Transformation of the principles of remuneration of workers and employees in the Soviet metallurgy during 1922 – 1928 period (based on collective agreements and tariff agreements of the Sickle and Hammer plant)

Chudinov Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Postgraduate student, Department of Social and Economic History of Russia, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 82 Vernadsky Ave., Moscow, 119571, Russia achudinov2023@mail.ru

During the period of the new economic policy, the metallurgical industry played a huge role in the economy of Soviet Russia. In the conditions of the capitalist environment, the production of own machine tools was the basis of the national independence of the Soviet state and the functioning of the Soviet economic system. However, in order to ensure the efficiency of production, among other factors, a competent wage policy is needed, which was the main link in the system of labor motivation of Soviet workers. And the NEP period became an important stage when the foundations of a new system of labor relations were laid, and the most effective forms of remuneration were sought.

Collective agreements have a fairly long history: even in pre-revolutionary Russia, entrepreneurs began to formalize them under the pressure of the strike movement. The trade unions laid the foundations for regulating labor relations in the Soviet system. In particular, they took a key part in the creation and implementation of the Labor Code of 1922, which for the first time legislated collective agreements. The idea of such regulation of labor relations organically fit into the logic of decentralization of management, common in the initial period of the NEP. At the same time, the state, of course, sought to maintain control over enterprises, especially in heavy industries. Archival materials characterizing the situation in the field of labor relations and wages at the level of individual enterprises (in particular, the Hammer and Sickle plant) allow us to trace how these ideas were implemented in practice.

There is no single idea among historians about the direction and results of the processes of state regulation of wages of workers and employees employed in the metallurgical industry, which gives relevance to this article. The research is carried out on the basis of materials from the Sickle and Hammer plant, and the basis of the source base were collective agreements and tariff agreements from 1921 to 1928, preserved in the funds of the Central State Archive of the City of Moscow (CSA of Moscow). Collective agreements were concluded between the Moscow branch of the Union of Metalworkers and the Board of the Moscow Machine-Building Trust. They contain information about the amount of wages of individual professions, the procedure for calculating piecework rates, tariff grids, tariff rates, the procedure for paying for marriage and downtime, the timing of payment of wages. This allows us, based on this source, to consider how the principles of remuneration changed during the NEP period.

 The choice of the enterprise is explained, first of all, by the fact that the Sickle and Hammer plant was experimental during the period under review, new forms of remuneration were being worked out on it, and, as a result, it was this enterprise that had to demonstrate the effectiveness of the state's salary policy. The acuteness of the problem and the relevance of the issue of forming the principles of remuneration at the Sickle and Hammer plant are indicated by the materials of the meetings of the pricing and conflict commission and protocols on negotiations between the board of the trust and the metalworkers' union attached to collective agreements. In them, the issues of remuneration occupy a key place.

The purpose of this study is to study the transformation of the principles of remuneration in metallurgy during the period of the new economic policy at the micro level, using the example of the Sickle and Hammer plant. The main tasks of the work: 1) to characterize the impact of the state's salary policy and the economic conjuncture of the NEP on the principles of remuneration based on collective agreements and tariff grids; 2) to identify changes in the principles of remuneration in the context of their impact on the differentiation of wages of workers and employees; 3) to analyze the transformation of various types and forms of remuneration (piecework, time-based, premium, overtime, natural, etc.) and their impact on the differentiation of earnings of employees of the enterprise selected for consideration.

There are research works in historiography, where the authors focus on the issues of remuneration in the Soviet industry of the NEP period. The first group includes publications that study directly the legal features of collective agreements, their origin and functioning within the Soviet system. Thus, the works of A. B. Ivanov ^[1], S. A. Urazov and G. V. Garbuz ^[2] are devoted to labor contracts and directly to the Labor Code of 1922, which legislated them as a legal norm. Another common way of analyzing collective agreements was to consider them in the context of studying the activities of Soviet trade unions. It was this body that was responsible for the creation of the draft collective agreements and took part in its implementation on the ground. Here we should highlight the works of N. A. Kobrin ^[3], D. V. Lobok ^[4] and L. V. Borisova ^[5]. In this group of works, collective agreements are considered in the context of various research tasks, but they contain important information about the source underlying our research and demonstrate its research potential.

