The logistics channel in the Russian Far East as a key factor in the development of Chinese-Russian trade.

Sin' Xiaodong PhD in Philology Department of Russian Culture and Regional Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University 100089, China, Beijing, 2 Xisanhuanbailu str. xinxiaodong2023@yandex.ru

Khu Chzhen Chief researcher, China Development Institute 518024, China, Guangdong region, Luohu, Jinhuijie str., 38 denisshadrin021@gmail.com

The logistics corridor connecting China and Russia in the Far East is becoming an integral part of the geopolitical and economic dynamics of the region. This important transport route, stretching through diverse and often harsh natural conditions, serves not only as a bridge between the two great countries, but also as a key factor for strengthening their economic ties, as well as expanding trade opportunities. In this article, we will consider the significance and prospects for the development of the China-Russia logistics corridor in the Far East, as well as its impact on regional and global dynamics based on press releases from the leadership of the two countries, official statistics, as well as from the historical context. Research methods such as empirical research, historical analysis, and media analysis will be used. This topic is relevant and has already been studied in many works, for example, the issue of the development of logistics transport centers in the Far East was raised by Kulikova V.A.^[1], Russian-Chinese infrastructure cooperation was studied by Pugachev I. N. ^[2], Remyga V. N. ^[3] and King R. G.^[4], the issue of reconfiguration of logistics flows in modern sanctions conditions were raised by Chuikova O. Yu. ^[5] and Luzyanin S. G. ^[6].

The importance of the China-Russia logistics corridor

First of all, it should be noted that Sino-Russian trade relations are inextricably linked with the functioning of the logistics corridor, which is an integral basis for this cooperation. In 2018, the volume of trade transactions between China and Russia exceeded the $100 billion mark for the first time. In June 2019, China and Russia set a goal to reach the level of 200 billion US dollars in bilateral trade by 2024. Since then, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia has been increasing every year at an ever-increasing rate. In 2019, this volume amounted to 110.757 billion US dollars, which means an increase of 3.4% compared to the previous year. Even despite the negative impact of the epidemic, bilateral trade between China and Russia reached 107.77 billion US dollars in 2020, and this level has been maintained for three consecutive years, starting in 2018. In 2021, there was a sharp change in the trend of Sino-Russian trade, with an increase of 35.8% compared to the previous year and reaching a level of 146.887 billion US dollars.

In 2022, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia increased by 29.3% compared to the previous year and reached 190.272 billion US dollars. Based on the optimism of the parties, it can be expected that in 2023, Sino-Russian trade will exceed the $200 billion mark. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, who recently visited China, expressed confidence that this goal, set by the heads of the two states, will be achieved this year. Data from the Chinese General State Customs Administration show that in the first half of this year, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia reached 114.547 billion US dollars, which represents an increase of 40.6% compared to the same period last year. Exports of goods from Russia to China increased by 78.1%, amounting to 5.284 billion US dollars, while imports from China to Russia increased by 19.4%, reaching 62.263 billion US dollars. Chinese-Russian

Trade and economic cooperation continues to gain momentum, moving to a new stage of development, overcoming the $100 billion mark and moving towards the next goal of $200 billion.

Over the past ten years, there has been a steady increase in trade turnover between Russia and China, which increased from less than $90 billion in 2013 to more than $190.3 billion in 2022. It is important to note that China has remained Russia's main trading partner for the past 13 years. Chinese companies have also increased their investments in Russia, switching from traditional sectors such as energy, agriculture and forestry to manufacturing industries such as automotive, household appliance manufacturing and food processing.

Benefits of economic cooperation

Economic cooperation between China and Russia benefits both countries. Russia has rich reserves of oil, gas, coal, various mineral resources and agricultural products, and also has advantages in the military industry, especially in the space and deep-sea spheres. All this is of interest to China. On the other hand, China is ahead of Russia in the fields of mechanical engineering, electronics manufacturing and the digital economy, and its light industry products are popular in the Russian market.

Thus, the complementary trade cooperation between China and Russia turns out to be mutually beneficial for both countries. This trend will remain key in the future and will determine their relationship in the long term.

The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia in March this year initiated the beginning of a new era in cooperation between China and Russia. One of the characteristic features of this new period is the increased attention paid to Chinese-Russian trade and economic relations, which have entered a phase of intensive development.

An important aspect of cooperation between China and Russia in the field of trade and economy is not only an increase in the total volume of trade, but also attention to the structure of trade, the variety of goods and the expansion of areas of cooperation, while maintaining the stability of trade in energy resources, which plays the role of a "safety cushion". Analyzing the growth structure of Sino-Russian trade, it can be noted that energy cooperation, including oil and gas supplies, significantly accelerates the growth of the total volume of Sino-Russian trade. In 2022, this volume reached more than 190.2 billion US dollars, which means an increase of 29% compared to the previous year.

Chinese exports to Russia reached more than 511.5 billion yuan (approximately 76 billion US dollars) and increased by 12%. These exports include goods such as clothing, toys, smartphones, household appliances, computers and cars. On the other hand, Chinese imports from Russia increased by 40%, reaching more than 767 billion yuan (approximately 114.035 billion US dollars), which is about 60% of the total import-export trade between China and Russia. In 2022, the total volume of Sino-Russian trade is expected to reach more than 190.2 billion US dollars, with a large share of this trade related to the supply of energy resources.

