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Philosophy and Culture
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Pris' I.E. About the Explanatory Gap Problem in the Philosophy of Mind

Abstract: The paper introduces the explanatory gap problem  in the philosophy of mind. A review of the mainapproaches to the problem shows that the traditional materialism/physicalism encounters the principaldifficulties. The article introduces the explanatory gap problem gap in the philosophy of mind. The author provides a brief review of the main approaches to the problem. The author focuses on attempts to overcome physical approaches, on the one hand, and critics of dualism, on the other hand. For example, Blok offered the definition of implicit physical phenomenal concepts. Papineau admitted that phenomenal concepts had a singular nature. Levin spoke of the concept of acquaintance. Varela offered to extend the scope of the traditional science and developed so called neuro-phenomenology. The research is based on the method of comparison of the main approaches to solving the explanatory gap problem. Preference is given to phenomenal realism. The author demonstrates that the traditional materialism/physicalism encounters the principal difficulties when solving the explanatory gap problem. At the same time, property dualism is an essential concept only a non-metaphysical version of naturalistic phenomenal realism, or nontraditional contextual naturalism/physicalism of Wittgenstein type may compete with. 

Keywords:

explanatory gap problem, hard problem, psycho-physical identities, physico-physical identities, phenomenal concepts, conceptual dualism, phenomenal realism, physicalism, property dualism, neuro-phenomenology

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