The second group of works is devoted to the issues of labor, wages and wage differentiation in Soviet Russia during the NEP period. First of all, it is necessary to note here the monograph by A. A. Ilyukhov ^[6], in which the author analyzes the measures of the Soviet government of the 1920s in the field of remuneration and their implementation, and also provides a large amount of statistical data. Also, for the analysis of collective agreements, works on labor conflicts are important, since the cause of the latter was most often dissatisfaction with the principles of remuneration, the amount of earnings, the timing of its issuance, etc. Among the studies considering this topic, it is necessary to pay attention to the monographs of Yu. I. Kiryanov and L. V. Borisova ^[7,8].  We also note more general monographs that give an overview of the history of workers' protests in Russia ^{[9, 10]}. The article by A. K. Sokolov, devoted in general to the issues of labor motivation at Soviet enterprises in the 1917-1930s, deserves special attention ^[11]. The work of S. P. Postnikov and M. A. Feldman, based on the materials of industrial enterprises of the Urals, gives an understanding of the moods of workers and their worldview ^[12]. In addition, an extremely important topic for our research is the study of methods of stimulation ^[13] and labor organization. For example, in the PhD thesis of A. K. Chistyakova (K. A. Chistyakova Movement for the scientific organization of labor of the 1920s-1930s in Soviet Russia: On the history of the formation of the Russian school of "human relations". Diss. cand. M., 2004) the scientific school of labor organization, which represented the use and adaptation of Taylor's ideas on the organization of the working process, is considered. S. B. Ulyanov in his work "On the gallop, then on the side" ^[14] analyzes the method of deploying political campaigns to stimulate labor. This practice, which became most widespread during the period of Soviet industrialization, began to take shape during the years of the new economic policy.

The third group of works contains an analysis of the system of labor incentives at specific enterprises. This is of interest to us not only from the point of view of the conclusions made by the authors, but also for studying the methodology of microanalysis conducted on the materials of large Soviet enterprises during the NEP and Soviet industrialization ^[15]. First of all, it is worth noting the works of L. I. Borodkin ^[16,17] and E. I. Safonova ^[18], in which the problems of motivation and labor organization are considered on the example of the textile industry and specifically the Prokhorovskaya Trekhgornaya Manufactory. Of particular interest to us are the works dedicated to the Hammer and Sickle plant. This is a monograph by A.M. Markevich and A. K. Sokolov "Magnitogorsk near the Garden Ring" ^[19], as well as a book by I. L. Kornakovsky "From Goujon to the Hammer and Sickle" ^[20]. However, the principles of remuneration at this plant in the 1920s, as well as wage differentiation, were not among the priority issues.

Thus, the questions posed in this article have not been solved before by researchers, including on the basis of the source base we have attracted, which determines the scientific novelty of this study.

***

The Hammer and Sickle plant, founded in 1883 by Yu.P. Guzhon, was one of the largest metallurgical and metalworking enterprises of the Russian Empire. If at first the plant's products were mainly nails, bolts, iron ropes, chains, wire, then since 1895 it began to produce metal structures for bridges and buildings. In 1918, the company was nationalized, and then, in the course of economic reforms, it was incorporated into the Mashinotrest association. During this extremely difficult period for the plant, the company's products focused on the mass consumer or on some random large order. "As a result, by the 1923/1924 economic year, the production level was 40% of the pre-war, 42% by tonnage and 37% by value" ^{[19, p.107]}. The plant managed to fully return to pre- war indicators only by 1928 .

Tariff agreements and collective agreements were concluded between the district branch of the All-Russian Union of Metalworkers, representing the interests of workers and employees of a number of Moscow metallurgical enterprises, and the board of the state Moscow Machine-Building Trust. This trust was an association of enterprises that included the largest Moscow factories "Hammer and Sickle", "Red Proletarian", "Fighter", "Hydrofil", "Krasnaya Presnya", "Boiler Apparatus", "Press", "Parostroy", "Klimovsky", etc. Collective agreements were concluded for three months, and in the absence of a new agreement were subject to automatic renewal. There is a gradual trend towards an increase in the validity period of the collective agreement, in 1925 it was concluded for 10 months, in 1927 for a whole operational year. Within the framework of collective agreements, there are no clauses or conditions that would indicate the possibility of their complete revision, however, individual clauses of the contract could be revised as part of the work of the settlement and tariff commission or, in particularly difficult cases, by an arbitration court. This is confirmed by the attached documents of the arbitration debates with the participation of representatives of Mashinotrest and the district branch of the metal workers' union.

