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Reference:

Conflicting Interests of Trading Companies and Causes of the South African War, 1899-1902

Sapuntsov Andrey Leonidovich

ORCID: 0000-0001-5689-5737

Doctor of Economics

Leading Scientific Associate, Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

123001, Russia, Moscow, Spiridonovka str., 30/1

andrew@sapuntsov.ru
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0609.2023.5.44071

EDN:

RCLLFV

Received:

19-09-2023


Published:

27-10-2023


Abstract: The author examines the economic aspects of the South African colonial exploration by the Europeans in the representation of accumulated contradictions between business organizations, which ultimately became a cause of the 1899-1902 conflict. Based on the study of Dutch East India Company’s activities in this region, as well as the specifics of the settlement establishment by the British and Boers, attention is paid to the root causes of the disharmonious economic situation of the rivalling parties, taking place before the discovery of gold deposits in the Witwatersrand (1886). The changing regional supremacy of the Cape colony and the other British possessions, as well as Boer States (the Republic of South Africa – Transvaal and the Orange Free State) has been periodized. The factors of the 1899 armed conflict have been structured to reveal the conflicting interests of trading companies which had sought to monopolize the business for extraction of valuable mineral raw materials. The author concludes that the main reason for the South African War was the desire of British trading companies to gain access to rich gold deposits in the Boer-populated Transvaal and form a single English-based state in South Africa. In order to achieve such goal, the British tried their best at delaying peace initiatives of the Boers, putting forward various contradictory demands to them, using the armies of private companies to conduct raids and sabotaging the formation of a federal state in the region. We have discovered the preposterous look of the British pretext for the outbreak of war, based on the protection of the Boer states English-speaking population interests, which had been supposed to initiate an uprising. The South African War became not only a place, where new methods of warfare were applied, and a “black hole” for the UK budgetary expenditures, but also a profitable market for new types of weapons and military equipment, which allowed their manufacturers to make considerable profits.


Keywords:

South African War, De Beers, mining for diamonds, gold production, East India Company, Paul Kruger, Cecil Rhodes, Transvaal, labor camp, South Africa

This article is automatically translated.

The prerequisites for the beginning of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 are based on a whole spectrum of contradictions between the colonies of Great Britain in Southern Africa and the Boer states: the Orange Free State and the Republic of South Africa (Transvaal). The desire of Great Britain to protect its compatriots abroad, to organize a single state in the region, to receive political dividends from a victorious military campaign in the metropolis, as well as other motives, certainly contained a certain rationalism as the reasons for the outbreak of war, as well as the desire of the Boers to preserve their sovereignty by delivering a preventive military strike against the British was justified. At the same time, the conflicting economic interests of private entrepreneurial capital in its various national (regional) affiliation to the above subjects occupy an important position at the heart of the conflict under consideration, and the inability to harmonize these interests has become a substantial catalyst for the outbreak of hostilities.

The Anglo-Boer War, in terms of the breadth of research issues, occupies a significant place not only in foreign historiography, but also in the works of domestic historians with a detailed study of the state of the armed formations of the parties, the chronology of clashes in their representation for three periods [3, pp. 31-51]. The conditions of guerrilla warfare and the end of the conflict, as well as the reconstruction of Southern Africa in the post-war period were studied [2, pp. 106-110]. In Great Britain, the Anglo-Boer War is considered by contemporaries from the standpoint of the conflict of entrepreneurial interests within the framework of the theory of economic imperialism by J. Hobson, who became an eyewitness to the war in question [4, p. 1-3].

At the same time, Russian historians only mention in the introductory parts of their works about the economic conflicts that led to the Anglo-Boer War as external objectively existing phenomena. For example, the work prepared with the participation of a well-known expert on the Anglo-Boer war, G. V. Shubin, refers to the economic causes of the conflict: "Special interest in these lands [of South Africa] at the end of the XIX century was caused by the fact that in 1886 the richest gold deposits in the world were discovered in the Transvaal in the Witwatersrand area" [1, p. 17].

