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Sazonova K.L.
The "state terrorism" policy: challenge to the existing system of universal collective security and the possible basis for international state accountability
// National Security.
2015. ¹ 1.
P. 67-72.
URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=66137
Sazonova K.L. The "state terrorism" policy: challenge to the existing system of universal collective security and the possible basis for international state accountabilityAbstract: This article examines the debatable category of "state terrorism". The object of this research is the certain illegal activity perpetrated by a state, for example, the organization of revolutions, active financial and military support of the opposition, the illegal listening of foreign embassies, murders of politicians and other illegal actions that are carried out by intelligence services of one state on the territory of another. The subject of research is normative-legal regulation contained in the international legal documents on state accountability for such illegal activity. The main conclusion of this research is that the actions related to policy of “state terrorism” are extremely difficult to diagnose as basis for international accountability of a state. Nevertheless, taking into account the illegality and big social danger of the state terrorism, it is necessary to promote the development of the universal international standards for further determination of such activity as the basis for international accountability of the states. Keywords: secret services, use of force, internationnal responsibility, revolution, opposition, state terrorism, international law, security, secret operations, legal regulation
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