Forms and terms of salary payments. The issue of wages during the NEP period was carried out through different currencies. The economy of this period was very unstable and prone to inflation. The purchasing power of monetary units changed extremely rapidly. As a result, especially in the initial period of the NEP, the dates of payments and the recalculation of wages in a stable currency were very important. The collective agreement of March 1923 states that the calculation of wages was carried out in commodity rubles, and then there was a recalculation in banknotes of 1923. In the future, payment was made in "chervontsy". The procedure for issuing wages is gradually changing. For example, in 1924, "The salary is issued during working hours 2 times a month. No later than the 22nd of the billing month and the 7th of the following month" (Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. d.250. L.21). It is important to note that the struggle for revision of payment dates is one of the key plots that run through all collective agreements. Workers continued to insist on earlier payments not only when wages were issued in inflation-prone banknotes, but also when payments began to be made in "chervonets". This led to the establishment of a monthly schedule for the issuance of earnings, which fixed the payment dates in advance. In some cases, the workers' demands regarding the change of payment dates were fulfilled, and in others, the options proposed by the administration were implemented.

Natural payments. A special form of remuneration, characteristic primarily for the initial stage of the NEP, became in-kind payments. However, the specifics of the metallurgical industry was the rather long preservation of such payments and benefits, which were mentioned, among other things, in the collective agreements under consideration. Conditionally, two periods of the existence of in-kind payments can be distinguished.  Firstly, this is the period of 1921-1923, within which natural disbursements of scarce products and goods were practiced, and secondly, this is the period after 1923 and almost until the end of the 1920s, when natural payments are transformed into providing the worker with some personal hygiene items and specialized uniforms for safe work in the shop. Further, it will be considered more specifically which goods could be issued as part of the distribution of the natural fund and according to what principles this distribution took place.

In the materials of the tariff commission of the Sickle and Hammer plant, information on the distribution of the natural fund for 1921 has been preserved. It included the following categories of distributed goods: factory-made products, workwear, food rations. The distribution of the first and third categories of goods took place on the basis of tariff categories, and the size of the ration of workers and employees starting from the 6th category was specifically stipulated. In the absence of these payments, compensation of goods was made with the help of a monetary amount equivalent to their value. There was a practice of free public transport for the workers of the Hammer and Sickle factory, which, however, was abolished already in 1922. As for workwear, its specific types and volumes of issuance were not mentioned, but there is information that 45% of the plant's employees in 1921 received workwear as in-kind payments (Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. d.117. L.12).

After 1923, there was a gradual departure from permanent in-kind payments in favor of providing workers and employees with uniforms, quick access to the workplace, hygiene items, and other means necessary for effective work in metallurgical workshops. Within the framework of the collective agreement of March 1923, the need to provide workers with overalls and "safety devices for work" is indicated (Central State Administration of Moscow. F. 176. Op.2. d.170. L.30). Special attention was paid to the issue of in-kind payments to workers of workshops with harmful production. The plant provided hot shop workers with milk or oil replacing it, as well as soap. In order to avoid the spread of epidemics, workers and employees of the plant were provided with free medical care. Interestingly, by 1928, some of the canceled privileges of workers, for example, the right to preferential travel in public transport, were gradually beginning to return to the collective agreement. This is probably due to the fact that in 1922 wages were so low that workers wanted to get the maximum earnings in natural goods or in foreign currency and demanded the cancellation of preferential travel, the partial cost of which was deducted from their wages. By 1928, wages had become higher, and the relative amount of deductions was small, which, accordingly, allowed workers to save on using discounted tickets.

The distribution of material payments in the period after 1923 took place according to the shop principle. In particular, the replacement or issuance of new workwear was carried out at the request of the workshop workers (with due justification) and was submitted to a meeting of the tariff and pricing commission. Based on the minutes of the meetings analyzed by us, it can be concluded that the requirements of workers involved in hot jobs and difficult industries were most often fulfilled. This suggests that in terms of in-kind payments, workers and, especially, workers in difficult industries had a clear advantage over other categories of workers.