The economic contradictions that led to the Anglo-Boer War are not limited to the virtually momentary desire of Great Britain to seize the gold mines in the Transvaal, since the opening of which a modest 15 years have passed. The foundations of this war were laid from the first days of the colonial development of Southern Africa by European travelers. Up to the end of the XIX century . Its territory was of interest to European countries mainly as an intermediate point on the sea route from Europe to India, which was discovered by Portuguese navigators in the autumn of 1497. The Afrikaner republics, colonies and protectorates of Great Britain located in the region, as well as the parastatal formations of Africans competed for limited irrigated fertile lands, for poor sources of minerals and other natural resources. The population of Southern Africa was distinguished by the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the indigenous peoples living there.

The Netherlands replaced Portugal as the main colonial power in Southern Africa after the landing in Table Bay of the expedition of Jan van Riebeeck, consisting of 80 people and organized by the Dutch East India Company (OIC) in 1652; a fort and a supply point for the company's ships were built, which were used to ensure navigation between Europe and islands of modern Indonesia [31, p. 14]. In a short time, the modest settlement of Cape Town, which appeared on the basis of the above-mentioned supply point, became the center of attraction for former employees of the Dutch OIC, other immigrants from the Netherlands, France, and Germany, and by the beginning of the XVIII century. its population exceeded 2 thousand people, and by the end – 14 thousand [16, p. 134-135]. The increase in the population was achieved, among other things, by expanding the staff engaged in servicing the export of slaves to the West Indies with their subsequent use as agricultural workers.

As a result of the wars of the late XVIII century between the Netherlands and Great Britain, the latter established control over the Cape Colony in 1806. The new metropolis did not change the established order of affairs in the economic and geopolitical situation of the colonies of Southern Africa: low-quality wine and wool were supplied from them, and an important transport function for servicing trade routes between Europe, Asia and America was preserved. The UK Government predicted the strengthening of the activities of the port facilities under consideration for the logistics of international merchant shipping. In comparison with colonies located in other regions of the world, at the beginning of the XIX century. South Africa was not so attractive for investment and labor immigrants, and the latter often represented unemployed Englishmen sent in a directive order. Residents of the English colonies of the region held a positive opinion about their metropolis, took care of cultural traditions and sought to preserve their language. This contributed to the achievement of a certain sociality of stability in the colonies under consideration, which resulted in the establishment of representative bodies of local government in 1853 [13, p. 190].

Unlike the English settlers, the Afrikaners (Boers) were descendants of the Dutch, Germans and French, who went abroad in search of a better life and formed a new ethnic and linguistic identity there. Dutch was used to read the Bible, while everyday communication was carried out in its dialect – Afrikaans [7, p. 111]. The Boers, who were Afrikaner farmers, used African slave labor, whereas in the colonies of the British, slavery was completely banned in 1840. Among the agrarians under consideration, there was a stratification into richer farms for wheat cultivation and wine production, in which a fairly large number of slaves were involved, and relatively poor cattle farms, where technical innovations of that time could rarely be found. Consequently, livestock products were mainly used to meet the colonists' own needs, and only a small part of it was exported.

The mood in the communities of English-speaking colonists was based on their economic superiority over the Boers, containing some elements of confrontation. For example, marriages between these social groups were quite rare. The situation was somewhat reminiscent of the division of Canada into English and French colonists in the XIX century, and the latter eventually found themselves in the minority. In the colonies of Southern Africa, the situation was the opposite: the population of Afrikaners increased more intensively than the British, and by the end of the specified period of time was correlated in the proportion of 3 to 2. In 1840, the European population of the Cape Colony was 70.8 thousand people, while the total number of former slaves, free Africans and colored people was 79.5 thousand people.[32, p. 524]. During these years, there was a shortage of fertile land plots, especially irrigated ones, which contributed to the emergence of conflict situations and the use of armed forces to expel Africans from their habitats.