It is important to note that in addition to energy cooperation, non-energy trade is also growing rapidly. Russia exports agricultural products to China, including grain, worth about $7 billion. Russian grain supplies to China increased by 15%, and wheat supplies increased by 78% in 2022. This growth reflects the mutual interest of both countries, as Russia is a major wheat exporter and is important in the fertilizer market, and China is the largest consumer of grain.

The trend towards increased trade and a variety of goods continues to develop within the framework of Sino-Russian economic cooperation. At the same time, energy cooperation remains an important element in the overall structure of trade between the two countries.

As the Russian-Chinese trade continues to expand and diversify, it is important to maintain stability in the wholesale trade of energy resources, which plays the role of "ballast". At the same time, it is necessary to expand the variety of goods, areas of cooperation and increase the total volume of economic and trade activities. This process will inevitably lead to the formation of a more diverse and multifaceted trade structure between China and Russia, which will require appropriate logistical support.

Pipeline transport can provide an efficient logistics channel only for oil and gas trade. At the same time, the expansion of trade and economic cooperation in other areas will require the creation of various logistics channels and forms of transportation. Rail and maritime logistics routes and modes of transport will become key logistics elements for mass trade between China and Russia.

However, it is worth noting that in Russia there are a number of challenges in the field of logistics, such as the lack of developed logistics corridors, complex transport infrastructure, many transport links, long distances, long delivery times and high transport costs. These factors limit the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics operations within the framework of international trade and economic cooperation.

For the long-term and stable prospects of Russian-Chinese trade, it is important to solve problems and constraints in the field of logistics. Underdeveloped logistics corridors may limit the steady and stable growth of trade between China and Russia. Thus, increased attention to the development of logistics is becoming a key factor for successful Chinese-Russian trade and economic cooperation.

Geographical factors and historical context

The main geographical problem of Russia is the limited port resources capable of receiving a large traffic flow of ships, which is critically important for successful international trade in bulk goods. Russia, located on the Eurasian continent, is the largest country in the world in terms of area. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, its territory reached 22.4 million square kilometers, and currently modern Russia covers more than 17 million square kilometers. The country stretches east and west for more than 9 thousand kilometers, covering 11 time zones. For this reason, the phrase is often used in China: "Russia is not just a country, it is a whole world."

Historically, Slavs, including Russians, lived in Eastern Europe, which differs from Western Europe in its continental character and lack of direct access to the seas and oceans. The region of Eastern Europe inhabited by Russian peoples has always remained inland and had no direct access to the sea trade routes.

Despite being geographically bordered by the Arctic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and dozens of other seas with a total coastline exceeding 37,600 kilometers, historically access to the sea has been limited, which prevented Russia from establishing direct maritime communication with the world's oceans. In this context, the history of Russia's expansion is partly the history of finding access to the sea and creating its own seaports, especially those that are not subject to icing.

Since the beginning of the XV century, Russia has actively sought to gain maritime access and develop its seaports. In general, Russia's history is largely linked to efforts to find sea lanes and seaports, which has made this an important aspect of its geopolitical and economic history.

Russia's knowledge of maritime affairs has ancient roots. The ancestors of the Russians, the ancient Slavs, since about the III century AD, actively interacted with the Black, Mediterranean and Caspian Seas. Nevertheless, due to the lack of real access to the seas, Russia for a long period was considered a country without access to the sea, and this situation continued for a long time until a connection with the sea was established at the end of the XVII century. As noted by the founder Chen L., this event was marked by a shift in Russia's maritime strategy to control the seas, and the development of coastal zones. ^[7].

Russia's unique geographical position in the maritime aspect had a profound impact on the strategic development and security of the country. Russian leaders faced the inherent need to provide the country with access to sea routes, and until the time of Peter the Great, Russia had no access to the sea.

The era of Peter the Great was marked by increased activity in the direction of ensuring maritime access. Peter the Great attached strategic importance to obtaining access to the seas and included this important issue in his reforms. He realized that it was imperative for Russia to fight for control of the Don, Neva and Heilongjiang rivers as key routes to the seas: to break the Ottoman blockade in order to open the mouth of the Don to the Black Sea and, accordingly, to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean; to overcome the Swedish blockade in order to ensure the mouth of the Neva to the Baltic Sea and consequently, to the Atlantic Ocean; and also to seek control over the mouth of the Heilongjiang River in China in order to provide access to the Sea of Okhotsk and, in the future, to the Pacific Ocean.^[8]

Russia has waged a number of wars in order to gain long-awaited maritime access. Since the beginning of the XV century, Russia has been actively striving for the sea and dreamed of having its own outlets to it. In a sense, the history of Russia's naval power is a characteristic of its periods of rise and decline, events that have an important historical impact on Russia ^[9].

Russia's struggle to secure access to the sea was accompanied by significant territorial expansion and was motivated by a complex of geopolitical, economic and trade considerations, as well as a strategic desire to get closer to Europe and open access to Western Sea routes. In this context, rivers played a key role as important transport arteries for Russia, and maritime access became necessary to expand foreign trade and effectively transport Russian goods to foreign markets.