The principle of collective payment. In 1922, the Sickle and Hammer plant was included in a group of industrial enterprises of various industries, which launched an experiment in the field of wages: the size of the salary fund now depended on the volume of products produced, and not on the number of employees. Here is how the stock system of remuneration is characterized in the documents of the trust to which the Hammer and Sickle plant belonged: "Mashinostroy issues a general salary fund to the plant teams for the execution of 100% of the production program, calculated as follows. The hourly tariff rate of the I-th category is multiplied by 192 hours, by the average tariff ratio for the qualification of factory workers and by a fixed number of employees and increases by 35%. The fund compiled in this way decreases or increases in direct proportion to the implementation of the production program. These 35% go to the disposal of the plant management for earnings and additional payments of workers and employees of the collective" (Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. D.170. L.25). Within the framework of such a wage system, two indicators play an extremely important role: the hourly tariff rate of the I-th category (and the tariff grid) and the percentage of completion of the production program. Thus, the dynamics of these indicators and the methods of their formation can show us the general trends in wage changes and its differentiation between different categories of workers.

Table 1 allows us to trace the changes in the rate of the I-th category for different groups of employees of the Sickle and Hammer plant in 1923-1928.

Table 1. The rate of the I-th category at the Hammer and Sickle factory in 1923-1928.

Sources: Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. d.170. l.10, 23.; d.250. L.21; d.718. L.15; D.811. L.6; D.386. L.32.

The data in Table 1 show a fairly sharp increase in the hourly wages of workers in 1925-1927. However, it should be borne in mind that, as already mentioned, the salary of a particular employee was also determined by changes in the tariff schedule and production standards, which we will consider further.

Changes in the tariff schedule in collective agreements. Turning to the analysis of changes in tariff grids at the Sickle and Hammer plant, first of all, it is worth noting that they were used both to establish a minimum wage and to regulate the level of wage differentiation between different categories of workers. It is necessary to additionally note the importance of tariff grids in the context of stimulating an employee to improve their skills and increase labor productivity.

In 1922, a standard 17-digit tariff grid was introduced at the industrial enterprises of Soviet Russia, on the basis of which the salary was formed until 1926. The first three categories corresponded to unskilled workers and students, categories from the 4th to the 6th - qualified workers who had completed a training period of at least six months, categories from the 7th according to the 9th, they corresponded to qualified workers with at least three years of training. The categories from the 10th to the 17th no longer covered workers, but administrative and technical personnel ^{[6, pp.73-74]}.

Table 2 shows the tariff coefficients that operated at the Sickle and Hammer plant in 1922-1924.

Table 2. Coefficients of the 17-digit tariff grid at the Sickle and Hammer plant. 1922-1924

Sources: Central State Administration of Moscow. F. R-176. Op.2. D. 170. L.10, 21; D. 250. L. 21; D. 386. L. 31.

Analyzing the data in Table 2, it can be seen that at the Hammer and Sickle factory in 1922 – early 1923, the gap between the rates of the highest and lowest categories was fivefold. But already in the tariff agreement of May 1923, where the same 17-bit grid was used, this gap becomes eightfold. And this is the maximum difference in the tariff coefficients of the lowest and highest categories at this enterprise in 1923-1928. It is significant that this corresponded to pre-revolutionary practice, when the maximum salary exceeded the minimum by eight times ^{[6, p.74]}.

Starting in 1927, both at the Sickle and Hammer plant and at other enterprises, differentiated tariff grids for different categories of workers began to be applied. Such a payroll system made it possible to abolish the binding of earnings of all groups of employees to a single minimum rate. Table 3 shows the differentiated tariff schedule that operated at the Sickle and Hammer plant in 1927.

Table 3. Differentiated tariff schedule at the Hammer and Sickle plant. 1927

Source: Central State Administration of Moscow. F. R-176. Op. 2. D. 718. L. 13-14.