The "Great Trek", which lasted from 1834 to 1844, was associated with the relocation of about 6 thousand Boers from the Cape Colony deep into the continent and the subsequent formation of the South African Republic (Transvaal) there, as well as the Orange Free State. The recognition of these republics by the British government in the 1850s took place in the context of the increasing confrontation of European states for world domination in their colonial expansion, accompanied by wars and new flows of settlers [23, p. 28]. Both in the colony of the British and in the states of the Boers, there was an increase in the exploitation of the natives in the majority, associated with restrictions on their rights to own land and opportunities to participate in the work of representative authorities (while two colored people accounted for one white).

Great Britain maintained its dominant position in Southern Africa until the early 1870s, having a naval and merchant fleet there, as well as foreign trade complexes in the ports of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban [21, p. 198]. In the continental areas, there were British trading and marketing enterprises and groups of missionaries who, in addition to economic influence, spread religious traditions, English language and culture. Under these conditions, the British government recognized the irrational possibility of gaining direct control over the poor underdeveloped territories where the Boers lived.

The alignment of forces in Southern Africa and the assessment of the prospects for territorial seizures underwent drastic changes with the discovery of a diamond deposit near Hopetown in 1867. Later, even richer deposits of this raw material were discovered near the nearby city of Kimberley, which received the name of the Western Griqualand district [35, p. 10-11]. These areas were located on disputed lands between the tribes of African natives, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony, which was backed by its self-governing bodies and the British government. Soon the British pushed back the Boers and annexed Western Griqualand, and the Africans who lived there lost organized forms of management of their tribes, were forced to sell their lands and become hired workers.

The revival in diamond mining stimulated the economy of the Cape Colony, increasing the demand for capital and labor resources of migrants. In just a few years, Kimberley became the second settlement after Cape Town in terms of the white population. In 1871, 10 thousand white miners and 30 thousand black auxiliary workers worked there, and many of these people migrated from Basutoland and the Northeastern Transvaal; four years later, the number of African workers reached 50 thousand [27, p. 110-111]. The expansion of diamond mining was accompanied by the concentration of capital, when small private artels began to merge into larger enterprises. As a result of the activities of the British politician Cecil Rhodes and European financiers in 1890, diamond mining in Southern Africa was monopolized by the De Beers United Mines company.

The new company was able to reduce the costs of diamond mining, labor costs and, in general, achieve an increase in economic efficiency. An innovation in diamond mining was the use of "labor camps", in which freelancers were placed in order to increase discipline and restrict their freedom. In addition to the logical, from the standpoint of that time, the detention of blacks in labor camps as former slaves or their descendants, white workers were also housed in these camps [18, p. 121].

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the route from Europe to Asia and somewhat reduced the importance of the route through Cape Town. At the same time, colonies in Southern Africa began to trade more actively with Europe, shipping diamonds and agricultural products there, as well as importing raw materials and equipment for a booming economy. Significant capital expenditures were required for the construction of railways connecting coastal and inland areas of the South African colonies. There was the introduction of progressive methods of farming and the use of new models of equipment, as well as agricultural crops and animals. In 1873-1883 alone, a record 22,000 immigrants arrived from Europe, who were predominantly British.

It is obvious that the change in the economic structure in the colonies in Southern Africa, associated with economic growth, has caused certain shifts towards the democratization of the political system of the region. In 1872, the Cape Colony gained the right to self-government, forming a local government and expanding the work of representative authorities. Only 237 thousand white residents of the colony participated in their activities, which accounted for about half a million blacks (about 100 thousand white residents lived in other parts of Southern Africa) [6, p. 70]. The formation of their own political institutions took place in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, with the latter dominated by the ideas of national identity of the Boers and the preservation of independence.

The Cape Colony occupied the first place in the economic, demographic and transport potential of Southern Africa, which allowed British politicians to talk about the future absorption of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Liberal trends in the philosophical thought of Western countries in the last third of the XIX century did not allow the British to directly use military force to seize Boer colonies with the subsequent genocide of the local population [26, p. 45]. Under these conditions, a variant of the federal structure of a single state in Southern Africa was being worked out, which could be based on the model of Canada. The organization (con) of a federal state formation in Canada on the basis of the dominion (1867) largely put an end to the endless armed conflicts between Great Britain and France, the confrontation between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Northwest Company, respectively, owned by them, as well as the pernicious exploitation and extermination of Indians.