One of the main conflicts that continued for many years was the war between Russia and Sweden, where one of Russia's key goals was to seize trade rights in the Baltic Sea, which at that time belonged to Sweden. This desire to open a sea route to Europe was the long-term goal of Peter the Great and his successors.

Peter the Great, in particular, moved the capital of Russia to St. Petersburg, which ensured geographical convergence with Europe and created close ties with the West. For Russia, control of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits have become key steps in finding alternative routes to the West and ensuring maritime access to European markets.

Despite the vast geographical area, which is 17 million square kilometers, Russia has a limited number of accesses to the sea. Currently, these outlets include the ports of St. Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland in the Baltic Sea (including Kalinin, which is a military port), Murmansk, Vladivostok in the Sea of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, as well as the Crimean Peninsula on the Black Sea, which is currently affected by the military conflict. The Arctic Sea Route, which represents a potentially important sea route, is also highly anticipated and takes time to fully implement.

It is important to note that only during the Soviet Union, Russia had the opportunity to use the ports of other countries, such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea, as well as Ukraine and Georgia on the Black Sea, as international sea routes for foreign trade and participation in global shipping. This made it easier for Russia to exchange goods and participate in global maritime trade.

Currently, Russia has a limited number of seaports, which seriously limits the country's ability to maintain high rates of international trade. From a geographical point of view, two of the main Russian seaports, St. Petersburg and Vladivostok, are located in the northern latitudes. The port of St. Petersburg, located at the highest latitude in the Baltic Sea, has to rely on icebreakers to ensure its operation during the harsh winter months. The port of Vladivostok, known as an all-weather port, also requires icebreakers to operate in winter, and it is not an ice-free port, which significantly limits its capabilities ^[10].

In addition, none of the Russian ports has the status of an international hub port, which means that they are not located in key global maritime transport hubs. As a result, many Chinese export cargoes destined for Russia by sea are forced to go to the main ports of Europe, such as Hamburg (Germany) and Rotterdam (the Netherlands), and then transit to the port of St. Petersburg via the Baltic Sea on the appropriate ships.

Political factors also have an impact on Russia's access to the seas. Many sea routes are limited by geopolitical considerations, which creates additional difficulties. For example, the Baltic Sea is surrounded by the countries of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Northern Europe, some of which have joined NATO, which makes it look like the inner sea of the alliance. In addition, the passage to the Atlantic Ocean from the North Sea through the narrow Strait of Ore between Sweden (wishing to join NATO) and Denmark (a NATO member) is also difficult for Russia.

The Mediterranean Sea also has its limitations, since in order to enter the Atlantic Ocean, Russian ships need to cross the Strait of Gibraltar, controlled by Great Britain and Spain, and to enter the Indian Ocean - passage through the Suez Canal in Egypt and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea.

Russia's access to sea routes is limited by various geographical, political and economic factors, and the development of alternative logistics routes is an important task for maintaining international trade and cooperation, especially in the context of expanding Sino-Russian trade and economic cooperation.

Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of Russia's access to the sea

Within the framework of Sino-Russian trade, the European sea route has always been the dominant logistics route. To illustrate this fact, we can consider representative ports on the coast of China and the sequence of sea routes. This route starts from the coastal ports of China, from where ships leave the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean, and then proceed to the Red Sea. They then pass through the Suez Canal to enter the Mediterranean Sea, and finally cross the Strait of Gibraltar to reach major European ports such as Hamburg and Rotterdam. From there, the goods are transported to the port of St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea on the appropriate vessels. The total length of this route is more than 20,000 kilometers, or about 11,000 nautical miles (see table 2).

Table 2: Statistics of distances between coastal port cities of China and Russian maritime logistics corridors (Coastal cities - port of Hamburg - port of St. Petersburg)

Note: the route "Port of Hamburg - Port of St. Petersburg" is based on the total mileage of the route "Port of Hamburg - Brunsbuttel - Kiel - St. Petersburg".

Source: "Table of miles of the largest commercial seaports in the world", edited by the Committee of Standard Measurements of the Ministry of Communications, publishing house "People's Transport".

Significant changes have now taken place, and the situation on the two key logistics corridors of the European route has changed markedly. Therefore, China and Russia should actively pay attention to the impact of logistics corridors on the development of trade and economic cooperation and take into account factors related to politics, economics, diplomacy, security and sustainability when developing strategic logistics corridors between these two countries.

The Far Eastern Logistics Corridor between China and Russia

China and Russia, which jointly have a 4,374 km long border, have the second longest border among China's 15 neighboring countries, second only to China and Mongolia, where the border is 4,710 km. The Russian Far East borders the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin, as well as the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which forms a common border of 4,319 km long, with a section of the western border extending only 55 km.

The Trans-Siberian Railway with its terminus at the port of Vladivostok, which serves as an important center for logistics infrastructure, is located in the Russian territory of the Far East. The port of Vladivostok is the central element that unites ports such as Dongfang Port, Nakhodka Port, Zarubino Port, Slavyanka Port, Posyet Port, and others.