In the industry of Soviet Russia during the years of the NEP, there was an acute shortage of qualified personnel, and the management of enterprises had to look for ways to attract and consolidate workers. Material incentives remained the main ones, and differentiation in wages was supposed to push workers to improve their skills. The data in Table 2 demonstrate an increase in the level of differentiation within different groups of workers. The difference between the maximum and minimum wages of apprentices and unskilled workers in 1922-1923 was 1.4 times, in 1924 the gap slightly increased to 1.5 times. According to the separate tariff schedule of 1927, the difference between the maximum and minimum wages of students was already 2.5 times. A similar situation is observed among accounting clerks and administrative and technical personnel. In January 1923, the difference between the minimum and maximum salaries of administrative and technical personnel was 1.2 times, and in 1927 the gap in wages could already be 4 times. The difference in the minimum and maximum salaries of accounting and office workers has increased even more significantly. If in 1923 the difference between their minimum and maximum wages was 1.5 times, then in 1927 it could differ by 8 times.

Having analyzed the tariff grids (Tables 2 and 3), it is possible to identify the following trends in the dynamics of wage differentiation at the Sickle and Hammer plant. Firstly, differentiation within different groups of employees (such as students, workers, administrative and technical staff, accounting and office employees, etc.) grew throughout the period under review. It is possible to record an increase in differentiation between these groups during the existence of the 17-digit tariff system (1923-1926). It is important to note that in 1924-1925, approximately 30% of the plant's employees were transferred to higher tariff categories ^{[19, p.113]}, which led to a parallel overall increase in wages and a reduction in the number of low-paid workers. However, given that the number of employees grew significantly during this period, and, as follows from the text of collective agreements, the category of worker actually depended on the type of work performed, the increase in the category of such a large number of employees could be associated with the reconstruction of the plant and the emergence of new production tasks, the performance of which required more highly qualified workers. The text of the collective agreement mentions the transformations that have occurred in the professional and tariff distribution. The distribution of works and categories were changed in accordance with the new tariff directory of the All-Russian Union of Metalworkers.

In 1927-1928, the factory pursued a policy to increase the wages of low-paid categories of workers. The trade unions sought to further increase the minimum rate. A list of disputed issues between the management of the trust and the metalworkers' union is attached to the collective agreement of 1927. The first three issues of this list are directly devoted to the increase in the minimum wage, as well as the distribution of the fund allocated by the government for these purposes (CSA of Moscow. F. 176. Op.2. d.718. L.3). Separately, the need to refuse to increase the salaries of administrative and technical employees at the expense of this fund, by increasing tasks for receiving bonuses, etc. is mentioned.

The obvious tendency to increase differentiation in wages of employees of the Sickle and Hammer plant during the years of the NEP was hindered by the government's policy of leveling wages. It is important that the initiative to reduce the level of wage differentiation belonged to the trade unions and the government, and not to the administration of enterprises. The latter, by the way, could use a separate discharge tariff grid, including for manipulating wages in order to increase the performance of the plant, which means its own premium. This is demonstrated by the materials of the pricing and conflict commission and arbitration debates with the participation of representatives of Mashinotrest and the district branch of the metal workers' union. Within the framework of these discussions, representatives of the trust most often advocated a reduction in time-based and piecework wages and an increase in bonus payments.

***

The collective agreement of March 1924 specifies the existence of the following types of remuneration at the Sickle and Hammer plant: "1) basic salary according to the tariff; 2) additional payment of responsible employees; 3) special allowance; 4) earnings; 5) overtime; 6) holidays; 7) compensation for unused vacation; 8) for dismissal; 9) piece-work; 10) for the benefit of employees when issuing wages to workers; 11) additional payment for the performance of work not according to the position held; 12) additional payment for the time spent on vacation" (CSA of Moscow. F. 176. Op.2. D.250. L.23). As part of the analysis these types of remuneration can be distinguished by the three most common, which are described in maximum detail in collective agreements. These are time-based wages, piecework wages and premium wages. Next, it is necessary to analyze their changes and the impact on wage differentiation.

Piecework remuneration. The bet on unlimited piecework was made by the Soviet government back in April 1921, when restrictions on piecework were lifted. Next, it is necessary to consider how the wages of the piecework worker were formed, and how it was transformed over time in collective agreements at the Sickle and Hammer plant.