The formation of a federal state in Southern Africa in the last quarter of the XIX century would have a positive impact on the region's economy due to the possible increase in capital inflows from abroad, free access to railways and seaports, as well as the elimination of conflicts of interest at the local level. An important plus should have been the free migration of the population (primarily Africans) within the region under consideration, which could eliminate spatial distortions in the labor market. Great Britain was interested in the development of events according to this scenario, for the implementation of which the option of "integration from below" was considered on the basis of British colonial entities: deepening economic ties within the region over time will require political transformations in terms of general political governance, that is, economic integration is the basis for political integration.

The appointment of Lord Carnarvon as Colonial Secretary of Great Britain in 1874 gave a new impetus to the formation of a single state in Southern Africa. A conference was held on this topic with delegates from the South African colonies and the Boer republics, at which prospects for the creation of a confederation-based union in the region were discussed. Great Britain offered to pay the Orange Free State a relatively modest 90 thousand pounds as compensation for the annexation of the lands on which diamond mining was carried out [30, p. 49]. The holding of conferences and negotiations on the above issues did not find approval from the leadership of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, which in every way sought to preserve their independence.

The events that followed radically changed the balance of productive forces in the region and aggravated the conflict of economic interests. In 1886, rich gold deposits were discovered in the Transvaal Witwatersrand mountains [34, p. 1004]. Mining of this metal on the territory of the Transvaal was carried out earlier, but its volumes were insignificant. In 1892, the value of gold exports from Southern Africa exceeded the value of its diamond exports, and by 1898 the Transvaal came out on top in the world in terms of gold production (27% of the world's gold production) [9, p. 115-116]. During the period 1883-1895, the export revenue of the Transvaal increased 25 times, which positively affected its economic situation, the standard of living of the population and the possibility of financing military construction.

The volume of capital inflows from the UK to the Transvaal increased, while part of the funds accounted for reinvesting profits from diamond mining, and by the end of the XIX century. The total volume of investments in its gold mining industry amounted to 75 million pounds. The Witwatersrand deposit began to be developed rapidly and outstripped similar facilities in the USA and Australia in terms of capital inflows [10, p. 302]. In these years, industrial coal mining was started in the Transvaal and Natal, which also contributed to economic growth and an increase in the standard of living of the population in these countries. Eventually, the Transvaal became the economic and political center of Southern Africa.

The need to make large investments in gold mining did not allow its producers to form a monopoly, as happened with the De Beers company in diamond mining. With the onset of the last decade of the XIX century. in the Witwatersrand, it was necessary to increase the depth of drilling of mines in order to keep the volume of gold production at the same level: for this, advanced European equipment, consumables and access to foreign financing were needed [17, p. 56]. The gold producers operating in the region formed an oligopoly on the market, in which two large companies were formed by 1892: United Rhodes Gold Fields and Corner House (Werner, Beit / H. Eskitsen and Co.") [36, p. 61]. Soon, Corner House showed positive trends in its activities, and it began to account for about half of the total annual gold production in the Transvaal. The capital of this company belonged to a number of large enterprises and concerns that were interested in achieving the long-term economic development of this country.

The expansion of economic activities for gold mining in Southern Africa increased its attractiveness for the reception of migrant workers, which was due to the low level of mechanization of production. Taking into account the peculiarities of the construction of the world monetary and financial system at the end of the XIX century, the price of gold was fixed, while the prices of other commodities declined sharply during periods of overproduction crises. Consequently, entrepreneurs could manage the costs of gold mining, especially the wage fund, by increasing the exploitation of African miners by lowering their wages, increasing working hours and maintaining jobs in a deplorable state [14, p. 33-34].