The logistics infrastructure includes the China-Russia oil and gas pipeline, which connects the regions of the Far East and China. This oil and gas pipeline, in addition to land and sea transport routes, has become an integral part of the China-Russia-Far East logistics. This logistics route has its own characteristics, which differ from the oil and gas pipeline and include public (automobile), railway (automobile) and water (marine) transport as elements forming a logistics corridor, with ports playing a key role as central hubs. ^[11]

Thus, a characteristic of the China-Russia-Far East logistics has been formed, which differs from the oil and gas pipeline and includes a large logistics corridor where ports play an important role in infrastructure and connecting public, rail and maritime transport.

China and Russia have a number of Far Eastern transit ports, which play a key role in their economic and trade cooperation. Among these ports, the following can be distinguished:

1. Suifenhe Port: Located in Heilongjiang Province and provides land and sea communication with China and Russia. This port is the hub and central element of the international transport corridor connecting China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea.

2. Dunning Port: This port is located near Vladivostok, the largest port city in the Russian Far East. It has rail links with the rest of Russia and is considered the best route for land and water transport between China and Russia.

3. Hunchun Port: The only land port in Jilin Province that has direct communication with Russian ports such as Zarubino, Posyet, Slavyanka and others. This port plays an important role within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative and has the status of a national Class I port.

4. Manzhouli Port and Manchuria Port: Located in Inner Mongolia, these ports have a railway connection and are key hubs for land and sea routes between China and Russia.

These ports and related infrastructure form a relatively unified logistics complex, which makes it possible to effectively organize trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia. The geographical location and advantages of Suifenhe Port make it an important hub for land and sea transportation, ensuring the integration of various modes of transport. Ports such as Dongning and Hunchun provide important land routes for cooperation between Russia and China. ^[12]

In addition, the city of Heihe and the city of Blagoveshchensk, located on opposite banks of the river, have a close transport distance and high technical characteristics, which contributes to economic and trade cooperation between China and the Russian Far East.

The China-Far East-Russia land logistics corridor is a comprehensive infrastructure that contributes to the development of trade and economic relations between China and Russia. This corridor includes the following main elements:

1. Trans-Siberian Railway: This railway line, extending for 9,288 km from Moscow to Vladivostok, connects the European part of Russia with the Far East. The speed is about 80 km/h, and the travel time from Moscow to Vladivostok is seven days and seven nights. This highway is of strategic importance and carries various types of cargo. It is important to note that it played a significant role during the Second World War and today serves as a key element of land communication between China and Russia.

2. Freight railway line connecting the ports of the Far East: In Russia, the ports of the Far East have the advantage of continuous communication with the railway infrastructure. Railway lines directly connect these ports with various port terminals, ensuring uninterrupted movement of goods between railway and marine infrastructures. This improves the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of transporting goods.

3. Road transport corridor connecting ports and harbors: China is actively modernizing its ports and highways, ensuring a high standard of quality and scale compared to the Russian side. An example is the Suifenhe Port, which has a Sino-Russian zone of mutual interest and a railway border trade zone. These infrastructure opportunities allow for the implementation of a full-fledged overland railway connection between China and Russia, which contributes to more efficient and large-scale logistics operations.

Thus, the China-Far East-Russia land logistics corridor is a complex and coordinated infrastructure system that contributes to the deepening of trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia, as well as ensuring the efficient movement of goods and cargo between the two countries.

Russia's Far Eastern ports are located in Northeast Asia and border the Sea of Japan. They belong to the same category of Asian ports as the coastal ports of China, and are characterized by the presence of common land areas, similar marine areas and associated routes (see Table 3). China's coastal ports extend north to the port of Vladivostok, and then connect with cities along the Russian route via the Siberian Railway.

Table 3: Distance between coastal ports of China and ports of the Russian Far East (in nautical miles/kilometers)

Source: "Mileage tables of the main commercial ports of the world", edited by the Committee of Standard Measurements of the Ministry of Communications, People's Publishing House.

Far Eastern Port Complex of Russia

The Russian Far Eastern port complex has significant capacity and significant port resources, which have high potential for future development and expansion, especially in the context of the use of Arctic sea routes.

The central element of the Russian Far Eastern Port complex is the port of Vladivostok. This port is located in Primorsky Krai, which is the capital of the Russian Far East and has an area of 331 square kilometers. It is located on the border of Russia, China and North Korea and has beautiful natural harbors on three sides, making it a key Russian port on the Pacific Ocean. It is also worth noting that the command of the Russian Pacific Fleet is located in Vladivostok.

Historically, Vladivostok had the status of a Chinese territory during the Qing Dynasty, but after the signing of the Treaty of Aigong in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing in 1860, the territory east of the Ussuri River, including Vladivostok, was transferred to Russia.

The port of Vladivostok freezes at higher latitudes for about 4 months a year, however, thanks to the use of icebreakers, navigation is possible all year round. The port has 16 deep-water berths with a total length of 4,200 meters and depths from minus 10 to minus 13 meters. Of these, terminal 16 specializes in the assembly of large-capacity containers, having a length of 370 meters, a depth of 13 meters and an annual capacity of 90-100 thousand containers of international standard.