The collective agreement of March 1923 stated: "Piecework and piece-by-piece rates are determined by dividing the tariff rate of pieceworkers by the number of items established as the production rate of its own category" (CGA of Moscow. F. 176. Op.2. d.170. L.23.). The salary of a pieceworker consisted of two parts: piecework wages and earnings. If the results of labor were within the production rate, then the worker received piecework payment in accordance with piecework (piece-by-piece) rates. If the production rate was exceeded, then he claimed earnings paid from the collective payment fund. For each unit of goods in excess of the norm, the amount due at piecework rates was paid, and the total amount of payment depended on the quantity of goods produced. Moreover, it is important that the same work could be performed by workers with different tariff coefficients, and the tariff at which these works were paid did not change. Thus, piecework payment was made according to the qualification of the work, and not the employee. Such a system, as already mentioned, depends on the production standards and the tariff grid. Since enough attention has been paid to the tariff grid of the Sickle and Hammer plant and its transformations above, let us turn to the issue of production standards.

In 1924, the production rate was defined as the best monthly average individual piecework, however, in the future, the production rates continued to grow steadily, and the principles of their determination changed. So, already in 1925, the maximum production rates began to be determined by taking into account the operation of machines at maximum load. The consequence of the increase in production rates could be a decrease in the earnings and basic earnings of workers. One of the additional factors that influenced the size of the earnings was the type of work in which the piecework worker was employed. Thus, earnings for cold work were limited to 75%, and for hot work – 100% of the rate (Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. d.170. L.23). It is important to note that not only piecework workers received earnings in case of compliance with established production standards. In 1923, "auxiliary workers, whose work intensity directly affects the work of pieceworkers," were paid "according to the average earnings of a workshop or factory" (Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. d.170. L.24). The rest of the workers and employees received earnings within the limits of the amounts of the general fund of the collective, but not above the size of the average factory-wide earnings. This means that the distribution of earnings occurred not only among the piecework workers directly fulfilling the plan, but also among the rest of the company's employees.

During the existence of a single 17-digit tariff grid, the minimum amount of earnings was calculated solely depending on the average earnings of piecework workers. However, since 1926, it has also become dependent on the tariff category of the worker or employee receiving this payment. Such a system stimulated workers and employees to improve their skills, and at the same time led to an increase in the differentiation of earnings within the tariff grid. The earnings of highly skilled workers who worked at the same time amounted to about 90-100% of the average earnings of piecework workers of similar qualifications.

An important factor affecting the amount of earnings of pieceworkers was the order of payment for marriage. In this matter, at the Hammer and Sickle plant in 1923, the policy of the leadership was quite soft, but gradually it was transformed towards tightening. In 1923, the marriage was paid depending on whose fault it was produced. At the same time, it is significant that even if the worker was guilty of producing defective products, he received 2/3 of his tariff rate. In the event that any other reasons became the cause of the marriage, the payment was made "according to the average salary of the worker" (Central State Administration of Moscow. F. 176. Op.2. d.170. L.24).

Such a system was probably explained by the fact that the main goal of the plant's management in the early 1920s was to increase quantitative indicators, and the general shortage of goods in the metallurgical and metalworking industries against the background of weak regulation of relations between manufacturers and customers allowed them to supply the latter, including low-quality products. However, with the restoration of industry and the introduction of new regulatory measures by the state, a mechanism for returning a low-quality batch of goods to the manufacturing plant appeared. Such a situation threatened serious financial losses, and the administration of the Sickle and Hammer plant began to fight for quality, primarily by regulating the payment of defective products. Already in 1924, a marriage that occurred due to the fault of a worker ceases to be paid if earnings exceed his tariff rate. Such measures seem justified in relation to those workers who tried, using unlimited piecework, to increase the volume of output, handing over finished products in pursuit of over-fulfillment of production standards. In the collective agreement of 1925, the terms of payment for defective products were tightened again. Payment for marriage was no longer made with a worker's salary of 75% of the tariff rate. Even if the marriage was not the fault of the worker, the product was not paid in full, but only to the extent that the work on it was completed.

The increased attention of the management of the Sickle and Hammer plant to the problem of product quality is also confirmed by the increase in the number of points regulating payment for the issue of marriage in collective agreements of 1927 and 1928. The latter circumstance caused dissatisfaction of workers (which was reflected in discussions between trade unions and the board of the Machine Shop), since it negatively affected the salary of pieceworkers and payment the earnings of all other employees associated with them. However, improving the quality of products should have had a positive effect on the overall production performance of the plant, and hence on bonus payments to highly paid time workers. I.L. Kornakovsky writes about the struggle for improving the quality of products and its positive results during this period, giving examples of the successful execution of large orders by the Sickle and Hammer plant, including supports for the Shaturskaya GRES power line and the bridge over the Parkha River, which were highly appreciated by customers ^[20].

