Gurevich, P. S. Intuition is not the Speed Reading of the Thought

Abstract: Over the last years there have been a great number of researches devoted to intuition. There is a hypothesis that intuition is not a special form of cognition but the ‘speed reading’, i.e. the fast ‘thinking’ of the thought. However, this point of view isn’t so new. Before Carl Jung’s theory appeared, intuition had been often interpreted as the aid for the analytical activity of human mind. For quite a long time it has been evident that in different majors scientists make their way to discoveries gradually as if they were pricking forward the thought that was still to become more complete or clear. The author of the present research article does not agree to the above mentioned interpretation of intuition. Based on Jung’s concept, he provides additional arguments proving that intuition gives independent access to knowledge and constitutes an important part in the theory of cognitive activity. As a research method, the author uses modern cognitive practices and theoretical concepts these practices are based upon. The author also bases himself on Jung’s teaching about the four functions used by an individual in order to adjust to the reality. The scientific importance and novelty of the topic under review is the statement that intuition cannot be always viewed as the ‘fast thinking’. Originally intuition gives access to the kind of knowledge that can’t be accessed through regular intellectual activity. According to the author, intuitive knowledge has nothing to do with the successive proceeding from one thought to another.

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