With the exception of Terminal 16, all other deepwater berths are multi-purpose. The annual capacity of the port is about 7 million tons, of which 4 million tons are intended for domestic transportation, and 3 million tons for international transportation. The port of Vladivostok specializes in handling heavy cargo, bulk cargo and large-capacity containers. At the same time, there is a great need for further diversification of the cargo base in this port ^[13].

The bulk of the cargo is transported along the Pacific coast of Russia, to the eastern Arctic coast, as well as to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The main cargo categories are dominated by oil and coal, food, basic necessities, construction materials, machinery and equipment, as well as fish and fish products, metals, ores and much more. Foreign trade goods, in turn, include exports of coal, timber, building materials, ores, fertilizers, fish products and imports of machinery and equipment, grain products and consumer goods.

The port complex of the Russian Far East is not only a highly passable system, but also has significant port resources with significant potential for future development and expansion, especially in the framework of the development of Arctic sea routes.

The central element of this port complex is the port of Vladivostok, which is located in Primorsky Krai, the capital of the Russian Far East and the largest city in this region, covering an area of 331 square kilometers. The port of Vladivostok is located on the border of Russia, China and North Korea, has natural harbors on three sides and an advantageous geographical location. It is a key seaport on the Pacific coast of Russia and also serves as the base of the command of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation. In a historical context, the port of Vladivostok was previously under Chinese rule during the Qing Dynasty, but after the signing of the Treaty of Aigong in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing in 1860, this territory, including Vladivostok, was transferred to Russia.

The port of Vladivostok is subject to freezing in winter, which lasts about 4 months. However, thanks to the use of icebreakers, navigation in the port is possible throughout the year. The port is equipped with 16 deep-water berths with a total length of 4,200 meters and depths reaching minus 10 to minus 13 meters. Terminal 16 specializes in the assembly of large-capacity containers and has a length of 370 meters, a depth of 13 meters and an annual capacity of 90-100 thousand containers of international standard. In addition to Berth 16, the remaining deepwater berths are designed for various types of cargo operations. 

The annual capacity of the port is approximately 7 million tons, of which 4 million tons are for domestic transportation and 3 million tons for international transportation. The port of Vladivostok specializes in handling heavy cargo, bulk cargo and large-capacity containers. The bulk of the cargo is transported along the Pacific coast of Russia, the eastern Arctic coast, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The main types of cargo are oil, coal, food, basic necessities, construction materials, machinery and equipment, as well as fish, fish products, metals, ores and other goods. Within the framework of foreign trade, the port of Vladivostok is a key point for the export of coal, timber, building materials, ores, fertilizers and fish products, as well as for the import of machinery and equipment, cereals and consumer goods.

Vladivostok has become a key transport hub in the Russian Far East due to its outstanding harbor, which serves as a transport and transit station and provides a connection between the Primorsky Territory of Russia, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic Ocean. Vladivostok has air links with the main cities of Russia and is the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway. It is also the center of maritime transport in the Far East and the terminus of the Arctic Ocean route. This position makes it strategically important for international trade.

The seaport of Vladivostok, located on the northwestern shore of the ice-free Golden Horn Bay of Peter the Great Bay, is the largest commercial port on the Pacific coast of Russia. Its privileged location contributes to the development of international trade. The bulk of exported goods are sent to China, Korea and Japan, while a significant portion of imported goods come from Australia, the United States and Japan.

It follows from the above that the group of ports of the Russian Far East with the port of Vladivostok as a key center has significant potential for the development of the Chinese-Russian import-export railway for cross-border linear logistics transportation. It also has the potential to become a maritime railway intermodal international transit port in Northeast Asia and a transit port between China and Russia. All this gives this region great importance for logistics and transportation of goods in the context of international trade on the border of the two countries.

China and Russia should begin strategic cooperation on the creation of the Far Eastern logistics corridor. There are several factors that contribute to this:

First, the first priority for China and Russia should be to establish strategic cooperation in creating a logistics corridor in the Far East. This project should be considered as a key strategic interaction between the two countries.

The creation of strategic logistics corridors implies a high degree of stability, scalability and commercial viability, as well as effective risk management.

The Far Eastern Logistics Corridor has its own unique advantages and disadvantages compared to the other two European logistics corridors. Among the advantages, it should be noted its high level of safety and reliability, as well as independence from external influences in the context of mass transportation of goods. This China-Russia corridor connects China's coastal areas and ports with border areas, railway stations and harbors in the Russian Far East. We can say that this is "the transportation of one's own goods by one's own means", and external factors have little effect on it. However, the disadvantage is the higher cost compared to sea transportation and the longer length of the railway line to the European part of Russia. The total length of the route, including sea and land sections, is about 11,000 km. In comparison, the sea route to the port of St. Petersburg is more than 21,700 km, and the railway route through the port of Manzhouli and the port of Alashankou to Moscow is more than 7,100 km and 8,600 km, respectively.

In a complex and volatile global environment, the creation of a strategic logistics corridor between China and Russia is of particular importance. This corridor should be stable and secure, which will ensure the interests of both countries in the framework of international trade.

Secondly, it should be noted that cooperation on the China-Russia-Far East logistics corridor is of strategic importance as a starting point for the further development of partnership between China and Russia in the Far East.

