Borisov A. M. On Substance of Relationship at Law

Abstract: One of the problems in the general theory of law is the substance of the relationship at law. In Russian jurisprudence, methodological approaches of researchers are identical in terms of acceptance of the unity of form and substance when solving this theoretical scientific problem. However, consistent development of the concept of indivisible unity of the factual material substance and the legal form was stopped as a result of the domination of the formal legal methodology formed in the middle of the 20th century thanks to the efforts of Leningrad legal school, Ural and Saratov scientific school of law. The material law approach was demonstrated by Moscow legal scientists. The analysis of a number of sources makes it possible to see the collisional nature of the traditional arguments and certain gaps in the scientific reasoning of the views on the substance of the relationship at law. In particular, the combination of mutual rights and obligations of the subjects of the relationship at law is a conditional, logical legal and unrealized mutual connection in which the public will is expressed for due behavior in social relations. However, it is viewed as the substance of the relationship at law. The logic of the philosophical legal speculation leads to the conclusion that in this case, the irreal is deemed to be identical to the real, the ideal replaces the material in the social life. The legal reality is also rich in examples which do not fit with the outlines of the superstructural model of the relationship at law. The author finds it reasonable to set the question of additional research into the pre-requisites of the relationship at law and believes that the relationship at law is characterized by the following substance: the aggregate of the interdependent acts of willful legal behavior of participants; the realized or protected right as a result of directional behavior in the relationship at law of the passive and active type respectively. Without the purpose component, the substance of the relationship at law does not have its conceptual completeness. Consideration of this problem convinces the author that it is necessary to revise the theory of the relationship at law on the basis of both wrongfully forgotten and new achievements of the legal science. When working on the material, the methods of substance legal analysis and synthesis, theoretical interpretation and dialectical logic methods were used. The scientific novelty lies in its critical evaluation and development of the views on the structure of the relationship at law on the basis of conflicting provisions of the formal legal and material legal approaches, development of the author’s own basis for the structure and elements of the relationship at law (legal form, material legal substance, subjects, object and matter of the relationship at law), including the substance of the relationship at law.

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