Gusev, D. A. Skepticism as a Philosophical Realism

Abstract: The present article is devoted to skepticism as the kind and style of philosophical thinking in comparison to naive realism as the natural attitude of mind and scientific realism as a belief that theoretical thinking lying in the basis of science may understand the true reality. As a philosophical realism skepticism is the third and highest level of realism (as a discourse) after native realism and scientific realism. Skepticism is the most consistent type and style of philosophical reflection. The research is based on the following: the principle of the unity of etymological, logical and historical approaches, the consistency principle and some hermeneutic methods (in particular, interpretation and understanding), the method of historical and philosophical reconstruction that includes the methods of the primary research (analysis of sources) and secondary research (analysis of general literary sources on the matter) and the method of synthesis. Skepticism is a philosophical realism and a certain type of a discourse. The skeptical ‘picture of the world’ is mobile and flexible and, as a consequence, skeptical philosophical statements usually do not lead to any particular results, at the same time they may accept any point of view and therefore they are alien to the provisions that are assumed in the last analysis. Skepticism is a search for truth but not denial of an opportunity to achieve this truth as skeptical philosophy is often interpreted. As a philosophical realism, skepticism can be defined as a self-doubting doubt which, being a rather non-traditional philosophical solution, represents an always searching and never satisfied philosophical thinking.

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