The joint participation of China and Russia in the creation of a logistics infrastructure hub in the Far East is becoming an integral part of Russia's development strategy in this region. This is especially relevant in the context of Russia's increased strategic orientation to the east, especially after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russia is actively intensifying efforts to find new opportunities for cooperation and partnership in the east, returning to previously forgotten aspects of Sino-Russian cooperation and accelerating the implementation of new projects that have long remained on paper.

As an example, we can cite the completion of the long-awaited eight-year deal for the construction of a gas pipeline in the Far East, intended for direct natural gas supplies to China. This project, known as "Russia-Far East-China", includes a route starting from the city of Rychinsk in the Primorsky Territory of Russia, passing along the Ussuri River and ending in Khulin, the Chinese province of Heilongjiang. After the pipeline is put into operation, Russia will be able to supply significant volumes of natural gas to China annually.

Another significant project is the overland food corridor between China and Russia, which was the result of a joint initiative between the two countries. This corridor creates the most economical and shortest logistics route for the export of agricultural products from Russia's Siberia to China. The Russian side plans to export significant volumes of products through this corridor, and the construction of an appropriate infrastructure, such as the Trans-Baikal Grain Terminal, is already at the final stage of construction. Belova E. S. also notes this point in the article "A new window of opportunity for Siberian farmers", while noting that the increase in agricultural production in Siberia should take place on a programmatic basis – we are talking about a long-term strategy at the level of the federal government ^[14].

It is also important to note that it is planned to create an international territory of advanced socio-economic development in Primorsky Krai, which will provide Chinese companies with favorable conditions for business and investment in the development of logistics, port, road and other infrastructure. This initiative is of strategic importance for Russia and expresses its desire to attract more Chinese investments to the region.

Consequently, the development of the Russian Far East and its successful promotion to the east are an integral part of the Russian strategy. The port of Vladivostok, as the central element of the Far Eastern logistics channel, plays a key role in this strategic partnership between China and Russia. Thus, cooperation in the development of the Far East should begin with the strengthening and development of the strategic Far Eastern logistics corridor, with the unification of infrastructure projects and joint initiatives in the field of logistics in order to achieve a higher level of interaction between the two countries.

The key factor for the success of this cooperation is the formation of consensus between the parties, mutual understanding and demonstration of sincerity in striving to develop this strategically important region, as well as the choice of the optimal strategy and coordination of the interests of both sides.

Thirdly, it is worth emphasizing the importance of cooperation and investment between China and Russia in the field of logistics infrastructure in the Far East within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative.

Cooperation between China and Russia in the field of logistics infrastructure in the Far East is a strategic necessity in light of the limited logistical resources available compared to the growing needs for economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.

The existing logistics capabilities in the Far East are proving insufficient to meet the needs for the delivery and movement of goods necessary to expand and strengthen trade and economic relations between China and Russia. In this context, cooperation and investments in the development of logistics infrastructure are becoming an important and strategic task for both countries.

The research by the Shenzhen Institute highlights a number of problems related to logistics and infrastructure in the context of cooperation between China and Russia, especially in the framework of customs clearance and port infrastructure development in the Far East.

Firstly, there is a significant imbalance in the construction of port and logistics facilities in the territories of both countries, which is a consequence of China's active policy to develop its ports and logistics infrastructure facilities. In particular, China actively supports the construction of ports and railway stations, logistics hubs and border areas of joint cooperation. Using the example of Suifenhe, China has seen a marked improvement in port infrastructure, including the creation of public railway stations and logistics parks, which allows efficient handling of various types of cargo.

However, the situation on the Russian side, in particular in the port of Guzhen, is significantly different. There is limited bandwidth and a lack of modern logistics resources. The Guzheng Loading and Unloading Station has only one container handling line and two bulk cargo lines, which severely limits its capacity. Unlike Chinese ports, the Russian side faces significant limitations in the capacity and throughput of port facilities, which creates significant problems in ensuring smooth cargo movement and leads to long delays.

This disparity between the port infrastructure and logistics complexes of China and Russia is becoming one of the key reasons for regular delays and congestion of cargo in the ports of both countries. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has also worsened the situation, leading to overloading of ports in the Russian Far East and increased transportation costs, which affected the cost of rail transportation and led to higher tariffs.

Solving these problems requires more balanced investments and modernization of the logistics infrastructure in the Far East, which would contribute to more efficient cargo movement and strengthen cooperation between China and Russia in this region.

Secondly, the low operating power of the port. The problem of low operating capacity of ports in the Far East has a serious impact on the development of regional logistics. There are 16 port trading terminals in the group of ports of the Russian Far East, especially in the core of the port of Vladivostok. However, the total length of the berths is only 4,200 meters, and terminal No. 16, which is a container terminal, has a length of only 370 meters and a depth of 13 meters. This terminal is capable of handling only 90-100 thousand containers of international standard per year.

With the exception of container terminal No. 16, all other terminals are multi-purpose terminals with a combined annual capacity of only 5-6 million tons. Other ports, such as the port of Posyet and the port of Zarubino, are limited in their operating capacity and specialize in loading and unloading coal and ore. Slavyanka Port, originally a shipyard, currently has only one berth for cargo handling.

