI, the second group consisted of 53 countries with high HDI, then the third group consisted of 39 countries with medium HDI and finally the last 38 countries with low HDI. Table 4 shows the HDI of the Latin American region countries marked in the UNDP index.
Table 4 – Classification of LAC States in the UNDP Human Development Index, 2022 (data for 2021)
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data from the UNDP Human Development Index 2022 (data for 2021) [21].
Chile tops the ranking in the region. This is the country with the highest life expectancy, on average Chileans live 79.7 years. Similarly, the state has the highest average number of years of study – 10.3 years, and the country differs greatly from the rest in terms of GNI per capita ($41,580). Chile's HDI of 0.843 places the State in the first group (very high HDI). Argentina ranks second in the region with an HDI of 0.825, and manages to belong to countries with very high HDI. His expected years of study are the longest in the region (17.4). Uruguay completes the list of Latin American countries in the group with a very high HDI. As in Chile and Argentina, its HDI exceeds 0.8. It has the highest GNI per capita and life expectancy in the region after Chile. The rest of Latin America belongs to the second group with high HDI. Mexico (0.774), Brazil (0.759), Peru (0.750), Colombia (0.747) and Paraguay (0.702) have HDI from 0.7 to 0.8. Life expectancy in Mexico is 77.3 years, which is similar to the indicators of the countries of the first group and even higher than in Argentina. Brazil has the lowest average number of years of schooling - 7.8 years and ranks fourth in terms of expected years of study. Its disadvantages are access to education. Peru ranks third in terms of the average number of years of schooling – 9.2 years. As for GNI per capita, it is still far from countries such as Argentina and Uruguay. Colombia also has problems with access to education, as its average school age is 8.3 years. Paraguay is the furthest away in this group. With a low GNI per capita (8,380) and a low average by years of study (8.4) and expected duration of study (12.7). The high crime rate in the region, especially drug trafficking, is associated with poverty and unemployment. As explained by Arnson K. And Orson E., most of the crimes are committed by young people. Young people suffer the most from high unemployment, so they tend to live in extreme poverty. Therefore, they readily agree to become part of transnational organized crime as a means of livelihood [22, p. 19]. For example, a country like Puerto Rico has proven to be an important transshipment point for illegal drugs smuggled from countries such as Peru and Colombia [23]. Drugs are delivered to the island directly from other source countries, so their cost is lower compared to other places in the United States. Therefore, they attract street gangs, who later buy and sell them to the population, which leads to increased internecine wars and a high murder rate in the United States. In this light, measures to eliminate social inequality will significantly reduce the high level of transnational organized crime in the region. In addition, poverty and lack of opportunities in society provide criminal organizations with fresh recruits. Despite the lack of official data on the number of young people working for organized criminal cartels, the majority of people accused of crimes such as drug trafficking, violence, rape and murder are unemployed [24, p. 288]. Arnson and Orson explain that the high youth unemployment rate in Mexico is a significant factor contributing to the emergence of transnational organized crime [22, p. 20]. In 2010, Mexican officials charged 214 minors who were involved in organized crime, and this number increased compared to the unemployment of just eight teenagers in 2007.
Lack of national mechanisms and institutions to combat organized crime The lack of reliable anti-money laundering regimes in some Latin American countries allows criminal organizations to operate with impunity. According to the annual Anti-Money Laundering Index (AML) compiled by the Basel Institute of Management, weak or absent anti-money laundering legislation, as well as corruption, impunity and lack of transparency, contributing to the laundering of illegally acquired assets, are an endemic problem throughout the region. The Anti—Money Laundering Index is a ranking of 203 countries and jurisdictions based on their respective anti-money laundering efforts and capabilities. Provides risk assessments based on data from 18 publicly available sources such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Transparency International, the World Bank and the World Economic Forum. In the 2022 index, Haiti ranked second in the world, which is not surprising, given that many of its current and former political leaders have been subjected to international sanctions for corruption and gang financing. The Caribbean as a whole was in a bad position: the Bahamas and Saint Kitts and Nevis also occupied the bottom lines of the rating, with the exception of the State of Dominica, which topped the rating of North and South America [25]. Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico were also in the middle of the list, despite their long-standing role in regional crime. The index report also notes that Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica are "holding back the onslaught" of crime through investments in financial crime units, specially trained prosecutors and regular asset seizures. Even Colombia performed at its best, being higher in the index than a number of European Union countries (Table 5).
Table 5 – LAC States in the Anti-Money Laundering Index, 2022
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data from the Anti-Money Laundering Index (AML) prepared by the Basel Institute of Management, 2022 [26]. Note: 0 is the highest risk. 10 is the least risk. Risk assessments cover five areas that are considered to contribute to high ML/CFT risk: AML/CFT system quality, bribery and corruption, financial transparency and standards, public transparency and accountability, legal and political risks.