Africans who arrived from remote areas not only worked in unfavorable conditions, but also lived in barracks under guard and had a minimal set of life benefits, receiving meager food. Death from occupational injuries or diseases was considered a common occurrence. The experience of setting up labor camps for diamond mining will be applied by the British during the period of hostilities in 1900-1902 when organizing the first concentration camps in history, in which Boer families, including women and children, as well as Africans, will be thrown [12, p. 68]. Diseases, mainly measles, were rampant in the camps, which caused high mortality among prisoners, and the harsh conditions of detention made it possible to suppress the prisoners psychologically, breaking their patriotic mood [33, p. 22].

Despite future hardships in labor, the gold mining of the Transvaal attracted Uitlanders – mainly English-speaking labor immigrants from Europe and, in some cases, from the United States. For example, in 1886-1899 75 thousand settlers from Great Britain arrived in the Witwatersrand. The immigration of Hindus to Southern Africa increased significantly, the number of which reached 100 thousand people by the end of the XIX century, and the first persons of this nationality arrived in Natal only in 1860, where they were engaged in the cultivation of sugar cane [29, p. 228-229].

The expansion of gold mining and the increase in the level of independence of the republics of the Boers contributed to the dominance in the political circles of Great Britain of the opinion on the need for a military operation to forcibly seize the above territories. In 1895, a private mining company, the British South African Company, sent an armed detachment to the Transvaal in order to help the British living there, suffering from the arbitrariness of the Boers. The events under consideration were called the Jameson Raid, during which the expected uprising of the British in the Transvaal did not occur, and an armed detachment was captured by the Boers [25, p. 219]. After that, the British authorities set a course to prepare for war with the Boer states.

In May–June 1899, a conference was held, and based on its results, the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare was signed, the provisions of which, among other things, absolutely prohibited robbery. At this time, the relations of the British with the Transvaal and the Orange Free State deteriorated significantly. The hypothesis is put forward that Great Britain specifically did not allow representatives of the Boer republics to participate in the work of this conference and, consequently, did not make them a party to the Hague Convention in order to wage a future war by any available means and inflict the greatest economic damage on the enemy [22, p. 185-186].

The events that followed in the second half of 1899 included the promotion of mutual demands by the opposing sides and the pulling of troops to the borders. The conflict of economic interests turned out to be unresolved peacefully and under the yoke of political demands towards the Uitlanders and ultimatums on the deployment of troops, a military solution to the conflict became inevitable. The peace initiatives of Transvaal President P. Kruger proved futile. Under the circumstances, the Transvaal took the initiative into its own hands when on October 12, 1899, Boer troops crossed the borders with the Cape Colony and Natal. The Anglo-Boer War has begun.

In the new war, the conditions for the use of firearms by the British changed. For example, earlier in the battle of Omdurman (1898), Maxim machine guns showed their effectiveness in the fire defeat of scattered natives, revealing the potential of the new technology of the British: out of 50 thousand dervishes who went into a frontal attack with rifles and sabers on British units with artillery and machine guns, 10 thousand and early 15 thousand were killed. people, while the losses of the British were measured in hundreds of people [20, p. 440]. However, Maxim machine guns were practically useless when aiming at dispersed troops during the Anglo-Boer War [15, p. 6]. The fighting showed that such machine guns should have been used in combination with shrapnel artillery shells [8, p. 1343]. Moreover, in the context of the introduction of new weapons and technical means into military affairs, such as armored trains, questions arose about the effectiveness of the use of cavalry formations armed with cold weapons by the British [24, p. 46]. Nevertheless, the cavalry was successfully used in the reconnaissance formations of the British, and the relevant experience gained in the Anglo-Boer War will be applied by them in the First World War [19, p. 496].

After the end of the Anglo-Boer War, an audit of the financial activities of the British army was conducted in terms of spending money on the purchase of weapons, ammunition and material support elements, the results of which revealed a low level of financing efficiency and facts of irrational use of material reserves [5, p. 506]. Large-scale discrepancies were revealed in the size of the financial costs of the British for the conduct of the Anglo-Boer War, which in 1899 was planned to be completed in four months with a budget of 10 million pounds and the participation of a 50,000-strong army; in fact, the conflict lasted much longer, 200 million pounds were spent on it and participated in it 250 thousand servicemen [11, p. 60]. For the first time in history, after the end of the war, the British government began to pay pensions to the widows of deceased servicemen, the number of whom amounted to 5 thousand people [28, p. 169].