It is important to note that the cost of loading and unloading in Russian ports is significantly higher than in world practice. Problems related to customs clearance, efficiency and adaptation of cargo loading and unloading processes in ports, as well as insufficient operating capacity, are the main obstacles to the development of the Far East. These problems require immediate attention and solutions.

After the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, trade volumes between Russia and China increased significantly, which affected the demand for overland transportation between the two countries. The lack of transportation capacity has led to significant delays in the movement of goods, especially on the Russian side of the border.

In this regard, the proposal to expand the area of the port where containers are located and the construction of terminal 17 is an important step to increase the operating capacity of the port of Vladivostok. It is also planned to purchase additional equipment, including cranes, to solve the problem of equipment shortage and improve the port's efficiency.

Thirdly, there is a significant difference in gauge standards between Chinese and Russian railways, which negatively affects the efficiency of transportation and increases the cost of transporting goods. The Russian railway traditionally uses broad gauge tracks, while China uses standard international rail standards. This creates inconsistencies in cross-border transport, requiring a change in the standard gauge and the re-laying of rails at the border.

The Chinese side has made significant efforts in equipping railway switching stations, such as Suifenhe Railway Switching Station. Here, bulk cargo is switched to four railway lines, with the possibility of changing up to 8 columns per day with continuous operation, and up to 12 columns at maximum productivity. There are also container lines capable of changing 4 columns per day.

In comparison, the Russian side is lagging behind in the equipment of railway switching stations and is experiencing serious limitations. The Suifenhe port, located just 16 kilometers from the Pogranichnaya railway station on the Russian side, has only a railway station for loading and unloading containers. The maximum capacity for changing bulk cargo is only 4 trains per month (30 sections), which is not enough to meet the needs of the China-Europe route and handle outgoing freight trains. The Russian Far Eastern Railway is also facing difficulties in adapting to the logistical demand between China and Russia, and the insufficient capacity of the Siberian Railway, which is becoming increasingly apparent.

It is important to emphasize that the Russian Railway remains an integral partner in the China-Europe route. However, the current state of the Siberian Railway is not able to adapt to both Russia's own logistical needs and the needs of the Sino-Russian trade logistics channel.

Fourth, the port of Vladivostok does not meet modern requirements in terms of cargo collection and distribution, and also needs to increase capacity. This implies the availability of safe and efficient transport routes for the movement of goods. Despite the relatively short distance between Hunchun Railway Station and the port of Vladivostok, only 320 kilometers, existing roads, especially the road connecting the port of Vladivostok and the port of Slavyanka, are of poor quality, and maintenance and repair do not keep up with the wear of the coating. This problem is especially relevant in conditions of harsh climate and high traffic intensity, which creates significant obstacles to reliable road transport. As a result, it is difficult to ensure the reliability and efficiency of logistics and transportation, which limits the development potential of this logistics system. ^[15]

Taking into account the prospects for the development of trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia, especially within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative, it is necessary to actively strive for the integration and coordination of logistics corridors in the Far East. Cooperation between China and Russia in the field of logistics corridor infrastructure in the Far East can be built around the following key areas:

1. Support for the joint construction of loading and unloading sites: The creation of an infrastructure that allows loading and unloading of goods in the same place becomes a priority. This helps to increase the efficiency of freight transportation by rail and reduce efficiency losses due to differences in track width. In the long term, the goal is to create railways with the same gauge between the ports of the Far East, which will reduce the need for re-laying rails and simplify logistics processes.

2. Investments in local port cooperation: Aimed at improving the condition of roads leading to ports, investments can contribute to increasing port capacity and developing business related to the consolidation of marine cargo. This includes improving the quality and class of routes connecting ports of the Far East, such as Suifenhe Port - Vladivostok Port, Dongning Port - Vladivostok Port and Hunchun Port - Vladivostok Port. Improving infrastructure and improving road surface and safety standards will optimize logistics flows and increase the efficiency of the port of Vladivostok.

3. Investments in the development of Far Eastern ports: The development of Far Eastern ports is becoming an important aspect of cooperation between China and Russia. The approach to the investment strategy should include avoiding the impact on key Russian ports such as Vladivostok Commercial Port, Nakhodka Port and Vostochny Port, as well as avoiding the creation of new ports "from scratch". Instead, the focus should be on the development, reconstruction and modernization of existing ports, such as Slavyanka Port, which is currently being used as a ship repair plant. Pilot projects based on joint investments and cooperation in the development of port infrastructure will play a key role in the development of logistics infrastructure in the Far East and promote cooperation between China and Russia in this area.

Effective use of the Vladivostok port Complex for cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods and the development of appropriate infrastructure in Heilongjiang and Jilin.