Allegations of money laundering surrounded Haiti's political elite at the highest level. The previous president of the country, Jovenel Moiz, who was assassinated in July 2021 [27], was on trial for money laundering before the beginning of his term [28]. In 2019, the latest assessment of the country by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) noted that Haiti "has not recorded a single successful prosecution and conviction for money laundering crimes over the past five years" [29]. In a 2021 report, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) drew attention to the structural problems that allow Haitian politicians to engage in such senseless criminal activities. "The Constitution grants members of Parliament immunity while they are in office, and the state cannot waive it in order to hold them accountable," the GFI report says [30]. The Basel Institute noted that Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico have two key points in common: corruption and bribery are the worst indicators in each country, and public transparency is the highest. While Ecuador's problems with the rapid increase in gang violence are widely known [31], the issue of asset laundering remains the least understood. According to a report by the Latin American Center for Geopolitical Strategy (Centro Estrat?gico Latinoamericano de Geopol?tica – CELAG), the amount of money laundered in Ecuador reached 3.5 billion US dollars in 2021, which is three times more than in 2016 [32]. CELAG added that money laundering in the country can account for up to 5% of Ecuador's gross domestic product. According to the analytical center, this growth is mainly due to the growth of drug trafficking, since the revenues from them have become so significant that they significantly exceed Ecuador's ability to conduct financial investigations [32]. Brazil was also in the middle of the Basel Institute index. Allegations of money laundering have constantly dogged the presidency and the family of Jair Bolsonaro. The former president was involved in allegations that he participated in a scheme known as "rachadinha", where part of the salaries of employees was withheld as a bribe so that they could keep their jobs [33]. His son Flavio, his ex-wife and several other allies of J. Bolsonaro was also under investigation for money laundering [34]. On a broader scale, the country has had to deal with high-profile money laundering cases involving one of its largest cryptocurrency trading companies [35]. Paramilitary groups in Rio de Janeiro - criminal structures, often consisting of active and retired police officers - have "laundered" up to three billion reais ($582 million) in three years from various types of criminal economy, according to statistics from the Council for the Control of Financial Activities (Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras – Coaf), a government body investigating money laundering [36]. The new president of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, faced money laundering scandals in connection with the large-scale investigation of "Lava Jato" ("Car Wash" from Portuguese), which revealed extensive corruption between Latin American politicians and the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht [37]. As for Mexico, the country's strict laws on the declaration of personal property and transparency of election financing have been recognized as one of the best in the world, at least "on paper," according to the Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index. However, Mexico was worse than Myanmar in terms of corruption and bribery. The growing turnover of fentanyl, which largely depends on chemical precursors from China, has led to the fact that Mexican groups are "pouring" millions of dollars into financial schemes with Chinese partners, which are very difficult to track, given the lack of support from the Chinese authorities [38].
The geostrategic position of the countries of the region Another important factor contributing to the spread of transnational organized crime in Latin America is the geographical location of individual countries in the region. El Salvador is vulnerable to this phenomenon because its geographical location makes the country a suitable transit point for drugs during their transportation from the Andean region to the United States [39, p. 26]. The geostrategic position of other States, such as Mexico and Colombia, serves as a starting point for global cocaine business routes. For example, the Andean region, in particular Colombia, has links with Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico, as well as North America. In addition, on the one hand, the African corridor or route connects Venezuela, Guyana, Colombia and Brazil, and on the other hand, it connects Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Togo and other West African countries for cocaine that is transported to Europe. As Hofmann explains, cocaine consumption has increased significantly in Europe, as well as in Latin America and West Africa, which means that South American drug trafficking cartels successfully sell their goods through the newly developed corridors of transit countries in West Africa [40, p. 3].
Conclusion Transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean continues to grow, posing serious threats to the security and development of the region. Among the key factors contributing to the spread of this phenomenon are weak public administration, high levels of corruption, low levels of human development, social inequality, insufficiently effective anti–money laundering institutions and the unfavorable geographical location of individual countries. Venezuela, Mexico, Haiti, Honduras, and Guatemala are the most vulnerable, while Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica are the least at risk. An effective fight requires a comprehensive approach to reduce inequality and improve the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. The political aspect of impunity, combined with the incompetence of governance institutions in combating transnational crimes, is also of concern. As a result, the institutions of democratic governance are being undermined, with economic consequences, as businessmen migrate from their regions of operation due to fear of kidnapping and the threat of violence, as well as the deterioration of social systems. Based on the dynamics of changes in the position of countries in the rankings of key risk factors, it can be predicted that Venezuela, which occupies the last places in terms of the rule of law and perception of corruption, will retain the status of the country with the highest risk of organized crime in the region. Mexico, despite improvements in AML/CFT, may fall even lower due to high levels of corruption. Haiti, which already occupies one of the last places in the fight against money laundering, is likely to maintain favorable conditions for organized crime. Costa Rica and Chile have a chance to consolidate their leadership positions among the least vulnerable countries to organized crime by further strengthening institutions and fighting corruption. In general, significant differences will remain between the most and least vulnerable countries in the region to organized crime, and the greatest risks will be concentrated in Venezuela, Mexico and Haiti. If comprehensive measures are not taken to address the socio-economic problems that contribute to the spread of organized crime in the region, then there is a possibility of further growth of transnational crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. This will lead to an even greater weakening of State institutions, an increase in social inequality, an increase in corruption and money laundering. As a result, threats to national and regional security will increase, and socio-economic development will slow down. To prevent such a negative scenario, it is necessary to intensify international cooperation in the fight against organized crime and take coordinated measures to eliminate key risk factors. The effective implementation of such an integrated approach will help reverse the current negative trends and create conditions for weakening the influence of transnational criminal groups in Latin America. In further research, in order to determine which factor prevails over others, the author will conduct a correlation analysis between crime rates in the States under consideration and the socio-economic variables analyzed in this article. References
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