Time-based payment of labor. When the majority of the plant's workers worked on conditions of unlimited piecework, employees and highly skilled workers (who were assigned supervisory and managerial functions), as well as the lowest-paid workers who performed tasks auxiliary to the main production, remained on time-based payment.

In 1923, the time-based payment of employees at the Sickle and Hammer plant was determined as follows: "To determine the salary of employees, the hourly rate of the corresponding category is multiplied by 192 hours [asa]" (CSA of Moscow. F. R-176. Op.2. D.170. L.22). It is interesting that at this time the duration of the employees' working day was six hours, but at the same time their salary was determined based on an 8-hour working day. For comparison, we note that workers of harmful industries, who also had a reduced working day lasting 6-7 hours, received payment based on the hourly rate. In practice, it turned out that the wages of workers were calculated based on the number of hours worked (and the volume of products produced), and in the case of employees, the number of working days was taken into account. Such a measure made it possible to equalize the hourly earnings of workers and employees, since the latter could not work piecework. It should be noted that this clause remained in the text of the collective agreement even after 1924, when some employees were transferred to an 8-hour working day, and their staff was significantly reduced.

Time workers (employees, administrative and technical personnel, highly qualified workers, auxiliary workers) were entitled to receive a part-time salary, the amount of which depended on the average part-time work of their shop workers, and subsequently also on their category. If we compare the earnings of piecework workers and workers and employees who were on time-based pay, we can see that these allowances affected the differentiation of salaries in different directions: they reduced the differentiation between piecework workers and low-paid time-based workers and employees, and also increased the differentiation between high-level time-based workers and piecework workers, giving the former an additional "bonus" to wages.

Bonus payments. In the conditions of transition to unlimited piecework, premium forms of remuneration for the work of the workers of the Sickle and Hammer plant were reduced. The collective agreement of March 1924 casually mentions several forms of payments that can be attributed to bonuses (additional payment to responsible employees, special allowance). Further mentions of bonuses arise only in relation to the remuneration of administrative and technical workers. Bonuses were given to them in case of fulfillment of factory-wide indicators, and along with the earnings. For example, the collective agreement of 1924 states that "the administrative and technical staff of the plant management is paid at the tariff rate plus a premium of 40 to 100%, depending on the production achievements of the plant" (CSA of Moscow. F. 176. Op.2. d.250. L.22). In conditions of increasing differentiation of the tariff grid after 1926 G. this could mean a significant increase in the level of salaries of administrative and technical personnel, however, the parallel policy of the government to bring the level of wages closer in a directive form required a reduction in salaries of administrative and technical workers by increasing the level of factory-wide achievements (required for bonuses) or a decrease in earnings.

Overtime pay. The procedure for determining and paying overtime was one of the most important issues addressed in collective agreements. Two types of overtime work appear in the documents — piecework and time-based. The first mention we found of the regulation of overtime work at the Hammer and Sickle factory refers to a collective agreement concluded in March 1924. The peculiarity of this collective agreement was that overtime work was understood as piecework or time-based work in overtime. At the same time, each use of overtime work had to be coordinated with the cell of the RCC (Pricing and Conflict Commission) and the labor inspector, which greatly limited their use. "In the case of piece-work overtime, compensation is made by way of an additional payment to the basic earnings for the first 2 hours at 0.5 tariff rate, and for subsequent hours at 1 tariff rate" (Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. d.250. L.22). Significant changes occur in the collective agreement of 1925. Now piecework in overtime is actually work in excess of the established rate of piecework. When piecework is carried out according to the maximum possible norms, "the surcharge in cold work was 1.5 of the tariff rate, and in hot work 1.75" (Moscow Central State Administration. F. 176. Op.2. D.386. L.33).