More than 160 years ago, as a result of the ratification of two treaties - the Aigun and Beijing - China transferred over 1 million square kilometers of territory to Russia, including Vladivostok and the Tumen River. This historic act led to the fact that the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin lost access to the sea, transforming from coastal provinces into inland regions. Today, goods produced in the provinces of Hei and Jilin have a long journey to the sea, exclusively to the southern ports through the Liaodong Peninsula, including the ports of Yingkou, Dalian and Lushun. The port of Dandong is too far from the interior of the Northeast, and the Liaodong Peninsula, mountainous and devoid of large rivers, does not provide an opportunity to connect coastal and inland cities. This situation makes the harbor in Liaoning Province the only access to the sea for the three northeastern provinces, which significantly limits their economic development. ^[16]

Given the ongoing reforms and the process of opening up to the world, the lack of a sea outlet has become a significant factor limiting the economic development of the two provinces, especially the northeast region. In this regard, the issue of providing a seaport in the northeast has become one of the most important tasks within the framework of the strategy of reviving the old industrial bases of the northeast of China.

Russia's Far Eastern ports, located close to the provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin, provide optimal conditions for the development of cross-border transportation, taking into account their geographical location and recent infrastructure improvements. The most significant advantages are the close distance between ports, for example, the Suifenhe port is located only 230 km from the Vladivostok commercial Port and 290 km from the Eastern Port of Vladivostok; Hunchun Port is 320 km from the commercial port of Vladivostok and 80 km and 95 km from the Russian ports of Zarubino and Slavyanka, respectively.

The ports of Zarubino and Slavyanka in Russia are located at a distance of 80 and 95 km, respectively, from the Sino-Russian border, and the port of Raskhin in North Korea is 124 km away. When comparing these distances by land, the distance from Harbin City to Dalian Port is about 950 km, and from Jiamusi City to Dalian Port is 1280 km, and from Suifenhe Port to Yingkou Port is 1300 km. This clearly indicates the high costs of land transport and highlights the advantages of the Far Eastern port group with Vladivostok as the center for the development of the most important port group of the Far East.

In May 2023, the General Administration of Customs of China (GAC) issued an official announcement announcing the expansion of the list of transshipment ports for cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods in Jilin Province. In addition to the existing ports, Vladivostok in Russia was added as a transshipment port for cross-border transportation of goods. Additionally, two ports - the Yongzhou Container Terminal and Jiaxing Zhapu Port in Zhejiang Province - were listed as ports of entry for cross-border transportation of goods.

This decision has generated considerable interest both inside China and abroad. Historically, since 2007, Heilongjiang Province has received permission from the General Customs Administration to conduct pilot cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods. This project allowed Heilongjiang Province to use Suifenhe Port as a starting point for cross-border transportation, and then reload cargo in the Russian ports of Vladivostok, Dongfang and Nakhodka, as well as in the ports of Shanghai, Ningbo and Huangpu in China.

In August 2010, an announcement was also published allowing Jilin Province to export domestic trade goods through the port of Hunchun-Yellow, then transit through the port of Wonjongri-Rajin in North Korea and re-enter the ports of Shanghai and Ningbo for cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods.

Over time, within the framework of pilot programs, a set of management methods and operational procedures has been developed for the effective conduct of cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods. The basic principle is to maximize the geographical advantage of the short distances between the ports of Russia and North Korea adjacent to Heilongjiang Province and the northeastern provinces of China. These ports provide exceptional opportunities for the transportation of goods between the north and south of the Chinese coast through a transshipment system using seaports. ^[17]

The port of Vladivostok has become a key outlet for goods to the sea for the northern regions of Northeast China, compensating for the only access to the sea through the southern ports of Yingkou and Dalian on the Liaodong Peninsula.

This step represents a significant improvement in the field of logistics, aimed at optimizing the processes of transporting goods and reducing costs in the logistics chain. This solution contributes to the intensification of logistics activities in the Northeast and serves as a means of supporting economic development in this region. Stimulating economic activity in the Northeast is of strategic importance, especially in the context of strengthening efforts to restore and develop the old industrial base in the region.

This initiative also represents an important innovation in the field of domestic trade and transport links in Northeast China. It ensures the improvement of relevant policies and their implementation processes, which helps to reduce the burden on business activities in accordance with the principle of "appropriate internal - appropriate external". This approach allows us to return to the basics of politics and to carry out a pragmatic promotion of cross-border transportation of goods of domestic trade. Overall, this represents an important innovative change in the transportation of domestic goods in the Northeast.

Cooperation between China and Russia in the creation of a logistics corridor in the Far East has many important aspects, especially in the context of the development of the Russian Far East. This makes it possible to adapt to the changing conditions of Sino-Russian trade and economic cooperation and contributes to Russia's efforts to develop its Far East. In this context, the Northeast region occupies a key position in strategic cooperation between the two countries.

The creation of a logistics corridor in the Northeast Asia region not only optimizes logistics flows, but also provides broad strategic opportunities for Russia and China. This corridor is becoming an important element of the logistics infrastructure of the region and contributes to the development of economic ties between the countries, which is of long-term strategic importance. In the future, it will be possible to make a contrastive study comparing trade turnover and the importance of the Far East in the past and present. For example, as it is written in the article Efimenko N. A. ^[18], in the 50s of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union played a dominant role in relation to China, but at the moment, the balance of power has changed, and the interaction has acquired a different character, which would be interesting to study in further research. Also, a comparison of land routes through Mongolia and through Kazakhstan (for example, the research of Dubovskaya A.M. ^[19] and Wang Ts. ^[20]) with waterways (as, for example, the study of Dyakova O. V. ^[21]).