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The First World War, with all its scope and scale (by the way, for Great Britain and, especially, France, this particular war is more likely to be Great than the Second World War) is often called forgotten in our country. It is not surprising that our compatriots do not have the most accurate ideas about the series of local wars that led to the conflict of 1914-1918. But contemporaries not only watched them closely, but also created vivid literary images (which is worth Captain Rip-Head from the work of the same name by Louis Boussenard). For all its fame, the history of the Anglo-Boer war has separate darkened places, the study of which allows us to reveal the nature of geopolitical conflicts at the turn of the XIX - XX centuries. These circumstances determine the relevance of the article submitted for review, the subject of which is the economic causes of the Anglo-Boer War. The author aims to show the origins of the European colonization of South Africa, to consider the change in the economic structure in the colonies, as well as to show the economic contradictions in the region. The work is based on the principles of analysis and synthesis, reliability, objectivity, the methodological basis of the research is a systematic approach, which is based on the consideration of the object as an integral complex of interrelated elements. The author also uses a comparative method in his work. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the very formulation of the topic: the author, based on various sources, seeks to characterize the economic causes that became the basis of the Anglo-Boer war. Considering the bibliographic list of the article, its scale and versatility should be noted as a positive point: in total, the list of references includes 36 different sources and studies, which in itself indicates the amount of work that its author has done. The undoubted advantage of the reviewed article is the attraction of foreign English-language literature, which is determined by the very formulation of the topic. Among the works attracted by the author, we note the works of the true luminary of South African studies, A.B. Davidson, S. Miller, G. Phillips, D. Reed and other specialists, whose focus is on various aspects of the history of the Anglo-Boer War. Note that the bibliography is important both from a scientific and educational point of view: after reading the text of the article, readers can turn to other materials on its topic. In general, in our opinion, the integrated use of various sources and research contributed to the solution of the tasks facing the author. The style of writing the article can be attributed to scientific, at the same time understandable not only to specialists, but also to a wide readership, to anyone interested in both the history of the Anglo-Boer War in general and its causes in particular. The appeal to the opponents is presented at the level of the collected information received by the author during the work on the topic of the article. The structure of the work is characterized by a certain logic and consistency, it can be distinguished by an introduction, the main part, and conclusion. At the beginning, the author defines the relevance of the topic, shows that "the economic contradictions that led to the Anglo-Boer war are not limited to the actual momentary desire of Great Britain to seize the gold mines in the Transvaal, since the opening of which a modest 15 years have passed." The paper shows that "the balance of power in Southern Africa and the assessment of the prospects for territorial seizures underwent drastic changes with the discovery of a diamond deposit near Hopetown in 1867." Of particular interest is the raid of a detachment of the private mining "British South African Company" considered in the work, the failure of which was an important step in London's decision to seize the Boer republics. The author draws attention to the hypothesis that "Great Britain specifically did not allow representatives of the Boer republics to participate in the work of this conference and, therefore, did not make them a party to the Hague Convention in order to wage a future war by any available means and inflict the greatest economic damage on the enemy." The main conclusion of the article is that "the conflict of economic interests turned out to be unresolved peacefully and under the yoke of political demands towards the Uitlanders and ultimatums on the deployment of troops, a military solution to the conflict became inevitable." The article submitted for review is devoted to an urgent topic, will arouse readers' interest, and its materials can be used both in lecture courses on modern and modern history, and in various special courses. There are separate comments to the article: for example, the author tends to be descriptive in a number of cases, and in the conclusion of the article does not actually sum up the overall results. However, in general, in our opinion, the article is full of rich factual material and can be recommended for publication in the journal "Historical Journal: Scientific Research".