In the collective agreement of 1927, there is a return to the time-based type of definition of overtime work, and the distinction between piecework and time-based overtime work is completely eliminated. For overtime work, regardless of the form of remuneration, 50% is paid in the first 2 hours and 100% in the following hours (CSA of Moscow. F. 176. Op.2. D.386. L.33). At the same time, it is no longer necessary to inform anyone except the plant administration about overtime work. Such simplification of the overtime work procedure became possible due to the stabilization of the plant. Additional administrative measures to control the use of overtime work were clearly caused by the need to reduce the level of excessive use of skilled workers in conditions of labor shortage. However, in the conditions of 1927, when the need for overtime work was not so high, the procedure for their implementation was simplified. There was a refusal of special piece-work overtime due to a large increase in production rates. In the context of differentiation analysis, the development of overtime pay has led to the absence of any differences in this regard between different categories of employees. It is worth noting, however, that remuneration for overtime work depended on the size of the tariff rates, and more highly skilled workers claimed a larger amount of payments.

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Summing up the results of the study, we will focus on the main conclusions obtained.

The new economic policy has led to significant changes in the principles of remuneration of employees of industrial enterprises. First of all, we note the return to the practice of collective agreements, which began to regulate most aspects of labor activity. The duration of collective agreements gradually increased, they began to regulate a greater number of controversial issues in the field of remuneration. Due to high inflation, the terms and forms of salary payments were standardized. The economic reforms carried out affected the organization of material payments and the provision of social benefits. Initially, many material payments and social benefits were canceled in favor of an increase in the monetary remuneration of workers. However, as the work of the plant was restored and economic processes stabilized, the most necessary material payments and benefits were restored (for example, benefits for public transport, overalls, materials for maintaining health in hot jobs, medical services). Thus, as we moved away from the principles of war communism, the transformation of in-kind payments was an attempt to find a balance between the shortage of workers at the enterprise and the need to reduce costs. At the same time, a huge number of disputes over the remaining material payments, their distribution and who should provide the necessary goods and funds indicate difficulties in their implementation. "Hammer and Sickle" was an experimental plant in which the stock form of remuneration was tested, however, the rate for unlimited piecework adopted at the state level began to prevail over time, and this, in turn, required stricter regulation of payment for defective products and production standards, which was fixed by collective agreements.

During the NEP period, there was an increase in wage differentiation at the Sickle and Hammer plant, both between different groups of workers and within them. However, this trend was offset by the actions of trade unions and the government, which sought to avoid a mechanical increase in wages of highly paid categories of workers in the face of changes in tariff rates and the emergence of enterprises with greater freedom in the formation of the wage system. The policy of wage equalization restrained the growth of wage differentiation rather than sought to reduce it. An exception was made for low-paid workers, their wages were increased, but this phenomenon lasted exclusively until the company spent the corresponding fund allocated by the government. In the conditions of separate tariff grids, which increased the differentiation of wages within each category of workers (compared to the 17-digit tariff system), the salary growth of low-paid groups could not lead to their "pulling up" to the high-paid without reducing the earnings of the latter, and the decrease in earnings in the metallurgical industry was extremely slow. As a result, in 1922-1928, the general tendency to increase differentiation in wages of workers and employees remained at the enterprise under consideration.

The study of the transformation of piecework, time-based and premium forms of payments in collective agreements showed the following. Piecework wages declined in the period 1923-1928, as workers faced tougher and more systematic requirements for defective products and their payment, with an increase in the production plan. There were certainly positive developments, for example, the increase in the maximum differentiation of tariff rates and the size of the minimum tariff rate in 1927, but these phenomena had an equally positive effect on the wages of time workers. The effectiveness of piecework as a wage system for metallurgy and state policy in this area have allowed to slow down the growth of the level of differentiation, both among workers and between workers and other categories of workers. Trends in time-based payment are determined mainly by the difference between tariff rates and minimum wages, which grew during the NEP period for all categories of workers. However, it is important to note that time-based workers were paid by the day, while piece-work workers were paid by the hour, which gave an advantage to time-based workers. Bonus payments characterized the highest—paid group of plant employees - high-level employees. The level of their earnings was formed with the help of bonuses, earnings and the tariff rate, which made their wages consistently high. The only period when they tried to limit their income by administrative means was 1927. However, the minimum and maximum amounts of bonuses and earnings specified in the collective agreement were not changed, and the difference between the maximum and minimum rates within this group of employees only increased.