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Zobnin A.V. American intellectuals who changed the paradigm of rational choice of the XX century

Abstract: This research is dedicated to the analysis of contribution of the accomplished American scholars into the study of the problem of rational choice of the XX century. The problematics of the rational choice covers an extensive circle of disciplines of the modern scientific knowledge: from mathematics to economics, and all the way to psychology and philosophy. Therefore the author examines the works of the American mathematician K. Arrow, economist P. Samuelson, political scientist H. Simon, psychologists D. Kahneman and B. Schwartz, philosopher A. Gibbard, and sociologist O. Holsti.  The main method of this work consists in biographical approach in combination with comparative analysis of the views and concepts that belong to the aforementioned scholars. During the course of this research, key trends of development of the American scientific thought within the frameworks of the paradigm of rational choice were being determined. The author underlines the methodological transition from the concept of universal rationality, which is based on implementation of mathematical and economic scientific apparatus, to the concept of limited, situational rationality based on the psychological and philosophical theories.


Keywords:

rational choice, rationality, P. Samuelson, D. Kahneman, A. Gibbard, B. Schwartz, O. Holsti, H. Simon, K. Arrow, American intellectuals

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